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After reading any general outline of Chinese history every student, or indeed anybody 
just vaguely interested, will inevitably get impression that the whole time span of Imperial 
China constitutes one long chain of periodical rise and decline, waxing and waning of 
imperial power and change of dynasties, where periods of the greatest achievements, glory 
and might are as a rule followed by dark ages of disunity, internal strife and political, moral 
and cultural decline. These periods are often just glossed over, historians being generally 
content with dutifully recording the name of the dynasty and years of its reign, limiting 
themselves to saying a few more words about unsatisfactory state of affairs China had been in 
during such a period. I still remember quite well the frustration I experienced as a student 
when I first tried to find some substantial information on the period of disunity and whole 
early medieval Chinese history. This lack of information, which I still perceive as a challenge 
of its own kind, aroused my interest in this period for the very first time. After spending 
almost ten years researching the sources for the medieval Chinese history, I feel even more 
convinced about the importance of this rather neglected and underestimated epoch for our 
understanding of Chinese history and culture as a whole.  
There is nothing unusual about history being viewed through the glasses of relative 
political or cultural success, periods of national history being judged according to its 
achievements, degree of prosperity, might and predominance of all kinds which the state or 
nation enjoyed. The use of history, stressing the times of glory and power, and denigrating 
periods of weakness and decline for bolstering nationalist feelings and attaining various 
political ends is most common indeed. And even more so in China where such a distinctly 
bipolar, black and white view of history is doubtless influenced by notion of the great unified 
China promoted relentlessly by all Chinese governments almost since the foundation of the 
first empire. Unity, or the lack of it, thus becomes sole criterion for measuring the degree of 
success of a respective imperial dynasty, that is also for considering a dynasty worthy or 
unworthy of any attention and possible study.  
The long period of division after the fall of the Han dynasty, known generally as Wei 
Jin Nanbeichao 魏晉南北朝 (i.e. the Wei, the Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasties), is 
one of the most important ages usually overlooked and shunned by scholars of Chinese 
studies. Xiaofei Tian, in the introduction to her book on the Liang literary culture 
characterizes this period as: “Wedged between Han and Tang, the two energetic and enduring 
4 
empires, this period has traditionally been considered a social and political “dark age”, a stage 
of preparation for the brilliant accomplishments of the Tang literary masters, and 
consequently a phase of transition, an almost four-century-long hyphen between great 
empires.”
1
 The Western Jin Dynasty (Xi Jin 西晉, 265-316 AD), on which I will focus my 
research was also a part of this rather troubled period, however, it has fared somewhat better 
than the Liang 梁, at least the Jin were lucky enough to have their name included in the 
general period designation, Wei Jin Nanbeichao, whereas the Liang and other short-lived 
regimes lost their chance to win a place in the memory of the general reader by being 
collectively referred to as the Southern and Northern Dynasties (Nanbeichao 南北朝). On the 
other hand, this doesn‟t mean much, for one should not expect an ordinary Chinese to know 
much more about the Jin apart from the fact that there was a dynasty of that name, which 
temporarily unified whole China. And it is exactly for this unification, albeit short-lived and 
ephemeral, that the Jin Dynasty is being remembered and known while the rest of the 
medieval Chinese dynasties appear rather vague to all but few experts in the field. 
This traditional view of Chinese history has influenced the Western scholars for quite 
a long time. More often than not they preferred to devote their time and efforts to dynasties 
traditionally considered as the apogee of Chinese culture for not only were these more likely 
to catch the eye of a curious scholar, but they were also better documented as tradition 
tirelessly praised chronicles of these dynasties as important pieces of historical writing, 
whereas the historiographical production of the disunion period was believed to lack any 
value whatsoever. In terms of Ancient and Medieval China, interest of Western scholarship in 
the Han and Tang periods led to serious neglect and underestimation of the period in between 
which has been much misunderstood until very recent times. Nevertheless, this might not be 
the only cause. The quick and chaotic succession of dynasties is quite bewildering in itself 
and the complexity of political, social and cultural changes confusing enough to deter many a 
scholar. Although the situation has changed for better during the last few decades and 
scholars both in China and the West, painfully aware of this lacuna in research of Chinese 
history, have paid more attention to Medieval China, the Wei Jin Nanbeichao period still 
remains rather puzzling and at the same time intriguing field of study offering whole range of 
problems and questions which still await satisfactory answers. By addressing some of these 
issues the future research may deepen our understanding of not only Early Medieval China, 
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but also of the Tang and other dynasties, which naturally built their empires on foundations 
laid during the neglected and denigrated time of disunion.      
One may ask: Of all the dynasties why the Jin? After the fall of the Han in 220 AD, 
China was divided among three smaller states: Wei 魏 in the north, Shu Han 蜀漢 in the 
present day Sichuan, and Wu 吳 in the south. These three kingdoms vied with each other for 
supreme imperial authority and each of them struggled hard to prove her legitimacy in 
continuing attempts to unify again the whole territory formerly ruled by the Han. None of 
them was destined to win for this goal was achieved only by the Simas 司馬, a family which 
overthrew the Wei and established the Jin dynasty in 266 AD. It is partially this brief unity of 
all China brought once again under power of one single ruling house which makes this period 
interesting because it has been seen as the last legitimate Chinese dynasty before the hordes of 
steppe nomads invaded Northern China and as such influenced many aspects of subsequent 
imperial dynasties up to the Tang 唐. Even more important, however, at least for medieval 
Chinese history, is the fall of the dynasty after years of turbulent civil disorders which 
inaugurated the whole “infamous” period of disunion and determined, to a great extent, the 
character of the future southern and northern regimes.  
Nevertheless, the Jin‟s rise to power began even earlier than 266 AD, when Sima Yi 
司馬懿 became one of the most important court ministers of the Cao Wei emperors Wendi 文
帝 (220-226 AD) and Mingdi 明帝 (226-239 AD). Since 249 AD, when Sima Yi arranged a 
coup and got rid of his most dangerous rival, an imperial relative Cao Shuang 曹爽, he 
wielded all the power quite unopposed, and he and his sons Sima Shi 司馬師 and Sima Zhao 
司馬昭 played the role of kingmakers whenever the puppet emperors showed any signs of 
growing too independent. In 263 AD, Sima Zhao conquered the neighbouring state of Shu in 
the Southwest and couple of years later, in 266 AD, his son Sima Yan 司馬炎 staged an 
abdication ceremony for the last Wei emperor and assumed the imperial throne as the first 
emperor of the Jin dynasty, later known as emperor Wudi 武帝 (266-290 AD). It was under 
Wudi that the new empire gradually took shape and many new policies, which were to 
influence the future course of China for next couple of centuries, were introduced. It was 
Wudi, who in 280 AD sent his armies across the Yangzi River and brought to an end the rule 
of the Sun lords of Wu, subjugating all the regions south of the river, accomplishing the quest 
for unification which his family had pursued for three generations.  
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No sooner was the unity achieved, than Wudi‟s imbecile son and successor Huidi 惠帝 
(290-306 AD) began to lose it again. For many a member of the imperial house a chance to 
rule this weak and vulnerable ruler proved too tempting to resist. Princes and imperial in-laws 
cherished wild ambitions which kindled disastrous civil strife, the so called Upheaval of Eight 
Princes (ba wang zhi luan 八王之亂) in which various groups of princes and courtiers fought 
for the custody of the emperor and the ultimate power this custody could provide, in which 
Huidi himself became easy prey having been degraded to a mere pawn in the hands of 
powerful relatives. In their struggle for power the princes looked for all possible allies and 
eventually did not hesitate to invite northern nomadic tribes of various ethnic origins to come 
and settle in Northern China. During sixteen years of incessant warfare the once mercenary 
nomadic forces became independent and their chiefs established regimes of their own. The Jin 
government, weakened by years of political instability and raging war, was no longer able to 
defend the state against the attacks of the hostile barbarians, let alone take any decisive action 
towards expelling this threat out of China proper. In 311 AD and 316 AD barbarian armies 
seized both capitals of the Jin, bringing about the final collapse of the dynasty which started 
to crumble soon after the death of Wudi in 290 AD. 
The defeated Jin regime found shelter in the South where Sima Rui 司馬睿, one of the 
princes of the blood, proclaimed himself emperor. Surrounded by the once powerful families 
of northern refugees, he relied on their support and support of the southern elite houses of 
Jiangnan 江南 area and managed to accomplish partial restoration of the imperial power. The 
dynasty continued to rule from Jiankang 建康 (present day Nanjing) the whole of Southern 
China till 420 AD and became known as the Eastern Jin (Dong Jin 東晉 ). Although 
nominally remaining the same dynasty, political reality in the south was very different from 
the situation known in the northern capitals. Character of the imperial rule was not to be the 
same any more. Ruling with support of mighty families, which claimed for themselves certain 
share of power, the emperor was no longer able to wield his authority without limit and was 
compelled to share it with his courtiers. Thus the pattern was set, which survived with some 
changes until the new unification of China in 589 AD.      
Here we get an answer to the second question concerning the topic of the thesis: Why 
the system of titled nobility? Scholars and students whose research concerns history of 
Chinese Middle Ages, sooner or later encounter one of the peculiar features of this epoch, the 
great families, often labelled as noble or aristocratic. Members of these families served in 
official posts at the imperial court, more or less, continuously for many generations, their 
7 
social standing remaining remarkably stable, regardless of all dynastic changes and political 
upheavals. Men of the same famous surnames filled the foremost court offices and their 
biographies are to be found in all official Chinese histories from the Eastern Han onwards. 
When dealing with these families, scholars usually speak about powerful aristocratic clans 
which dominated contemporary society and monopolized politics of the court. However, 
Professor Albert E. Dien observed that: “…there is much evidence that a re-examination of 
precisely these assumptions is in order and that an argument can be made… that during this 
period the putative “powerful aristocratic clans” were neither powerful, nor aristocratic, nor 
even clans.”
2
 Their social standing was not derived directly from hereditary titles or 
landowning, as was the case with European aristocracy and as their alleged power was 
concerned, the fact that none of these families had ever established any imperial dynasty of 
their own, speaks for itself.
3
 
The group of elite families of the highest social standing and political power was by 
no means constant, yet the number of families which survived and thrived during the whole 
medieval period is rather limited. Scholars are usually more interested in following the ups 
and downs of the more successful families throughout the history or focus on the periods and 
dynasties when the so called menfa 門閥 families4 dominated the Chinese political world. As 
far as I am aware, there has not been a study dedicated exclusively to the Western Jin Dynasty 
elite families. Such a study might be helpful, not only for better understanding of the political 
and social history of the Western Jin but also for clarifying the process of establishing the 
menfa government of the later dynasties, for the Western Jin was a crucial period when 
families active in the court service, as well as locally prominent houses, transformed 
themselves and gradually became “the aristocratic clans” as we know them from the Southern 
dynasties. 
The present study will focus on ennoblement system and families that held hereditary 
noble titles created during the Western Jin dynasty (266-316 AD). This titled nobility is not 
necessarily identical with the great menfa houses of the southern courts; nevertheless some of 
these families survived all the political changes of the disunion and disappeared from the 
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stage only after the fall of the Tang some six hundred years later. The system of ennoblement 
and especially the new Five Ranks System (wudeng zhi 五等制) introduced by the Sima 
family shortly before they took over the throne and established the Jin Dynasty were of vital 
importance to all court families in securing high and relatively stable social standing which in 
due course helped them to evolve into the menfa houses and survive all the political ups and 
downs of the ephemeral dynasties.  
Facing the problem of many different definitions and various kinds of elite I have 
decided to focus my attention on the quite clearly defined group of families holding various 
noble titles, the titled nobility. According to Yang Guanghui during the Western Jin there was 
a strong connection between noble titles and sense of nobility, social exclusivity, wealth and 
political power. Outstanding position of the ennobled ministers and military commanders was 
also acknowledged by the Jin law. One of its parts, the Zhuhou lü 諸侯律 (The Code for the 
Lords), sanctioned all kinds of preferential treatment regarding punishments for various 
crimes and offences committed by members of titled nobility. The same does apply for ritual 
behavior guided by special set of rules, the Zhuhou li 諸侯禮 (The Rites of the Lords), which 
stated their precedence over all other social groups with their position being second only to 
the ruler and his clan.
5
 The prominence of the titled nobility as the main part of the elite is 
also corroborated by the fact that almost all holders of noble titles we know of so far have 
their biographies in the Jinshu 晉書 (History of the Jin) and that almost all the important 
persons with biographies in the Jinshu hailed from one of the families holding a noble title. I 
am far from suggesting that the elite and titled nobility were in fact identical, but I do believe 
that the nobility probably formed majority of the highest stratum of the Western Jin society. 
Therefore, detailed study of the ennoblement system appears crucial for better understanding 
of elite families of the Western Jin as well as relationship between the state and the elite.   
In my research I will rely mainly on primary historiographical sources such as Jinshu 
dynastic history, Sanguozhi (Records of the Three Kingdoms) and some fragments of older, 
contemporary or almost contemporary historical works cited by Pei Songzhi 裴松之 in his 
commentary to Sanguozhi. I would like to elucidate the nature of Western Jin ennoblement 
system by following fortunes and careers of titled nobles and interpreting official documents, 
imperial edicts or communications submitted to the throne discussing various problems 
connected with creation of noble dignities. The Western Jin were actually the first dynasty 
which introduced full-fledged system of ennoblement combining various traditions and 
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precedents of all previous dynasties up to the ancient Zhou. In the first part of my thesis I 
would like to explain how the system of titled nobility came into being and in how it managed 
to integrate these preceding traditions. I will especially focus on the introduction of the five 
ranks as a part of gradual usurpation process culminating with establishing of the new 
dynasty. I will also try to trace later development of the institution during the reign of 
Emperor Wudi with his ingenious use of ennoblement for asserting legitimacy of the rightful 
Son of Heaven as well as consolidation of positions of the royal family and loyal followers 
vis-à-vis former court families of the Wei.  
In the second part I would like to examine how the ennoblement system actually 
worked which might help to explain connection between noble title and privileged social 
standing which some of the Jin families were able to maintain for generations. Under what 
circumstances could one hope for a noble title and what did such a title actually mean for the 
family? What profits and privileges did it bring and on what conditions could a noble dignity 
be actually inherited? These are some of the important questions I shall try to answer. The 
regular bestowals of noble titles upon meritorious subjects may have been of great benefit to 
non-royal court families, however, we shall not forget that the ennoblement system was in the 
first place a governmental institution. Therefore, it is equally important to pay attention to its 
role in the politics of the dynasty as well as to different ways in which ennoblement was 
employed by the government. Careful and detailed examination of the contemporary sources 
would contribute to better understanding of the process of ennoblement and privileges 
connected with it. It would also enable us to estimate influence of the titled nobility and the 
role of this socially dominant group of elite families in the history of the Western Jin and 





Delimiting the Subject – Defining Crucial Terms 
 
Even in the European context the aristocracy or nobility are rather ambiguous terms, 
multilayered and multifaceted, which comprise many fundamentally different groups. There is 
no definition of nobility as an elite social group which could be indiscriminately applied to 
any of the national nobilities Europe wide, for speaking about European nobility, one may 
have in mind groups as varied and different as the aristocracy of the French anciénne regime, 
various nobilities of the Habsburg Empire, knights or princes of the Holy Roman Empire, 
aristocrats of the papal court or even boyars of Medieval Russia. There is no need to look for 
the exact equivalent, a group which would resemble the most realities of the Medieval China, 
for such effort would be absolutely futile from the very beginning. However, I find it useful to 
specify the meaning of some terms, point out the differences in concepts of nobility and 
explain how I understand and use this term in connection with China‟s medieval elite 
families. 
Comparing terms aristocracy and nobility, David Crouch argues, that: “A nobility is a 
dominant group whose status is legally defined, while an aristocracy is the same group 
defined sociologically. So a nobility is a socially privileged group, whose privilege set it apart 
from others and was evident to contemporaries. An aristocracy, on the other hand, was a 
dominant group in society which drew its importance from its economic and social weights. 
As a group it is usually wider than the nobility in any generation, and its nature is more often 
evident to historians than to contemporaries.”
6
 Therefore, we shall first ask how the medieval 
Chinese themselves envisaged their society and what terms they used to describe the upper 
layer.  
Browsing through the contemporary sources, one does encounter almost confusing 
abundance of status terms applied more or less subjectively to the elite, however, there is one 
term used more frequently and perhaps even more generally than the others. Shi 士, which 
could be translated as gentleman, denotes a member of the upper stratum of society, often in 
juxtaposition to shu 庶, a commoner. While the medieval Chinese were quite aware of the 
boundaries between the two and were eager to discriminate between them, they were less 
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eager to explicitly state the difference. As David Johnson proved, there were no legal and 
institutional criteria which would stipulate the conditions of the membership in this group.
7
 
While in Europe a gentleman, or gentilhomme, denoted someone whose father and 
grandfather were noble by birth and not even the ruler could make one out of someone unless 
the individual possessed the ancestors of noble descent,
8
 the Chinese shi was far less well 
defined term. Position of the shi was determined by their high culture standard and access to 
the offices in the state bureaucracy. Johnson argues that while shi was term most often used in 
referring to the upper class, there was no objective juridical status which would specify the 
standing of the shi. It is a “…conventional term denoting a loose category of people whose 
status is earned rather than a coherent group with ascribed status: an elite, not an aristocracy. 
This is not to deny that as time passed people began to think of the group of office and rank 
holders as a kind of hereditary class.”
9
 If we accept the shi to be a general term denoting in 
the broadest possible sense a member of the elite, then we are still looking for terms referring 
to the uppermost strata of the elite, which would imply some concepts of aristocracy or 
nobility. 
Being almost painfully conscious of all kinds of social distinctions and boundaries, 
which, nevertheless, may not appear as clear and pronounced to our eyes as to the eyes of 
contemporaries, authors of medieval sources provide great number of expressions denoting 
socially and politically preeminent groups of society. Richness of the vocabulary is confusing 
as the various terms overlap and one family could be described in different contexts with 
different terms.  Some of the most frequently used are: menfa 門閥  (great bureaucratic 
houses), mendi 門第  (great houses), shizu 士族  (scholar-official families), shizu 世族 
(hereditary families), guizu 貴族 (noble families), youzu 右族 (eminent families), gaomen 高
門 (exalted houses) and zhuxing 著姓 (famous names).10 They all refer to a nobility of some 
kind, either national, or local, hereditary, official, or cultural. The meaning was by no means 
specified, connotations of these terms are varying greatly, ranging from denigrating and 
derogatory when the rising power of these families had been perceived as a threat to the 
interests of the state and other social groups, to reverential and respectful, revealing esteem 
and awe in which they were held once they began to be connected with central power.
11
 All 
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these terms were used rather freely and subjectively and while we still find it useful to refer to 
the Chinese terms, we will be using terms nobility and aristocracy, when speaking about the 
group of elite families in general. However, it is necessary to be aware of the fundamental 
differences in realities of medieval Europe and China, therefore the usage of term nobility 
demands further clarification  
  The European concept of nobility as a social group stems from division into three 
orders of society, a notion prevalent throughout the Middle Ages, according to which priests 
and monks pray, nobles and rulers defend the society with their military force and peasants till 
the soil and work for the other two. The whole legal concept of nobility, with privileges 
attached to it, was based on the service rendered to a sovereign, or any liege lord. A noble was 
expected to provide kind of help, by fighting for his lord in times of need. In return for this 
military service the nobles had been rewarded by lands and by certain political and social 
privileges, their lands being exempted from taxes.
12
 “A noble order had come into existence 
in France by the end of the twelfth century and throughout much of Europe by the end of the 
fourteenth century. Its origins were primarily, though not exclusively, military… Noble status 
was acquired primarily by birth. Though this status was essential, however it was not 




Apart from the military character of the European nobility, there were other features 
peculiar to this social group, such as service at the court in honourable positions, living only 
on honourable occupations which were state-sanctioned as acceptable for someone of the 
noble blood, and ownership and occupation of landed estates, original fiefs bestowed by the 
sovereign on members of his entourage in lieu of their future services, their loyalty and fealty. 
Even though not all members of European nobility owned any landed property, and the 
maintenance of their noble status was not endangered by the fact, nevertheless, the land and 
its possession still loomed large in the eyes of European nobility, as Scott and Storrs 
comment: “The attractions of a landed estate and the social and economic power that this 
                                                                                                                                                        
豪族 during the Han see Cui Xiangdong (2004): pp. 43-79. Xiang mentions altogether as much as 94 expressions 
used during the both parts of the Han dynasty and later. He argues that the changes in the vocabulary mirror 
changes in society and in character of the haozu families, their gradual merging with central power through 
serving in the offices and their being accepted by the state as well as society in general.    
12
 Interestingly enough, the titles awarded to titled nobility in China also used to have distinctly military 
character, being bestowed in reward for military merits mostly to successful generals and army commanders. 
With the Confucian virtues becoming the ideal the elite society tried to live up to, the whole concept changed 
and the focus shifted to merits and exploits more civil in nature. Nevertheless, as we shall see the military 
achievement remained the main way for obtaining a noble title even during the Jin dynasty.    
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While the European nobility could be defined as: “… a distinct group within society 
distinguished primarily by the social and legal privileges which it enjoyed and by its position 
as an important and often dominant landowner.”
15
 the nobility of medieval China was more or 
less defined in the same terms, except the fact that landownership was not prerequisite for 
attaining the high social status and legal privileges pertained only to the part of nobility 
holding noble titles. The Chinese elite families were no landed nobility. Some of them were 
great land owners and land might have been important at certain stages in the development of 
the elite families, nonetheless, it was not crucial in sustaining the position of eminence and 
social exclusivity which made these families conspicuous throughout the age of disunity.
16
 
Nor could we imagine the Chinese aristocracy having some distinctly military qualities. 
Despite the fact that its members occasionally were in command of military forces, either 
private or state ones, pronounced civil character of the families, necessary in the moment 
when the process of recruitment for office, the only factor which really mattered in 
maintaining the social status of a family, was based on civil virtues and Confucian learning, 
speaks against such an assumption.
17
 Whatever the differences, we will use the term nobility 
in the sense of belonging to a big elite family, or being a member of an elite per se.  
There is, however, more than one concept of nobility. Besides nobility as a distinct 
social group we can also think about nobility as “… a quality, a legal characteristic of the 
individual, which was held or acquired in specified ways, and which conferred specified 
rights and privileges.”
18
 And this quality was hereditary. In Europe no one could lose one‟s 
noble status, because one was born with it, had it running through one‟s veins as noble blood, 
inherited from one‟s noble ancestors. European aristocrats may have lost their titles, their 
standing, their privileges and their property, but never could they lose the nobility itself. No 
one, not even the ruler could deny their noble status. On the other hand, nobility as a 
hereditary quality did not exist in China. Although Medieval Chinese society did attach great 
importance to the family background and origin and fussed about pedigree to an extant 
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bordering on obsession, it was not the same thing. Members of the elite families did not 
inherit the quality of nobility. What they did inherit was a name which commanded respect 
and certain potential to stand up to the expectations and demands such a name laid on its 
bearer. They were born into privileged class but if they wanted their family to continue 
figuring on the list of the most eminent families of the realm, they had to renew the claim to 
this eminent social position again and again by showing their worth in service to the 
government and emperor. Birth into an elite family could mean privileged life and privileged 
access to the office but it could not secure it in every case. A son of a member of elite got into 
his first office because his father was high official himself, and as such, had a special 
privilege of naming his son or younger brother as a candidate for minor appointment. It had 
nothing to do with the fact that both the son and the father belonged to a noble, that is elite 
family. Theoretically, any incumbent of a high enough office could use the same privilege, 
whatever his family‟s status might have been. If someone‟s father lacked an office of required 
rank, his son had no chance of entering the bureaucracy in the privileged way, even though he 
could have hailed from a long established family lineage of a well known name boasting of 
many illustrious ancestors. Once members of a branch failed to enter bureaucracy, they lost 
the opportunity to renew their claims to social importance as well as prospect of their 
respective family or branch surviving in the ranks of elite. In a few generations they 
disappeared from the scene, while more successful bearers of the same surname may thrive 
for centuries. 
However, there was a legally defined group among the elite of Chinese Middle Ages 
which resembled certain kind of European nobility as a social group with its juridically based 
status, and even possessed nobility as a hereditary quality of its own kind. This group is 
seldom mentioned in the sources under its comprehensive appellation; nevertheless, proofs of 
its existence are quite abundant and omnipresent. I propose to call this group titled nobility,  
nobility in a narrower sense of a group possessing quality of nobility brought by a title 
received from the emperor as a reward for rendered services. Titled nobility is my rendering 
of the Chinese term zhuhou 諸侯. This term will sound familiar to anyone even casually 
acquainted with the history of ancient China. It was originally used for all the feudal princes, 
rulers of the feudatories of the Zhou period and kings, dukes and marquises of later 
independent states during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. However, the 
meaning has shifted considerably as the centralized imperial government with strong control 
over the whole realm set in, and during the Han and Six Dynasties zhuhou denotes a group of 
15 
holders of noble titles from the imperial princes down to the purely honorary titles of lords of 
the royal domain (guanneihou 關内侯) and lords outside the passes (guanwaihou 關外侯). 
Nobility was a distinct quality of this group, quality conferred by a title. As all the 
titles of the zhuhou were hereditary, once a title was granted, hereditary nobility was 
bestowed with it. Nobility was connected entirely with the title and conferred only on the title 
holder; nevertheless, some of the privileges, which came with the title, were enjoyed also by 
other members of the family. However, all the titles and hence all the privileges they could 
bring, depended on the goodwill and grace of the emperor. Therefore, titled nobility of the 
medieval China was no independent hereditary social class. On the contrary, it was totally 
dependent on the favour of the emperor. The emperor could easily bestow a title and 
corresponding social privileges, but the title could be forfeited even more easily through 
committing an offence or failing in a duty to the emperor. The sovereign, or more abstractly, 
the central authority remained the sole arbiter of which family would enter the ranks of titled 
nobility, which one would remain there and for how long. Unlike the European titled nobility, 
whose “noble status and wealth were transmitted across the generations by inheritance and 
did not depend upon external political and economic circumstances,”
19
 every dynastic change 
in China meant a dire threat to any family of the titled nobility. More often than not this threat 
proved to be real and great changes occurred in the ranks of titled nobility, with families 
being stripped off their hereditary dignities and losing the noble titles, being replaced by new 
bunch of people who had been instrumental in establishing of the new dynasty. Only those, 
who were quick to realize that the wind of change was blowing, and managed to ingratiate 
themselves with the future masters, supporting their cause and thereby earning a new right to 
the position they had already enjoyed under the previous regime, were able to survive in the 
ranks of titled nobility. Such periodical reshuffling and membership changes were 
unthinkable in case of European titled nobility, which was generally surviving not only the 
changes of the ruling houses but even the fall of the monarchies. 
Nobility of these titled aristocrats depended on title and their status was hereditary 
insomuch that the title itself was hereditary. The important privileges, political, juridical, 
economic and social in nature, were conferred just on the holder of the title and his immediate 
family members. Once he lost the title, he lost also the status of nobility and the 
corresponding privileges. However, he may still have been considered a member of the elite 
and his family may have continued to be regarded as a noble hereditary house, as long as its 
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members endeavoured to renew the family‟s claim to social importance by pursuing proper 
Confucian learning and career in the offices of the state. This rather confusing situation might 
be more comprehensible when we recall the differences between a nobility and an aristocracy. 
While all the elite families and hereditary houses may be considered as aristocracy, only a 
small part of them has ever acquired a noble title and entered the ranks of nobility proper. On 
the other hand, not all title holders hailed from the distinguished and long-lived families of 
aristocracy. Many a military man or an upstart favourite of the throne was awarded noble title 
as reward for services or token of imperial favour. Whereas it is true that majority of the 
families holding and inheriting noble titles belonged at the same time to the larger group of 
aristocratic families or elite in general, the two groups, titled nobility and aristocracy, were by 
no means identical.  
It is also possible to draw a parallel to Europe, where the titled nobility formed just the 
highest echelon of the whole social class. Majority of the European noble families in all 
countries belonged to untitled nobility or aristocracy. In describing the French nobility, 
Francois Velde argues that the title used to be attached to certain land or territory and 
acquired with it in a process of enfeoffment or grant. Nobility as a status and personal quality 
were therefore separate from noble title, although nobility was a pre-condition for bearing a 
title of nobility.
20
 That means that there were much more noble families than titles available 
and majority of all noble families thus were untitled, forming nobility in a broader sense of 
aristocracy, same as elite families of Chinese Middle ages.  
The zhuhou or the titled nobility of the Jin dynasty comprises three kinds of noble 
titles fengjue 封爵, all bestowed in the same procedure of ennoblement, that is conferred by 
an imperial edict zhao 詔, carefully ranked and differentiated in terms of various privileges, 
degree of power they could bring to their holder as well as dignity and respect which they 
commanded. Foremost place was occupied by the imperial princes, holders of title wang 王,21 
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 Although wang 王 is more often translated as a king, I prefer to use prince instead, as status of a wang has 
changed considerably with the unification and centralization of the empire. Once the title of the supreme ruler of 
the Shang and Zhou and later used as a title of an independent sovereign of the feudatory states during the 
Warring States period, it was used again under the new Han regime, endowed though with a brand new meaning. 
The Han Empire was divided into commanderies and princely fiefs or territories. These apanages carved out 
from the empire were given to younger sons of Emperor Gaozu to rule. Initially the princes enjoyed quite 
extensive independence, but with gradual centralization of the empire, their privileges were curtailed, their 
territories decreased and their standing was reduced to formal rulers, mere figures with almost no authority over 
consigned territory living of an allowance from the revenue of their so called princely fief wangguo 王國. A 
prince thus neatly combines two meanings which are both apt in describing position of Chinese medieval wangs: 
First, a son of the monarch, or more generally any member of the royal family or ruling dynasty in a sense of the 
French prince du sang, prince of the blood, and secondly, a ruler of a certain territory, sometimes independent, 
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a dignity which was during the Jin dynasty reserved almost exclusively for the prince of the 
blood.
22
 Second group are the so called Five Ranks Titles wudeng 五等爵, for which I 
propose to use term peerage. It is the peerage which will concern us most as the best 
documented and most often mentioned group of titled nobility in all surviving sources. 
Bellow the peerage stand lesser noble titles known collectively as the liehou 列侯 (lordships) 
which were also hereditary but the privileges and benefices in terms of land revenue which 
came with a liehou title were less distinguished and some of the titles were purely honorific, 
lacking any grant of land revenue, which was bestowed with princely as well as peerage 
dignities.  
Formally, no wide distinction existed between the titles of princes and the peerage in 
terms of rules of their creation and character of these dignities, process of ennoblement being 
the same, some provisions of the imperial edicts even applied to a certain degree to both 
categories, but both concepts stemmed from different traditions and their reinstitution served 
different ends. Besides, strict exclusivity of a princely title and its practical unattainability for 
anyone who was not of the blood royal, made this title a dignity which may have been 
coveted by, yet was definitely not related to any of the noble families whatsoever. It is 
interesting, though, that while the ranks of imperial princes remained exclusive preserve of 
the imperial kin, they were neither the only option opened for a kinsmen in his search for a 
title, nor even the most common option indeed, as many titles of dukes and marquises were 
created for members of the cadet branches of the imperial house of Sima and its many 
princely lines, who thus formed part of the peerage. I have already dealt with this imperial 
peerage of the blood elsewhere, together with the princes, therefore the present study is 




                                                                                                                                                        
who is nevertheless in the title hierarchy at least theoretically subordinated to a higher authority of either king 
(Prince of Wales in the United Kingdom, Prince of Asturia in Spain or princes in the Italian kingdoms of Naples 
and Two Sicilies) or emperor (princes of the Holy Roman Empire).   
22
 Exception from the rule that only a cognate relative of the imperial house, bearing the same surname of Sima, 
and later only son of an emperor could be created a prince, was the last emperor of the Cao Wei dynasty. After 
he had abdicated in favour of Sima Yan, Emperor Wudi of Jin, he was created Prince of Chenliu commandery 陳
留郡王, with the title being hereditary in this line of the Cao dynastic house. The lineage of the princes of 
Chenliu eventually survived the upheavals at the beginning of the 4
th
 century and disappeared only with the fall 
of the Eastern Jin in 420 AD. They enjoyed privileged position in the court hierarchy and in the order of 
precedence came even before the most senior of all Sima princes. Hrubý, Jakub (2007): p. 48, note 105. 
23
 I attempted to analyze the imperial house of Sima and especially the position of the princes, structure of the 
dynastic house, and bestowing of the titles and offices upon members of the imperial kin in a study Sima, 
vládnoucí rod dynastie Jin. Mocenské postavení knížat z císařského rodu a role, kterou sehrála v dějinách 
dynastie [Sima, the Ruling House of the Jin Dynasty. Status of the Princes of the Blood and the Role They Have 
Played in the History of the Dynasty]. Praha: Orientální ústav AV ČR 2007.  
18 
Why to use the term peerage in connection with medieval Chinese titled nobility? The 
titled nobility of Europe was by no means uniform group, for the rules of ennoblement and 
traditional usage of noble titles differed from country to country, being determined by diverse 
origins of national aristocracies and dependent on different systems of government as well as 
social conditions prevailing in the respective region. In France a title was attached to specific 
piece of land, a fief, and titles were thus borne just by one person at a time, because only one 
person could own the property to which such a title was attached.
24
 On the other hand, 
nobility in Northern Europe and Germany as well as in Bohemia received titles in a different 
way and under different conditions. The titles were unattached to a land and usually the same 
title of the same rank was born by all members of the noble family.
25
 Chinese system 
resembles more that of France or England where peerage as concept originated in the first 
place, because the title was always held by one individual at one time, being hereditary in the 
direct line of his descendents, usually for the eldest son born of the main wife. Other offspring, 
brothers and cousins of the title holder were not considered noble in a sense of being entitled 
to any juridical or other privileges unless they had a title of their own. In France one family 
might also have more than one title and the head of the family might distribute them among 
his heirs. However, in China one person could bear just one title and one only. Accumulation 
of impressive titles which is by no means rare in Europe where a person could boast three 
ducal titles, a marquisate and two comital titles at the same time was quite inconceivable in 
medieval China.
26
 One might have got promoted to a better sounding title, or one‟s apanage 
might have been increased, but if that was a case, than the recipient of such favour ceased to 
use the old title and was known under a new one. Depending on the imperial favour, the old 
title was either abolished altogether or could have been bestowed, as a mark of exceptional 
favour or distinction for the services rendered to the dynasty, on a younger son or brother who 
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 For example, when the Kinský family was raised to the rank of counts (Reichsgraf) in 1628, the title of Count 
Kinský was not connected with any particular land and all members of the family were entitled to use this title. 
On the other hand, according to the French model, a member of the noble family was known just by his family 
name, as simple seigneur and only in case that he bore a title, was he known as count or duke of XY. Lets take 
famous French family de Rohan as an example. In sixteenth century three brothers were all known as de Rohan, 
but they bore different noble titles: Louis VII. de Rohan was Duke of Montbazon, Pierre de Rohan Prince of 
Guémené, and Alexandre de Rohan was Marquis of Marigny. Other members of the family were left with no 
titles and were using just their family name de Rohan.   
26
 For example the head of the Gordon-Lennox family bears titles and dignities of Duke of Richmond, Earl of 
March, and Baron of Settrington in the Peerage of England and Duke of Lennox, Earl of Darnley and Baron 
Methuen of Torbolton in the Peerage of Scotland. But the real record holders among European nobility were 
Spanish grandees, each of them equipped with plethora of noble titles referring to dignities acquired under 
several crowns which were in possession of Spanish kings. For example certain Don Rodrigo de Silva y 
Mendoza (1614-1675) held titles of Duke of Pastrana, Duke of Francavila and Duke of Extremera, Prince of 
Melito and Prince of Eboli, Marquess of Algecilla and Marquess of Almenara, Count of la Chamusca, Count of 
Ulma and Lord of Mandayuna, Miedes and Balciense. 
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The concept of peerage, or pairie, emerged in France in the Middle Ages as a special 
distinction within the system of the French nobility. The title of pair de France was held by 
and reserved for the highest-ranking and greatest members of the nobility. The vast majority 
of titled nobility in France were no pairs, because it was an extraordinary honour granted only 
to very few.
28
 In England the peerage gradually evolved into the whole system of titled 
nobility and the word is used either generally and collectively for the entire body of titles, or 
individually referring to a specific title. As in China, all honours and peerage dignities springs 
from the sovereign who stands high above the peerage. The peer is someone holding a 
peerage, that is a title, and it is this peerage dignity which is raising him above commoners, 
other people, even members of his own family, who don‟t have any title of their own.
29
   
Peers in the wudeng system 五等制 were of five ranks, derived from the titles used 
already under the Zhou dynasty for rulers of dependent feudatory states, corresponding neatly 
with European or British nomenclature: gong 公 (duke), hou 侯 (marquis), bo 伯 (count), zi 
子 (viscount) and nan 男 (baron).30 As in the case of the British peerage system, these peers 
were hereditary and the dignity of a peerage continued as long as the line of direct male 
descendants of the first holder existed.
31
 Once the heirs died out and there was not even a 
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 In the British peerage some of the titles of the father could be bestowed on his eldest son and heir as a courtesy 
title. It is usually the second highest title and being used as a courtesy title means that it does not bring right to sit 
in the Parliament, only certain privileges in terms of order of precedence. Thus, the eldest son and heir to the 
Duke of Beaufort bears a courtesy title of Marquis of Worcester, the heir of Duke of Bedford is Marquis of 
Tavistock and the heir of Duke of Richmond uses the title of Earl of March while his son, grandson to a duke, is 
entitled to a courtesy tile of Baron of Settrington. Even though Chinese peers could not hold more than one title, 
and their sons and heirs had to wait for their fathers to die before they could succeed to any title, emperor Wudi 
in order to establish proper distinction between first-borns and sons born to concubines, proclaimed a special 
edict by which he created a sort of uniformal courtesy title for all heirs of peerage dignity. This title was shizi 世
子, literally a son which would inherit. So, a son and heir to the duke of Julu 鉅鹿公 was known as shizi of Julu
鉅鹿世子. This title was very similar to German Erbprinz used for heirs of ducal or princely dignities within the 
Holy Roman Empire. 
28
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 In the case of British peerage even a member of the royal family is considered to be a commoner unless he has 
been awarded a peerage dignity. Important aspect of the British peerage was their direct connection with the 
Parliament. Their title entitled them to sit in the House of Lords, a fact which is of course entirely lacking in case 
of medieval Chinese titled nobility, therefore any discussion of this aspect at this place would be to my opinion 
utterly pointless.  
30
 As we are dealing here with a system which, after all, resembles the British peerage only superficially, I prefer 
to use count as rendering of bo instead of British earl which is too indigenously connected with the United 
Kingdom, and more international spelling of marquis for Chinese term hou, instead of medieval form marquess 
still used with the titles of British peerage.  
31
 Whereas in Europe some peerage dignities were hereditary even in the female line of descent, in China 
peerage was reserved for heirs male only. There was a special noble title of jun 君, a lady of XY, used for high 
born women, usually with connection to the throne, mothers of empresses and thus grandmothers to the 
emperors. This title was not hereditary, though.  
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chance of having some distant bearer of the same family name adopted, the peerage became 
extinct. There were also cases of forfeiture of a peerage, meted out as a punishment for taking 
part in conspiracies, committing offenses against the throne, taking part in an armed uprising 
against central authority, or trespassing against moral code of behavior dictated by Confucian 
teaching, the li 禮.  
At the time of establishing the pairie system, the peerage was attached to specific 
territorial jurisdiction, a fief, and henceforth was transmittable or inheritable only with the fief. 
The peer originally administered the place associated with his title and collected the revenue, 
but later on title and land became separated and titles were created in the ranks of British 
peerage with no corresponding territories having been given to their incumbents.
32
 Chinese 
model is somewhere in between. The most important thing is creation of a title. But there is 
also an allowance which is given to the title holder to be collected as a part of revenue of 
certain plot of land, usually administrative unit on a prefecture (xian 縣) or commandery (jun 
郡) level, which corresponds with the title, as title uses the name of this very place. The title 
holder did not exercise any direct authority over this piece of land and his rights in connection 
with this “fief” guo 國 were restricted to a claim to a portion of the land revenue. We can 
argue that if in France “the titles of nobility were a rank attached to a certain pieces of land,“
33
 
then in medieval China the rank itself was more important and land was just attached to it as a 
place name forming a part of the title. We shall use the words fief or domain for this piece of 
land, even though the peers did not exercise any authority over their fief and majority of them 
have never as much as set foot in their allotted territory, let alone resided there. These 
domains – duchies gongguo 公國 , marquisates houguo 侯國 , counties boguo 伯國 , 
viscountcies ziguo 子國 and baronies nanguo 男國 were just certain pieces of land attached to 
a respective noble dignity, administered on principally the same basis as normal prefecture 
xian and commanderies jun by officials named from the center. Peers had no rights over the 
population in their domain, but they were entitled to a special household formed by several 
kinds of domain officials who oversaw everything from the right education and cultivation of 
a peer, running the household, and maintaining proper ritual conduct to matters of the revenue 
received from the central government. The peerage domains resemble appanages of Medieval 
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 With no land attached to a title, there was, of course, no jurisdiction and no right to any revenue. There are 
even titles the appellation of which was created not from a toponym but from a surname of a family. Thus we 
can see a Russell as Duke of Bedford, or a Manners as Duke of Rutland, a Fermor being Earl of Pomfret, but a 
Gage being created Viscount Gage, a Ruthven Baron Ruthven and a Gray being created Earl Grey. 
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France, where sovereign granted a territory from the Crown lands to maintain a dependent 
member of a ruling family, except the fact, that French appanages entailed direct and rather 
independent control over the whole appanage, which might have become a threat to the 
central royal power.
34
 While in medieval China the princes of the blood did enjoy quite 
considerable control over their princely domains, this was certainly not the case with the peers. 
Therefore, I prefer not to use the term apanage as denoting the territory allotted to a peer of 
either rank. Instead, I will use the word apanage for the allowance granted to a peer, based on 
revenue from the allotted land. A peer was not a lord in sense of a master over the land and 
population of his domain, he was a mere apanagist living on an allowance, apanage, bestowed 
on him by the state, in the form of precisely defined portion of revenue, which was not even 
kept directly by apanagist, whose officials collected it, but redistributed in form of salary from 
the state granaries and warehouses.  
The size of domain was determined by the rank of the title, duchies being the largest 
and baronies the smallest of the fiefs. Each grade corresponding to one of the five titles had 
fixed number of miles (li 里), which the domain should encompass. At the same time, the 
domain was also defined by number of families or households hu 戶 allotted to a title and its 
domain with number decreasing from a duchy to a barony.
35
 The allowance bestowed on an 
appanagist came from revenue produced by these households. Usually, not all the population 
of a certain territory connected with a title was given under the nominal supervision of the 
household of a peer, as commanderies and prefectures were not unified in terms of population 
and area, therefore the domain of prescribed size corresponding to a ranked title was only 
rarely matching any existing area in the given system of local government. When a local 
government unit was larger or more populous than required quotas for the peerage dignities, 
only a portion of it was allotted to a newly created title. In case of a county or a commandery 
being too small and underpopulated, households and territory of the surrounding areas were 
added to the newly created peerage dignity. This fact, however, was not reflected in bestowed 
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 About French appanages and origin of this word see: Velde, Francois: www.heralica.org. Apanages in the 
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 Many titles of European nobility were more or less traditional, not ranked in respect of the wealth or amount 
of land owned by a title holder‟s family. Thus, there might have been counties as big as duchies and barons who 
were more powerful and wealthier than many a duke or marquis. However, it is interesting to note that even in 
Europe there appeared efforts to connect title of a certain rank with certain amount of land or income. A royal 
edict issued by the French king Henri III. in 1575 AD stipulated minimal land revenue attached to a title, which 
should form a basis for bestowing one of the five peerage titles. Velde, Francois, www.heralica.org. History of 
the French Nobility. 
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title, which always derived from the name of the original territory, however small it might 
have originally been.
36
      
The fief and revenue were aspects in which the peerage differed from the lowest 
ranking group of noble titles, the liehou lordships. These were well established noble titles, 
inherited from the system of the Qin; they were originally used during the Han and later Cao 
Wei as the only titles available for non-royals, because higher titles of princes and peers were 
exclusively reserved for the members of the ruling house. Therefore, members of the 
hereditary families could have claimed only titles bellow the peerage. This situation has 
changed with the accession of the new dynasty. The ranks of the peerage were reinvented as a 
useful tool for maintaining loyalties and winning over powerful supporters for the Sima 
enterprise, as the Simas instigated the opening of the peerage ranks for any member of the 
court circles worthy of such distinction, the sole qualification being the adherence to the right 
cause. With the appearance of the new social dignities the prestige and the social standing of 
the liehou titles sank considerably.  
All liehou titles fell into two categories, from xianhou down to tinghou were titles 
which still provided not only social distinction but also an income for their bearer, while 
guanneihou and guanzhonghou were rather honorary distinctions (so called cijue 賜爵 ) 
awarded only for the life time with no hereditary privileges attached to it and usually no 
income in form of revenue from a particular piece of land.
37
  Ban Gu 班固 in his Hou Han 
shu 後漢書 (History of the Later Han) clearly tried to differentiate between the liehou titles 
with and without revenue by using different verbs referring to the act of ennoblement. With 
titles of xianhou, xianghou and tinghou Ban Gu used the verb feng 封 – traditional expression 
for enfeoffment, meaning of which has, however, by the time of the Han dynasty slightly 
shifted from to enfeoff to that of to create (a dignity) or to ennoble, while with honorary titles 
of guanneihou and guanzhonghou the verb ci 賜 is used, which means to grant, to bestow (an 
honour or a title). Even though this verbal distinction is not used in later sources, including 
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 I rather use usually, as Zhang Xuefeng explains that there is still some disagreement among scholars regarding 
the question of guanneihou receiving apanages. He argues that according to the system, guanneihou were purely 
honorific titles with no income attached, however, in reality, occasionally even the guanneihou could receive an 
apanage as an extraordinary privilege and mark of honour in form of grant of revenue from the so called fief-
town (revenue town) shiyi 食邑. Nevertheless, if that was the case, such grant could not have been inherited and 
the title lapsed with the death of its holder with revenue reverting back to the Crown possessions. See Zhang 
Xuefeng (2001): p. 30, 32. 
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Unlike the peerage holders who had their domains precisely defined in terms of 
expanse of land and number of households working for them, the grants of revenue for three 
liehou ranks entitled to some income and heredity were bestowed under slightly different 
conditions. Their “domains” were even more illusory than that of the peerages, there was no 
new administration set up with creation of a liehou title and no officials of the liehou 
household were actually named. There were no stipulations regarding the extant of land 
corresponding to different ranks, nor any regulation concerning number of households hu 
attached to the title. Prefecture lord (xianhou 縣侯) thus used name of a prefecture in his title 
without exercising any rights over the prefecture administration, which was run by the 
centrally appointed officials as any other prefecture. Domains of these lords were sometimes 
seemingly larger than fiefs of the peerage; in the Western Jin system quotas for a peerage 
marquisate ranged from 1600 to 1400 households, however, the sources mention creation of 
liehou titles awarded with some 6000 or even 10 000 households. The difference was in 
portion of the revenue allotted to the respective kinds of titles. Noble title holders never 
collected whole revenue; they received only a certain portion of it and while the peers enjoyed 
one third of the revenue produced by the number of households granted to their use when 
their title was created, the liehou title holders were entitled only to one tenth of the total 




Unfortunate use of the same title, hou 侯 – usually translated as marquis - in both the 
wudeng peerage and the liehou ranks makes it sometimes difficult to distinguish a peer from a 
mere liehou, especially in case of peerage marquises and “marquises of prefecture” (xianhou 
縣侯), as the important word xian 縣 – prefecture was often omitted when referring to a title 
holder. For example He Pan 何攀 was created Marquis of Xicheng prefecture 西城縣侯, but 
he also appears as Marquis of Xicheng 西城侯, a designation referring to a dignity of marquis 
in the ranks of peerage. The situation is even more confusing for us, as the same title of 
marquis, albeit with a specific modifier, is used for titles standing in the hierarchy much 
bellow of the lesser peerage titles of counts, viscounts, and barons. Thus a village marquis 
(tinghou 亭侯) could have been promoted to a viscount, which was considered a remarkable 
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promotion jumping over four ranks from liehou to peerage. As the liehou marquises stand 
way below the peerage, I would rather translate the word hou as a simple lord in a sense of 
the French seigneur, which was not used as a specific title in the peerage hierarchy, but rather 
as an honorary appellation for anyone possessing some landed estate. Therefore I will 
translate xianhou 縣侯 as a Prefecture Lord, xianghou 鄉侯 as a Township Lord, tinghou 亭
侯 as a Village Lord, guanneihou 關内侯 as a Lord of the Royal Domain, and guanzhonghou 
關中侯 as a Lord Inside the Passes. 
The present study focuses on families of titled nobility; therefore we shall also explain 
how we perceive these families from the sociological point of view as kinship units. Chinese 
sources use many different terms such as zong 宗, zu 祖, xing 姓, shi 氏 and others when 
referring to the noble families throughout the whole period of middle ages. Like other terms 
used in the medieval sources, these are very loose and used rather randomly. Patricia Ebrey 
concludes her research on the Boling Cui 博陵崔氏 family with suggestion, that simple 
reading of “kin” would be more apt than clan or lineage as the reality behind these terms 
varied greatly and changed constantly from dynasty to dynasty: “…in the Han the Ts‟uis were 
a loose grouping of local kin, in the late Northern Wei a closely defined aristocratic lineage, 
in the T‟ang a scattered group of high status families of common patrilineal descent.”
40
  
As we will be dealing only with the Western Jin Dynasty, we may presume that 
character of these families has not changed much over such a short time span, and we still 
need some workable description of a family under focus, more precise than kin. So clan or 
lineage? Although Ebrey is right that we cannot refer to the families as clans or lineages in the 
strict sense of an organized kinship groups with common activities, we still can use more 
general definitions of both terms. In the scope of the present study, we understand a clan to be 
an unilineal kinship group, which is socially defined in terms of actual or purported descent 
from a common ancestors.
41
 A clan may be further segmented into subclans and lineages. On 
the other hand, lineage is also a unilineal descent group, either paternal (patrilineage) or 
maternal (matrilineage). “All members of such a group trace common ancestry to a single 
person… A lineage is exclusive in its membership and is normally corporate, its members 
exercising rights in common and being collectively subject to obligations. A lineage may 
comprise any number of generations but commonly is traced through five to ten.”
42
 The 
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question is, how do the Chinese medieval families fit into these definitions and to what 
exactly we can apply both terms?  
Apart of other things, all the families were defined by their surnames. Families bearing 
the same surname were considered to be descended from the common ancestor and members 
of the two families were seen as related to each other, no matter how distant the ancestors 
may have been in terms of time and blood connection. As number of Chinese surnames is 
rather limited, families used to add a place name, usually name of the commandery or 
prefecture in which their ancestors had settled or where the family burial ground with 
ancestral graves was located, as a kind of marker of their respective descent groups. This so 
called choronym (benwang 本望 or junwang 郡望) later became an indicator of an aristocratic 
family, a special prenomen derived from the ancestral home, through which individual 
members of larger kinship group identified themselves. It was not necessarily referring to 
actual place of residence of the family and its members - indeed more often than not the 
families later ceased to have any connection with the place in choronym - but by using the 
choronym one was laying one‟s claim to membership in a certain well established descent 
group.
43
 Choronyms were noble styles of medieval China, appendages of the family names 
distinguishing a commoner named Li from a Li of Zhaojun 趙郡李氏 or a Li of Longxi 隴西
李氏, members of hereditary aristocratic houses.  
In course of history, members of these families identified by the same surname and 
choronym may have dispersed due to the warfare and unfavourable political situation and 
settle in different regions of the empire. The knowledge of exact family connections and 
relations may have been forgotten, but awareness of the same origin of different lines was 
fostered by using the old choronym as kind of marker of common descent. When browsing 
through the sources, we can from time to time come across cases of two people using the 
same surname and choronym and still not being able to ascertain their exact family ties and 
lines of descent. Therefore, I think it appropriate to label these large descent groups identified 
by the same surname and choronym as clans.
44
 These clans were formed by several lineages 
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bound together by awareness of common ancestry and bounds of clanship, but they were not 
forming one single enduring group with common interest. 
The lineages apparently were more likely to share interests and work together in effort 
to attain their goals, however, they often lacked the degree of cohesion required by some 
precise definitions of the term lineage.
45
 Even though these definitions may not apply to the 
specific case of Chinese medieval families, we will use this term in more general sense as a 
descent group that can demonstrate their common descent from a known apical ancestor, but 
members of which do not necessarily participate in the same ritual activities. In focusing on 
titled nobility, we will be more often dealing with individual lineages than clans, because we 
know much more about members of the main lines of descent within one family (or clan) who 
form one single lineage, or, as lineage structure is a branching process in which younger 
brothers find their own lesser lineages, several leading lineages. However, collateral cadet 
branches of the same family are less well documented, unless they later established lineage of 
their own by attaining high offices and ranks or receiving another noble title. Younger 
members or more distant relatives are often just mentioned by name and sometimes by their 
title and no particular details are known about their lives or careers; sometimes even their 
proper place in the genealogy of the lineage is not clear.  
I find it appropriate to speak about the lineage while dealing with families of titled 
nobility, as the concept of lineage stresses the ties of consanguinity in historical perspective. 
The sense of continuity of blood line and inheritance of noble title in a vertical line 
connecting generation to generation of the bearers of noble titles and holders of high offices 
of state fostered an awareness of belonging to a privileged group of exclusive social standing. 
It was this line, which brought their claims to social preeminence and privileges, through 
connecting them to the past generations of illustrious ancestors. While lineage is basically 
another word for family, I may use both terms interchangeably. However, I will also use the 
word family in more particular sense of a unit of the lineage. Such concept of family stresses 
horizontal kinship ties in one single generation as opposed to vertical dimension of a lineage, 
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comprising relatives not only consanguineous, but also affinal, offering a glimpse into wide 
kinship connections and working of the marriage alliances network of endogamous social 
group of aristocratic hereditary houses.
46
  
Titled nobility is thus group of families and lineages defined by their surnames and 
choronyms, whose members were ennobled by the imperial court, that is the emperor issued 
an edict by which a title was created, either in the ranks of peerage or the liehou lordships, 
and conferred on an individual together with appropriate appanage corresponding to the rank 
of the bestowed title. 
Before we start tracing gradual emergence and development of the ennoblement 
system it would be appropriate to introduce relevant primary sources available which were 
used in the process of writing this thesis and point to certain peculiar features of the medieval 
Chinese historiography and limits which its character imposes on our knowledge of the 
period. The main sources for the Western Jin period are two of the standard dynastic histories 
(zhengshi 正史), the History of the Jin (Jinshu 晉書) covering periods of both the Western 
and the Eastern Jin and also the Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi 三國志) dealing 
with states of Wei, Shu and Wu which divided the empire after the fall of the Han in 220 AD. 
As many a lineage of the Jin titled nobility descended from generations of Han and Wei 
officials and some of the noble dignities were in fact bestowed already during the preceding 
dynasty of Wei by the Simas in their capacity as regents to the emperor Sanguozhi provides 
useful additional information about progenitors of the Jin title holders and their careers prior 
to the establishment of the dynasty.  
Historiographical tradition of ancient China is proverbial for its richness and diversity 
of written sources available to historians. However, for the period of Chinese Middle Ages we 
are more or less dependent on official court or governmental compilations known as dynastic 
or standard histories. Great distance in time separating us from the period in question, 
together with certain peculiarities of the compilation process of a standard history are 
responsible for relative scarcity of contemporary historiographical works. Even though 
surviving catalogues of the imperial libraries which found their way into later compiled 
standard histories attest to rich historiographical output, both private and official, subsequent 
state-sponsored and state-controlled compilations overshadowed older works both in size and 
importance and indirectly caused their disappearance. The officially appointed team of 
officials-historians working under the aegis of the emperor often ransacked the imperial 
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archives rummaging through piles of official memoranda and government communication as 
well as private and official histories written so far and utilized all available sources from 
governmental and private libraries. Thus the official standard histories were often viewed as 
the cream of historiographical production and the original chronicles and histories gradually 
began to be considered redundant and obsolete, despite their obvious value as more or less 
contemporary testimony of the given period. They ceased to be copied and gradually 
disappeared as time and fires consumed imperial libraries one after another. The voluminous 
compilations of standard histories therefore became the most comprehensive source of 
information about early medieval Chinese history even though they were created even 
hundreds of years after the fall of the dynasties the history of which they were recording.  
It is exactly this feature which makes them so valuable, as Endymion Wilkinson puts 
it: “The value of the earlier Standard Histories is greatly enhanced by the fact that many of the 
sources upon which they were based have since been lost and alternative sources are lacking. 
For these reasons the scissors-and-paste methods of some of their editors should be regarded 
as an asset.”
47
  Thanks to the cumulative process of compilation the standard histories 
preserved many of the written sources which would otherwise have had no chance to survive 
in their physical form. The chronicle records are interspersed with many official documents 
quoted verbatim, presumably taken straight from the imperial archives and palace library, 
holdings of which were at disposal of the compilers. Governmental documents, memoranda to 
the throne, imperial edicts as well as analyses of current political situation and proposals of 
governmental policies were utilized side by side with private correspondence, poetry and 
treatises on various philosophical or ritual issues in order to underscore or explain certain 
events or certain deeds of historical personalities adding depth to often dry records of their 
lives and careers portrayed in individual biographies (zhuan 傳) which comprised majority of 
each standard history. The compilation practice may have undoubtedly preserved many an 
original document word for word, yet the very nature of the compilation process imposed 
certain limits on knowledge we can acquire through reading of the standard histories. We can 
never be sure what was omitted or discarded during the compilation process, deemed 
unnecessary or even unworthy of attention of future generations. The questions of what or 
who was or wasn‟t included and why should always loom large in our minds when dealing 
with standard histories. 
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 Even though there were many chronicles written before the beginning of the 7
th
 
century which were retrospectively labeled as standard histories it was in fact the Jinshu 
compiled in 644 AD
48
 which stood right at the beginning of the tradition of state-sponsored 
compilations as joint undertaking of officially appointed team of historians working in the 
History Bureau (shiguan 史官). At the beginning of the Tang 唐 Dynasty (618-907 AD) 
writing or compiling of a history of the preceding dynasty became one of ritual steps 
establishing authority of the new dynasty as a successor of the legitimate imperial rule 
(zhengtong 正統). Being an heir to the tumultuous period of disunion the Tang tried to 
reinforce in a symbolic way actual unification of the realm though compilation of official 
histories for those of the preceding dynasties which still lacked zhengshi of their own which 
would at the same time provide historical explanation for the rise of the Tang as the legitimate 
imperial power. No less than eight standard histories were produced during the first century of 
the Tang rule but the importance of the Jin as the last dynasty to rule the whole of China was 
in fact preeminent for the legitimacy issue. The Jinshu, which was compiled under the aegis 
of Tang Emperor Taizong 唐太宗 (626-649 AD) by a team of court dignitaries and official 
historians headed by prominent meritorious minister Fang Xuanling 房玄齡 (578-648 AD), 
was perceived as an exemplar standard history mirroring accurately the past and illuminating 
various patterns and correlations of historical events. Understanding of these correlations 
should have served as a source of inspiration and guidance for future generations and as such 
was presented to Taizong‟s crown prince in earnest hope that the sovereign to be would pay 
attention to lessons of rise and fall of the dynasties and emulate models of proper conduct 
provided by the history.
49
 As the function of the histories as mirrors of the past offering 
guidance for the future was dependant on the right understanding of the principles behind 
historical events, “the idea that history told the truth was keenly appreciated by rulers and 
historians … [and] belief in the factual veracity continued to loom large in both official and 
private history and historiography in the Tang period.”
50
   
While Jinshu represents a state-sponsored compilation created almost three hundred 
years after the fall of the Western Jin, Sanguozhi occupies the opposite end of an imaginary 
scale as a private work, only additionally labeled as standard history, which is nevertheless 
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nearly contemporary to the recorded period being compiled shortly after the fall of Wu.
51
 Its 
author Chen Shou 陳壽 (233-297 AD) began writing his work as a private enterprise with no 
official support and the Records gained status of an official history only after Chen Shou‟s 
death. Due to the lack of available sources and highly charged political situation at the time of 
writing the author was compelled to omit certain important particulars and exercise 
remarkable degree of circumspection and discretion in referring to certain events as their 
protagonists were still living and wielding considerable power at court.
52
 Therefore, later 
generations deemed it necessary to fill in some of these omissions and gaps in Chen Shou‟s 
history and Liu Song 劉宋 Emperor Wendi 文帝 (424-453 AD) ordered Pei Songzhi 裴松之 
(372-451 AD) to write a commentary to Sanguozhi. The work was finished in 429 AD and 
together with the Records of the Three Kingdoms represent truly remarkable and 
accomplished historiographical work unique in its temporal proximity to the recorded events 
for in the course of compilation Pei Songzhi consulted many contemporary sources unknown 
or inaccessible to Chen Shou, which he often quoted verbatim in order to elucidate difficult 
passages of the original text or offer a different view or perspective.
53
 In this way Pei Songzhi 
utilized more than one hundred and fifty sources which are now irretrievably lost. The 
surviving passages of these sources provide wide range of invaluable additional information 
which is unfortunately lacking in case of later Tang compilations.  
Even though the time gap between actual events and compilation of the Jin standard 
history minimized the danger of manipulation and tampering with the facts, which Sanguozhi 
was accused of, selective compilation process must be blamed for the loss of considerable 
amount of information. Most probably we will never know what was deliberately omitted and 
lost for the surviving fragments of the original contemporary works which the compilers 
presumably had at their disposal do not permit us to reconstruct their original form in its 
entirety, but it is sure that only those people and events considered important enough by the 
Tang to figure in the imperial compilation made it to the pages of Jinshu as we know it. It 
seems that majority of the Jin titled nobility passed into oblivion completely unnoticed. We 
know that there were allegedly some six hundred titles created in 264 AD when the peerages 
were first introduced. Two years later, when the Jin Dynasty was founded, there were some 
five hundred noble dignities, either surviving from the Wei or created anew, yet I was able to 
ascertain only less than two hundred noble dignities recorded in all biographies and basic 
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annals (benji 本紀) of Jinshu and selected parts of Sanguozhi for the whole period of the 
Western Jin. Moreover, majority of these titles were actually created only after 266 AD.
54
 
The same selective scarcity of information pertains also to fortunes of various noble 
lineages which were lucky enough to have their name recorded in the standard history. The 
sources sometimes offer surprising details, yet these are often matter of chance. Being fairly 
focused on official careers of the Jin ministers, they offer only occasional glimpses of private 
or family life of these men. While we may know fairly well details of life and career of the 
founder of a noble lineage the information about his progeny and further succession of the 
noble dignity is often limited to a record of accession to the title, highest office attained and 
record of subsequent demise and eventual successor. The details of genealogy, number of 
descendants, degree of relationship between various members of a noble lineage, all this is 
often lacking and our knowledge about family situation of a given noble lord often depends 
on occasional mentions scattered in various biographies as well as few circumstantial facts 
which could be gleaned from basic annals of Jinshu. Inevitably, there are lacunae and 
confusions which cannot be presently filled or settled as we lack corroboration in other 
contemporary sources. 
In my work I have focused mainly on selected official documents, edicts and 
memoranda submitted to the throne as well as records of official careers and official posts of 
titled nobles which they held during their life for this kind of information is less likely to be 
tampered with, especially after couple of centuries which lay between the fall of the Jin 
Dynasty and compilation of Jinshu. Still, the limits imposed by the scissors-and-paste method 
used in compilation should always be born in mind as we can never be sure who was included 
and who was not. Therefore, my thesis does not aspire to be an exhaustive study of all noble 
dignities conferred under the Western Jin. It merely tries to disclose some regular patterns in 
bestowal of peerages and lordships and trace certain tendencies in use of the ennoblement 
system in the politics of the dynasty. The existence of more noble dignities could be later 
proved by epigraphic evidence, either existing or discovered in the future. The tomb 
inscriptions (muzhiming 墓誌銘) unearthed from medieval graves may shed additional light 
on dignities, titles and family ties of known individuals or even uncover existence of 
unknown family members or title holders. But as Jinshu and Sanguozhi represent the main 
sources of information for the given period I thought it prudent to concentrate my attention on 
them first.  
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Development and Structure of the Ennoblement System 
 
Titled Nobility of the Han (221 BC-220 AD) 
 
The origins of the ennoblement system (fengjue zhi 封爵制), as we know it from later 
history of Medieval and even Late Imperial China, are linked to the founding of the unified 
empire at the end of the 3
rd
 century BC. Widespread rebellion which had toppled the short-
lived Qin dynasty saw resurrection of some of the old regional states as well as birth of the 
new political entities founded by ambitious military leaders of highly various origins. Shortly 
after the fall of Xianyang 咸陽 the unity achieved by the Qin disappeared and the centralized 
empire disintegrated once again in the ensuing power struggles. Heirs of the ancient royal 
houses assumed their hereditary rights, powerful local generals and rebel leaders proclaimed 
their independence trying to use the opportunity to create a state of their own, and yet others 
were created by Xiang Yu 項羽, the all-powerful victor over the Qin, who strived to rule over 
these new “feudal” states in a pre-Qin fashion as a high king or hegemon (bawang 霸王).55 
The unity was as short-lived as the Qin dynasty itself. Indeed, the very concept of a unified 




The original centralized system of regional and local administration based on 
commanderies (jun 郡 ) and prefectures (xian 縣 ) was replaced by nineteen kingdoms 
(wangguo 王國) ruled by their respective kings (wang 王). Most of these kings were quite 
happy to acknowledge Xiang Yu as their superior as this situation enabled them to rule 
independently in their respective territories and wait for opportunity to expand at the expense 
of their peers. Following the battle of Gaixia 垓下, Liu Bang, King of Han 漢王劉邦, became 
the sole master of the realm and proclaimed himself emperor of the Han dynasty (later known 
as Gaozu 高祖). And yet, despite the unequivocal assertion of supreme rule connected with 
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the title of emperor (huangdi 皇帝), the highly complex political reality compelled the Han 
founder to retain system of kingdoms and fiefs which Xiang Yu had awarded to his allies and 
powerful local leaders. Apparent reinstitution of the ancient enfeoffment system of the Zhou 
might have seemed as a step backwards bringing back potentially chaotic political conditions 
of the pre-Qin China threatening newly achieved unity. But given the specific circumstances 
of the newly established empire Gaozu had no other choice. His seeming willingness to 
recreate the original multi-state China was in fact dictated by pressing political needs.  
Apart from necessity to reward his allies among the kings who had helped him to 
defeat Xiang Yu and urgent need to secure their support and allegiance for the future there 
were also other important reasons connected with the ideology of the new dynasty. There 
were only two precedents for the unified empire known to the Han, the glorious Zhou 周 and 
rather infamous Qin. Therefore, the legitimacy of the new dynasty must have been construed 
in lines of reflecting these models from the past and either emulating or rejecting them. By 
sanctioning the existence of the semi-independent kings and seeming recreation of the pre-
Qin state of affairs Han Gaozu could at least symbolically reenact the time-venerated practice 
of awarding fiefs which set him on a par with the Zhou kings of high antiquity. Perhaps even 
more important under the given circumstances than an effort to emulate the Zhou with its 
glorious and glorified past was to distance oneself as far as possible from the corrupt and 
oppressive practices of the Qin misrule. Thus, retaining the petty kingdoms was in line with 
the overall Han policy of publicly denouncing and denigrating methods of administration used 
by the First Emperor of the Qin.  
Extermination of the old-established lineages of the “feudal” lords (zhuhou 諸侯) was 
one of the grievances against the Qin misrule which had been voiced in the strongest terms. In 
fact, the very ephemeral nature of the Qin regime had been seen as the direct consequence of 
depriving the supreme ruler of support of his kith and kin, that is the lords. However, kings 
and lords Gaozu inherited from Xiang Yu were of course no relatives of his and the bonds of 
allegiance held true only as far as the kings found them useful and expedient. Gaozu not only 
had to acknowledge their kingly status and preserve their domains intact but also had to 
guarantee the hereditary right of succession for their offspring. If Gaozu had ever thought 
about reinstituting the ancient enfeoffment system, he gave up the idea quite soon. He had no 
illusions and was well aware of all the possible dangers of the new situation which soon 
appeared to be untenable in the long term and incompatible with the new ideas of unified 
empire and absolute universal power of the emperor Gaozu wanted to promote. Whereas the 
34 
central part of the empire with the imperial domain around the capital city of Chang‟an 長安 
was administered directly from the centre, the border regions were domain of the kings who 
ruled their kingdoms as semi-independent lords. It is true that such an arrangement was quite 
effective in terms of border defense and administration, but the questionable loyalty of the 
kings made the whole administrative structure rather volatile. By 202 BC the Han Empire was 
comprised of thirteen commanderies and ten kingdoms which in terms of area and population 
exceeded by far the imperial domain.
57
   
In following years Gaozu used every opportunity and every pretense to undermine the 
position of the kings and replace them with his own sons and other male relatives. His quest 
for reasserting imperial authority over the whole empire was successful and by the year 196 
BC all but one of the original kingly fiefs were either abolished or given to newly appointed 
princes of the blood,
58
 members of the imperial Liu clan.
59
 This qualitative change in 
awarding fiefs and princely titles actually introduced the whole new system established on 
different basis, practically using the old categories and concepts endowed with totally new 
meanings as was the case with many other imperial institutions which allegedly derived from 
the institutional practice of the inimitable Zhou. Thus during the first reigns of the Han 
dynasty the new system of ennoblement (fengjue zhidu 封爵制度) was created, based on the 
model of the ancient enfeoffment system (fenfeng zhidu 分封制度), which was nevertheless 
more compatible with administrative mechanisms of the unified empire and centralized 
government. 
Under the new system the highest title of a prince (wang 王) was henceforth reserved 
for members of the imperial family. All sons of an emperor, except the designated crown 
prince or heir presumptive, were usually given princely fiefs. The title was hereditary in the 
direct male line according to rules of Chinese primogeniture (i.e. only the eldest son of a 
ruling prince born of the lawful main wife may inherit). Younger sons of the princes or sons 
born of concubines may have been given a lesser fief and title of a marquis (hou 侯). The 
proximity to the main imperial line of descent determined the titles and apanages given to 
respective cadet branches with distant relatives receiving no titles at all and becoming 
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commoners in the course of few generations. The number of princely lines varied during the 
dynasty ranging from eight to twenty five, being dependent only on fertility of the imperial 
line and number of imperial sons eligible for the princely rank.
60
 
Unlike the original Zhou enfeoffment system which used five hierarchically distinct 
noble titles, the new ennoblement system of the Han dynasty recognized only two noble ranks, 
prince and marquis. As acquiring of the rank of a prince was destined to be exclusive 
prerogative of the princes of the blood, all other non-royal families could reach only for the 
lesser title. In fact, by adopting marquisates as the lesser degree of the noble titles the Han 
were actually utilizing some features of the system of social hierarchy used during the Qin. 
For the marquis dignities of the Han were not derived from the title of marquis (hou 侯) 
originally awarded by Zhou kings to rulers of the fiefs (zhuhou 諸侯), but their origin is to be 
found in system of twenty honorary and noble ranks (cijue 賜爵) given to subjects of the Qin 
kings according to their military merits. The feats of arms and services rendered to the crown 
and the king were judged by the number of severed heads of the enemy gained at the 
battlefield. This system of ranking was institutionalized by famous Qin reformer Shang Yang 




The highest of the twenty ranks was called chehou 徹侯 and was awarded only to the 
most important military commanders and court ministers as a mark of the highest favor or 
reward for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the overall war effort aimed at unification of 
all under heaven. The chehou were given a part of the kingdom as their apanage, usually a 
prefecture, couple of walled towns or certain number of tax-paying households. As the 
chehou rank was the highest possible distinction, the Qin kings were rather frugal in its use. 
The last known chehou was Ying Zheng‟s 嬴政 regent Lü Buwei 呂不韋. After his death in 
235 BC the young Qin king took the reins of power into his own hands and was careful not to 
lose them again. Powerful nobles with certain rights over part of the state territory were 
perceived as a potential threat to central authority of the king and later the emperor and the 
chehou rank therefore practically ceased to be used.
62
 
It was only with the establishment of the Han dynasty and gradual emergence of the 
new ennoblement system when the chehou and later even other jue ranks (especially the 
                                                 
60
 Bielenstein, Hans (1980): p. 105; For more detailed information on the Han imperial princes, the system of 
princely fiefs and its later development see Hrubý, Jakub (2007): pp. 33-35. 
61
 For discussion of the exact dating see Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 47. 
62
 Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 38. 
36 
guanneihou 關内侯) were reintroduced as the lesser grades of the titled nobility of the unified 
empire. Therefore, the Han marquises were at least institutionally direct descendants of the 
Qin highest titled nobility. The designation, however, was changed from chehou to tonghou 
通侯 and later liehou 列侯, which became the term generally used for lower titled nobility 
during the whole medieval period.
63
  
Important feature of the fengjue system, presumably inherited, from its Qin 
antecedents, was that the liehou neither exercised any direct control over the territory which 
had been nominally given to them as their “fief” or apanage, nor administered directly state 
tax-paying households (hu 戶) who were assigned to a respective title holder and who handed 
in certain portion of their taxes as his annual income. The system thus was no alternative to 
the centralized state administration (junxian zhidu 郡縣制度) and worked within the system 
of local and regional government. The so called fiefs were just another form of commanderies 
or prefectures temporarily assigned to certain individuals but administered centrally as any 
other comparable unit of local administration. I am saying temporarily because any of the 
noble lines might have died out at any moment or the title could have been attainted for crime 
or misbehavior of its holder and the territory turned once again into a proper commandery or 




The size of a marquisate was determined by relative merits of a marquis to be and his 
services rendered to the crown. The greater the services, the bigger the apanage assigned, one 
prefecture being the norm for larger fiefs. The smaller fiefs usually consisted of only one 
township (xiang 鄉) or a mere village (ting 亭, also translated as neighborhood), however 
technically speaking these titles were not differentiated and all title holders were known as 
liehou, regardless of the actual size of their respective fiefs.
65
 The size of an administrative 
territory is after all rather misleading as the actual size of the apanage is expressed in number 
of households whose taxes are assigned as an income of the title holder. By the time of 
Emperor Wudi the government gave up on measuring the fiefs in terms of land and territory. 
Fluctuation of the population upset the state-ordained hierarchy of the marquisates and 
affected the fiefs in positive or negative way to such an extent that nominal holder of a small 
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yet populous township could have consequently enjoyed greater income than someone with a 
large but depopulated prefecture. Relative hierarchy of merit was thereby seriously 
jeopardized. As the clearly defined proportionality between service (merit) and reward 
(apanage) which should have stimulated loyalty and diligence of government officials was 
one of the raisons d‟etre of the whole system, the territory-based grants were gradually 
abandoned for precise and rigid household allotment quotas which became the norm of all 
future systems of ennoblement. This change allowed government to use whole system more 
flexibly. Even though the fengjue system knew no formal distinction between the various 
liehou title holders, the subtle distinctions still could be maintained in terms of income. 
Number of tax-paying households became an indicator of relative standing within the liehou 
group. The household grants attached to a title could be further modified, either increased or 
decreased depending on official or military service of the respective liehou. On the one hand, 
loyal service and unyielding support of the dynasty could be fostered and rewarded by 
increasing household allotment, on the other hand trespassing the law or being negligent in 




As in the case of the original Qin cijue ranks the merit (gong 功) remained the crucial 
condition sine qua non for ennoblement and acquiring a marquisate. The most important 
group among the liehou title holders thus were the meritorious ministers (gongchen 功臣). As 
there was no greater merit than assisting with the founding of the new dynasty, these men 
acquired position of great social preeminence and quite often also considerable political 
power. The liehou title was kind of mark of favor, indicator of their social status and at the 
same time tangible reward for rather symbolic debt the dynasty and its rulers owned to the 
meritorious ministers. The gongchen were sort of founding members of the dynasty, close 
colleagues, loyal advisors and valiant commanders of the dynastic founder without whose 
help the great enterprise of establishing new dynasty could have never been achieved. Their 
valuable contribution to the enterprise merited reward and gratitude of not only the dynastic 
founder himself, but also of all the emperors to come, as they remained constantly obliged to 
them for the very throne they sat upon. This bond of obligation was symbolically expressed in 
granting the liehou marquisate, high distinction in itself, given in appreciation of the services 
rendered, but also highly valuable means how to maintain stable social position of the 
gongchen family as it secured privileged social and economical position for gongchen‟s 
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descendants, for all the liehou titles were hereditary. Ideally the noble lineages established 
through creating a liehou dignity were meant to last indefinitely, practically speaking, the title 
was to be inherited from generation to generation as long as the dynasty lasts, thereby 
reminding the reigning emperors of the meritorious deeds of their ancestors.
67
 
Awarding of noble titles did not stop with the founding of the dynasty. Later emperors 
of course used the same system to reward their own efficient and loyal servants, however, the 
merits of ministers and generals ennobled later during the dynasty generally tended to be 
considered less important than those of gongchen. At the same time the category of merit was 
somewhat abstract and consequentially highly ascriptive in nature. Services rendered to the 
emperor himself or those who ruled in his name were various indeed, ranging from leading 
military campaigns to offering advice in crucial problem of the state ritual to serving the 
emperor in the private quarters of the imperial palace. No wonder that especially towards the 
end of the Eastern Han (Dong Han 東漢, 23-220 AD) creating and undoing of the liehou 
marquises tend to reflect the political infighting of the court factions. Prevailing practice of 
awarding marquisates to imperial favorites (enzehou 恩澤侯 ) and members of consort 
families (waiqihou 外戚侯) closely mirrors the political ascendance of the inner court.68 This 
trend is especially obvious in highly unorthodox bestowal of the liehou titles on the palace 
eunuchs and creation of eunuch marquisates (huanzhehou 宦者侯) practiced during the reigns 
of the last Han emperors. As the grant of a liehou title presumed the continuation of the title 
in an unbroken line of hereditary succession, this late Han practice virtually encouraged the 
emergence of powerful mock or adoptive eunuch families which dominated the court politics 
at the end of the Han.
69
 
The last group within the Han liehou were the royal marquises (wangzihou 王子侯) 
which started to appear during the reigns of Emperors Jingdi 景帝 (156-141 BC) and Wudi. 
The process of transformation of the princely fiefs from semi-independent border 
principalities to more or less centrally-administered apanages was only gradual. It is true that 
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the non-royal kings were replaced by princes of the blood soon after the founding of the 
dynasty, but the problems of control remained and the situation progressively worsened with 
every new generation as the main imperial line of succession and old established princely 
houses grew more and more distant. The power struggle between the main imperial line and 
collateral branches of the Liu house resulted in series of insurrections which culminated in the 
Rebellion of the Seven Princes (qi wang zhi luan 七王之亂) in 154 BC during the reign of 
Emperor Jingdi. The imperial line prevailed and ambitious princes were quickly defeated and 
summarily dealt with. But their defeat had some recuperation for the whole system. Surviving 
princely fiefs were drastically reduced and all the rights over the land and people withdrawn. 
Jingdi„s successor Wudi continued the policy of weakening the collateral branches of 
the imperial house. In 127 BC
70
 the emperor ordered that all sons of princes were to become 
marquises in their own right. In doing so Wudi just enlarged the scope of well established 
“special grace” (tui‟en 推恩) policy which combined the rules of inheritance of the princely 
fiefs with the bestowal of the liehou titles. Previously the central government tried to curb 
power of the princely fiefs by introducing special grace policy. Whenever a prince died his 
eldest son was allowed to inherit the title and the apanage, but one of the prefectures of the 
original fief was to be actually singled out and given to a younger son of the deceased prince 
who had been, by a special grace, ennobled as a marquis of said prefecture. Wudi‟s seemingly 
generous gesture aimed at serious disruption of family ties within princely lines. Once the 
younger sons were given opportunity to establish their own hereditary lines, they were no 
longer willing to act in the best interests of the princely line as a whole. Even though the 
prefectures given by the crown as new marquisates were actually to be found mostly outside 
the original fief and therefore brothers did not necessarily become rivals for their father‟s 
heritage, the family ties and loyalties loosened because the interests of the new marquises laid 
elsewhere. As the marquisates were under direct control of the central government and the 
special grace policy periodically reduced size of the princely domains with every single 
father-to-son transmission, diminishing their ability to rebel against the court, the collateral 
branches of the imperial house ceased to be a threat to the central government.
71
  
There were some one hundred seventy eight marquisates bestowed on sons of the 
princes during Wudi‟s reign alone
72
 and this number must have increased even more during 
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the reigns of Wudi‟s successors. The royal marquises undoubtedly represent the majority of 
all the liehou titles awarded during the whole dynasty with meritorious ministers, victorious 
commanders, imperial in-laws and members of the consort clans, various favorites and palace 
eunuchs lagging far behind in numbers. 
  The liehou was not the only rank of the Qin cijue which was adopted by the Han. The 
second highest rank of guanneihou 關内侯 (i.e. the 19th rank of the original twenty) was used 
side by side with liehou titles as kind of honorary distinction. The literary meaning of this Qin 
title is “marquis within the passes” where guannei 關内 (within the passes) stands for the 
royal domain of Guanzhong 關中, roughly corresponding to the present day province of 
Shaanxi. The Wei River valley and adjacent regions formed the central core of the Qin realm 
and were known as the royal domain (wangji 王畿). No fiefs were ever established in this 
area which was constantly under the direct rule of the royal court in Xianyang. The 
guanneihou were no exception to this rule. The very designation of guannei differentiated 
their holders from the group of chehou, the highest social rank of the Qin empire, who were 
given certain territories as their fiefs and apanages. Whereas the chehou could be considered 
as marquis proper, the guanneihou were only titular marquises, the mere nominal lords with 
no right over land and people living on a stipend paid by the central government from the 
taxes collected from the tax-paying households of the royal domain.
73
  
The same held true for the guanneihou during the Han. Unlike the liehou titles, the 
guanneihou went without any noble style, reference to a territory or administrative unit within 
the empire, as their apanages were connected with no particular place and gradually turned 
into a stable income paid on a monthly basis resembling wages paid to regular government 
officials and court dignitaries. As they were qualitatively different from the liehou I prefer to 
avoid the misleading term “marquis” used in their title and shall translate the guanneihou as 
the “lord of the royal domain.” It seems that the lords of the royal domain were created only 
for life and their titles were not hereditary, at least not during the Han dynasty.
74
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The Cao Wei Dynasty (220-265 AD) 
 
With the fall of the Han in 220 AD a short period of disunion commenced known as 
Three Kingdoms (Sanguo 三國). The unified empire split into three independent states: Wei 
魏, occupying the Central plain in the north, Shu 蜀 in the present day Sichuan and Wu 吳
lying in relatively peripheral region south of the Yangzi River. All three kingdoms sooner or 
later claimed the supreme authority of the son of heaven for themselves and therefore tried to 
recreate the administration and institutions of the Han court including their systems of 
ennoblement. The commitment with which they undertook this task was of utmost importance 
in the strife-ridden world of three rival regimes fighting for supremacy, because in doing so 
they were assuming the position of the rightful heirs of the Han imperial legacy which gave 
them much needed political legitimacy.   
All three regimes adopted the original Han system of two noble ranks, princes and 
liehou, however they did not use it in the same way. Moreover, the Han system itself 
underwent some changes during the Eastern Han, developing more diverse hierarchy within 
the established ranks. The highest rank of the princes remained more or less the same and the 
Eastern Han emperors usually applied time-proven policies which had been devised by 
Emperor Wudi in the 2
nd
 century BC. But the lower rank of the liehou was gradually divided 
into hierarchically distinct grades which corresponded to the size of an apanage bestowed on 
title holders. The differences between the liehou title holders apparently became too great and 
called for better-expressed distinctions than the rather shadowy inner hierarchy of precedence 
based solely on number of allotted households. The liehou rank was officially divided into 
three separate ranks of “prefecture marquis” (xianhou 縣侯), “township marquis” (xianghou 
鄉侯) and “village marquis” (tinghou 亭侯). Even though these ranks corresponded roughly 
to the actual size of the apanage, the apanage itself was by no means determined by the rank, 
as we know of some gongchen prefecture marquisates having been created after the 
restoration of the Han dynasty by Emperor Guangwudi 光武帝 (25-57 AD) holders of which 
enjoyed income from two, four or six prefectures at the same time.
75
 The absence of 
prescribed household quotas still provided enough maneuvering space within limits of each 
new rank as to allow rather nuanced appraisal of individual merit of respective meritorious 
ministers. 
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It seems that in case of Wu and Shu the system was adopted with no substantial 
change. However, we are lacking comprehensive account of many of their institutions and the 
evidence in surviving historical sources is rather scant and circumstantial.
76
 We can surmise 
that both regimes enfeoffed their royal offspring as princes and used three ranks of the liehou 
as a means how ho reward loyalty of their non-royal subjects. Apparently, both regimes were 
somewhat constrained in terms of their resources. Both of them were situated in the regions 
considered under the Han to be on the periphery of the empire. The area under the state 
control was therefore limited and both courts could not afford to lose too much territory and 
prospective tax income even if it were in barter for loyal support of its military commanders 
and local leaders. Thus the prefecture marquisates were bestowed only rarely as a mark of the 
highest favor and the township and village marquisates remained the most usual form of noble 
title used until the end of the Shu and Wu in 264 AD and 280 AD respectively.
77
  
In case of the third regime, the Wei, we are somewhat better informed due to the fact 
that the dynasty was seen as a link in the chain of legitimate succession going from the Han to 
the Tang and therefore received much more attention than her less fortunate rivals. 
Nevertheless even in the case of Wei we have to rely on circumstantial evidence and infer the 
form of the whole system from more or less unrelated mentions. It seems clear that Cao Cao, 
founder of the Wei imperial house, pondered great institutional reform of restoring the 
original noble titles used during the Zhou, the so called “five ranks” (wudeng 五等), as new 
peerage strata of nobility. However, for the reasons as yet unclear the whole project 
eventually did not materialize and five ranks had to wait another five decades before the 
Simas brought them again back to life. Despite the abandoning the recreation of the peerage 
scheme Cao Cao did at least partially revive some of its features. Before long, he adopted the 
ducal title (highest of the five ranks) for himself and established dukedom of Wei in 213 AD 
which became the political and institutional base of the prepared dynastic transition.
78
 His 
successors used various varieties of the ducal title such as “domain duke” (guogong 國公), 
“commandery duke” (jungong 郡公), “prefecture duke” (xiangong 縣公) and “township 
duke” (xianggong 鄉公), but these were reserved for the princes of the blood and members of 
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the imperial house. Other five ranks titles were used sporadically and apparently simply on an 
ad hoc basis.
79
     
Apart from appropriating for himself the highest possible distinction opened to non-
royal commoners Cao Cao also expanded the lower end of the noble hierarchy in 215 AD by 
introducing four new ranks which stood just below the guanneihou. These were the “lord of 
renown” (minghaohou 名號侯), the “lord inside the passes” (guanzhonghou 關中侯), the 
“lord outside the passes” (guanwaihou 關外侯) and the “noble lord” (wudafu 五大夫). As in 
the case of guanneihou, they all derived from the original Qin system of personal ranks (cijue) 






 and the 15
th
 grade respectively. These titles 
were meant to be personal distinctions, honorary ennoblement with no claim to territory or 
apanage and as such they were not heritable and did not provide title holder with any stable 
income. Therefore they were known as honorary or empty ennoblement (xufeng 虛封).80 
Nevertheless even the empty ennoblement could bring assets, which might have been less 
material and tangible, yet essential for entering the elite circles and surviving in them. Social 
prestige, higher official rank and formal precedence were of utmost importance at every royal 
and imperial court and made the empty ennoblements valuable prizes to be sought after. 
Expanding the noble hierarchy and especially creating new noble distinctions at the bottom 
end of the hierarchy on the one hand enabled Cao Cao to meet the expectations of the loyal 
followers and satisfy their hunger for rewards, promotions and distinctions. On the other hand, 
it greatly reduced the risks of another court family becoming unduly powerful through its 
service to the dynasty. Cao Cao in the name of the puppet emperor successfully performed 
“constitutional” duty of the sovereign who should evaluate individual merits of his subjects 
and bestow generous rewards accordingly, without actually jeopardizing his regent position at 
the imperial court by creating future possible rivals which would inadvertently happen if Cao 
Cao would have stuck to the unaltered system. 
Cao Cao‟s innovations were readily used by his successors, especially his son Cao Pi 
曹丕 who shortly after his father‟s death ascended the imperial throne as Emperor Wendi 文
帝 (reigned 220-226 AD) of the newly established Wei dynasty. Cao Pi‟s path to the throne 
wasn‟t as straightforward as he would have wished for. Cao Cao could not make up his mind 
as to which of his sons should succeed to the royal throne of Wei and thereby get the chance 
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to become the founding emperor of the new dynasty.
81
 Cao Cao‟s vacillation in naming his 
heir and successor had negative impact on the whole family and its cohesiveness. His sons 
vied with each other for father‟s favor and viewed each other as rivals and potential threat to 
the future well-being of themselves and their families. The result of this unfortunate 
development was deep mistrust which the new emperor Wendi felt towards his closest 
relatives. This mistrust later on bordering on paranoia created an atmosphere of universal and 
constant fear which expressed itself also in strict policy of deliberate reduction of the cadet 
branches to impoverished state pensioners in virtual house arrest living far from the court 
under the vigilant surveillance of the court authorities with all their crimes and misdeeds, no 
matter whether imagined or real, being swiftly dealt with in the sternest possible way.
82
   
The Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi 三國志) chronicle summarizes the 
plight of the imperial kin under the Wei as follows: 
 
“The princes and dukes of the Wei possessed their fiefs in name only. There were no 
real altars of grain and soil. Moreover, they were closely watched and separated [from the 
world/from one another] as if they were in prison. Their standing and titles were not firmly 
defined, once high, once low, changing [as the occasion arose] during the years. [The emperors 
of the Wei] turned their back on the kin [of their own] flesh and blood and discarded the 




Pei Songzhi„s 裴松之 commentary to the Sanguozhi paints even more vivid picture of 
the Cao Wei system:   
 
“When the Wei dynasty arose, it succeeded the [period] of great disorder. The 
population decreased so it was not possible to begin [to rule in the manner of] the old. Hence, 
when the marquises and princes were enfeoffed, they were given their territories in name only, 
not in reality. The princely domain was to have [mere] one hundred odd old soldiers for its 
defense. Despite their titles of princes and marquises, [the imperial kin] were basically the same 
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as ordinary people. The prefectures [where the fiefs were situated] were thousands of li away 
[from the capital] and no annual audiences were organized. It was even not possible to visit or 
to communicate with one another in neighboring fiefs. When the lords (zhuhou 諸侯) hunted 
they were not allowed to distance themselves more than thirty li [from their fief]. Moreover, 
there were special offices of Guardians (fangfu 防輔) and Keepers of the Fief (jianguo 監國) 
established to spy on them. The princes and the marquises remembered [with nostalgia the times 
when they were mere] commoners but they could not achieve it. Thus [the Wei] defied the 
principle of the kin fiefs shielding and protecting [the throne] and harmed the favor of close 
relatives of [the same] flesh and blood.
84
       
 
Wendi was afraid of the influence of his brothers and other male relatives which they 
might have exercised at court. Immediately after the accession ceremony the new princes of 
the blood were sent to their nominal marquisates they had held already since the end of the 
Han and it was only two years after the establishing of the dynasty that Wendi brought 
himself to promote his brothers as befitted their new standing of imperial kin. In 222 AD 
Wendi enfeoffed all his brothers and sons as princes and introduced new code according to 
which the princely dignity was heritable only in the main primogeniturial line of descent: 
 
“In the third year of the Huangchu Era (222 AD) during the reign of the Wei Emperor 
Wendi it was first decreed that younger sons and sons of concubines of the enffeofed princes 
should become township dukes (xianggong 鄉公) and younger sons and sons of concubines of 
the princes-inheritors shell be named village marquises (tinghou 亭侯). Younger sons and sons 
of concubines of the dukes and marquises shell be named village counts (tingbo 亭伯).”85 
 
Younger sons of the founding prince (i.e. the prince who was first enfeoffed) were to 
become prefecture dukes (xiangong) whereas the younger sons of the princes in second, third 
and any other generations were given only considerably less glamorous title of a village 
marquis (tinghou). Younger sons of the prefecture dukes were only entitled to even lesser title 
of a village count (tingbo 亭伯).86   
The weakening of cadet branches policy had a direct impact on the practice of 
bestowing lesser noble titles of liehou marquises and lords. The governmental effort to 
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deprive the princes of any means of support and independent power tended to relegate them to 
the lower rungs of noble hierarchy. There were even general demotions from princes to 
marquises and then back again. Yet the formal insurmountable distinction of the imperial 
house and members of other, non-royal families had to be maintained. The same 
considerations of national security and safety of the throne and the main line of imperial 
succession which prompted the harsh measures taken against emperor‟s relatives also dictated 
caution in dealing with non-royal members of the elite. The meritorious ministers and 
efficient servants of the dynasty had to be suitably rewarded for their efforts but by no means 
could the imperial court allow them to grow more powerful then the imperial clan itself. 
Logical consequence of the downgrading trend practiced in case of princes was the 
corresponding downward shift of the lesser ranks of nobility.  
As the ranks of princes and still not fully developed peerage were practically reserved 
for the offspring of the imperial clan, courtiers and ministers could only hope for the liehou 
marquisates. However, in reality only the township and village marquisates were regularly 
bestowed on the Wei subjects, the highest rank of prefecture marquis was singled out as a 
mark of special prestige and conferred rather infrequently. Instead, Wendi could use whole 
new range of honorary empty ennoblement titles resurrected by his father in 215 AD. These 
lordships (guanneihou, minghaohou, guanzhonghou, guanwaihou or wudafu) were probably 
the more common noble titles used during the Wei. It was only with gradual rise to power of 
the regent house of Sima 司馬氏 during the later reigns of the Wei that the court families 
asserted themselves and started to hope for greater distinctions as they sensed the impending 
dynastical change. The whole process is inextricably intertwined with the gradual usurpation 
of the Simas and shell be dealt with shortly. But before we actually broach on the topic of 










Tab. 1: Noble titles used under the Wei Dynasty
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grades of nobility ranks within grades 
princes commandery prince (junwang 郡王) 
prefecture prince (xianwang 縣王) 
peerage
88
 domain duke (guogong 國公) 
commandery duke (jungong 郡公) 
prefecture duke (xiangong 縣公) 
township duke (xianggong 鄉公) 
village count (tingbo 亭伯)89 
lords (liehou 列侯)90 prefecture marquis (xianhou 縣侯) 
township marquis (xianghou 鄉侯) 
village marquis (tinghou 亭侯) 
honorary lordships (xufeng 虛封) lord of the royal domain  
(guanneihou 關内侯) 
lord of renown (minghaohou 名號侯) 
lord inside the passes  
(guanzhonghou 關中侯) 
lord outside the passes (guanwaihou 關外侯) 
noble lord (wudafu 五大夫) 
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The Rise of the Sima Regency and Establishment of the Peerage in 264 AD 
 
Wei Wendi‟s harsh policy of demeaning the closest imperial relatives did succeed in 
securing the throne against possible threats from unduly ambitious princes of the blood. 
Isolated in their distant fiefs, barred from entering the presence without official summon and 
thwarted in any attempt to communicate with each other, brothers and sons of the Wei 
emperors lived in constant fear of punishment, degradation, and often even physical 
elimination under the watchful eye of the imperial representatives who virtually ruled their 
fiefs and the princes themselves. As their survival was totally dependent on mercy of the 
emperor and his representatives, they had no means to organize a coup or conspire against the 
throne. By depriving the imperial kin of its traditionally sanctioned and defined role the 
imperial line had to fight for itself in constant political struggle at court. Wendi and his 
successors had to rely on distaff relatives and loyal retainers as a replacement of the lacking 
support with dire consequences which proved to be fatal for the survival of the dynasty. Once 
these retainers decided to follow their own interests, the dynasty was left defenseless and it 
became just the matter of time before the new imperial house came to the throne.  
  The foundations of the new dynasty were laid soon after the demise of Emperor 
Wendi by Sima Yi 司馬懿, influential courtier and trusted servant of the Wei emperors. Sima 
Yi started his official career by entering the private administration of the then counselor-in-
chief (chengxiang 丞相) Cao Cao. Later he was assigned to the Eastern Palace of the Wei 
where he was to wait on Cao Cao‟s heir apparent Cao Pi 曹丕. Befriending the prince, Sima 
Yi‟s star consequently began to rise once Cao Pi ascended the imperial throne in 220 AD. In 
couple of years Sima Yi had risen to the position of one of the highest ministers of the court 
and when Wendi was dying he was one of four relatives and loyal retainers entrusted with 
care of young Emperor Mingdi 明帝 (227-240 AD).91 
 Sima Yi‟s influence at court steadily increased due to the military victories he had 
achieved during the campaigns against the state of Shu and the independent enclave of the 
Gongsun 公孫氏 family in Liaodong 遼東. The prestige of the victorious military commander 
helped the ambitious minister to consolidate his position in the politics of the court and his 
actual presence in the field enabled Sima Yi to forge quite strong bonds of loyalty with 
various officers and generals under his command. Yet his personal influence still did not 
challenge directly the power of the throne as there were other great ministers and military 
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leaders around the throne and Emperor Mingdi himself was quite capable ruler. Everything 
changed in 240 AD when Mingdi named in his testament edict Sima Yi to be one of the two 
regents for his young adoptive successor Cao Fang, Prince of Qi 齊王曹芳. Mingdi was 
following the time-proven policy of circumventing the imperial kin as the safest way how to 
secure the line of primogeniturial succession as neither Sima Yi, nor his co-regent Cao 
Shuang 曹爽 were related by blood to the imperial house. Strictly speaking, Cao Shuang was 
considered to be a member of the imperial house but in fact he had been adopted into the Cao 
family long before the appointment to the regency. All his possible claims to the throne would 
be therefore necessarily considered null and void and this fact naturally made him suitable 
and harmless choice in the eyes of the dying emperor. But Mingdi made serious 
miscalculation. The circumstances of the regencies were quite different and what had worked 
at the time of his own accession was not going to work now, because unlike himself, his 
successor was a minor of mere eight years unable to challenge the powerful regents.
92
 
It seemed that Cao Shuang gained the upper hand. Sima Yi had withdrawn from the 
court politics and did not pay attention to the state affairs. Claiming to be gravely ill he was 
carefully bidding his time. The opportune moment came in 229 AD when the young emperor 
left the imperial capital of Luoyang to visit the Gaoping Tumulus (Gaopingling 高平陵), 
tomb of his predecessor Mingdi outside the city walls. While Cao Shuang and his supporters 
accompanied the emperor, Sima Yi was free to secure control over the troops of the capital 
garrison and guards of the imperial palace. As the imperial entourage performed the rituals at 
Mingdi‟s tomb, the empress dowager was forced to issue an edict depriving Cao Shuang and 
his brothers of all their offices and military command over the municipal garrison. Cao 
Shuang was unable to react and use the august person of the emperor as a weapon against 
Sima Yi. He was arrested as soon as he returned to the capital and later charged with treason 
and conspiracy against the sovereign majesty. Hapless regent was executed, his whole family 
annihilated and all his supporters dismissed from their official posts.
93
 
The so called Gaoping Tumulus coup was one of the first actual steps of the Sima 
family towards the throne but their position vis-à-vis other court families and forces loyal the 
Wei dynasty was by no means secure. It took another seventeen years of careful political 
maneuvering to accomplish the great enterprise of replacing the imperial house of Cao. Sima 
Yi himself died in 251 AD to be succeeded by his equally capable sons Sima Shi 司馬師 and 
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Sima Zhao 司馬昭 who in turn acted as regents to the Wei emperors and heads of the Sima 
house and faction at court. Both brothers did not hesitate to play the role of a kingmaker 
whenever the imperial puppet showed the slightest signs of acting independently or being 
under influence of a rival court faction. Thus Sima Shi deposed Prince of Qi in 254 AD 
following the revealing of a conspiracy of distaff imperial relatives against the regent and put 
on the throne young Cao Mao 曹髦, township duke of Gaogui 高貴鄉公. Six years later Cao 
Mao again tried to rid himself of the domineering regent only to be killed during the fight in 
the precincts of the imperial palace. The unfortunate death of the sovereign was a severe blow 
for the Sima cause as the heinous crime of regicide seriously jeopardized legitimate claims to 
the throne which the Simas had earned so far. But quick and clever manipulation of the facts 
saved the day. The dead emperor was officially declared corrupt and vicious, allegedly trying 
to kill his adoptive mother, the empress dowager, and committing other offences of gross 
misdemeanor threatening the well being of the state. Regicide was thus presented as a 
necessary preventive measure sanctioned by an edict of empress dowager, forged without 
doubt, which ordered Cao Mao‟s deposition. Following in the footsteps of his brother, Sima 




Even though the above described political crisis showed the growing strength of the 
Sima faction it would be mistaken to view them simply as victories pushing the Sima cause 
nearer its ultimate goal of establishing new dynasty. In fact each deposition was potentially 
harmful to the Sima cause as it showed the inability of the regents to manipulate sufficiently 
the puppet emperor and instigate the abdication. Instead, their effort to raise an obedient 
puppet who would eventually hand over the mandate of heaven was time and again frustrated 
by unwillingness of the young sovereigns to become reconciled to the fate of the dynasty as 
conceived by the Simas. However, the firmer the position of the Simas, the less support the 
ruler could hope for. As the political and military influence of the Sima steadily grew the Wei 
emperors lost all support and their resistance became pointless. The Sima usurpation was long 
and gradual process in which the violent clashes and actual fighting were rather rare.  
By the second half of the 3
rd
 century the usurpation was already more or less well 
established process with a set of certain fixed rules dictated by tradition and precedence. 
Wang Mang 王莽 (9-23 AD) and Cao Cao set an example for peaceful dynastic transition 
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which became a viable alternative to usual bloody and violent overthrowing of a dynasty by 
sheer military force accomplished in the manner of Zhou and Han dynastic founders.
95
 Actual 
abdication of the dynasty and transmission of authority and legitimacy to the new imperial 
house was the climax of a long process of usurpation during which the new masters were 
gradually building their supremacy trying to convince the court and provinces that the tide 
had changed and the mandate of heaven was going to be given to a new ruling house. As we 
have seen in the case of the Simas, it was rather delicate process during which the contender 
for the throne had to carefully orchestrate and manipulate the portents and auguries of heaven 
and emulate the ritual practices set by the precedents of the past, building a sequence of 
evidence which should attest to gradual shift of heaven‟s favor and impeding change of the 
heaven‟s mandate. Manipulating, interpreting and fabricating portents as well as repeating 
certain rituals connected with founding of the dynasties allowed for legitimacy to be gradually 
transferred from one ruling house to another. By going through the whole process of this 
ritual and political game, the usurpation became a legitimate succession of its own kind with 
both parties voluntarily acknowledging the will of heaven. By actual performance of the 
abdication ceremony both parties were accepting the change of heaven‟s mandate; one by 
willingly resigning the throne, the other by ascending it and founding new imperial dynasty. 
Establishment of the five ranks peerages (wudengzhi 五等制) must be viewed as an 
integral part of the whole usurpation process, one of several ritual steps taken on the path to 
the throne. Its timing was not accidental and coincided with crucial stage in the usurpation 
following the subjugation of the rival state of Shu in 263 AD: 
 
“In the fourth year of the Jingyuan Era (263/264 AD) … the eleventh month: Since 
Deng Ai and Zhong Hui led their armies to attack the state of Shu, wherever they went, they 
were victorious. In the same month Liu Shan, Lord of Shu, went to Deng Ai and surrendered. 




“In the fourth year of the Jingyuan Era (263/264 AD) … in the eleventh month Deng Ai 
led more than ten thousand men from Yinping through forbidding and inaccessible [terrain until 
they] arrived at Jiangyou. [Later he] crushed the Shu general Zhuge Zhan at Mianzhu, cut his 
head off and had it sent to the imperial capital. [Then] he advanced with the army to Luoxian 
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and Liu Shan (the emperor of Shu) surrendered [to him]. The son of heaven ordered the duke of 
Jin (Sima Zhao) to supervise all the affairs of state as councilor-in-chief (xiangguo 相國)… .”
97
    
 
The conquest of Shu was beyond doubt crucial moment for the future of the Sima 
cause. Sima Zhao had carefully planned the whole campaign as a way how to bolster his 
position vis-à-vis the ruling house of Cao, because the eventual victory would provide 
necessary drive for overcoming last obstacles on his quest for throne. While two loyal Sima 
partisans Zhong Hui 鍾會  and Deng Ai 鄧艾  were fighting their way through the Shu 
defenses in direction of Chengdu 成都, Sima Zhao took the emperor and settled temporarily 
in Chang‟an 長安 from where he supervised the military operations in Sichuan as the supreme 
commander-in-chief. When Shu finally surrendered at the beginning of 264 AD Sima Zhao 
could deservedly claim a lion‟s share of credit for the victory achieved as he had 
masterminded the whole project from the very beginning.
98
 The fall of Shu carried deep 
symbolic meaning, for it was no conquest of a mere rival state, but technically speaking 
subjugation of a rebellious part of the unified empire of the Han which had for decades 
challenged the legitimate authority of the Wei son of heaven. The victory over Shu thus 
crowned ceaseless endeavors of generations of Wei sovereigns and their Sima regents to 
eliminate the rebels and bring the territory of the present day Sichuan under their control. It 
attested to supreme military strength of the northern state but also, and more importantly, 
affirmed in the symbolic way the legitimate claim to the mandate of heaven as the only true 
heir of the Han predestined to rule all under heaven. Yet, because the present Wei emperor 
Cao Huan was still only an underage boy, all merit must therefore go to his regent and 
custodian Sima Zhao whose prospects of becoming the founder of a new dynasty were 
thereby greatly enhanced. For what else could better demonstrate whom the will of heaven 
favors as the next sovereign than a decisive military victory over Shu which had eluded even 
the founding emperors of the Wei, the victory which was in fact perceived as the beginning of 
the unification of the old empire.  
The court and emperor duly acknowledged the implicit meaning of the conquest of 
Shu and Sima Zhao‟s status was raised to unprecedented height:          
 
“In the first year of the Xianxi era (264 AD) … in the third month … on the yimao day 
the Duke of Jin was promoted in rank to prince and enfeoffed with [territory of additional] ten 
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commanderies [to the ten which he had received previously as his ducal fief], twenty 
altogether … In summer, fifth month, on the day gengshen Councilor-in-chief, Prince of Jin, 
petitioned [the throne] to reinstate the five ranks peerages.”
99
   
 
As we can see from the chronicle, the establishment of the five ranks peerages was 
directly connected with the important change of status of Sima Zhao. Indeed, the connection 
was not only temporal but causal as well. By accepting the princely enfeoffment Sima Zhao 
made another direct step towards usurpation, but this time he reached the point of no return. 
The sheer size of the princely fief was simply overwhelming. No other prince could command 
so large a territory with so many households, not even father of the ruling emperor, Prince of 
Yan.
100
 Yet the change in regent‟s standing was even more conspicuous. By becoming Prince 
of Jin Sima Zhao obviously challenged the unwritten law that only princes of the blood are 
entitled to the princely dignity. Powerful minister was now stepping over the theoretically 
insurmountable boundary line, symbolically moving from the level of subjects to that of the 
royalty. Moreover, as the territory assigned to the newly created non-royal prince was 
enormous, the imperial edict practically sanctioned formation of a semi-independent political 
entity, a state within the state. Sima Zhao was promoted beyond established political order 
and social hierarchy and with emperor‟s willing consent used some of the prerogatives 
normally reserved for the imperial majesty. Originally Sima Zhao had long declined even the 
lesser dignity of a duke which the court repeatedly conferred on him. Being aware of the 
gravity of such an appointment and all its connotations he was always at pains to profess his 
modesty and humility in rejecting the honors. Yet, the successful campaign in Shu changed 
everything. Sure of himself and confident of his position at court Sima Zhao accepted first 
ducal and later princely title and embarked on the last stage of the usurpation process.  
One of the most important features of the gradual usurpation, beside portents, military 
victories, and empowerment rituals (accepting the higher noble titles of a duke or prince as 
well as the so called Nine Distinctions),
101
 was the need for institutional reform, often rather 
formal attempt to recreate a well known institution or institutions of old which would add 
legitimacy to a usurper by putting him on par with the glorious kings of the Zhou dynasty. 
Creation of the princely fief for the usurper called for building of new administration which 
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would in turn become the basis for future government structure of the new dynasty which was 
to be established shortly. Creating brand new administrative structure independent of the 
current state bureaucracy offered the right opportunity to introduce certain administrative and 
institutional changes. The most important aspect of the whole process was that the usurper 
was not simply a reformer. Reform of certain shortcomings in the administrative practice of 
the ruling dynasty might have been commendable and even highly useful for the future, but 
such an act was not charged with badly needed legitimacy. As Carl Leban observed, “While 
there may be simpler political motives for restoring archaic institutions, it seems plausible that 
such acts are also frequent ritual ornaments of usurpation. Their psychological function is to 
make the usurper to appear a restorationist rather than an innovator.”
102
 By formally 
recreating an institution of glorious and morally impeccable past the usurper implied moral 
deficiency and institutional or administrative inadequacy of their predecessors on the throne. 
At the same time the institutional reform or institutional restoration so to speak could be 
viewed as a pledge for the future, hinting at the possible revival of the golden era of the 
ancient sages. Both aspects naturally strengthened usurper‟s position and provided certain 
kind of legitimacy for his new regime. Even though there were probably diverse reasons why 
Sima Zhao at the given moment thought it prudent to restore the five ranks peerages, however, 




“In the first year of the Xianxi era (264/265 AD) … in autumn, the seventh month Sima 
Zhao petitioned [the throne and suggested that] the Minister of Works (sikong 司空) Xun Yi 
[should] decide on the rites and ceremonies, the Capital Protector (zhonghujun 中護軍) Jia 
Chong [should] rectify the laws and regulations, the Vice Director of the Department of State 
Affairs (shangshu puye 尚書僕射) Pei Xiu [should] deliberate on the official system and the 
Grand Guardian (taibao 太保) Zheng Chong [should] supervise their work and decide [the final 
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It appears that the restoration of the five grades peerages was the result of joint effort 
of the highest officials of the Wei court.
105
 However, not only were they working on 
instigation of Sima Zhao, but all of them belonged to the staunch supporters of the Sima cause. 
Their taking part in devising the new peerage system is therefore no coincidence and must be 
seen as part of the usurpation process. The verbs used in this chronicle entry for activities of 
the ministers are ding 定 (to settle or to decide), zheng 正 (to rectify) and yi 議 (to deliberate 
on, to discuss). These verbs by necessity imply some preexistent forms which could be 
decided on, rectified or deliberated upon, thereby strongly suggesting that the whole process 
was perceived more as a deliberation on and rectification of already existing rites, laws and 
administration rules than creating something new. Sima Zhao appeared to be simply restoring 
an ancient institution, closely following the examples set by Wang Mang and Cao Cao, the 
“model” usurpers of the past, albeit this very institution proved to be useful for more than one 
reason.     
As a matter of fact it was Wang Mang who first considered reviving the full-fledged 
five ranks peerage system.
106
 Unfortunately, we know next to nothing about this early attempt 
to explore potential of this ancient practice of the Zhou and we are unable to compare it to the 
system brought to life by Sima Zhao and his ambitions. Nevertheless it seems that in one 
respect both peerage systems had something in common and that is that they probably bore 
just very superficial resemblance to the original Zhou enfeoffment system, if indeed such has 
ever existed in the form described by surviving sources.
107
 Because despite the fact that both 
appeared to be restorations of an ancient practice, they were in fact brand new institutions 
garbed in obligatory rhetoric of institutional restoration but devised with current needs of the 
regime in mind.  
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The actual correspondence of the new system with original institution of the Zhou was 
irrelevant. It has been ages since the Zhou enfeoffment system was abolished by the First 
Emperor. It has become just a distant memory of more glorious past kept via Confucian 
orthodoxy and contemporary understanding of the system must have been rather vague at best. 
But the logic of the whole legitimating process was not in the reinstituted system and its 
relative correspondence to the original but in the restoration act itself by which the restorer 
was dubbed righteous Confucian sovereign and defender of Confucian orthodoxy. For 
acquiring necessary legitimacy it was essential to perform the act of restoration but the final 
form of the “restored” institution might have and often did differ from the original practice. 
Its actual usage was dictated by and at the same time catering to the current needs of the 
usurper‟s administration. Sima Zhao‟s five ranks peerage system was no different in this 
respect and many features of the new system emerged from the specific political situation at 
the court after the fall of Shu. Practical considerations of rewarding the victorious 
commanders and gathering tangible political and military support before the actual abdication 
took place were by no means less urgent than vindication of the intended change on the throne 
through symbolic restoration of the archaic institution.     
After the quick and almost unexpected success of the Shu campaign the Wei 
government and Sima administration in particular faced utterly practical problem how to 
reward victorious commanders and army officers who had taken part in the campaign. The 
conquest of Shu was epochal indeed in the context of the Three Kingdoms history and as this 
victory was achieved only thanks to valor and strong resolve of the army leaders, their merits 
were unprecedented as well and called for corresponding reward. But the current ennoblement 
system practiced under the Wei did not offer much space for adequate reward as the highest 
ranks were reserved for members of the imperial house and only non-royals who had ever 
reached for the highest liehou marquisates were only a handful of gongchen, meritorious 
ministers, who had helped to establish the dynasty at the beginning of the 3
rd
 century. 
Practically speaking, there were not many noble ranks opened to the non-royal 
courtiers and military commanders, certainly not enough to allow a fair appraisal of an 
individual merit of respective generals and officers. The ranks were too low for merits of such 
importance in the first place, and the absence of clearly defined inner hierarchy in terms of 
apanage territory and households made any effort to establish well balanced hierarchy of 
merit virtually impossible.
108
 Establishment of the five ranks peerages enabled Sima Zhao to 
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implement elaborate system of noble hierarchy which permitted better evaluation of the 
rendered services and detailed grading of rewards. The old liehou marquisates were not 
abolished but their relative standing sank as the five peerages were placed above them in the 
new order. Inner diversification of the ennoblement system and introduction of the new ranks 
facilitated a clearly defined hierarchy of ennoblement embodying clear equation between 
merit and corresponding reward. Such defining of the new scale of rewards of course must 
have had direct impact on the willingness of both civil and military staff of the Wei to serve 
and in fact should have influenced their performance in their respective offices and military 
posts. Whole system should have encouraged loyal service. Every single official of state knew 
what the reward of such a service was and could act accordingly. But it went without saying 
that as it were the Simas who ruled the court and decided about the rewards and ennoblement, 
it was also them and not the Wei emperor, who commanded the loyalties of those desiring 
promotion and nobility. The signal sent to the Wei administrative circles was clear. The Simas 
were the future and career success was possible only through loyal service to them. Whole 
system introduced in 264 AD was therefore highly useful to the Simas and proved to be of 
considerable importance during the following dynastic transition as many a Wei official 
reconsidered his options and joined the Sima cause.  
Winning support and allegiance through offering reward was just one aspect of the 
peerage reinstitution. No less important was strengthening the positions of the Sima partisans 
and the Sima cause itself. Reinstitution of the peerage permitted Sima Zhao and other leaders 
of the faction to promote the long time supporters to the ranks of peerage without causing too 
much alarm and undue disquiet at court. The wholesale creation of the new peers would under 
normal circumstances without doubt cause considerable outcry from the Wei loyalists. As the 
ennoblement was always inextricably connected to merit and service to the dynasty, 
promotion of the Sima partisans without proper cause would be questioned by many at court 
as unlawful and in doing so the regent would have trespassed on the authority of the sovereign 
and definitely overstepped his authority as subject of the dynasty. Premature renouncing of 
the role of dutiful and obedient subject to the emperor could endanger the delicate process of 
the gradual usurpation. After all, ennoblement of the Sima partisans by the Wei throne was 
hardly justifiable as it was a public knowledge to whom these men had so loyally served.  
The fall of Shu was an expedient excuse for conveniently circumventing these formal 
obstacles. By the 3
rd
 century the ennoblement still retained a strong innate connection to 
military exploits and feats of arms. This was especially the case of the liehou marquisates and 
lordship titles derived from ranks which the Qin originally awarded according to the number 
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of severed heads of the enemy. The merit necessary for obtaining such a title was understood 
to be primarily military in nature, gained at the battlefields in the skirmishes at the border, 
raids into the enemy territory or during punitive expeditions against the rebels. Given these 
well-known precedents the campaign against Shu therefore presented Sima Zhao with a great 
opportunity for strengthening the Sima cause through elevating official and social standing of 
his staunch supporters. Majority of the army leaders taking part in the expedition were loyal 
partisans of the Simas anyhow. And those who had remained at court and had not taken part 
in the actual fighting could always claim their share of credit for making advanced plans and 
organizing the logistic support from the rear.  
Up to the creation of peerages in 264 AD the majority of the Sima supporters held 
only minor lordships or lower liehou marquisates, if any at all.
109
 With new five ranks 
peerages at his disposal, Sima Zhao could at last promote all his supporters and consolidate 
position of his faction vis-à-vis the Wei gongchen and distaff relatives of the imperial house. 
At the same time the regent acquired the means with which he was finally able to fulfill the 
expectations of his supporters. For their loyal support was by no means unselfish. Fulfilling 
one‟s ambitions and gain a generous reward might have actually been one of the main 
objectives which made them support a rival claimant to the throne. As they were not counted 
among the meritorious ministers of the Wei, their social standing was somewhat lacking and 
their chance of successful career in a high court office was rather limited. Therefore they had 
staked everything on the Simas and hoped for better once their patrons get to the throne. A 
peerage or any other noble rank was obviously seen as a fitting reward for their effort 
bordering on treason. High risk should bring high profit and nobility was without doubt 
exactly the kind of reward these men longed for. Noble title secured both economic 
advantages in form of stable income provided by the assigned apanage, as well as social 
prestige and prominence in the court administration circles brought by the high official rank 
enjoyed by the title holders. The certain convergence of ennoblement system with 
bureaucratic systems of the government offices and official recruitment (the so called “Nine 
Ranks System” jiupinzhi 九品制) provided also hereditary privileged access to the court 
offices which greatly enhanced chances for long term survival of the family as a member of 
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social and political elite.
110
 The ennoblement became highly desirable and establishment of 
the five ranks peerages was intended, among other things, to meet this pressing demand. 
The Sima partisans were not alone in benefitting from the innovation of the 
ennoblement system. The introduction of the peerages did not limit itself to creating new titles 
for military leaders of the Shu campaign. It brought about systematic revision of all current 
noble titles and their potential adjustment in order to correspond to the new creations made 
after the fall of Shu, which often meant promotion of an original Wei liehou marquisate to 
one of the peerage grades. The Simas were well aware of prevailing mood among the court 
families, political elite of the empire, dissatisfied in the long term with the Wei policy of 
bestowing only meager dignities on the non-royals. There was a wide gap between the royal 
title holders and members of other court families in terms of rank and wealth. Whereas the 
royal princes and dukes were given the first court rank (yipin 一品) the highest liehou grade 
of a prefecture marquis was entitled only to the third rank (sanpin 三品) with the official rank 
descending with relative standing of the titles in the noble hierarchy. The holders of the 
lordships (guanneihou and bellow) enjoyed only the sixth rank (liupin 六品) which meant that 
these titled nobles actually stood fairly low in the official hierarchy and could not reach for 
the hereditary privileges bestowed with the rank five and higher.
111
                       
With the steady decline of the royal authority overshadowed by ever powerful regents 
the elite families of the court officials also strengthened their position. The once universal 
power of the sovereign emperor gradually crumbled with every successful assertion of power 
by the Sima regents, ever more determined and unyielding, only to become a mere illusion 
kept for the sake of propriety and political expediency. The court families grew in importance 
and their influence of the decisive factor on the scale of power made itself felt, pressing for 
the revision of the current ennoblement system. For the usurpation to be successful Sima 
Zhao needed support or acknowledgment of these families. There were scions of ancient 
official lineages of the Han as well as meritorious ministers of the Wei to be won over. 
Bestowing a noble title seemed to be a useful way how to court their favor and achieve this 
goal. But it also bore a symbolic message meant for the courtiers of the Wei who had still 
remained undecided as to where their future allegiance lay, that the impending dynastic 
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transition would not bring any social change. The social hierarchy of the court would not be 
disrupted as the Simas were willing to guarantee the court families the same social standing 
under the new regime in exchange for mere tacit support or condoning their usurpation 
activities. 
Majority of the peerage titles created in 264 AD survived the actual abdication of the 
Wei and became the titled nobility of the Jin. New peerage title for established court family 
therefore symbolized readiness of the prospective winner of the power struggle to ensure the 
same social standing and preeminence of the family even under the new dynasty. This was 
rather unusual. The social standing of the court families derived from the service rendered to 
the dynasty and could not be taken for granted once the dynasty had changed. Even though 
the noble titles were hereditary, their survival and even the right to pass them on to one‟s 
children were totally dependent on the will of the emperor. Privileges could be withdrawn at 
any moment and noble title could be abolished once its holder was attainted. Trespassing the 
law, being disloyal to the dynasty or simply being slack and negligent in service meant risking 
the loss of a noble title and jeopardizing the future of the family as a member of the elite. 
Without the title and corresponding privileges family‟s position at court became insecure, 
more dependent on official career of its members, and could quite easily decline rapidly and 
merge with the common folk in just a couple of generations. Every dynastic change thus 
presented a great threat to the well-being of the court families. When the old dynasty was 
going to be replaced by a new ruling house, all the merit which had earned the families their 
privileged standing ceased to be of any consequence. From now on, it was only the services 
for the new dynasty which mattered. The ability to choose the right moment for the change of 
allegiance thus became the vital precondition for the survival of the family. No wonder that 
every dynastic change opened place for limited social mobility which brought about certain 
reshuffling and readjustment within the highest strata of the elite. The gradual usurpation 
process of the Simas and establishment of the five ranks peerages in 264 AD offered the 
established court families unique opportunity to transfer their allegiance and secure a place 
among the elite of the new dynasty.                   
We have seen that the restoration of the five ranks peerages was expedient on several 
levels. Besides providing much needed legitimacy for the usurper by symbolically stressing 
Sima Zhao‟s role as a restorationist of an ancient institution, it also helped to consolidate 
authority of the Simas and strengthen the bond between the usurper and his followers. Timely 
reward secured indispensible loyalty which might have otherwise wavered.  Last but not least, 
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the reform of the ennoblement system met the demands of the influential court families whose 
tacit agreement was after all vital for successful accomplishing of the usurpation process. 
Let‟s turn our attention to the new peerage system itself. The Treatise on Geography 
and Adminisrative Division (Dilizhi 地理志) of the Jin empire describes the five ranks system 
of peerage in following terms: 
   
“When Sima Zhao (Wendi) was the Prince of Jin, he ordered Pei Xiu and others to 
establish the system of five ranks of ennoblement. Only Sima Fu, commandery duke of Anping 
had an apanage of ten thousand households which was the same as the system prescribed for all 
Wei princes [of the blood]. The apanages of all other prefecture dukes were one thousand eight 
hundred households with territory of seventy five miles. The apanages of the first grade 
marquises (daguohou 大國侯) were one thousand six hundred households with territory of 
seventy miles. The apanages of the second grade marquises (ciguohou 次國侯) were one 
thousand four hundred households with territory of sixty five miles. The apanages of the first 
grade counts (daguobo 大國伯) were one thousand two hundred households with territory of 
sixty miles. The apanages of the second grade counts (ciguobo 次國伯) were one thousand 
households with territory of fifty five miles. The apanages of the first grade viscounts (daguozi 
大國子) were eight hundred households with territory of fifty miles. The apanages of the second 
grade viscounts (ciguozi 次國子) were six hundred households with territory of forty five miles. 





First of all, even though the new peerage system aspired to establish well defined 
hierarchy of noble titles with clearly defined differences in apanage, precedence at court and 
corresponding social standing applicable to all non-royal court families including the Simas, 
the actual arrangements and titles bestowed did not leave anyone in doubt as to who the next 
ruler should be. As we have seen the gradual usurpation was rather delicate process of 
political machinations and psychological manipulation of the opinions of the state elites. 
Sudden promotion in rank, restricted to the Simas and their supporters was therefore 
unadvisable if not inconceivable. Sima Zhao had to maintain an image of more or less humble 
and selfless servant of the throne pressed by the circumstances and will of heaven to assume 
wider responsibility for the affairs of state. The image of loyal and unpretentious regent had to 
be maintained almost to the very last moment. To limit the privileges of the peerages only to 
                                                 
112
 Jinshu juan 14, Dilizhi shang, p. 414. 
62 
the Sima partisans was under the given circumstances simply impossible. The establishment 
of the peerage system was therefore meant to benefit not only Simas and their followers but 
also other influential families at court whose support, no matter how tacit, was essential for 
bringing about the final abdication of the Wei dynasty.  
However, the seeming parity of the court families was rather illusory. While the 
majority of the court families of some consequence indeed secured a peerage dignity and with 
it also the membership in the future elite circles of the Jin dynasty, the preeminent position of 
the Simas was further enhanced as well. Not only did Sima Zhao‟s relatives secured highest 
possible titles within the frame of the new peerage system, but the exceptional standing of the 
dynasty was stated quite unequivocally by the sheer size of the apanage bestowed on Sima 
Zhao‟s uncle Sima Fu 司馬孚. Whereas all other new peers were presumably given apanages 
according to prescribed quotas of the new system, Sima Fu was the only person created 
commandery duke (jungong 郡公) with apanage of the size which was usually reserved for 
the members of the imperial house of Cao. Despite being only a duke his position in fact 
equaled that of the princes of the blood. The nominal difference between the royalty and non-
royals was retained, yet the resources given at his disposal were roughly the same. 
There was nothing coincidental about creation of the commandery dukedom of 
Anping 安平. Even though it is not certain if there was any prescribed quota for the apanage 
of a commandery duke,  by comparison of the apanages connected with the respective peerage 
ranks it becomes clear that a huge gap existed between a commandery duke and a prefecture 
duke (xiangong 縣公) who was entitled to one thousand eight hundred households only. Sima 
Fu‟s appointment was therefore highly symbolic and should be seen as a statement. Whereas 
the majority of the five peerages were opened, at least theoretically, to members of other court 
families, the Simas claimed the premier position among them closing on the imperial house 
itself. Sima Fu was never one of the key leaders of the Sima faction. Indeed, it seems that he 
might have not agreed with the pretensions of his nephews and he professed his unrelenting 
loyalty to the Wei dynasty even after the actual abdication in 266 AD: 
 
“When Emperor Wudi accepted the abdication of the Wei, the [deposed sovereign] 
Prince of Chenliu (Cao Huan) departed to the Jinyongcheng fortress [in Luoyang]. [Sima] Fu 
bidding him farewell, took his hand and cried and sighed being unable to compose himself 
professing: “Until my last day I will always remain a true subject of the Great Wei!””
113
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Sima Fu‟s elevation to the position of the premier peer of the realm was no reward of 
any meritorious deed, but a symbolic gesture laying claim to the semi-royal position of the 
whole family as a future ruling house of the empire. Sima Fu was younger brother of Sima Yi, 
the great architect of the Sima‟s rise to power, and in 264 AD he was the most senior member 
of the family living. As a patriarch of the clan he commanded respect of ritual if not actual 
head of the family and symbolically speaking he stood for the Sima family as a whole. 
Conferring of a commandery dukedom on Sima Fu, comparable to the princely fiefs of the 
Cao clansmen, symbolically elevated the ambitious family and paved the way for the future 
promotion of its members by creating useful precedent. The peerage system in a certain way 
prefigured the future social hierarchy of the new imperial regime which was to appear in a 
due course. High rank equaling the princely dignities conferred on the most senior of the 
Simas heralded eligibility of all Sima clansmen to attain such a high position. And indeed 
immediately after the abdication all male adults within the Sima family were promoted to the 




Even though the Simas played the vital role in establishing the peerage system and 
secured the highest ranks among the peerage dignities, the majority of the new peers hailed 
from other court families. Zhang Xuefeng estimates that there were some six hundred new 
peerages created in 264.
115
 The exact number of the peerages is, however, unknown, as the 
contemporary historical sources and later dynastic histories did not preserve anything which 
would resemble a list of conferred titles. The majority of the peerages known to us are 
mentioned in the biographical entries of the respective title holders in the standard dynastic 
history Jinshu. As their membership of the titled nobility was generally not the reason for 
having their biography included in the historiographical compilation, it is highly probable that 
we know of only rather limited number of peerages conferred shortly before the establishment 
of the Jin dynasty. Only the most important servants of the new dynasty and supporters of the 
Sima cause had the privilege of being mentioned in the later dynastic histories used for the 
compilation of the Jinshu. Thus many peers created in 264 AD may have been too 
inconsequential or not important enough for the new dynasty to have their names and titles 
recorded for posterity even though their noble line might have actually survived the dynastic 
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transition and continued under the Jin for couple of generations. We simply can‟t tell for the 
lack of relevant information, yet it seems rather probable as we can occasionally find solitary 




[Pei] Xiu devised the five ranks peerages and more than six hundred persons were 
enfeoffed starting with [the offices of] Cavalry Commanders (jidu 騎督) and higher. [Pei] Xiu 
himself was enfeoffed as a Marquis of Jichuan with territory of sixty miles and an apanage of 
one thousand four hundred households. The prefecture of Gaoyuan and the wilderness of 




As it is impossible to determine the exact number of the new peers created in 264 AD, 
it is equally impossible to get more precise idea of the actual distribution of the peerage ranks. 
Apart from the fact that ducal titles were more or less reserved for members of the Sima 
family we know next to nothing about usage of other peerage ranks opened to members of 
court families. It seems that the most loyal and trustworthy servants of the Sima were given 
rather high title of marquis whereas majority of the newly created peers, that is members of 
the original Wei court, had to be content with lesser titles of viscount and baron. However, the 
better understanding of the whole situation would need much more detailed research which is 
out of the time scope of this study. 
Suffice it to say that new peerage system introduced five noble ranks in ten grades.
118
 
Apparently all the five dignities allowed further nuanced differentiation of merit and honor 
being generally divided into two distinct grades. Even though the above quoted excerpt from 
the Dilizhi chapter of Jinshu does not mention such division in case of baronies, it seems that 
this omission was probably caused only in the process of compilation of Jinshu at the 
beginning of the Tang. The similar passage in the Taiping yulan 太平御覽 encyclopedia 
mentions the division of the baronial rank in the same manner as the preceding peerage ranks. 
According to this mention the first grade barons (daguonan 大國男) were entitled to an 
apanage of four hundred households and territory of forty miles, while the second grade 
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Apart from the ducal dignity which was differentiated by the duchy being either 
commanderial or prefectural, the rest of the peerages were well defined in terms of both 
territory (i.e. nominal area of conferred fief in miles li) and income (i.e. number of tax-paying 
households hu allotted to be the apanage of a new peerage holder).
120
 The difference between 
the two grades of ducal dignities was not so much difference in actual size of the fief as 
difference in category. As a commandery was higher administration unit one level above the 
prefectures, the title of a commandery duke necessarily implied wider authority and position 
qualitatively different from the prefecture dukes. The fact that the only commandery dukedom 
ever conferred before the founding of the Jin dynasty in 266 AD was given to the Sima 
patriarch also bears testimony to the special position of the commandery duke in the whole 
system and to the wide gap separating it from the remaining peerages. The main features of 
the new peerage system introduced in 264 AD are summarized in the following table:  
 
Tab. 2: Five Ranks Peerages (Wudengzhi 五等制) introduced in 264 AD121 
title (jue 爵)  grade apanage (yi 邑) territory 
duke (gong 公) commandery duke (jungong 郡公)              unspecified 
prefecture duke (xiangong 縣公) 1800 hu  75 li 
marquis  
(hou 侯) 
first grade marquis (daguohou 大國侯) 1600 hu 70 li 
second grade marquis (ciguohou 次國侯) 1400 hu 65 li 
count (bo 伯) first grade count (daguobo 大國伯) 1200 hu 60 li 
second grade count (ciguobo 次國伯) 1000 hu 55 li 
viscount (zi 子) first grade viscount (daguozi 大國子) 800 hu 50 li 
second grade viscount (ciguozi 次國子) 600 hu 45 li 
baron (nan 男) first grade baron (daguonan 大國男) 400 hu 40 li 
second grade baron (ciguonan 次國男) 200 hu 35 li 
                                                 
119
 For discussion of the Taiping yulan excerpt and division of the baronial rank see: Zhang Xuefeng (2001): p. 
31; and Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 29-30.  
120
 We shall deal with implications of this dual way of defining peers‟ apanage in a due course in a special 
section of this thesis.  
121
 This table is based on Jinshu juan 4, Dilizhi shang, p. 414 and tables in Zhang Xuefeng (2001): p. 31; and 
Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 4. 
66 
The Accession of the Jin Dynasty (266 AD) 
 
Despite all the effort and careful arrangements Sima Zhao was not predestined to be 
the founder of the new dynasty. It was to be his son Sima Yan 司馬炎 who accomplished the 
gradual usurpation process which took almost three decades and finally received the 
abdication of the last Wei sovereign early in 266 AD. It appears that by the time the new 
ennoblement system was brought to life Sima Zhao had been fatally ill.
122
 Knowing that he 
was going to die he tried to secure the position of the family and proclaimed his eldest son 
Heir Apparent of the Jin principality and had him appointed the Great General of the 
Pacification Army (fujun da jiangjun 撫軍大將軍) assisting the Counselor-in-chief (fuer 
xiangguo 副貳相國), thereby making him his indisputable heir in both familial and political 
sense.  
As the heir apparent of the Jin principality he was to inherit not only the greatest 
domain in the realm but also symbolic claims to the rulership and supreme authority which 
the extraordinary fief represented at the first place. Sima Yan became the future head of the 
Sima family and leader of the most influential court faction commanding loyalty of all 
supporters of the Sima cause. His position of the political heir to Sima Zhao was further 
enhanced by the official appointment which made him virtual vice Counselor-in-chief and 
designated successor to the highest of the court offices. Carl Leban stresses further symbolic 
implication of these appointments arguing that Sima Zhao was deliberately strengthening the 
legitimacy of his family‟s claim to the throne by imitating Cao Cao who in turn had followed 
the precedent of the Zhou comparing himself to king Wen of Zhou. As it was only Wen„s son 
King Wu of Zhou who had actually established the new dynasty, Cao Cao was insinuating 
that the dynastic transition would take place after his death and succession of his son Cao Pi. 
Sima Zhao was going in his steps declaring himself to be “…“Cultured” King of Zhou for his 
own time, a powerful ruler who left the dynastic founding to his heir.”
123
 
Sima Zhao died on 6 September 265 AD and the next day Sima Yan assumed his 
position as the new Prince of Jin and Counselor-in-chief. The scene was set for the last ritual 
act of gradual usurpation process, but the decent period of mourning had to be observed 
which delayed the final procedure. It was almost four months after Sima Zhao had been 
buried when the ritual of abdication was staged. On 4 February 266 AD after announcing to 
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Heaven and ancestors the emperor‟s resolve to resign his august position, the court dignitaries 
came to Sima Yan inviting him to accept the throne. Two days later, after three ritual refusals, 
Sima Yan did accept the imperial seal and ascended the throne as the first emperor of the Jin 
dynasty.
124
 One of the first acts of the new ruler was to address his relatives and loyal 
followers:   
       
“In the first year of the Taishi Era (265/266 AD) in the winter, the 12
th
 month on the day 
bingyin … [the emperor Wudi] graced [by his presence] the front [chamber] of the Taiji Hall in 
the Luoyang palace and issued the following edict: “In the past our august grandfather King 
Xuan (Sima Yi), being wise and sagacious, respectful and discerning, complied with the [right] 
moment (i.e. did what was needed at the time) and gave rise to the beginning of imperial 
[majesty] and established the mighty foundations [of the imperial enterprise. Our] late deceased 
uncle King Jing (Sima Shi), perceiving and sensible, personally trod the right path and brought 
glory to the noble lords [being one of them]. When it came to our august father King Wen, his 
wisdom was sage-like, bright and vast. In harmony with [the wish of] the deities of Heaven and 
Earth he obeyed Heaven and acted according to the current needs and received this bright 
mandate. The humanness [spread] all over the world and the merit became the norm of those 
above as well as bellow. Therefore the Wei took the inspiration from the ancient lessons [of the 
past], followed [the examples of Tang [Yao] and Yu [Shun] and [after] discussing [the whole 
thing] with lords and ministers entrusted the great mandate to us. I myself was in awe of the 
mandate of heaven and did not dare to oppose [Heaven‟s will]. We have taken upon ourselves 
this great enterprise, yet our virtue is limited. Therefore we entrust the princes and dukes to rule 
as lords over [all between the] four seas. We are greatly anxious and fearful, not knowing what 
to do [in order to] help [the empire]. But you [my lords] were [our] most trustworthy supporters, 
loyal civil and military ministers. [Some of you have served our] grandfather, [others have 
served our] father. [All of you] were truly the closest servants of our kingly predecessors [and 
together you have made] our cause glorious and grand. I wish to give you one thousand fiefs so 
that you too would be able to share this great blessing [of securing] the imperial throne.” After 
that an amnesty was proclaimed and a new imperial era commenced.”
125
        
   
This imperial proclamation of the new Emperor Wudi was kind of customary opening 
of the reign of the new dynasty which was more or less expected. In professing being 
unworthy of such an exalted dignity and admitting personal shortcomings and awe in front of 
such a great task as ruling the empire undoubtedly was, the emperor was validating the 
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expectations of those who begged him to accept the throne. By appearing humble and 
unassuming his virtue was confirmed as well as his right to the supreme position and 
legitimacy of the new dynasty. The declared willingness to share power with worthy 
councilors and advisers of his forefathers was kind of encouragement of loyalty to the new 
dynasty expressed in ceremonial way. By symbolically offering his subjects a share in ruling 
the state, the emperor was simply asking for their loyal support as administrators of the new 
Jin government, hoping that once they got involved in the Sima cause, their interests became 
one with that of the state and dynasty and concern for their own wellbeing would strengthen 




This rather general statement of appreciation of the past services of the loyal servants 
and assurance of unfading gratitude of the dynasty was followed by more tangible token of 
the emperor‟s grace in form of new peerage titles for those whose unwavering support was 
vital in accomplishing the dynastic transition. These men became the so called meritorious 
ministers (gongchen 功臣) of the Jin, founding members of the new regime: 
   
“In the first year of the Taishi Era (265/266 AD) in the winter, the 12
th
 month on the day 
dingmao … the Cavalry General (piaoji jiangjun 驃騎將軍) Shi Bao became Commander-in-
chief (dasima 大司馬) and was enfeoffed as Duke of Leling. Chariot and Horse General (cheji 
jiangjun 車騎將軍) Chen Qian became Duke of Gaoping, General of the Guards (weijiangjun 
衛將軍) Jia Chong became Chariot and Horse General and Duke of Lu. Director of Department 
of the State Affairs (shangshuling 尚書令) Pei Xiu became Duke of Julu. Palace Attendant 
(shizhong 侍中) Xun Xu became Duke of Jibei. Grand Guardian (taibao 太保) Zheng Chong 
became Grand Mentor (taifu 太傅) and Duke of Shouguang. Defender-in-chief (taiwei 太尉) 
Wang Xiang became Grand Guardian and Duke of Suiling. Councilor-in-chief (chengxiang 丞
相) He Ceng became Defender-in-chief and Duke of Langling. Censor-in-chief (yushi dafu 御史
大夫) Wang Shen became Cavalry General and Duke of Boling. Minister of Works Xun Yi 
became Duke of Linhuai. Great General Defender of the North (zhenbei da jiangjun 鎮北大將
軍) Wei Guan became Duke of Ziyang. All the rest had their enfeoffment [apanages] increased 
                                                 
126
 The same kind of willigness to share authority with those who used to be one‟s peers, however pretended, is 
stated already in some of the acts and edicts of Emperor Gaozu, founder of the Han Dynasty. For example see 
Homer H Dubs‟ translation of the second chapter of Gaozu‟s Basic Annals in Hanshu. Dubs, Homer H. (1938): 
pp. 95-150.  
69 
and [noble] ranks promoted according to their individual merit. The standing of the civil and 




This collective promotion of the highest ranking ministers and officials of the state 
within couple of days of founding the Jin dynasty again reflected the older tradition of the 
previous dynasties and by the 3
rd
 century became one of the customary procedures connected 
with a dynastic transition. The meritorious ministers were all given ducal titles which were at 
the apex of the noble hierarchy instituted in 264 AD, no doubt as a token of appreciation of 
their extraordinary services. But it seems that although they have been all raised to 
unprecedented ducal dignity which under the previous dynasties used to be reserved for 
royalty, their services did not all carry the same weight for the emperor as their new titles 
were not of the same grade. Whereas Leling 樂陵, Gaoping 高平, Lu 魯, Julu 鉅鹿 and Jibei 
濟北  were commandery dukedoms the remaining titles appear to be only prefecture 
dukedoms standing within noble hierarchy one grade below jungong.
128
 Prestigious ducal 
titles were bestowed also on some members of the old ruling house of Cao as well as on 
former Han and Shu princes in whose veins circulated the royal blood of the imperial Liu.
129
    
Even though we don‟t know any details, it is obvious that the promotion was not 
limited to a dozen or so of the founding members of the Jin regime and scions of the past 
dynasties. The gongchen were in fact just the most visible part of the title holders because the 
unprecedented prestige of their new ducal titles singled them out for the special mention. The 
majority of the titled nobles are summed up under the “all the rest” whose enfeoffment and 
apanages were increased and noble ranks promoted. In fact, this rather brief statement 
describes the symbolic birth of the new titled nobility of the Jin dynasty. Even though we 
cannot be hundred percent sure (due to the lack of information), it seems that no revolutionary 
changes were introduced into the current noble hierarchy and that the composition of the titled 
nobility remained remarkably stable as there was no need for radical readjustment of the elite 
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membership which otherwise happened to be the norm during every dynastic succession. As 
the membership of the new elite was more or less decided already two years ago Wudi simply 
followed the precedents set by his father and generally restricted the changes only to relative 
standing of a family within the noble hierarchy. From the biographies of the individual title 
holders included in the Jinshu we may infer that the majority of the titled nobles and peers 
created during the introduction of the five grades peerages retained their noble status even 
after the change of the dynasty. The particular noble title or peerage dignity may have actually 
differed from the one bestowed in 264 AD, nevertheless their noble status was assured. As 
they were supposed to be the new titled nobility of the Jin Empire, the merit and loyal service 
to the new dynasty again became the main criteria deciding the relative standing of the 
individual nobles and peers.  
General impression which we get from the sources is that of almost universal 
promotion. Not only does the above cited passage mention increase in apanage and promotion 
of rank of all other court dignitaries but also individual biographies offer the same picture. 
The problem is that the people mentioned in the dynastic histories were by definition 
connected with the rise and fall of the dynasty. Thus in the case of the Jin, the court 
dignitaries living during the Wei-Jin transition mentioned by the Jinshu were naturally 
proponents of the new regime and as such they could claim their share of credit on creating 
the new order and were duly rewarded by promotion of their titles and increase in their 
income. The emperor seemed to be quite generous. As the most meritorious servants were 
given ducal ranks, which were hitherto unattainable for non-royals, corresponding shift in the 
upward direction appears in all noble ranks. Even considerably less important supporters 
could have hoped for a high dignity within the peerage and Wei viscounts and barons were 
becoming marquises and counts of the Jin. This general impression, however, might be 
misleading. If we are to believe the occasional mentions of the sources suggesting existence 
of hundreds of noble dignities, it is highly probable that the majority of the noble titles created 
in 264 AD, which we unfortunately don‟t know by name for the simple reason because their 
holders were not instrumental in politics of the Simas and the Jin dynasty, continued under the 
new regime unchanged.
130
   
The formal creation of the titled nobility of the Jin Empire again worked on both 
symbolic and practical level. The symbolic importance was connected with the legitimacy of 
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the new dynasty. As the gradual usurpation process became more and more institutionalized, 
performance of certain acts became obligatory. The validity of the transfer of mandate was 
conditioned by close following of the precedents set by successful usurpers of the past and 
emulating their deeds. Each of these acts claimed to be sanctioned by Heaven, being 
performed according to its will. Only repeating or replicating the whole process could ensure 
that the semblance of legitimacy would be maintained and the seizure of the throne would 
succeed. The majority of these symbolical steps took place before the actual abdication, but 
some of them were performed only after the establishment of the new dynasty as ritual 
confirmation of the legitimacy of the whole process and its irreversibility. Omitting one of 
these ritual acts might have seriously jeopardized the legitimacy of the new regime. 
Professions of humility and unworthiness of the new sovereign had the same objective as an 
amnesty or proclamation of the new government era. They were all ritual expressions of 
establishing new legitimate imperial regime, formal indicators that the transfer of mandate 
was legal and conforming to the will of Heaven. 
Establishment of the new titled nobility was also one of the acts of ritual legitimization. 
Even though in reality the whole process entailed only minor changes in peerage ranks and 
relative social standing of former Wei nobility, creating new peers and nobles in the symbolic 
way ushered in the beginning of the new age and introduced new social order based on merit 
and service rendered to the Jin dynasty and its founders. Promotions in rank and apanage as 
well as creation of the new titles were seen as just and well deserved rewards for the steadfast 
loyalty and unstinting support of the Sima followers. By bestowing generous rewards with 
ennoblement being the most prominent of them, the Jin court met the expectations of its 
supporters and demonstrated in quite tangible way that the trust of the supporters in the Sima 
leaders was well justified. The trustworthiness of the new dynasty was of course one of its 
cardinal virtues establishing the Jin as legitimate receiver of the mandate of Heaven as was 
their ability to institute and maintain new social order integrating the vestiges of the preceding 
regimes. Princely and ducal titles for the Wei ex-emperor and other members of the ancient 
and not so ancient ruling houses were to be proof of this ability. On the one hand, enfeoffment 
of the scions of the Zhou and the Han gave the newly established dynasty rightful place in the 
chain of legitimate dynastic succession making the Jin the heirs of the ancient traditions of the 
empires of old. On the other hand, creating the deposed Wei emperor a prince and his 
relatives dukes and marquises integrated the formal royalty into the new social order in a way 
which was both prudent by being acceptable for both parties, and appropriate by stressing the 
legitimacy of the dynastic transition. By accepting the Jin noble title the Wei emperor was 
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actually accepting his new position as a subject to the new dynasty demonstrating that he had 
resigned his power voluntarily. This attitude of Cao Huan and his relatives and their 
willingness to serve the new sovereign sanctioned the whole process of dynastic transition 
and provided necessary legitimacy for the authority of the Jin rule. 
There were also more practical factors at play in creating the new Jin titled nobility. 
The ritual reordering of the society was at the same time used as practical tool for 
strengthening the position of the new rulers. Political partners and allies were elevated to the 
highest ranks of the peerage becoming the elite of the new empire. As there was direct 
connection between noble ranks, office recruitment and all kinds of social and economical 
advantages, the families of the meritorious ministers should have become influential power 
behind the throne. The common interest should have ensured future loyalty of these families 
and reinforce the political position of the Simas and the dynasty as a whole. 
We have seen that in accomplishing the dynastic transfer the Simas relied on the active 
support of their followers as well as on tacit consent of the established court families. After 
266 AD these families naturally expected some kind of reward for their effort and at least 
some of the promotions might be attributed to the need of the government to reward their 
timely change of allegiance. Majority of the noble titles was probably only confirmed, but 
even the mere confirmation of the current noble title acquired during creation of the peerages 
was enough to establish the family of its holder as a member of the elite circles. Each noble 
title conferred certain official rank (guanpin 官品) depending on its position within noble 
hierarchy. The grander the title, the higher the official rank which went with it. The official 
ranks were instrumental in ordering the hierarchy of the court society in many ways. The 
official rank determined not only precedence during the audiences and ritual performances 
within the palace, but also laid claim to all kinds of social and economical privileges. Only 
holders of certain ranks were endowed with hereditary rights (yin 蔭) including the right of 
privileged entry into the state bureaucracy. This right enabled their sons and younger brothers 
to acquire the official position at remarkably early age giving them advantage of uninterrupted 
official career long enough to reach the offices with the highest court ranks which would 
again give them the same kind of privilege for their own offspring. As all the noble titles 
provided their holders with the higher official ranks, creation of a noble title ensured certain 
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perpetuation of the social standing of the family thus honored and considerably raised the 
chances of the survival of this family as a member of the elite.
131
 
Beside the hereditary privileges the official rank also determined the size of the 
property of its holders. The early medieval Chinese state repeatedly tried to introduce fixed 
quotas on land and dependent households which would prevent locally powerful families 
from seizing the land formerly tilled by free peasants and sheltering families of the state tax-
payers who tried to avoid their tax duties by entering their service. Despite this continuous 
effort the results of this policy were only meager and temporary at best and urgent political 
needs often compelled the government to close its eyes over these nefarious practices. 
However, the influential families always tried to legalize their land holding and noble title 
with corresponding high official rank entitled them to more land and depending tenants. Mere 
confirmation of the Wei noble title thus simply legalized land holdings of many a court family 
as well as numbers of tenants working on their estates in the country. Wudi tried to meet the 
expectations of the established court families and ensure that they would not be disappointed 
and disillusioned with the new regime. Due to the nature of the long and gradual usurpation 
process by which the dynasty got to the throne, the creation of the new social order was more 
about replicating and restructuring the original society of the Wei court than about 
dismantling the whole structure and replacing it with something completely new. 
The same motives probably lead Wudi to another mass creation of the noble dignities 
only a year later. But this time the titles awarded were only lesser ranks of lordships and not 
the peerage dignities:                    
            
“In the second year of the Taishi Era (266/267 AD) in the second month the emperor 
issued the following edict: “The enfeoffments of the five grades (peerages) all record the old 
merits (i.e. merits before the establishing of the Jin dynasty). Let the enfeoffment of those who 
were originally prefecture marquises be handed down to their second-born sons who should 
become village lords (tinghou). [In case of] township marquises, [let their second-born sons 
become] lords of the royal domain (guanneihou). [In case of] village marquises, [let their 
second-born sons become] lords inside the passes (guanzhonghou). All these should enjoy one 
tenth of [revenue produced] by households allotted [as their apanage].”
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The new noble dignities were in fact expression of the well established policy of the 
special grace (tui‟en 推恩) by which second-born sons or younger brothers of a title holder 
were getting noble dignity of their own, considerably lower in terms of rank and income, as a 
kind of courtesy and special favor expressing the gratitude of the court for the meritorious 
services of appointee‟s father or elder brother. This kind of ennoblement was usually 
practiced within the peerages, and its use in this context is rather exceptional. Wudi applied 
the tui‟en principle to the original Wei noble titles of lords (liehou). Those who had before the 
introduction of the five peerages held one of the lordship titles (that is prefecture marquis, 
township marquis or village marquis) were now entitled to pass this original dignity to their 
younger sons as a new lordship two ranks lower than the original dignity. Second-born son of 
the prefecture marquis would continue the original Wei enfeoffment as village lord, younger 
son of a township marquis would become lord of the royal domain and second-born son of a 
village marquis would be granted the title of a lord inside the passes. 
Even though the new noble titles were relatively inconsequential in comparison to the 
peerages bestowed in 264 AD and 266 AD, and definitely lower in social standing and 
privileges than the original Wei dignities, Wudi‟s decision was of great benefit to all court 
families and went along with the policy of preferential treatment of the original Wei elite. 
Apparent degradation in rank was in fact an additional honor for the family. Every individual 
could at one time hold only one noble dignity and this dignity was transmitted in single line of 
succession from father to the eldest son born of the legal wife. Therefore, every promotion in 
rank or creation of a new dignity meant that the original title was discontinued, either being 
abolished altogether or remaining in abeyance for generations to be resurrected only by an act 
of a special imperial favor conferred on a younger member of the family. Wudi‟s act of 
special grace was in line with this practice. Because the families in the meantime got new 
peerage and noble titles they had no right to claim the original ones. Wudi‟s willingness to 
resurrect the Wei dignities in at least some form expressed great magnanimity of the new 
rulers which was supposed to be binding for the old elite committing them to support the Jin. 
Creating an extra noble dignity and new line of hereditary succession for each of the 
established noble families practically doubled the scope of family members who could use the 
hereditary privileges, which not only greatly enhanced the stability of their current social 
position as members of the elite but also much improved their future chances to expand their 
influence and become even more successful in official career. For even the lowest of the 
lordship ranks conferred high enough official rank for the family to enjoy all the above 
mentioned privileges.  
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The process of creation of the new Jin nobility reflects peculiar nature of the 
prolonged power struggle between the Simas and the Wei imperial house. Yet, the picture 
which we get by looking at promotions in titles and reshuffling of the noble ranks at the 
beginning of the Jin is but one side of the proverbial coin. Parallel to this adjustment of the 
social hierarchy of the new empire the continuous rise of the imperial clan of Sima was taking 
place as well. The question of securing the position of the ruling house in general and the 
main imperial line of succession in particular became the major issue of the court politics 
throughout the reign of Emperor Wudi. If the founders of the Wei before them were haunted 
by prospect of an emperor‟s brother or other collateral relative replacing the main imperial 
line on the throne through conspiracy and military coup, then the Jin suffered from different, 
yet not unrelated fear. Wei Wendi‟s fear might have been paranoid but vacillation of Cao Cao 
in naming him his successor and the insecurity caused by the opened question of succession 
were definitely important factors determining the harsh policy of the Wei towards the 
imperial relatives. The specific circumstances under which the dynasty had been established 
influenced directly its policies. The same holds true for the court of Wudi, except the fact that 
the imagined threats to the survival of the royal dynasty were seen elsewhere. 
Whereas the Wei emperors were afraid of their own kin, Jin Wudi could not forget the 
manner in which his family gained the throne. The Wei policy of circumscribing political 
independence of the royal princes deprived the throne of its natural protection and facilitated 
the usurpation of the supreme authority by a court family which became too powerful for the 
lonely throne to be effectively dealt with. Thanks to the Wei anti-clansmen policy the Wei 
court was full of influential families. The Simas were originally but one of them. Other 
families may have been initially as powerful and ambitious as the Simas; the only difference 
was the skill with which Wudi‟s ancestors manipulated politics of the court and final success 
which catapulted the Simas high above all other possible claimants for the throne. And still, in 
minds of many a courtier the Simas remained only primus inter pares and Wudi was painfully 
aware of the fact. As the hostile policy towards imperial kinsmen was universally blamed for 
the fall of the Wei, Wudi naturally decided to avoid the grave mistakes of his predecessors 
and stake the future of his family on completely opposite policy of strengthening the royal 
house by large scale enfeoffment of the princes of the blood. Members of the imperial clan 
were to be endowed with large political and military power as pillars of the dynastic authority 
shielding it from any attempt of another court family to replace the Simas at the helm:    
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“At the beginning of the Taishi era, when the [situation of] all under heaven quieted 
down [the emperor] reformed the lingering flaws of the Wei. Abiding by the ancient practices of 
the Zhou [he] established the imperial kin (zongshi 宗室) [in their fiefs] to be the bulwark and 
support [of the dynasty]. All those [from the generation of emperor‟s] father were honored in 
the same manner as [the lords] of Yu and Guo and his brothers [and cousins] received the 
blessing of Lu and Wei. Thus [the dynasty could enjoy] the eternal time span and the root and 
the branches [would support one another] for hundreds of generations.”
133
 
   
The collective promotion of the imperial relatives, mostly uncles and cousins to the 
emperor, mentioned by the chronicle took place immediately after establishing the new 
dynasty, within a day after Wudi‟s accession. In fact, creation of the new princes of the blood 
occurred on the same day as the promotion of the meritorious ministers to the ducal dignities 
and both appointments are clearly related. In both cases Wudi was only following well 
established practice and policies set by his predecessors. Building on the foundation laid by 
his father Sima Zhao in 264 AD when the future eminence of the Sima clansmen was clearly 
stated by enfeoffment of the clan patriarch Sima Fu, Wudi now enfeoffed twenty seven of his 
close male relatives as new princes of the blood. It seems beyond doubt that this 
unprecedented promotion of the wider imperial kin was dictated by the fear that without 
adequate backing some other court family might replace the Simas as easily as they had 
replaced the Caos. 
The scale of the Jin creation was unprecedented indeed. None of the preceding 
dynasties had ever conferred princely ranks on so many male relatives. Even the Han were 
careful not to establish independent regional sources of power and tried to keep the princely 
rank out of reach of the more distant male members of the imperial clan. As Wudi‟s sons were 
at this time still only minors, he had to rely on support of his brothers, uncles and cousins. His 
willingness to risk possible internal family disputes as well as danger of the main imperial 
line being replaced by one of the cadet branches attests to the urgent need of the imperial 
family to assert itself against all possible rivals.
134
 The main aim of this collective creation of 
the princes was to consolidate the standing of the new imperial house vis-à-vis the original 
Wei elite. The Simas may have been the most powerful force at the Wei court but the actual 
accomplishing of the usurpation process changed the scene and moved the new imperial 
house on less stable ground. They still had to find their roles as the new ruling house and 
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defend their position. Wudi‟s decision to enfeoff his relatives was not only ritual gesture, 
mere concession to the Confucian tradition but efficient means how to secure power for his 
own family and elevate the status of its members high above their former peers, thereby 
ensuring stability of the new regime. Rationale behind Wudi‟s policy was nicely summed up 
in the preface to biographies of the imperial princes: 
          
“Since the ancient times all the emperors and kings who ruled all under heaven wanted 
to establish widely the defenses and bulwarks [and therefore] they respected the imperial 
kinsmen and made them stable… Since [the rule] of the Zhou royal house how clearly it can be 
seen! They have enfeoffed their close relatives and the wise and thus various states [came into 
being]… the Wei Emperor Wudi (Cao Cao) forgot paramount rules of governing a state and 
practiced only low crafts of being jealous and mean. Meritorious ministers did not have land 
enough for a single awl to be placed on and the lord did not allow [his] sons and younger 
brothers to rule over the people. Even though the reed-wrapped soil [from the altars of state] 
was divided, they were in fact passing on only the empty fiefs. The roots had nothing to be 
sheltered and covered with and therefore [their empire] ended in just three generations. The Jin 
thought about how to alter the overturned carriage and how to heap up again [foundations of the 
dynasty as firm and eternal as] a boulder. Some of [the princes] were sent to the provinces 
where, wielding the yak tail [standard] and imperial commission, they enjoyed the glory of 
being shepherds of military regions. Others were summoned [to the court] where, ascending the 





The superiority of the imperial clan was demonstrated not only by higher noble titles 
of princes which remained unattainable for anyone who wasn‟t of royal blood but also by the 
sheer size of the princely fiefs bestowed on Sima clansmen as well as administrative and 
military power vested in the princes and their civil and military staff: 
             
“In the first year of the Taishi Era (265/266 AD) of the Jin Emperor Wudi all the 
princes created [at that time] were given a commandery as their fief. Those with apanage of 
twenty thousand households were first grade fiefs and established the upper, middle and lower 
army, three of them altogether with five thousand soldiers. Those with apanage of ten thousand 
households were second grade fiefs which established the upper and lower army with three 
thousand soldiers. [Those with apanage of] five thousand households were small [third grade] 
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fiefs which maintained [only] one army of one thousand and five hundred soldiers. The princes 
did not depart to their respective fiefs and they served in the state offices in the imperial capital. 
System of the five ranks was abolished. Those dukes and marquises who [enjoyed] apanage of 
ten thousand households and above were [considered to be holders of the] first grade fiefs. 
Those who [enjoyed] apanage of five thousand households and more were [considered to be 
holders of the] second grade fiefs, [whereas] those whose apanage did not reach five thousand 




Before we discuss any details of the system of the princely fiefs, we should comment 
on the baffling statement which poses a problem for our understanding of the evolution of the 
titled nobility. This statement insinuates that the five grades peerage was abolished following 
the creation of the princes of the blood. I agree with Yang Guanghui who argues that this 
statement must be an error.
 137
 I suppose that it might be some kind of misconception or 
misunderstanding of the situation on the part of later compilers as there is plenty of evidence 
attesting to continuous usage of the five peerage system of ennoblement throughout the whole 
period of the Jin rule both before and after the restoration of the dynasty in 316 AD up to the 
very end in 420 AD. The above quotation is from the Treatise on Geography of the Jin 
dynastic history. As the treatises of the Jinshu were written only at the beginning of the Tang 
Dynasty during the compilation process it is possible that the author did not fully understand 
the sources at his disposal and has somehow distorted their testimony.  
First of all, it is not clear whether the passage speaks about dukes and marquises 
within the frame of the five peerages. As we have seen earlier, the government implemented 
system of the fixed quotas which determined the size of the apanage of the five peerages. 
With the exception of the commandery dukes in which case we lack relevant information, all 
other peerage ranks were allotted precise number of households. In comparison to the 
apanages of the imperial princes this number was not staggering with one thousand eight 
hundred households granted to a prefecture duke being the highest. The first grade marquis 
enjoyed only one thousand four hundred households. Neither the above mentioned division 
into the first, the second and the third grade fiefs nor the indicated size of the apanage 
oscillating between under five thousand and above ten thousand households does fit into the 
frame of the peerage system as it has been recorded elsewhere in the dynastic histories. As the 
beginning of the passage deals with princes of the blood it seems plausible to me that the 
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whole passage does not deal with the ordinary peerage of the realm, but mainly with the royal 
peerage, royal dukes and marquises. These royal peers formally belonged to the peerage of 
the realm, however due to the emperor‟s policy of raising the position of the imperial clan 
high above all the non-royal families their fiefs tended to be much larger than prescribed size 
of apanages of the ordinary peerage dignities. Therefore I would suggest that what the 
compilers meant by the alleged abolition of the peerages was not the abolition of the system 
per se, but comment on obvious disregard of the fixed quotas prescribed for the five peerages 
in case of the royal dukes and marquises. In creating royal peers the usual rules of the peerage 
system were not applied and their fiefs abided by different set of regulations resembling those 
normally used for creating princely dignities.
138
  
Unlike the Cao Wei, Emperor Wudi from the very beginning bestowed on his relatives 
large commandery fiefs corresponding to their standing within the new social order of the 
realm. However, this distinction reflecting the change of attitude to the imperial clansmen 
remained for some time rather formal and the princely dignities were mostly empty fiefs 
(xufeng 虛封) with their authority over certain territory being only nominal. The princes of 
the blood received regular stipend derived from their apanage, but as they resided in the 
capital where they served in the offices of state they could not attend to administration of their 
fiefs. Wudi employed the ancient rule of the Han, that “the [princes] are lords in their fiefs, 
yet they do not rule the people” (jun guo er bu lin min 君國而不臨民).139 In other words, the 
princes of the blood were supposed to reign and not to rule their respective fiefs. In fact, the 
fully operating administration of the princely fief was established only in case that a prince 
had left the capital and departed to his domain to attend to its affairs. As there were only six 
princes of the smaller fiefs who really assumed their position as domain holders,
140
 the 
provisions of Wudi‟s edict were in reality never fully realized. Even establishing of the armed 
forces of the princely fiefs which is mentioned in the quotation above was dependent on 
physical presence of the prince in his fief. 
During the first ten years of the Wudi„s reign the majority of the princes did not repair 
to their domains. Some of them remained in the imperial capital where they served in the 
official positions at the court and participated in the court deliberations, formulating the state 
policies and often sharing executive powers with other court ministers from non-royal 
families. Others were commissioned to depart to the provinces where they assumed command 
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of the military regions as Regional Inspectors (cishi 刺史 or mu 牧) and Commanders-in-
chief (dudu 都督).141 Thus the stability of the imperial house was achieved not so much 
through the creation of the princes as through the appointment of the imperial relatives to the 
highest civil and military posts in both central and provincial administration. Whatever the 
actual means, Wudi‟s policy did succeed in securing preeminence of the ruling family 
creating an insurmountable gap between imperial clansmen and other non-royal subjects. In 
fact, it was so effective that even though the threat which the non-royal peers allegedly posed 
to the supreme authority of the throne was not forgotten, it was the princes of the blood 
themselves who later became cause of considerable concern for the emperor. 
Even though the current political and power situation effectively precluded any 
attempt of another usurpation, the fear of influential court families encroaching on the 
sovereign authority of the emperor still lingered on, being perhaps even more acute after the 
change of the dynasty because now the potential rivals were wielding new kind of authority 
conferred by the noble titles and peerage dignities. This fear was keenly felt by many Jin 
officials who repeatedly voiced their concern for the future well-being of the empire and 
security of the imperial line. The question of curtailing power of the titled nobility is 
repeatedly mentioned amidst the usual and rather formal exhortations encouraging high moral 
integrity and impeccable conduct of the government officials, side by side with need of 
support of the agricultural production and recruitment of worthy and talented men into state 
bureaucracy as the way how to ensure peaceful and successful reign of the dynasty. The 
memorials of Duan Zhuo 段灼 may serve as a good example of the reservations some Jin 
officials felt towards the current system of ennoblement, being quite unequivocal in stating 
his concern in strongest possible terms:  
 
“Your subject has heard that the opportune moment is not as good as the topographical 
advantage. And the topographical advantage is not as good as the support of the people [acting 
in unison]. In the case of a walled city [surrounded] by wall three miles long and an outer wall 
of some five miles, if we besiege it and attack it [from all around], we may still not be able to 
subdue it. That is [what is meant by] the opportune moment being not as good as the 
topographical advantage. And when the [defenders] give up and abandon the city even though 
the walls are high, the moat is deep, the grain supplies are abundant and the weapons are sharp, 
[that is the moment when] the topographical advantage is not as good as the support of the 
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people [acting in unison]. Because this is so, those who ruled as kings of old have all as the first 
[and foremost] thing bestowed the special grace binding people‟s hearts with tight [bonds of 
loyalty]. Once the hearts of the people are in harmony, [ready to act in unison], even the walled 
city of a mere three miles and outer wall no longer than five miles cannot be attacked. [But] 
once the hearts of the people are not in harmony then even the metal walls and moats filled with 
boiling water cannot be defended … Shun played the five-stringed zither qin and sang a song of 
the Southern Airs, yet all under heaven was ordered by itself. [It was possible only] because 
Yao‟s men were enfeoffed one after another [and therefore were able to be of assistance to 
Shun]. There were many troubles and upheavals in the past. Unscrupulous schemers have risen 
time and again confusing and disturbing the hearts of the multitude. The swords and saws (i.e. 
the instruments of punishment) vied with each other and the sound of wailing of orphans of 
those who had died in banishment does not cease. Therefore your subject thinks it prudent that 
Your Majesty should deeply ponder this [problem] and consider the distant [past]. [Your 
Majesty] should prevent corrupting [influences] and be on guard against the sprouts [of 
wickedness]. [And then You should] play the zither and sing the song and do nothing else. 
There is nothing more important in this respect then bestowing special grace in order to bring 
harmony to the common people. For when one bestows the grace, one is able to secure all 
between the four seas. But when one does not bestow the grace one is not able to secure even 
his own wife and children. That is the reason why Tang Yao attached such an importance to his 
family and clan being loving and harmonious and why King Wen of Zhou was so concerned 
about treating his own wife according to the rites and law. Among all the bright kings and 
sagely rulers there was none who would not approach those close to him first and only later deal 
with those who were distant moving from near to far. Your subject believes that it would be 
fitting to leave the three princes [who are] the Great Steward (taizai 太宰 ), Minister of 
Education (situ 司徒) and General of the Guards (weijiangjun 衛將軍) in Luo[yang] to defend 
and guard it [against intrusions]. Regarding the rest of the princes, those capable of serving in 
[an official position should be] recalled from the provinces, those over fifteen years of age 
should be all sent to their respective fiefs. Princely Attendants (zhonglang 中郎), Mentors (fu 傅) 
and Princely Administrators (xiang 相 ) should be selected for them whose talents would 
combine [abilities both] civil and military in order to assist and guide [the princes]. They should 
be allowed to train soldiers and horses in their fiefs which would declare the benevolence [of 
the emperor] end [establish] good faith far and wide. Then surely [they] would look after those 
below them as their own children and would love the state as their family. [The position of] the 
ruler and the subject will be settled and won‟t change in hundred generations. The neighboring 
cities and divided territories [of the fiefs] would become Jin, Lu and Wei [the strongest 
buttresses of the Zhou]. The whole under heaven yields to the strength of the so called clan as 
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[eternal and firm as a boulder]. Even though we are talking about dividing the territory, it is 
more like a pierced sack [leaking] inside the storeroom [with none of the grain getting lost]. 
They are after all also a possession of one single family. If you are worried that they would 
grow stronger and bigger in later generations, it is possible to [take precautions], introducing 
system [of control] in advance and make them receive the special grace and thus divide [the 
territory of their fiefs among their] sons and younger brothers. In this way the branches would 
ramify and leaves would spread and [the fiefs] would little by little become smaller on their own 
accord gradually being turned into ten thousand states. Thus the interest of the future 
generations is again nothing to be worried about.  
In the past during the reign of the Han Dynasty when the Lüs made themselves 
suspected [of disloyalty], there were the close relatives like Zhuxu and Dongmou at court and 
the lords with the strength of nine princely fiefs outside in the provinces. The Lüs therefore did 
not dare to move and shake [the world]. Today, it would be expedient if the princes would 
become stronger and greater in order to be as firm and steady as the Mount Tai. If someone is 
not of our clan and house, his heart would necessarily differ [from ours]. And yet, the Wei law 
forbade all the princes to serve in the offices and the close relatives were isolated from each 
other. There is nothing more unfortunate than this. In the meantime all under heaven was carved 
up without a cause [when] the five ranks lords were created. Thus the upper [rank] does not 
reflect the ability, the lower [rank] does not discuss the merit, the right and the wrong 
intermingle [and are confused] when [all] regularly receive reed-wrapped soil [without proper 
discrimination]. This resembles [merely] an expedient measure serving present needs but not the 
constant and everlasting order. If this is going to be unchanged in the future then these men will 
again [cause] disturbances and [the five ranks peerage system] becomes the first step [leading to] 
the gradual onset of chaos. For the prosperity of the state [is achieved] through family and clan 
being loving and harmonious and common folk being supportive and acting in unison. Decline 
of the state lies in flesh and blood being estranged and alienated and hearts of the common 
people losing faith [in government]. Therefore when the state of Xia became unstable, Yi Yin 
transferred his allegiance to the [Shang] Yin. When the state of Yin became disordered, Lü 
entered [the service] of the Zhou. The [Shang] Yin learned their lesson from the Xia. The 
warning of the things past is truly the lesson for things to come.”
142
                        
 
For Duan Zhuo the establishment of the five grades peerages paved the way for chaos 
and disintegration of the state. With the benefit of hindsight he considers Wudi‟s generous 
ennoblement policy to be highly unwise and potentially harmful to the state and calls for 
preventive measures to be taken which would counterbalance the dangerous centrifugal 
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tendencies caused by supposed alienation of the supreme authority of the throne. The Jin 
emperor should learn a lesson from the past and rely on his kin in order to forestall the 
disintegration of the empire caused by the rise of rival loci of power. The imperial clansmen 
should be enfeoffed not only in theory but they should really be sent to their respective fiefs 
to administer the region and thereby share the authority of the throne as well as the 
responsibility for the defense of the realm against every intrusion be it a raid of the nomads 
into the border regions or conspiracy of a court faction attempting to overthrow the legitimate 
imperial line. According to Duan Zhuo the empire and responsibility for it should be shared 
by all members of the imperial house, for even though this entails certain diminution of the 
supreme authority of the emperor and his central administration the division of power makes 
the regime outwardly stronger without jeopardizing the foundations of the dynasty. After all, 
the control over the empire remains in the family. 
On the other hand, Duan Zhuo is well aware that the policy of strengthening imperial 
house through wide creation of the imperial princes might have dire consequences of its own 
kind. Powerful cadet branches of the imperial house could pose a threat to the main imperial 
line of succession. While mentioning the attempted coup of the Lü family following the death 
of Empress Lü in 180 BC as an example of efficiency of imperial clansmen in safeguarding 
the throne against any potential threats, he at the same clearly remembers the deterring 
example of the Upheaval of the Seven Princes. In 154 BC the collateral branches of the 
imperial house rose against the main line which had employed resolute and unscrupulously 
harsh policy of asserting supreme authority of the centre over the regions ruled by the princes 
of the blood. This ill-fated attempt to preserve the independence of the princely domains was 
short-lived and initiated the process of transformation of the fiefs into harmless units of 
provincial administration totally dependent on the central government. Duan Zhuo suggests 
that in order to prevent possible discord within the imperial family, the government should 
follow the example of the Han emperors and use the policy of special grace which had been 
first implemented precisely after the victory over the seven princes. Continual division of the 
fiefs occurring time and again in every generation would render the princes of the blood too 
powerless for any coup on their part to succeed, yet their function as a bulwark and shield 
against the ambitions of the non-royal elite families would remain unaffected. 
The same arguments are presented in another of Duan Zhuo‟s memorial submitted 
couple of years later. The clear indication that these thoughts were heavy on his mind: 
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“In the past when the Zhou and the Han flourished they had installed their close 
relatives [in position of influence] and established virtue. The Zhou [achieved it] through the 
five ranks peerages and the Han used the pledge of rivers and mountains. But when decline set 
in, the imperial regalia were snatched by powerful subjects and the throne of the realm was 
transferred to an outsider [from a different family]. Thus those who had annihilated the Zhou 
were the Qin and not a member of the [Zhou imperial] house of Ji. And those who had replaced 
the Han were the Wei and not scion of the Liu family [of the Han emperors]. Today, the great 
strategy of the state should be to deprive the non-royal families of the territory which had been 
divided among them and the cities which they claim unlawfully. [On the other hand, members] 
of the imperial clan should take hold of the territory of neighbouring walled cities. If we order 
the future sons and grandsons of the princes to return [the territory] back, then it would be like 
the men of Chu who had lost the good bow Fanruo in Yunmeng, and yet the bow itself was not 
[irretrievably] lost! And if the imperial regalia would not be transferred to some other family 
than the founding ancestors would not be moved from their temple and in ten thousand years the 
common people would not change their name (i.e. the dynasty would not change)! 
The princes of the blood of the Great Jin [number only slightly] more than twenty 
persons, yet there are more than five hundred duchies, marquisates, counties, viscountcies and 
baronies. If you want to [object] that their fiefs are all small [and insignificant, remember, that] 
the Emperor [Gao]zu of the Han rose [to the imperial throne] even though he did not possess a 
single foot of land, let alone those in possession [of the whole] fief! If you intend to say that 
whereas the [rulers] of the Great Jin are wise and sage-like in every generation, the offspring of 
the noble lords are generally unworthy [of their ancestors], foolish and unwise, [then remember] 
that even though Fang Xun (Emperor Yao) himself was solemn and perceiving [his son] was 
Dan Zhu and even though Gusou (the Blind man) himself was conceited and stubborn [he was 
father to] Yu Shun. Whenever there are disturbances in all under heaven it is always by means 
of weapons [and military activity]. And yet, for no reason, we are establishing many bases of 
military [power] and opening wide the source of chaos. That is why your subject says that the 
five ranks [of peerage] are not appropriate [at this stage]! Your servant deems it advisable [to 
act] according to [what has been proposed in the] previous memorandum. The fiefs of the 
respective princes should be enlarged, [strength of] their military forces augmented and [princes 
themselves] should all be sent to assume control over their domains. Only if we arrange things 
in such a way that they would be able to join [and support] one another, would Your Majesty be 
able to lie down and sleep peacefully. Your servant thinks it prudent to change titles of all the 
marquises, counts, viscounts and barons and adjust the system of ennoblement, salaries and 
emoluments and ceremonial precedence and ranks to correspond with the precedent of the lords 
(lordships – liehou) of all under heaven. 
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Your subject has heard that those who follow the track of an overturned cart won‟t ever 
be safe, those who suffer from a dead man‟s disease won„t ever survive and those [states] which 
observe the rules of a perished state won‟t ever endure. Let alone this mighty and majestic Great 
Jin whose [emperor] is just about to climb the Mount Tai and sacrifice at Liangfu, engraving a 
stele with record of the meritorious achievements for all posterity forever to see. It would be 
advisable to take lesson from distant [past] of rise and fall of dynasties [long] gone and [ponder] 
deeply [the causes thereof and] take strict precautions, for if all the affairs are written down 
truthfully and straightforwardly there is surely some moral [and guidance to be found] in them. 
Long ago Yi Yin felt ashamed that his ruler was no Yao or Yu. And that is the reason why your 





Duan Zhuo‟s analysis of the situation points out obvious discrepancy of the 
ennoblement system as it was practiced during the first decade of the Wudi‟s reign. Whereas 
the meritorious ministers and other members of the former Wei elites were given prestigious 
titles and privileges of the peerage, the princes of the blood who were supposed to 
counterbalance the influence of the titled nobility were only nominal lords of their domains. 
Because they were kept in the capital the planned semi-independent administration of their 
fiefs was never fully brought into life and the whole policy of princely enfeoffment did not 
serve its purpose. Without full control over their domains and command of its military forces 
the princes would not be able to protect the main imperial line and check the ambitions of 
would be usurpers. In order to secure the dynasty the court on the one hand should send the 
princes of the blood to their domains and let them fulfill their role of support behind the 
throne, on the other hand the excessive and highly dangerous practice of creating peerages 
should be abolished. Duan Zhuo is not questioning the need to award meritorious services of 
loyal Jin subjects otherwise he would not suggest degrading all the peers to the status of noble 
lords (liehou). He is merely pointing out that a peerage is too high and dangerous an honor to 
be given lightheartedly. Creation of the peerage is politically inappropriate. There may have 
been a good reason to bestow such high honors on followers before the founding of the 
dynasty in order to secure their support and allegiance, but after the establishment of the 
dynasty the situation changed and one of the prime concerns of the new imperial regime 
should be curtailing the power of titled nobility through keeping their privileges and their very 
number within well defined limits. 
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 The main reason why the system of princely fiefs was still not fully operational was 
that the emperor relied on his male relatives not as on some abstract source of support which 
would lie dormant in the provinces rushing in to rescue the throne only in times of need, but 
he was still dependent on them in very practical terms. With their help Wudi was able to 
control the state administration quite effectively as the princes of the blood practically 
monopolized crucial official position at court as well as in the provinces. If the princes were 
to be sent to their fiefs Wudi„s control over bureaucracy might be shaken as he would have to 
take the risk and appoint members of non-royal families whose loyalty was by definition more 
questionable as heads of executive offices and commanders of crucial military regions. The 
security of the state was at stake.  
Emperor‟s attitude changed in the second half of the 270s. As his own sons were 
growing up, the group of the princes of the blood wielding considerable power both at court 
and in the provinces who up to this moment served their purpose so well started to threat the 
main line of succession and members of Wudi‟s immediate family. The latent contradiction in 
interests of the both parts of the imperial house was growing more prominent with time. 
Whereas Wudi naturally tended to prefer his own flesh and blood over distant relatives and 
tried to secure smooth succession for the main imperial line, the princes of the blood 
(zongshiwang 宗室王) were of course eager to retain as much authority as possible and 
resented emperor‟s plans to replace them in the due course with his sons. The princes of the 
blood constituted a very powerful political group as it did not comprise only the princes 
themselves but also their sons and younger brothers who could often boast their own peerage 
titles of dukes and marquises and therefore Wudi had to act very carefully. The first step was 
taken in the third year of the Xianning 咸寧 Era (277/278 AD) when four sons of the emperor, 
who had just approached adulthood, were created princes. Many current holders of princely 
dignity were transferred to different domains and the system of the princely fiefs and their 
administration was thoroughly modified in order to strengthen the position of the central 
government and main imperial line vis-à-vis possible rival claimants for the throne from 
among the princes of the blood.
144
  
The Jinshu asserts that the Xianning Era reshuffling of the princely dignities were 
direct consequence of misgivings of certain court ministers close to the emperor about rising 
power of the princes of the blood and especially Sima You, Prince of Qi 齊王司馬攸: 
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“In the third year of the Xianning Era (277/278 AD) the General of the Guards 
(weijiangjun 衛將軍) Yang Yao and Secretariat Supervisor (zhongshujian 中書監) Xun Xu 
were afraid that because Sima You, Prince of Qi, enjoyed respect and prestige of the time, some 
difficulties might arise in the future for Emperor Huidi (that is the then designated heir and 
emperor to be). Therefore, they pursued the [original] intent of the late Minister of Works Pei 
Xiu to establish the five ranks peerage enfeoffments and together calmly explained to Emperor 
Wudi what the current time demanded: “[The men of] old enfeoffed marquises in order to 
shelter and protect the royal house. Nowadays the bandits of Wu still remain unsubdued and the 
responsibility of those entrusted with the regional military command is great. The princes of the 
blood are commanders supervising and exercising control over their fiefs and yet, none of them 
actually governs the subjects within the territory [under their rule]. Their importance is not 
appropriate. Moreover the generals from non-royal families are stationed at the borders. It 
would be fitting if the [imperial] relatives would be involved as well, yet the [royal] princes and 
dukes are all in the capital. That does not [conform] to principles of strengthening the border 
garrisons and [securing] the stability of ten thousand generations.” At first the emperor did not 





Both Yang Yao 楊珧 and Xun Xu 荀勖 belonged to the inner circle of Emperor Wudi 
their families being tied by bonds of past loyal service strengthened by number of marriage 
alliances. Therefore they may have been privy to many private thoughts and fears of the 
emperor. Even though the Jinshu wants us to believe that they were acting on their own, being 
worried about the heir apparent having an unwelcome rival which threatened the smooth 
succession of the throne, it is quite plausible that they were just voicing general concern of the 
court or even perhaps personal fears of the emperor himself. Whatever the truth, it is more 
interesting to look at the subtle way in which they deal with the problem of excessive power 
of the princes of the blood which in many respects prefigures the solution chosen by Wudi. 
First of all, the problem itself is not mentioned at all. Both ministers argue for full 
implementation of the enfeoffment system which is here somewhat misleadingly labeled as 
five ranks peerages system. Such confusion is, however, not uncommon and it is quite 
understandable if we take into consideration that the princely dignities were considered to be 
equivalent of the Zhou feudal lords, which were in turn direct models for the peerages of the 
Jin. Indistinct boundary line between the princes and the royal peers on the one side and other 
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non-royal peers on the other further enhanced chances of confusion as many rules and 
provisions of the enfeoffment system applied to both groups without difference. 
Under the rhetoric of implementing the enfeoffment of the princes which is almost 
universally considered to be one of the main pillars of the imperial authority and stable 
dynastic rule lies the ingenious strategy how to eliminate the threat and divest the princes of 
their power without their being able to raise any rightful objection. Only by departing the 
capital and assuming one‟s responsibility in one‟s domain could the princes fulfill the roles of 
guardians of the throne which were traditionally expected from them. There was no fighting 
back without losing the moral high ground and therefore once the emperor had decided to 
send them to their fiefs, they had no choice but to obey the imperial command. It is true that 
to send the princes to their fiefs on the one hand meant realization of the division of the 
empire among members of the imperial house which had been so far only nominal, 
accompanied by establishment of the full-fledged fief administration including the armed 
forces. However, on the other hand, the princes of the blood were gracefully sent packing, 
having to leave the imperial capital with just a faint hope of return. They were deprived of the 
chance to participate in court deliberations and influence directly the policy of the state. Even 
though their departure may have been extolled and celebrated as noble accomplishment of 
their prescribed role, in reality they were exiles banished from the centre of power sentenced 
to precarious existence in the provinces, practically deprived of any means how to 
communicate with one another being constantly under the watchful surveillance of centrally 
appointed administrators. It is kind of paradox that the fear, however groundless, of too much 
power being vested in the non-royal peerage which was still prevalent in the court circles was 
so ingeniously used as an excuse for smooth elimination of a danger much more real 
threatening the future stability of the dynasty. 
The position of Sima You, Prince of Qi, whose popularity among the Jin courtiers 
caused such alarm of the meritorious ministers, was exceptional indeed. He was a younger 
brother of Emperor Wudi but as he had been adopted as an heir of his sonless uncle Sima Shi 
he got ritually separated from the main imperial line represented by the emperor and his 
immediate family and became premier prince of the blood, standing for the cadet branches of 
the imperial house and their ambitions in claiming the succession for themselves. Unlike the 
majority of the princes of the blood who were only distant cousins of the emperor, You‟s 
claim to the throne was legitimate and therefore very dangerous for Wudi‟s line: 
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 “Sima Shi was the first born son of Sima Yi but he died prematurely without leaving a 
son of his own. And therefore Sima Zhao made Wudi‟s younger brother Sima You Sima Shi‟s 
heir and successor and favored him greatly. He used to say that he acted as the regent only as a 
proxy [of his older brother] and that after his death the great enterprise should return to You. He 
always said: “This is Sima Shi‟s all under heaven. What have I to do with it?” When he wanted 
to name his hereditary prince [and successor] his heart favored [his younger son] You.”
146
 
                    
By the act of adoption, Sima You became the heir to the older line of the Sima house 
which at least theoretically had better claim to the throne. However, Sima Zhao may have 
professed his readiness to return the empire to his brother‟s heir, yet in the end he followed 
the advice of his counselors and named his eldest son Sima Yan his heir and successor. The 
tricky question of precedence in succession was not solved by the establishment of the 
dynasty either. Even as the emperor of the new dynasty Wudi was still considering naming his 
younger brother the heir to the throne and thereby fulfilling his duty to the ancestors in which 
their father had failed. Later on the interests of his own children prevailed and Wudi 
appointed his oldest son Sima Zhong 司馬衷  crown prince. The position of Sima You 
changed immediately. As the new crown prince was not very bright and even his father was 
not sure whether he would ever be able to take up the responsibility of the supreme ruler of 
the empire, his uncle Sima You was all of a sudden too much of a competition for the young 
prince. Sima You was an experienced administrator and military commander who had 
achieved great merit in services of the dynasty which did not endear him to his brother‟s heart. 
And the emperor‟s distrust of Sima You was not lost on the more perceptive of his courtiers 
who might have their own reason for wishing the unfortunate prince ill:  
 
“As Emperor Wudi was getting old, his sons were [still quite] young and the crown 
prince was not fit to rule. All the ministers and officials at the court and in the provinces set 
their mind on You [and thought about him as their future sovereign]. Secretariat Supervisor Xun 
Xu and Palace Attendant Feng Dan promoted themselves through fawning and flattery. You 
loathed their behavior. As You was the hope of the whole court, [Xun] Xu and others were 
afraid that once he succeeded the disaster would inevitably have befallen them. Therefore they 
have said to the emperor [with seeming] disinterest: “When the ten thousand years of Your 
Majesty‟s [life] are up, the crown prince will not be able to ascend [the throne].” “For what 
reason?” asked the emperor. [Xun] Xu answered: “All the officials both at court and in the 
provinces in their hearts pay allegiance to Prince of Qi. How could the crown prince ever be 
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able to ascend [the throne]?! Your Majesty should try to order the Prince of Qi to depart to his 
fief. This would without doubt stir the whole court and [everyone would say] it is not possible. 
Then the words of your humble servant will be vindicated.” [Feng] Dan added: “Your Majesty 
should send all noble lords to their respective fiefs. In implementing the five ranks peerage 
system [it would be highly] suitable to begin with one‟s own close relatives. And there is no one 




Even though both ministers were probably pursuing their own interests, having been 
motivated by the urge to get rid of their political opponent as well as the chance to win the 
good will of the future emperor, they were at least outwardly acting in perfect correspondence 
to their position of meritorious ministers. One of the duties of these founding members of the 
dynasty was to defend the interests of the main imperial line of descent and safeguard the 
stability of the imperial regime which manifested itself in direct primogeniturial succession 
from father to son. Of course it is a question whether we can believe the Jinshu at all, yet it 
seems obvious that the attitude attributed by the chronicle to both ministers represents kind of 
general view held by those being close to the emperor and very probably by the emperor 
himself. Mounting tension between the main imperial line and princes of the blood may have 
urged the emperor to ponder pros and cons of the current system of princely enfeoffment. The 
need for reform which would reflect the changed political situation at court compelled the 
emperor to initiate open discussion on working of the ennoblement system and possible 
sending of the princes to their fiefs in which all the relevant state agencies should participate. 
  
“At that time the [question] of sending princes and dukes to their fiefs was discussed [at 
the court]. The emperor asked [Xun] Xu what was his opinion [in this matter] and Xu answered: 
“All the princes and dukes already act as Commanders-in-chief [supervising military areas and 
provincial commands] (dudu 都督). To send them to their respective fiefs means to discard the 
provincial administration. Moreover carving and partitioning the commanderies and prefectures 
would without doubt cause an outcry [and discontent] because people love [their] roots (i.e. 
where they come from). All the fiefs are to establish [at least one] army [which means] that 
officials and soldiers [would have to be] recalled in order to be assigned to the respective fiefs 
and would be [sorely] missed in the border defenses.” When the emperor had [Xun] Xu to think 
it over again, he expounded [his thoughts] further: “If the imperial edict [took] the ancient 
[practices of] selecting the talented ones to be regional governors as the norm and would 
arrange things in such way that regional commands would be assigned according the territory of 
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the fief and location of the army on a Commander-in-chief to be, then it would be indeed the 
brightest of intentions. As the carving out the territory and correcting the borders of the fiefs is 
concerned, if we differentiate between close and distant [relatives], it would be fine indeed! But 
I am afraid that dividing the old territories (administrative units) would shake the [established 
situation] and certainly make the people‟s hearts restless and agitated. When I think about [this 
matter] I would dare to say that it is fitting to [leave it] as it used to be before. (i.e. no change of 
the fief, no redistribution of the domain territory) If [in the future] the current situation and the 
politics of the state necessitate a change of the enfeoffment [and the fief itself] which would not 
go as far as dividing the territory then if there is something gained or lost it could be dealt with 
[ad hoc] as deemed suitable [for the occasion]. After all, the fiefs of the five grades [peerages] 
were created long time ago, yet in fact there is no system established as yet. They posses just an 
empty name but the actual administration [of the fiefs] is roughly the same as in the case of old 
commanderis, prefectures, townships and villages. I am afraid that if we are rash and imprudent 




Obviously, even though the previous Jinshu quote wants us to believe that Xun Xu 
was one of the main advocates of the sending of the princes to their fiefs, this passage from 
his own biography in Jinshu suggests that he warned against any rash and unwarranted 
changes which would destabilize the system which was after all one of the main pillars of the 
supreme authority of the throne. Again he discharges his obligations as a meritorious minister 
and advises for prudent and circumspect action which would not jeopardize the power base of 
the imperial family. It seems that his concern for well-being of the dynasty was caused mainly 
by the influence of the Prince of Qi whom he wanted to see banished from the court as the 
latent danger of future succession struggles loomed large in his mind. However, universal 
revision of the princely enfeoffment system was not advisable either. Xun Xu points out a 
couple of technical difficulties connected with some of the suggested changes in the system. 
As some of the princes were appointed commanders-in-chief of the crucial military region, to 
recall them back and replace them by non-royals would definitely weaken the position of the 
Simas and risk the security of the state and its borders. With sending of the princes to their 
fiefs the proper fief administration would have to be established including rather large 
contingents of military forces which were to become a garrison of the fief. As these troops 
had to be set aside from the state armies, the fighting efficiency of the Jin military forces 
would be seriously impaired as well as the ability of the state to withstand an attack from the 
still unsubdued southern state of Wu. 
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Xun Xu‟s convincing arguments were duly taken into consideration and some of them 
were reflected in the final reform of the princely enfeoffment system which was introduced in 
277 AD. Despite dealing mostly with regulations of princely fiefs, their administration, armed 
forces and their inheritance, some of the provisions applied to the highest ranks of the non-
royal peers as well, given certain overlapping of the princely enfeoffment and peerage system: 
        
“The officials concerned petitioned the throne that the system of apanages of the princes 
and dukes should be changed and that the forces of the fief should be given under the command 
of a Commandant-in-ordinary (zhongwei 中尉 ) in every [fief]. Pingyuan, Runan, Langye, 
Fufeng and Qi were to be considered as the large fiefs (first grade fiefs), Liang, Zhao, Le‟an, 
Yan, Anping, Yiyang as the second grade fiefs. All other were to be considered as small fiefs 
(third grade fiefs). All of them were to be enlarged [by including the territory of] neighboring 
prefectures in order to fulfill the [prescribed quota of] ten thousand households each. Moreover, 
the system used for the commandery dukes should be the same as that of the princes of the 
small fiefs. Their forces should also be given to Commandant-in-ordinary to command. The 
commandery marquises established one army of one thousand and one hundred men, also under 
the command of a Commandant-in-ordinary as was the case of princes with apanage of less than 
five thousand households. 
At that time the apanage of the ducal fief of Lu was increased by special [grace] and the 
title of the late Minister of Works, Wang Shen, Duke of Boling, was posthumously promoted to 
that of a commandery duke, and title of Yang Hu, Marquis of Juping to that of a commandery 
marquis of Nancheng. Moreover Sima Cheng, Prince of Nangong, and Sima Wan, Prince of 
Sui
149
 were at the beginning of the Taishi Era both enfeoffed as prefecture princes with apanage 
of one thousand households. Now their [status] was corrected to proper prefecture princes and 
their apanages increased [accordingly] to three thousand households. The rules for them were 
the same as those of a commandery marquis and they were also to establish one army. 
Hence, only the sons of emperors were [entitled to be created] princes. The younger 
sons and sons of concubines of the princes of the blood were all the closest relatives of the 
imperial family and as such they should again by special grace receive enfeoffment of some 
territory. In case of princes-founders (shifengwang 始封王, i.e. princes enfeoffed as the first in 
line, progenitors of respective princely lineages) of the first and second grade fiefs, their 
younger sons were to become dukes. Younger sons of the princes-inheritors (chengfengwang 承
封王, i.e. those who inherited the fief from the princes-founders) were to become marquises. 
Younger sons of the princes-successors (jichengfengwang 繼承封王, i.e. all princes who stood 
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in line in the third place or later) were to become counts. In case of small fiefs with more than 
five thousand households the younger sons of the princes-founders were to become viscounts. 
Younger sons of the princes-founders whose apanage is less than five thousand households 
together with younger sons of dukes-founders and marquises-founders were all to become 
barons. No other could ever be enfeoffed. The rules [applicable] to these dukes were the same 
[as the rules of] five thousand household fiefs. The rules [applicable] to the marquises were the 
same [as the rules of] fiefs with less than five thousand households. They established one army 
of one thousand men each too which was under command of a Commandant-in-ordinary. The 
counts, viscounts and barons were differentiated [from one another] but none of them was to 
establish a single army. 
The grandsons of the first grade fief founders should disband the lower army, great-
grandsons should disband the upper army. The offspring (sons and grandsons) of the second 
grade fief founders should also disband the lower army. All the rest were regularly left with just 
one army. In case of the first grade fiefs the middle army numbered two thousand men and 
upper and lower armies one thousand five hundred men each. The upper armies of the second 
grade fiefs numbered two thousand men and their lower armies numbered one thousand men. 
Those who had not yet departed to their respective fiefs raised [only certain number of men] for 
defense of their territory [in their absence.] One hundred men in case of the first grade  fiefs, 
eighty men in case of the second grade fiefs and sixty men in case of the lesser fiefs. Rules for 
commandery marquises and prefecture dukes were the same as those [applicable to] the lesser 
fiefs. Once they have gone [to their fiefs, the number of their] retainers would be increased 
according to the original memorial. [The princes] were sent off to their respective fiefs, but all 
the dukes (i.e. princes) felt attached to the capital city [and life in it] and therefore they left it 
shedding [many] tears. When the state of Wu [was finally] vanquished, Sima You, Prince of Qi 




The reform of the princely enfeoffment system in 277 AD at last implemented all the 
provisions envisaged eleven years ago and at least theoretically brought into life the ideal of 
princely fiefs serving as the support of the dynasty, a kind of regional backup in times of 
emergency. Yet to say that these provisions were applied indiscriminately would be too 
farfetched as the various objections, recommendations and reservations of men like Xun Xu 
were also taken into consideration and many regulations were adjusted and modified 
accordingly. Many princes did indeed depart to their respective fiefs, but the order to leave the 
capital did apply only to those who did not perform any government office. The princes in 
official positions were to remain at court or in their respective provincial posts and discharge 
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their duties as before. Wudi‟s sons who were newly given the princely dignity were also to 
remain at court where they assumed command of the palace guards and metropolitan forces in 
obvious attempt to strengthen the position of the main imperial line. Even Sima You, Prince 
of Qi was to remain at court and it was not until 282 AD that he was finally sent to his domain, 
yet not in capacity of a mere fief administrator but provided with wide authority of regional 
command:  
 
“The emperor believed [Xun] Xu‟s words and heeded the advice of [Feng] Dan and in 
the third year of the Taikang Era (282 AD) indeed issued the following edict: “In the ancient 
times when they had first established nine ranks and created the counts-palatine (bo 伯 in sense 
of regional viceroy), some of them were retained at court where they [attended to] court affairs 
and assisted the government while others were sent [to the provinces] to administer the regions 
of the empire. Lü Wang of Zhou, five lords and nine counts-palatine can verily bear testimony 
to [such a practice]. Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中), Minister of Works (sikong 司空) Sima 
You Prince of Qi possesses bright virtue, pure and untarnished. He is loyal and earnest, faithful 
and honest. Being our close relative, our own full younger brother, You was entrusted with a 
position of aiding the government in which he accomplished great achievements in assisting the 
[establishment of the] imperial mandate, laboring hard for the benefit of the royal house. It 
would be fitting to raise him to the office of some consequence in which he would be looked up 
to [with respect and reverence]. Let him be appointed Commander-in-chief (dasima 大司馬), 
[area commander] supervising all the military affairs of the Qingzhou province and Palace 
Attendant as before. Let him be commissioned with a warrant. Let him command one thousand 
men of his original garrison and have personal mounted escort, headquarters staff (aides de 
camp) and majors and [ceremonial] great carriage as he used to have earlier. His [princely] 
entourage is to be expanded by a troupe of pipers and drummers. The number of the official 
mounted forerunners should be evened up to twenty and he may establish five cavalry majors. 
All other important matters not mentioned should be all carried precisely according to the old 




As we can see from this as well as the previous edict the government tried to sweeten 
the bitterness of forced political exile by bestowing various additional honors and privileges 
devoid of any political meaning. The 277 AD reform also generously increased the princely 
apanages, allegedly in order to reconcile the current holdings of the princes with quotas set 
earlier for the size of the princely fiefs. However, this reconciliation was applied only in one 
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way. Whereas the fiefs found to be too small were augmented by tax-paying households from 
neighboring prefectures, the apanages at the apex of princely dignities which often exceeded 
by far the prescribed quotas were left unaltered. Enlargement of the princely fiefs was also in 
keeping with the declared objective of transforming nominal territorial lords into 
counterbalance of non-royal court families in order to establish a fully operational system of 
backing for the throne and its future incumbents. On the other hand, the command of military 
forces of the fiefs was to be entrusted to centrally appointed Commandant-in-ordinary 
(zhongwei 中尉) and thereby subordinated directly to the central authority of the emperor. 
Wudi did not want to create possible independent regional forces. After all, curtailment of the 
power of the princes was one of the main aims of the whole reform.
152
 
The most important innovation of the system was resurrection of the old-established 
Han rule according to which only the sons of an emperor are entitled to the rank of a prince, 
which was to become the most important rule in judging eligibility of an imperial clansmen 
for princely dignity. The criterion of imperial parentage should have effectively prevented the 
more distant branches of the imperial clan from getting more and more powerful. The 
younger sons of the current princes could no more be created princes in their own right. While 
in 266 AD almost every adult male member of the Sima family received princely title, 
henceforth this dignity should be reserved for sons of the reigning monarch. The new rule was 
not enforced retroactively, though, so the cadet branches of the imperial family retained their 
position, however their future prospects as the further enfeoffment was concerned, were rather 
bleak. The princely title was hereditary in the main line from father to eldest son but younger 
members of the princely families could claim only considerably less prestigious titles and 
their position sank even further with every new generation up to the point when they 
effectively ceased to be considered members of the imperial family and became commoners. 
The reform of the third year of the Xianning era also introduced elaborate mechanism 
of devolution of privileges of the princes. As their line grew in time and generation more and 
more apart from the main imperial line of succession, the power of the princes was gradually 
curtailed. One of the examples is disbanding of the armies mentioned in the above passage. 
The mutual distrust and consequential fear of disloyalty was believed to grow in direct 
proportion to the genealogical distance from the main line and therefore each new inheritor of 
the princely rank should disband one of his armies so even the biggest first grade fiefs were 
left with but one single army after just two generations, being no different from much smaller 
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fiefs of third grade princes, dukes or marquises. The same kind of devolution principle 
applied to the official staff of the fief administration and princely household. The fief itself 
should have been divided with every transfer of princely title as the younger brothers of the 
new title holder were supposed to get part of family inheritance and by the special grace 
(tui„en) be created noble lords in their own right. Even though this last regulation was never 
thoroughly implemented and the original fief was usually reduced by only one prefecture,
153
 it 
did succeed in weakening the position of the princes in their own domains.  
Practice of continuous partitioning of the princely fiefs was accompanied by elaborate 
system of royal peerages regularized for the first time precisely during the 277 AD reform of 
the princely enfeoffment. The younger sons of the princes were to be given peerage dignity, 
but the exact title and its grade was to be determined by the size of the ancestral fief, one‟s 
position in the imperial clan and one‟s relative distance from both the imperial line and the 
founder of the respective princely line, with the rank and title decreasing as the distance 
grows.  
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Tab. 4: Schema of Tui‘en Peerages Practiced in the 3rd Grade Princely Fiefs with 




Tab. 5: Schema of Tui’en Peerages Practiced in the 3rd Grade Princely Fiefs with 




It is obvious from the above schemes that the same hierarchical principle based on 
genealogical proximity to the main imperial line was at work in creating royal peerages. 
Whereas the great fiefs of the first (daguo 大國) and the second grade (ciguo 次國) were 
usually given to the most prominent of the princes, that is the sons of a reigning emperor, the 
smaller fiefs of the third grade (xiaoguo 小國) were conferred on more distant imperial kin. In 
other words, the smaller the fief, the greater the distance between its incumbent and the 
reigning emperor. Concern of the main imperial line not to bestow too much power on distant 
relatives is clearly expressed in decreasing rank of peerage titles available for different 
offspring of different princes. While the younger sons of a prince founder of the 1
st
 grade fief 
were entitled to become dukes, the sons of a prince founder of the 3
rd
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viscountcy or even only a barony, depending on the actual size of the fief. Thus the system 
ensured that the grandsons and great-grandsons of the emperor would be dukes and marquises 
whereas their peers from more distant lines were entitled to ranks of viscounts and barons at 
the best. In this way the everlasting supremacy of the main imperial line was ensured, with 
close relatives of the reigning emperor ideally holding at every given moment the highest 
dignities of premier princes of the realm.  
The system of the special grace creations did help in the long run to strengthen 
position of the main imperial line, yet the future would show that the power of the princes of 
the blood was not sufficiently curbed. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to blame the failure 
of the special grace system as there were much more serious reasons for the final 
disintegration of the empire in internecine bloodbath known as the Upheaval of the Eight 
Princes.
154
  Indeed I don‟t think that the system ever failed in the first place. It seems quite 
intriguing to me to see the whole system as useful tool serving more than one purpose. If the 
creation of the new dignities out of the original princely fief aimed at the power of the princes, 
the pruning of their privileges was never as drastic and absolute as to render the princes 
completely powerless. Wudi deliberately employed the principle mentioned already by Duan 
Zhuo in one of his memorials. While the perpetual partitioning may have diminished political 
consequence of the individual fiefs, shrinking of the domains and multiplying of the dignities 
did not affect the power base of the imperial family as a whole. On the contrary, the tui„en 
policy gave birth to numerous and practically ever-growing group of royal peerage which 
effectively counterbalanced the influence of the non-royal peerage families and if not outright 
precluded any possibility of recurring of usurpation than at least greatly minimized the danger 
of it.    
The assumption that the tui„en creations of peerage dignities served double purpose 
may be supported by indirect mentions of the changes being made in the non-royal peerages 
as well. During the reform of the enfeoffment system in 277 AD three non-royal peerages are 
explicitly mentioned as being promoted either in rank or apanage:                  
 
At that time the apanage of the ducal fief of Lu was increased by special [grace] and the 
title of the late Minister of Works (sikong 司空 ) Wang Shen, Duke of Boling, was 
                                                 
154
 For detailed analysis of these resaons see my study of the role of the imperial princes during the Western Jin 
Dynasty: Hrubý, Jakub (2007), especially chapters “Princely Fief” (pp. 72-97) and “Memebers of the Imperial 
Family as Officials” (pp. 100-117). 
99 
posthumously promoted to that of a commandery duke, and title of Yang Hu, Marquis of Juping 
to that of a commandery marquis of Nancheng.
155 
 
The fact that the promotions are mentioned in connection with far-reaching changes of 
the system of the princely enfeoffment suggests that both systems were intertwined and 
probably even partially overlapping.
156
 It is highly significant that all three belonged to 
meritorious ministers enjoying imperial favor. It seems that Wudi tried to adjust their relative 
standing within the ranks of non-royal peerage and raise them closer to the ranks of the 
princes. Whereas Wang Shen 王沈 was originally created prefecture duke of Boling, Yang 
Hu 羊祜 refused the ducal dignity and accepted only title of marquis.157 Now both of them 
were promoted to commandery peers and attained the highest possible grade within the non-
royal peerage. The third beneficiary, Jia Chong 賈充, was already commandery duke of Lu, 
but his apanage was now considerably enlarged. His position at court was exceptional. Not 
only was he one of the staunchest supporters of the Jin regime, but he was also related to both 
candidates to the throne as he had married two of his daughters to the heir apparent and Prince 
of Qi respectively. As an imperial in-law he may have been seen as a part of the wider 
imperial family and this generous promotion in apanage may in fact reflect general effort of 
strengthening the position of the main imperial line.  
Be it as it may, the promotion of Wang Shen and Yang Hu at this particular moment 
and other circumstantial evidence suggests that Wudi was closing the ranks of the non-royal 
peerage in the same way as he had closed the ranks of the princes. Parallel to the new 
development in conferring the princely dignities which restricted the eligible candidates to the 
sons of an emperor, similar restrictions were introduced into the process of ennoblement as 
well. The bestowment of the peerages was always guided by ancient Han principle according 
to which “none was to become lord unless through merit” (fei gong bu hou 非功不侯).158 
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Nevertheless the merit (gong 功) was rather a general concept which could under different 
circumstance mean all kinds of different services to the dynasty and one‟s sovereign. 
Obviously the various services might be of varying importance and therefore qualified those 
who had rendered them for reward of varying degree. As the peerage dignities were 
universally seen as the highest possible reward they were naturally set aside to be awarded 
only for the most loyal service. For Wudi such loyal service was tantamount to helping the 
Sima family in accomplishing the usurpation process and establishing the dynasty of their 
own. In this context the merit referred to the greatest merit of all that is the assistance in 
founding the dynasty (zuoming zhi gong 佐命之功). Wudi considered peerage to be too high 
an honor to be given lightheartedly and therefore only meritorious ministers who were 
instrumental in bringing about the abdication of the Wei were entitled to such high dignity. 
Even though the available sources do not state this explicitly it is clear from the fact that the 
266 AD creation and confirmation of the peerages connected with the proclamation of the 
new dynasty was to remain the only creation of the peers in the long reign of more than thirty 
years. Never again did Wudi bestow any of the peerage ranks on a deserving minister or 
military commander. Even the leaders of the victorious campaign against the southern state of 
Wu who had vanquished the long time rival of the Wei and Jin regimes and achieved the 
longed-for unity of the empire were not given more than prefecture lordships, the highest of 
the lordship dignities standing just below the peerage ranks. 
As the foundation of the dynasty could not be repeated it was impossible to gain the 
kind of merit necessary for bestowment of a peerage. In consequence the peerage ranks 
became unattainable for all non-royal court families as no other achievement, however 
spectacular it may have been, could match the merit of the gongchen. Meritorious service for 
the dynasty was to be rewarded only by bestowal of the lesser titles and fiefs of lordship ranks 
(liehou). The position of the existing peerage was apparently enhanced (at least in some cases) 
by promotion in rank and apanage to equal the position of the royal peers and princes which 
further widened the gap between the peerage holders, the one-time founders of the dynasty, 
and other titled or untitled non-royal elite families in the service of the Jin. Wudi‟s decision 
effectively precluded further rise of the peerage as independent power challenging the royal 
authority. It did not only prevent the actual growth in number of the peerage as a whole but at 
the same time greatly minimized the influence of single peers as they were in the long run 
bound to be eclipsed by the royal peerage. For it is true that the ranks of the peerage were 
closed to members of non-royal families, but the newly introduced system of privilege 
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devolution connected with the enfeoffment of the imperial princes and inheritance of the 
princely dignities ensured that the royal peers were to be created regularly with every change 
of incumbent in any of the princely lines. 
While the number of the royal peerage continuously increased, the number of the non-
royal peerage dignities should remain the same or actually even decrease due to the various 
natural or legal causes as the lack of an heir or negligence in one‟s duties, treason or gross 
misconduct, all of which warranted abolition or attainder of the peerage. Wudi practically 
turned the peerage ranks into monopoly of the imperial family. In a way he was heeding the 
advice of men like Duan Zhuo who called for the strengthening of the position of the imperial 
family vis-à-vis the non-royal peerage by creating multitude of politically inconsequential 
royal fiefs which were nevertheless firmly under control of the imperial clansmen and 
centrally appointed officials. Under these circumstances the peerages of the meritorious 
ministers were too small to serve as the territorial base of possible regional resistance defying 
the authority of the centre. Even Duan Zhuo himself was to find out that once the ranks of the 
peerage were closed, Wudi would not consent to any revision of the meritorious achievements 
which would include further ennoblement. When Duan Zhuo petitioned the throne for 
reconsideration of the adequacy of the rewards bestowed upon the victorious commanders of 
the Shu campaign, the emperor did not deign to answer:        
    
“In the past when [we] fought Shu, [in order to] enlist and recruit men and horses from 
Liangzhou and brave lads of Qiang and Hu [descent], [the court] had promised them rich reward 
and more than five thousand men followed [Deng] Ai in chastising the rebels and the merit 
these men achieved was tremendous [indeed]. Yet the imperial edict from the yihai (day or year) 
[stated] that [the merits and rewards] of the generals and army leaders of the provincial [militia] 
forces would be [estimated] differently from those of standing imperial armies and even though 
their merits were high, they were not enfeoffed accordingly. Only some thirty men from those 
lead by the Governor (taishou 太守) of Jincheng, Yang Xin were enfeoffed for the [military] 
pressure they had exerted on Jiangyou. But there was not a single commander west of Jincheng 
enfeoffed who would not be from Yang Xin‟s unit. However, those who served in the central 
army, despite their merits having been rather meagre were all enfeoffed as marquises [and lords]. 
Not to enfeoff those who are from the provincial [militia] forces even though their merit is high 
is not what is meant by not awarding munificent grants on those who are near and  not omitting 
to bestow grace and favour on those who are far.  
Your servant has heard that fish [tend to] hang [from the angling hook] due to the sweet 
bait and brave men [are eager to] die for generous reward. That is why Jing Ke admired the 
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righteousness of the Yan crown prince Dan and [why] Zhuan Zhu was moved by Helü‟s love. 
And the dagger was raised in the halls of Qin and the blade of Wu glistened in the fish belly. To 
view death as a mere return, is there not a reason to it after all?! For merits and honour and 
[corresponding] generous reward, that is something the noble men vie for. Being unfair [in 
bestowing rewards] leads to resentment. It has always been so. The Book of Songs says: 
“Turtledove sits on a mulberry tree, it has got seven children! A good and noble man has but 
one way of acting!” Your subject [dares] to suggest that [the men] like those [mentioned above] 




Motivated by his concern for what he considered to be a dangerous stain on the 
imagined moral profile of the dynasty, Duan Zhuo called for impartial bestowment of rewards 
to all those who had helped to establish the Jin imperial regime, yet his appeal went unheeded. 
It is rather difficult to date this memorial and therefore unclear whether Duan Zhuo‟s 
initiative preceded or followed the changes of the enfeoffment system introduced in 277 AD, 
however, whichever the case, it is still obvious that Wudi was disinclined to reopen the 
discussion on merit connected with the establishment of the dynasty and create any new noble 
dignity be it a peerage or a lordship. By the enfeoffment of the meritorious ministers in 266 
AD Wudi had fulfilled his moral obligations as the founder of the new regime to his 
supporters. Any further sharing of the supreme authority of the emperor was deemed 
unnecessary and should have been avoided as such. Of course, the loyalty of the subjects 
should be encouraged as before but not in a way which would be detrimental to the power of 
the imperial family. Therefore the government should be rather circumspect in bestowing the 
noble titles limiting the future use of the peerages to members of the imperial clan. Even the 
lesser titles of lordships were to be granted rather reluctantly during the whole period of 
Wudi‟s reign. It was only during the second half of the dynasty when decline of the central 
authority of the throne compelled Wudi‟s successors to rescind many of these restrictions and 
resort to creation of the new peerages which would satisfy the ambitions of powerful men at 
court and in the provinces whose support was crucial for survival of the dynasty. 
Due to the highly complex and intertwined policies of princely enfeoffment and 
ennoblement of the non-royal families the period of Western Jin saw birth of an elaborate 
system of noble dignities comprising whole range of noble titles from imperial princes and 
royal and non-royal peerages to all kinds of lordships differing in rank, income and right to 
inherit. In fact the government had at its disposal more than twenty different noble titles of 
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three to four categories which differed widely in their usages and origin. The following table 








category title  
(jue 爵)  
grade apanage  
(yi 邑)  
rank  
(pin 品) 
princes prince  
(wang 王) 
domain prince (guowang 國王)161 unspecified 1
st
 rank 
commandery prince (junwang 郡王)162 from 5000 to 




prefecture prince (xianwang 縣王) unspecified 1
st
 rank 
peerages duke  
(gong 公) 












commandery marquis (junhou 郡侯) unspecified 2
nd
 rank 
first grade marquis (daguohou 大國侯) 1600 hu 2
nd
 rank 





first grade count (daguobo 大國伯) 1200 hu 2
nd
 rank 





first grade viscount (daguozi 大國子) 800 hu 2
nd
 rank 





first grade baron (daguonan 大國男) 400 hu 2
nd
 rank 
second grade baron (ciguonan 次國男) 200 hu 2
nd
 rank 
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respective title holders in the Jinshu and tables in Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 5. 
161
 These were the princely dignities bestowed on his sons not long before his death in Taikang 10 (289 AD). See 
Hrubý, Jakub (2007): pp. 57-61.   
162
 Yang Guanghui comments that this princely rank was further divided in dependence on the size of the fief to 
three grades of 1
st
 grade prince (daguowang 大國王), 2nd grade prince (ciguowang 次國王) and 3rd grade prince 
(xiaoguowang 小國王). According to the Diguanzhi treatise the 1st grade prince had commandery fief with 
apanage of twenty thousand households, the 2
nd
 grade prince enjoyed the commandery fief with apanage of ten 
thousand households and the 3
rd
 grade prince was given the commandery fief with apanage of five thousand 
households only.  
163
 It seems that both commandery dukes and commandery marquises were at least after 277 AD considered to 
equal in some respects the princely ranks. Average apanage of these noble ranks may have been around five 
thousand households. 
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lords 
 (liehou 列侯) 







township lord (xianghou 鄉侯) 4
th
 rank 















lord inside the passes (guanzhonghou 關中侯) unknown 
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 The apanages of the lords (liehou) were not liable to any limits or quotas as was the case with the peerages. In 
fact, their apanages often seemingly exceeded those of the peerage. However, whereas the peers were entitled to 
one third of taxes collected from the allotted households plus some more levies collected from all households 
living within the conferred territory, the lordships enjoyed only one tenth of the taxes produced by households 
conferred as their apanage. Therefore their net income was generally lower than in case of peerage holders. See 
Yang Guanghui (2007): p. 88. 
165
 It is still not known whether the honorary lords were given any apanage at all, let alone the quotas for its size.  
166
 It is not clear which court rank belonged to the lords of the royal domain during the Western Jin. It used to be 
the 6
th
 rank under the Wei so it seems rather probable to me that the Jin retained it. See Yang Guanghui (2007): 




The Fief – the Apanage and Bestowal of Noble Dignities 
 
The Fief Administration 
 
We have seen that the much discussed recreation of the old institution of enfeoffment 
did not in fact mean restoring the state of affairs which had existed prior to the establishment 
of the unified empire. Even though there were voices among the court ministers who called 
for resurrection of the ancient practices of the Zhou, yet this concept inevitably collided with 
the political needs of a unified empire and central government and therefore could have never 
been fully implemented. The imperial kin and trusted supporters were created princes, peers 
and lords in order to become kind of power backing for the throne and the main imperial line, 
but the central government was reluctant to surrender part of its authority over territory and 
people and share it with these prospective protectors of the realm. Thus, reflecting the 
experience of its predecessors the Han and the Wei, the Jin Dynasty did not so much recreate 
the ancient pre-imperial order as rather established original and new system of ennoblement. 
The period of Western Jin did not see emergence of the semi-independent landed aristocracy, 
but mere titled nobility fully subordinated to the central government. Despite persisting 
practice of differentiating between two kinds of administrative units, commanderies and fiefs 
(guo 國), the mere existence of the fiefs did not mean the existence of two separate systems of 
local administration.  
The fiefs, regardless of their being princely domains or territories assigned to peerage 
dignities,
167
 were integral parts of the Jin realm functioning as administrative units of 
provincial administration side by side with commanderies and prefectures. Yet the specific 
position of the fiefs vis-à-vis more standard units of provincial administration was reflected in 
the administration of the fiefs which combined two separate official structures with different 
agenda and distinct fields of activity. Whereas the actual administration of the fief was not 
dissimilar to the official structure of any commandery or prefecture of the realm, the fiefs 
gradually established the institutions of princely and noble households run by separate official 
                                                 
167
 It is not clear from the sources whether the lordship titles (liehou) holders actually got any territory as a fief. It 
seems that unlike the peers who were given nominal control over an official fief with special fief administration 
and corresponding staff, the liehou titles were connected only with apanages drawn from precisely defined 
number of households in certain area which may have corresponded somehow to the territory used as a title 
appellation. Even if they had indeed been given fiefs of their own, we do not know any details regarding the 
structure of such a fief and rules governing its administration. 
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staff which were of course lacking in standard administrative units. The household 
administration in the fiefs imitated similar agencies within the imperial palace and in case of 
advisors and mentors also the administration of the palace of the crown prince.
168
 The 
officials of the administration proper handled the everyday agenda of the fief, supervising the 
populace, collecting the taxes and administering justice. The officials of the noble household, 
on the other hand, presided over the administration of the private sphere of the fief, the family 
of the domain lord, his residence and household maintaining the comfort and security of the 
lord and his family, overseeing his education and also monitoring his conduct. Members of 
the household staff, especially those who were part of the closer retinue of the princes and 
royal peers, often played the roles of trusted advisors and intimate confidants. With the rising 
influence of the imperial princes towards the end of the dynasty these men often stood good 
chance of becoming politically influential and some of them even managed to secure a noble 
title of their own. 
We may be quite well informed regarding the official structure of the princely fiefs,
169
 
but our knowledge of the administration of the peerage fiefs or offices connected with 
lordships (liehou) is rather sketchy and prevents any attempt of reconstruction of the official 
system as a whole.
170
 Given the previously mentioned overlapping of the system of princely 
enfeoffment with the rules governing the creation and inheritance of the peerage dignities we 
may presume that the main features of the fief administration might have been the same as 
well. We may surmise that at least in case of ducal and marquis fiefs which in certain respects 
obviously equaled the third grade princely domains
171
 the official structure of their 
administration may have actually matched or at least approached the apparatus of the princely 
fiefs. It appears that the composition of the official staff of the peerage fiefs mirrored the 
hierarchical distinctions between the peerage ranks with only the main fief officials being 
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 As in the case of the heir apparent the central government stressed the importance of education of the princes 
and royal peers. The men of great talent and moral integrity were to be appointed as tutors and advisers of the 
princes and peers in order to instruct them in philosophy and sharpen their literary skills as well as to provide a 
model for the proper behavior which would instill in the nobles the moral virtues and qualities required of their 
high social standing.  
169
 The Jinshu treatise on offices lists dozens of official posts responsible for the administration of the princely 
fief, smooth running of the princely household and well-being of a prince and his ancestors. See Jinshu juan 24, 
Zhiguanzhi, p. 742; for discussion of these official posts and their agenda see Zhang Xingcheng (2001): p. 53-65.   
170
 For some of the offices for which we have evidence from the sources see Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 15, note 
number 7; and p. 65, note number 16. 
171
 In view of this connection to the princely fiefs Yang Guanghui argues that the ranks of duke and marquis 
actually formed distinct group within the peerage, the high peerage so to speak, with remaining ranks of count, 
viscount and baron lagging far behind in rights, offices and precedence. See Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 15, note 
number 7. 
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common to all five peerage ranks. Number of other official posts allotted to a peerage fief 
decreased with the rank of the peerage in question.
172
                     
Judging from the names of offices which have been preserved in the contemporary 
sources the official structure of the peerage fiefs probably retained the division into two 
separate agencies, noble household and domain administration proper, which was typical for 
the fiefs of the princes and royal peers. The most senior official of the fief administrative 
hierarchy was an Administrator (xiang 相, later neishi 内史) who resided in the fief and 
exercised authority over the territory and its inhabitants. Even though the Administrator was 
the head of fief administration, he was actually appointed by the central government and was 
no different in this respect from a Governor of a commandery (taishou 太守). Theoretically 
the Administrator was a subordinate of the fief holder but in practice he was acting 
independently of the lord and was accountable to the central authority only. Once appointed, 
the fief holder could not dismiss the Administrator. On the contrary, he had to beware his 
watchful eye for the Administrator was authorized not only to administer the fief but also to 
monitor the activities of the domain lord and report any irregularities, acts of misconduct or 
treachery to the central government.
173
 
The Jin court made sure that the noble title holders would not become potential threat 
endangering the position of the central government in the provinces through establishing 
independent regional centers of power. The authority of the fief holder over the territory and 
its inhabitants was only nominal and even though the officials of the fief administration were 
considered to be the subjects of a prince or peer, this subordination was limited to symbolic 
and ceremonial level as a more or less ritual vestige of the ancient practice of the Zhou. The 
fief was controlled by the throne through centrally appointed officials who took part in both 
the administration of the fief and running of the noble household. Rights of the fief holders 
were curtailed to such an extent that the very word “fief” came to denote simply centrally 
administered territory from where an apanage was drawn for a prince or peer which was 
otherwise no different from any other commandery. The fief holders neither owned land of 
their fiefs, nor commanded loyalty of the people living within their boundaries. They could 
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 Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 65, note number 16. 
173
 For the discussion of the responsibilities of the administrator of the princely fief see Hrubý, Jakub (2007): pp. 
72-74. 
174
 For detailed discussion of the rights of the fief holders and development of the system from the Han to the 
Western Jin see Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 59-62. 
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The same holds true for the military forces which Wudi ordered to be recruited and 
stationed in all princely and some of the peerage fiefs at the beginning of his reign, probably 
right in the year 266 AD (see the edict quoted above in the previous chapter). This imperial 
edict without doubt aimed at strengthening of the position of the imperial family and its most 
loyal supporters during the critical period of dynastic transition. The number and strength of 
these military forces differed according to various grades of the princes and peers, ranging 
from three armies of five thousand men to one army one thousand and five hundred men 
strong. As we have already seen, these new provisions, however, lay dormant for years till 
277 AD when change of the power balance between the princes of the blood and the main 
imperial line forced the emperor to revise the whole system of enfeoffment including their 
military forces. The command of these fief forces was again given to a centrally appointed 
officer, Commandant-in-ordinary (zhongwei 中尉 ) who was subordinated directly to the 
central government. Thereby the imperial court retained its control over the military forces of 
the princes without jeopardizing their important role of prospective defenders of the throne. 
This time the dukes and marquises within the peerage ranks were also included and their fiefs 
should have abided by the same general rules as the fiefs of the princes. According to the 
edict issued in 277 AD a duke had at his disposal one army of one thousand five hundred men, 
whereas a marquis should have commanded a force of one thousand and one hundred 
soldiers.
175
 It is possible that these new provisions related to the royal peerage, sons and 
grandsons of the princes of the blood who were at this time newly equipped with the peerage 
dignities, but as there was no formal institutional distinction between royal and non-royal 
peerage they applied to previously existing peerage fiefs of the meritorious ministers as well. 
Even though this formal sanction of possible emergence of military forces connected 
to non-royal peerage fiefs may seem as going against the overall policy of strengthening the 
imperial house vis-à-vis the elite families at the court, the setting of the system in fact 
prevented any undue rise of power of these families. Despite the imperial edicts the 
recruitment of the fief armies was actually in abeyance as was the establishment of the fief 
official structure itself. Not only that the non-royal peerage holders could not administer their 
respective fiefs but even their ability to establish household offices corresponding to their 
dignity was in reality rather limited as the establishment of the full-fledged civil and military 
administration of a fief was conditioned by the actual departure of the title holder to the 
allotted territory. Unless the fief holder decided to reside permanently in his fief the 
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 The first edict is mentioned in Jinshu juan 14, Dilizhi shang, pp. 414-415; the second edict is quoted in Jinshu 
juan 24, Zhiguanzhi, pp. 744-745; for the discussion of the fief armies see Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 57. 
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household administration staff could not be appointed and the title holder‟s right to establish 
an official retinue which would differentiate him from his fellow courtiers remained more or 
less just an empty privilege. 
Unlike the princes, many of whom were indeed forced to leave the imperial capital 
and exchange its sumptuous life style for politically uneventful existence of a local fief holder, 
the non-royal peers and title holders remained at court. Overwhelming majority of these men 
served in some official position in the central government or in the imperial palace 
administration. Bound by their official duties they could not simply take up residence in their 
fiefs even if they wanted to and the administration of their fiefs was therefore never fully 
established and remained incomplete.
176
 Despite the proclaimed resurrection of the 
enfeoffment system the non-royal peerages remained for all practical purposes just empty 
titles with peers simply drawing stable income from certain territories assigned to them as 
their “fiefs” which nevertheless continued to be administered by centrally appointed officials. 
It seems possible that these arrangements were actually part of conscious effort of the 
emperor to curb down power of the potentially rival court families without unduly alienating 
them and losing their support. One of the main objectives of the changes in the system of 
ennoblement introduced in 277 AD was consolidation of the position of the imperial house in 
general and the main imperial line in particular. However, in order to alleviate the sting aimed 
at non-royal court families the new system did not distinguish between royal and non-royal 
peers and the new rules naturally applied to non-royal peers as well. Therefore, at least 
theoretically, the non-royal peerage holders should have benefitted by the new system in the 
same way as the princes of the blood. On the other hand this concession to the influential 
court families was nothing but an illusion for the emperor would never risk the future of the 
dynasty by giving too much power to possible rivals. The non-royal peers simply could have 
never been in position to become a threat to the imperial family. The official posts they held 
in the central government and palace administration effectively prevented them from leaving 
the capital and resettling in their domain. Without this final step they were not able to take up 
their position as fief lords and substantial privileges connected with the establishment of the 
full-fledged fief administration remained dormant. Thus, the non-royal peers could never fully 
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 As the matter of fact there is only one mention of a peer departing to his fief in all contemporary sources. At 
the beginning of the Taikang Era (280 AD) Wang Jun 王浚, second duke of Boling 博陵郡公, inherited the title 
and later together with other princes and lords departed for the fief (yu zhu wang hou ju jiu guo 與諸王侯俱就
國). Only two years later, however, he was recalled back to court and appointed Supernumerary Gentleman 
Cavalier Attendant (yuanwai sanji shilang 員外散騎侍郎). Unfortunately the Jinshu does not provide any 
information regarding possible establishment of the fief and household administration. See Jisnhu juan 39, Wang 
Jun zhuan, p. 1146.  
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use the potential of their fief. Emperor Wudi managed to achieve his goal by granting the 
court families much desired privileges without giving them opportunity to acquire real power 
which could have been turned against authority of the throne. 
 
The Apanage 
Even though bestowal of the noble title did not bring any real political or military 
power which could have been used to one‟s advantage the peerage dignities as well as 
lordship titles retained their appeal to members of court circles and state bureaucracy. The 
noble titles remained highly coveted social distinction which improved the standing of one‟s 
family in the ranks of elite. Some of the reasons for continuous attraction were such practical 
aspects of ennoblement as hereditary privileges, precedence and stable income drawn from 
the apanage. For every title holder, no matter whether he had actually taken up his position in 
the allotted fief or not, was entitled to annual stipend paid from the taxes. A noble title 
provided its holder with economic advantages which were by no means negligible as the 
revenue gained from the fief exceeded by far the state-provided income of the state officials 
of comparable court rank who were not members of the titled nobility.
177
 This economic 
advantage could of course be employed in gaining social and political preeminence at court as 
was indeed often the case. Thus, beside hereditary privileges which considerably improved 
the prospect of survival of an aristocratic family, the ennoblement brought also some tangible 
assets which favored any title holder over untitled members of the bureaucracy, no matter 
how high their position may have actually been. 
 The amount of income connected with a noble dignity was dependent on the rank and 
grade of the particular title and was drawn from certain number of tax-paying households (hu 
戶) living within the boundaries of the fief, which constituted the so called apanage (shiyi 食
邑). In case of the peerage the number of households corresponding to each rank and grade 
was prescribed by the imperial edicts issued at the beginning of Wudi‟s reign. The lower 
ranks of lordship titles (liehou), however, were subject to no such regulation. Number of 
households allotted to the lords was therefore not restricted and depended solely on the 
largess of the emperor and the relative importance of the meritorious deed which was to be  
rewarded by bestowal of the lordship in case.  
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 Yang Guanghui shows that whereas the government officials were paid only in grain, the nobles were getting 
certain amount of both grain and silk produced by the households allotted as their apanage, which exceeded 
income of the officials. For example a court minister of the highest court rank (yipin 一品) received only just 
about half of an income of the first grade marquis (daguohou 大國侯), who, with the second court rank, stood 
bellow him in the court hierarchy. See Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 92. 
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The noble titles themselves do not tell us much about the actual size of their apanage 
or territory conferred as their fief. Despite the seeming connection of a noble dignity with 
particular territorial or administrative unit which appears in the very title the size of the fief 
hardly ever corresponded to the actual size of the territory in question. Titles as commandery 
duke, prefecture duke, commandery marquis, prefecture lord, township lord or village lord did 
not refer to the actual size of their respective apanages. These were mere ranks with the usage 
of administrative unite nomenclature simply denoting their relative standing within the 
hierarchy of noble dignities. Thus a marquis within the peerage was entitled to one thousand 
six hundred households only despite the fact that the title was formally considered to be 
connected with commandery, an administrative unite which under the Jin tends to have 
thousands, even tens of thousands tax-paying households. On the other hand, some prefecture 
lords were officially given apanages of twenty thousand households even though the average 
population of a Jin prefecture could have been just between one and two thousand tax-paying 
households. 
In comparison to the princes who were indeed often given whole existing 
commanderies and prefectures as their fiefs,
178
 the peerage fiefs appear to be less well defined 
domains only vaguely related to any particular territory or administrative unit which figured 
in the title. We may suppose that in many cases there actually was a direct connection with 
territory in question with majority of the apanage households living within its boundaries, but 
the real fief or rather the apanage related to it and administrative unit itself were by no means 
identical. The same territory might have appeared in turn as designation of a peerage dignity, 
prefecture lordship and even village lordship without actually changing its own administrative 
status.
179
 Thus the names of particular territorial units were used as mere appellations which 
might have or might have not born any resemblance to the reality. The size of the apanage 
was not related to the actual administrative unit used in the designation of the noble dignity 
and was determined by either the prescribed quotas applied in creating peerages, or by the 
grant itself in case of the lordships.
180
 
                                                 
178
 For the details regarding the princely fiefs, their size and location see Hrubý, Jakub (2007): pp. 82-83, 141-
143.   
179
 For example Anchang 安昌 was bestowed as dukedom and township lordship, Anle 安樂 as dukedom, 
township lordship and village lordship, Chengyang 成陽 as dukedom and barony, Lanling 蘭陵 as marquisate 
and dukedom, Liangzou 梁鄒 as marquisate and township lordship, Pingyang 平陽 as prefecture lordship and 
township lordship, Wuchang 武昌 as commandery dukedom, marquisate and village lordship, Wuling 武陵 as 
marquisate and prefecture lordship and Pingle 平樂 as county and township lordship.  
180
 Yang Guanghui claims that in contrast to the peers the lordships„ apanages corresponded to the real territorial 
units used in the appellation. Even though he might be right in case of smaller apanages allotted to the village 
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The peerages and lordships further differed in one more respect. Whereas the apanages 
of the lesser lordship dignities were defined only in terms of number of apanage households 
(the principle known as allocation of people, fenmin 分民), the fiefs of the peers were in 
addition defined also in terms of territory (the principle known as allocation of territory, fentu 
分土). The rules set by Emperor Wudi prescribed not only quotas of households but also the 
expanse of territory, acreage measured in miles (li 里), conferred on the recipient of the 
peerage title.
181
 Yet again, despite referring explicitly to a well defined territory, the practice 
of fentu did not imply any territorial rights or jurisdiction over certain area and was 
considered only as an additional means for assessing the annual income drawn from an 
apanage. 
The revenue of every single peer was in fact comprised of two distinct parts reflecting 
parallel use of principles for allocation of people and territory. The bulk of the revenue was 
drawn from the taxes paid by the apanage households (shiyi hu 食邑戶) conferred under the 
fenmin principle. The term “apanage households” denotes ordinary state tax-paying 
households (bianhu 編戶) the taxes of which were assigned for the use of the peerage holder. 
This assignment was, at least in theory, only temporary as it depended on viability of the 
hereditary peerage line and its loyal service to the dynasty. Once the peerage line became 
extinct or the dignity happened to be abolished as a consequence of some offense committed 
by its current holder, the fief ceased to exist and the revenue from the households which were 
once allotted as its apanage once again found its way to the government coffers. 
The status of the apanage households did not differ from that of the ordinary tax-
paying households and the fact that they were assigned as apanage to a peer did not imply any 
form of dependence on or subservience to the lord of the fief. For all practical purposes these 
people remained free state tax-payers whose taxes were for the time being redirected to the 
private treasuries of the peerage holders.
182
 This rather loose and indirect connection between 
peers and their apanage households becomes even more apparent when we realize that the 
peers were entitled to just a portion of the revenue collected from these households. 
According to the Jinshu and other sources the peers were granted only one third of the taxes 
                                                                                                                                                        
lords I would disagree with his assumption that the same holds true for all the prefecture and township lords as 
well. See Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 70.   
181
 Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 67, 70; For the number of households and miles conferred with respective 
peerage ranks see Table 2 in the previous chapter of this thesis, page 65.  
182
 For the detailed discussion of the apanage households‟ status see Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 78-80. 
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paid by the households allotted as their apanage.
183
 The rest of the revenue belonged to the 
state which actually never relinquished its authority over the land and people. The total 
amount of tax-paying households allotted as apanages to various princes and peers was 
staggering and if it were not for the provision limiting the fief holders‟ income to one third of 
total revenue, the vital human and fiscal resources would slip out of the state‟s control.
184
 
Nevertheless the total income of the peerage holders was slightly higher than one third 
of revenue produced by the apanage households. We have seen that even though there was 
certain connection between the administrative unit used as the dignity appellation and the 
population of certain area bestowed as its apanage, only rarely did the apanage comprise the 
whole administrative unit in question. The first grade marquis may have been entitled to some 
one thousand six hundred households only, but the appellation used for his title connected 
him with a commandery the population of which must have been considerably higher than the 
marquisate apanage. Regardless of actual institutional inability of the peers to be involved in 
the administration of their fief, the peerage title at least on the symbolic level gave its holder 
potential right to exercise some kind of nominal authority over the whole administrative unit 
for after all the status of the commanderies and prefectures was officially changed to that of 
the fiefs (guo 國) once they were granted as peerage dignities. Yet the actual size of the fief 
did never exceed the prescribed quotas. In order to somewhat alleviate the obvious 
discrepancy between nominal claims to authority derived from the peerage title and reality 
dictated by state-ordered regulations the government tried to take into consideration these 
claims and deal with them in a way which would not jeopardize the state control over the 
fiscal resources but which would symbolically do justice to the peers in their capacity of lords 
over their domains. And that is when the fentu principle of land allotment comes into play. 
The term “allotment of land” is rather misleading as it did not refer so much to the 
land itself as to the population living within certain area defined by the prescribed acreage. 
Even though this area did not correspond to the territory of the whole commandery (such a 
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 Zhang Xuefeng (2001): p. 39; and Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 88; for the detailed discussion of the state 
revenue and peerage income ratio during the Western and Eastern Jin see p. 98, note number 2.  
184
 Despite drawing only one third of revenue from the allotted households, the fiefs inevitably must have been 
great burden on the state finances. When assessing impact of the princely enfeoffment on the economy of the 
dynasty Wang Zhongluo argues that the total number of households given to the Western Jin imperial princes 
might have been around 570 000. Taking into account other peerage and lordship fiefs Wang estimates that one 
sixth of all the tax-paying households were actually allotted as apanages to the various princes, peers and lords. 
Wang Zhongluo (1998): p. 221; Yang Guanghui takes Wang Zhongluo‟s estimations one step further. He argues 
that peerage apanages conferred at the beginning of the Western Jin may have amounted to some 500 000 
households. Yang Guanghui estimates that with households of the princely fiefs and apanages given to the liehou 
lords added to the total number, the apanage households  may actually account for one third of the population of 
the realm during the Taikang Era (280-289 AD). Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 79.   
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concession to a mere symbolic claim would be too dangerous a risk for the state to take), the 
total number of households living within its boundaries was as a rule higher than number of 
apanage households which formed but a part of the population. Thus, from the fiscal point of 
view, there were two different types of households living side by side in every domain, 
probably intermingled and dispersed over the whole territory of the fief. Whereas the apanage 
households, number of which corresponded to the quota of particular peerage dignity, were 
obligated to contribute one third of their taxes in grain and silk to the lord of the domain, the 
rest of the families living within the allotted territory were not considered to be apanage 
households and retained their status of state tax-payers. Yet their nominal obedience to the 
domain lord was symbolically expressed by their duty to pay annually one sheng 升 of grain 
from every mu 畝 of the tilled land in addition to the state-imposed taxes. Even though the 
quotas for households and acreage applied universally to all peerages, the total income of two 
peers of the same rank and grade may have actually varied as it depended on the density of 
population in the areas conferred as fiefs. The apanage households granted under the fenmin 
principle were the same, while the revenue collected from the remaining households in 
allotted area (fentu) differed from fief to fief.
185
 
Our ability to understand properly all the details of the apanage and land allotment 
process is seriously impaired by paucity of the relevant sources. As we have to rely on mere 
accidental evidence and later summarizing comments of the Jinshu treatises which were 
compiled only at the beginning of the 7
th
 century, we may never be sure if the system 
described by these sources actually ever worked. The traditional sources may have recorded 
the imperial decrees and edicts in their original wording but it is hard to tell whether the 
provisions stipulated in these edicts were really implemented or not. It is possible that in 
describing the working of the system the ideal directive proclaimed by the edicts may have to 
a certain extant taken place of the everyday routine practice already adapted to working 
conditions of the imperial administration as was the case of some other imperial institutions 
described in the dynastic histories. 
The rules of this elaborate and highly sophisticated system of dual apanage allotment 
must have been extremely hard to abide by. The faithful observance of the ideal provisions of 
the imperial edict was in practice hindered by technical problems and difficulties in regard to 
actual location and delineation of the fief and its apanage. The provisions could probably be 
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 Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 70, 88-89; for a detailed table enumerating income and official emoluments of 
various princely and peerage dignities in comparison with the highest bureaucratic positions in the central 
government and imperial palace administration see p. 91. 
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hardly ever implemented in its entirety as it must have been extremely hard to take account of 
every relevant factor. The awarded fief had to correspond to the importance of the merit, the 
status of the administrative unit ideally ought to match the rank and grade of the conferred 
title, the area and the population should have been large enough to provide the required 
number of apanage households and so forth. It is obvious that reality must have lagged far 
behind the ideal set by the edicts. The demands which the system made upon the process of 
selection of the suitable territory were high from the very beginning. With the creation of new 
fiefs (mainly princedoms, royal-peerages and lordships) later during the reign of Emperor 
Wudi and his successors it was increasingly difficult to meet all criteria. Moreover, even if the 
office of Chamberlain of Dependencies (dahonglu 大鴻臚) responsible for creation of the 
noble dignities managed to find the right territory fulfilling the necessary requirements any 
subsequent change of the noble dignity, be it promotion, demotion or transfer of the fief, 
would upset the effort as the territory in question would need to be adjusted to new standing 
of the title holder in question. Such a highly impractical system was untenable in the long run 
and it is no wonder that it did not survive the fall of the Western Jin. Restored regime in the 
South was even more circumscribed in its options. Pressed by various urgent political needs 
and constrained geographically to the region south of the Yangzi River the Eastern Jin 
government reduced number of peerage ranks and simplified the rules governing the selection 
and delimiting of the fief. The territory allotment principle was abolished altogether and the 
household allotment became the sole means of determining the size of the noble apanage.
186
   
The rules governing bestowal of the liehou lordships and allocation of their apanages 
were less elaborate. The dual concept of fenmin and fentu allotment was not used and the 
apanages were defined only in terms of number of apanage households. No precise quotas 
were imposed with number of households often only roughly following the hierarchy of the 
lordship titles, the size of the apanage being dependent solely on largess of the emperor and 
the importance of particular meritorious deed which had been the incentive for the bestowal. 
Despite the fact that the size of their apanages was not limited by any quotas, the actual 
income gained from the apanage was always lower than revenue of the peerages. Of course, 
that without the territory allotment the liehou lords could not draw any additional income 
from families living within their fiefs other than the apanage households. But much more 
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 Beside abolition of the practice of fentu the southern court also abolished the grades within the peerage ranks. 
For details see Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 33, 36; the strained economic conditions of the Eastern Jin regime 
also prompted the government to reduce the income ratio of the princes and peers from one third to universally 
applied one ninth of the revenue collected from the apanage households. Yang Guanghui (2004): p. 93; For 
discussion of the differing Western and Eastern Jin apanage income ratios see also Zhang Xuefeng (2001): pp. 
34-37.   
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important factor was that the relative hierarchy of both groups of titled nobility tended to be 
reflected in different income ratio of the peerage and lordship apanages. Whereas peers were 
entitled to one third of the revenue, the lords had to content themselves with only one tenth of 
the revenue produced by their apanage households.
187
 
The system of lordship ennoblement may have been simple in itself, yet it presents 
problem of its own. Even though there obviously existed institutionally defined distinction 
between peerage ranks and lordship titles, in case of marquises this clear difference tends to 
be obscured by confusing use of the same word hou 侯, “marquis” or more generally “lord” 
for both the peerage dignity and all the lordship titles. The situation is especially confusing in 
case of prefecture lords (xianhou 縣侯) who could be easily mistaken for peerage marquises 
as the contemporary sources often drop the word xian 縣, “prefecture” from their title. The 
difference made by the absence of the full title is not merely a difference in degree, but one of 
quality. While the peerage marquis was one of the highest noble ranks opened to non-royals, 
occupying third to fourth position of the noble hierarchy (first grade marquis and second 
grade marquis), prefecture lord was standing just below the rank of the baron, the lowest of 
the peerages, and belonged actually to a different category of noble dignities. 
While the peerage marquisates were usually referred to simply as XY hou (marquis of 
XY) the full title of a prefecture lord would be XY xianhou (prefecture lord of XY). Yet these 
titles were often abbreviated and the word xian was omitted. And once we omit the word 
“prefecture”, there is no way how to tell both ranks apart. To complicate matter even further 
many of the peerage marquisates used in their appellation name of a certain prefecture as was 
also the case with the prefecture lordships. Undoubtedly, the contemporaries would know the 
difference for they knew their peers and nobles, but we have to rely on other indicators of 
their standing such as official career, patterns of promotion in title or rank and above all the 
size of their apanage expressed in number of allotted households. When we happen to know 
the exact number of household which constituted the apanage in question we are moving on 
safer ground. As the apanages of the peerage marquises were strictly defined we may assume 
that all mentions about hou having apanages higher or lower than the quotas prescribed for 
peerage marquises (ranging from one thousand four hundred to one thousand six hundred 
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 Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 92-93; for discussion of the usage of the lordship titles under the Western Jin and 
their gradual decline in importance see Yang Guanghui (2004) pp. 44-45; and Zhang Xuefeng (2001): pp 32-33.  
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households) actually refer to mere prefecture lords.
188
 Yet there still remain instances in 
which we cannot determine for sure the rank of particular noble dignity for we lack the 
relevant data concerning the number of apanage households. 
 
Location of the Fief 
The elaborate system of rules prescribing allotment of apanage and fief may have been 
important in itself, yet it was but one of the factors taken into account during the process of 
selection of suitable territory. The final decision was apparently also influenced by equally 
important considerations of geographical and geopolitical nature. Some of these factors may 
become clear when we look at location of the fiefs and their distribution throughout the 
empire. However, one should not forget that while comparing title designations with existing 
administrative units can provide some idea of where the fiefs may have been situated this idea 
must be necessarily only general. We cannot be hundred percent sure where the fief actually 
lay, because the contemporary sources mention exact location of the fief in only few rather 
exceptional cases. Therefore, the following tables of noble titles listing the supposed location 
of the fiefs are based on assumption that there existed some kind of connection between the 
territory figuring in the appellation of the noble title and the allotted fief. As we know that this 
was not always the case I am aware that the conclusions resulting from the comparison of the 
data summarized in tables are rather tentative. Yet my objective is not to come up with an 
exhaustive overview of all awarded fiefs and titles. The dearth of the relevant data does not 
permit doing so. I merely try to present a survey of certain tendencies and developments 
which might have influenced the practice of bestowing noble titles and determined the choice 
of territory suitable to become a noble fief.  
The following tables (Tab. 7, 8, 9 and 10) list all known peerage and lordship dignities 
created during the Western Jin, presumed location of the fief and also choronym of the family 
of the title holders and its location within the provincial structure of the empire. As we shall 
discuss the relationship between the fief and the place of origin of the family of title holders 
later, we should first focus on the location of the fief itself. As we have generally more 
information about the peerage dignities than the lordships, and as the selection of the lordship 
fiefs obviously tend to show similar tendencies, we shall pay attention mainly to the peerage 
fiefs with only occasional mentions of the lordships. By looking at the information in the “fief 
                                                 
188
 For discussion of the hou and xianhou confusion see Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 45-46; Beside discussing the 
same problem Zhang Xuefeng also provides table of prefecture lords whose title is confirmed by the size of their 
apanage and circumstances under which their dignity was bestowed. See Zhang Xuefeng (2001): pp. 33-34. 
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location” column one may get the impression that the peerage were dispersed, albeit unevenly, 
over the whole territory of the empire. The peerage domains were to be found in sixteen out 
of nineteen provinces of the Jin realm with only three provinces in the far south and south-
west conspicuously lacking fief of any of the peerage ranks. Obviously there was no special 
part of the empire for the fiefs to be ideally located in with number of fiefs per province 
usually ranging from one to ten. Only the economically better developed provinces of the 
Central Plain sported almost twice as many fiefs as other areas. The preemeninence of Henan 
and Huainan regions, however, is not so striking when we take into consideration only the 
peerages created during the reign of Emperor Wudi (266-289 AD) when the whole 
enfeoffemnt system was first institutionalized. Even though both regions retain the highest 
number of awarded fiefs, the contrast between the Central Plain and the rest of the empire is 
not so high and the pattern of balanced fief dispersal becomes even more apparent. 
 The heart of the empire was the province of Sizhou 司州 comprising the area around 
the capital city of Luoyang which was basically conceived as the imperial domain (huangji 皇
畿), a sovereign territory of the crown parallel to the royal domain (wangji 王畿) of the 
ancient Zhou. Yang Guanghui argues that the Western Jin followed the practice of the Zhou 
and more recently the Han who were not used to conferring as fiefs the territory within the 
imperial domain. According to him the peerage fiefs were evenly distributed among the 
centrally administered commanderies and prefectures outside the imperial domain and also 
outside the border regions where the presence of the fief might have been undesirable from 
the security point of view.
189
 This assumption is in all probability correct, yet as we can see in 
the table, it holds true only for some periods of the Western Jin and even then just to a certain 
extent, for Wudi himself had bestowed three peerage dignities within the imperial domain 
right at the beginning of the dynasty in 266 AD. 
Nevertheless all Sizhou dignities were kind of exceptional. First of all, dukedoms of 
Wei 衛 and Shanyang 山陽 were created for scions of the imperial houses of the Zhou and the 
Han respectively to ensure continuous offering of sacrifices to the deified ancestors of both 
dynasties. Whereas the parentage of the alleged Zhou descendant Ji Shu 姬署 may have been 
dubious, Liu Kang 劉康, the duke of Shanyang, was indeed a grandson of the last Eastern 
Han Emperor Xiandi 漢獻帝 (189-220 AD) and therefore the undisputed heir to the main 
imperial line of descent entitled to look after the altars of his illustrious ancestors. Promotion 
of both men to the ranks of peerage was a symbolic act confirming the legitimacy of the new 
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dynasty as the rightful heir to the imperial past. I think that the locating of the new fiefs 
within the imperial domain was therefore not coincidental. Luoyang was after all associated 
with both Eastern Zhou and Eastern Han regimes and gradually became the domicile of both 
ruling houses even though their ancestral homes may have lain elsewhere. Through creation 
of these peerages and location of their fiefs within the wider Luoyang area, the Jin 
symbolically acknowledged the eminence of deposed ruling families and at the same time 
presented themselves as their legitimate successors by strengthening the spatio-temporal 
connection to their locus of power. 
The connection of the third peerage dignity, marquisate of Miling 密陵, to Sizhou is 
only tentative as I was unfortunately not able to determine the exact location of Miling. But 
because this peerage was created for one of the better known families of the disunion period, 
the Xingyang Zhengs 滎陽鄭氏, it is possible that Miling might have been actually located in 
or near Mixian 密縣 prefecture which happens to be within the borders of Xingyang, the 
home commandery of the Zheng family. If this identification happens to be mistaken, it would 
confirm the unique position of Sizhou within the realm as an area under the exclusive 
authority of the throne. But even if Wudi had decided to acknowledge the positions of the 
locally important Zheng family by awarding them a marquisate fief not far from their 
ancestral home, we may still conclude that for all practical reasons no large fief was ever 
awarded within the province of Sizhou during the reign of Wudi except for symbolic and 
ritual reasons.  
The worsening political situation of the empire during the second half of the Western 
Jin led to inevitable decline of central authority and subsequent deterioration of many 
imperial institutions including the ennoblement system with rules and provisions of the 
system envisaged and observed by Wudi being generally disregarded or circumvented. 
However, it seems that the exclusivity of the imperial domain was more or less respected with 
only minor lordship fiefs being formally allotted within Sizhou territory. The remaining two 
peerage fiefs in Sizhou were created only during the reign of Emperor Mindi 愍帝 between 
313 and 316 AD, when Sizhou ceased to be the imperial domain. In fact, it is hard to tell 
whether the territory in question was under the sway of the Jin anyway, as the capital city of 
Luoyang had been captured by the Xiongnu 匈奴 forces after prolonged siege and large tracts 
of Sizhou became a part of territory of the Former Zhao Kingdom (Qian Zhao 前趙, 304-329 
AD). The emperor was dragged into captivity while remnants of the Jin court managed to flee 
to Chang‟an in the west, where they proclaimed Mindi the new emperor. With the shift of the 
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capital the area of Guanzhong 關中 became at least theoretically the new imperial domain and 
the territory of Sizhou, or whatever remained of it, was again available to be given to new 
peerage holders as was the case of any other ordinary province of the realm.
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The majority of the peerage fiefs bestowed during the Western Jin were located in the 
populous and economically well developed regions with thriving agricultural production and 
presumably also operational road or waterway network providing decent transport facilities 
enabling smooth collection of the tax levies. The leading place among these provinces was 
occupied by Jingzhou 荊州 and Yuzhou 豫州 with nineteen and fourteen fiefs respectively. 
Jingzhou comprised the southern part of the present day Henan, the valley of the Han 漢水 
River and important grain-producing regions in the middle reaches of the Yangzi. Part of this 
region extended into neighboring Yuzhou, a province which stretched on both banks of the 
upper Huai 淮水 River forming part of the agriculturally important regions of Huaibei 淮北 
and Huainan 淮南. The river Huai was an axis of this strategically very important border 
region the economic potential of which started to be fully realized only after subjugation of 
Wu in 280 AD. The province of Xuzhou 徐州 which lay on the lower reaches of the Huai 
River and more or less coastal Qingzhou 青州 occupying Shandong 山東 Peninsula north of 
Xuzhou could claim nine peerage fiefs each attesting to the relative prosperity of the region. 
The Yellow River basin in the northeast of the Central Plain represents another affluent region 
traditionally rich in people, grain and silk, the province of Yanzhou 兗州 on the southern 
bank of the Yellow River being home to at least ten peerage fiefs with Jizhou 冀州 in 
southern Hebei 河北 lagging not far behind with eight peerage fiefs, some of them being large 
fiefs of the premier non-royal dukes of the realm. 
Encircling this prosperous core territory of the Jin Empire there was a belt of less 
populous border provinces stretching from the north-eastern Pingzhou 平州 (North of Korean 
Peninsula and southern Liaoning 遼寧) to Liangzhou 涼州 in the far west, which, bestriding 
the vital Gansu Corridor, connected the empire with markets of Central Asia via the various 
branches of the Silk Route. It seems that for some reason it was not so desirable to confer a 
fief in one of these provinces, at least the number of peerage fiefs we know of is strikingly 
smaller than in case of the core region and the gap between the core and the border regions 
was gradually widening, growing even more prominent in the latter part of the dynasty. Three 
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 Due to the various geopolitical reasons the Eastern Jin could not any longer afford to allot the fiefs only 
outside the imperial domain of Yangzhou 揚州 as there was not enough suitable territory at their disposal. For 
detailed discussion of the Eastern Jin practice see Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 75-76. 
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of these provinces appear to be used somewhat more often. Bingzhou 並州  in Shanxi 
immediately north of the imperial domain takes the pride of place with five fiefs being 
followed by Yongzhou 雍州 and Qinzhou 秦州 which bordered the imperial domain on the 
west and occupied the original Han core region of Guanzhong. 
While Bingzhou despite its peripheral position retained some strategic importance as 
the northern bulwark of the imperial capital, the glory of the Guanzhong was long past. The 
relative decline in importance which set in after the restoration of the Han when Emperor 
Guangwudi 光武帝 (25-57 AD) had moved the capital to Luoyang culminated during the 
series of devastating uprisings and border raids of the Qiang 羌 at the end of the Han. The 
central government, unable to deal effectively with such menace, decided to move the 
inhabitants to the east and abandon the region to its fate.
191
 Guanzhong was partly 
depopulated and its economy brought virtually to its knees. Especially its western part, 
Qinzhou, suffered heavily and the situation did not become much better even during 
subsequent Wei period as the continuous warfare raging between Wei and Shu Han affected 
the Sichuan-Shaanxi border with Zhuge Liang‟s 諸葛亮  invasions repeatedly ravaging 
territory south of the Wei 渭水  River. Yongzhou and Qinzhou were less populous in 
comparison to the core provinces and therefore probably also less eligible as territory suitable 
for peerage apanage with four fiefs in Yongzhou and only three in Qinzhou. 
Liangzhou 涼州 in the far west was in peripheral position and its importance started to 
grow only with decline of the central authority of the court and disintegration of the realm 
which set in after the fall of Luoyang. Therefore it is not surprising that just two fiefs were 
ever bestowed in this province. While it is not even clear whether the marquisate of Yongping 
永平 which Wudi bestowed on a relative of one of his meritorious ministers was a peerage 
dignity or a mere lordship, the second fief, dukedom of Jiuquan 酒泉, was a peerage created 
for an uncle of Emperor Mindi and therefore reflects the changed political situation within the 
empire with the centre of power shifting at least temporarily to the west. As the court settled 
in Chang‟an Liangzhou naturally ceased to be that distant frontier of old and became suitable  
source of revenue and appealing alternative base which could, if the need be, provide shelter 
for the court on the run. 
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Qi 祁  marquis 266 Bingzhou Taiyuan Shangdang Tongdi Bingzhou neighboring commanderies of the same province 
Juyang 劇陽 viscount 266 Bingzhou Yanmen Rencheng Fan Yanzhou   
Jingling 京陵  
duke 280 
(266) 
Bingzhou Taiyuan Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Daling 大陵 duke 306 Bingzhou Taiyuan Taiyuan Qi Bingzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Dingxiang 定襄 
marquis 
     < 311 





Shaoling 邵陵 duke 266 Jingzhou unknown   ruling line of Cao Wei 
Guanyang 觀陽  count 266 Jingzhou Lingling Pingyuan Gaotang Jizhou   
Xi‟e 西鄂 marquis 270 Jingzhou Nanyang Xiangyang  Jingzhou commanderies of the same province 
Yidu 宜都 duke 272 Jingzhou unknown     
Pingchun 平春  
marquis 
     < 280 




Guangxing 廣興  marquis      < 289 Jingzhou Ancheng unknown     






Donghai Tan Xuzhou 
  
Anzhong 安眾 baron 300 Jingzhou Nanyang Nanyang  Jingzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Xingjin  興晉 marquis      300 > Jingzhou Weixing Taishan Nancheng Yanzhou   
Anchang 安昌 duke 
301 
Jingzhou Yiyang Xingyang 
Zhongmou 
Sizhou   
Xingjin  興晉 duke      < 304 Jingzhou Weixing Taishan Nancheng Yanzhou   
Nanxiang 南鄉  marquis 306 Jingzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou   
Jiangxia 江夏 duke 306 Jingzhou Hedong Anyi Sizhou   
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ruling line of Wu 
Wuling 武陵  marquis  306-311 Jingzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou created but never accepted 
Xincheng 新城 duke  306-311 Jingzhou Peiguo Xiang Yuzhou   
Quling 曲陵  
duke 
 313-316 




Wugang 武岡 marquis      < 317 Jingzhou Shaoling Langye Linyi Xuzhou   
  
Boling 博陵  duke 266 Jizhou Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou   
Leling 樂陵 duke 266 Jizhou Bohai Nanpi Jizhou neighbouring commanderies of the same province 
Julu 鉅鹿  duke 266 Jizhou Hedong Wenxi Sizhou   
Tangyang 堂陽 viscount 266 Jizhou Anping Leling Yanci Jizhou commanderies of the same province 
Gaoyi 高邑  duke 266 Jizhou Zhaoguo unknown   ruling line of Cao Wei 
Anxiang 安鄉  duke 301 Jizhou Julu unknown     
Wuqiang 武強 
marquis 
     301 > 















Jiuquan 酒泉  duke  307-313 Liangzhou 涼 Wuwei Guzang Liangzhou 涼 commanderies of the same province 
  




     < 316 





Liangzou 梁鄒 marquis 266 Qingzhou Le'an Jinan Zhuo Qingzhou neighboring commanderies of the same province 
Shouguang 壽光 duke 266 Qingzhou Le'an Xingyang Kaifeng Sizhou   
Xinta 新沓 count 266 Qingzhou Qi Henei Huai Sizhou   
Ziyang 菑陽 duke 266 Qingzhou? Hedong Anyi Sizhou   
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Leling Yanci Jizhou   









Mouping 牟平  duke 301 Qingzhou Donglai unknown     
Pingshou 平壽  duke 301 Qingzhou Peihai Xingyang Kaifeng Sizhou   
Zhu‟a 祝阿 viscount      < 317 Qingzhou Jinan unknown     
   
Yinping 陰平  marquis 266 Qinzhou Fufeng Mei Yongzhou   
Linwei 臨渭  duke 266 Qinzhou Lüeyang unknown     
Yinping 陰平 baron 302 Qinzhou Yinping Taishan Fenggao Yanzhou   
  
Wei 衛  duke 266 Sizhou Dunqiu unknown   ruling line of Zhou 
Shanyang 山陽  duke 266 Sizhou Henei unknown   ruling line of Shu Han 
Miling 密陵 marquis 266 Sizhou Xingyang Xingyang Kaifeng Sizhou if Mixian is Miling, prefectures of the same commandery  
Yuanling 苑陵 duke 313 Sizhou Xingyang Pingyuan Gaotang Sizhou commanderies of the same province 
Shangluo 上洛  duke  313-316 Sizhou Dunhuang  Liangzhou 涼   
  







Jiqiu 即丘 viscount 266 Xuzhou Langye Langye Linyi Xuzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Suiling 睢陵 duke 266 Xuzhou Xiapi Langye Linyi Xuzhou commanderies of the same province 
Lanling 蘭陵 
marquis 
         266? 
Xuzhou Donghai Langye Linyi Xuzhou neighboring commanderies of the same province, if ever 
existed 
Zheng 氶 viscount          266? Xuzhou Donghai Donghai Tan Xuzhou prefectures in the same commandery 







Lanling 蘭陵 duke          300? Xuzhou Donghai Hedong Anyi Sizhou   
Zhuxu 朱虛 duke    303 Xuzhou Dongguan Donglai Ye Qingzhou commanderies of neigbouring provinces, not far distant 
Sheyang 射陽  
duke 










Linhai 臨海 marquis 266 Yangzhou Donglai Ye Qingzhou   
Kuaiji 會稽 duke 270 Yangzhou unknown   ruling line of Wu, at that time under kontrol of Wu 
Danyang 丹楊 marquis 276 Yangzhou Wujun Wu Yangzhou neighboring but at that time under control of Wu 
Yongshi 永世  
marquis 
     280 > 
Yangzhou 
Danyang 
Langye Linyi Xuzhou 
  
Jiaxing 嘉興 count 302 Yangzhou Wujun Wuguo Wu Yangzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 
Xuancheng 宣城  duke      < 305 Yangzhou Peiguo Xiang Yuzhou   
Yanling 延陵 duke      < 306 Yangzhou Piling Chenliu Yucheng Yanzhou   





Guangling  Xuzhou 
  
Wucheng 烏程  duke  313-316 Yangzhou Wuxing Yixing Yangxian Yangzhou neighboring prefectures within the same commandery 









Gaoping 高平  duke 266 Yanzhou Linhuai Dongyang Xuzhou   
Juancheng 鄄城 duke 266 Yanzhou Puyang unknown   ruling line of Cao Wei 






Chenliu Yu Yanzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Chengyang 成陽 viscount 291 Yanzhou Jiyin Jiyin Yuanju Yanzhou neighboring prefectures within the same commandery 
Fengqiu 封丘  duke 301 Yanzhou Chenliu unknown     
Pingyin 平陰  duke 301 Yanzhou Jibei unknown     









Han‟an 漢安 marquis 316 Yizhou Jiangyang Langye Linyi Xuzhou   
  
Chungu 鶉觚 viscount 266 Yongzhou Anding Beidi Niyang Yongzhou commanderies of the same province 
Xiayang 夏陽  marquis 266 Yongzhou Fengyi Anding Linjing Yongzhou commanderies of the same province 
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Linjin 臨晉 marquis 276 Yongzhou Fengyi Hongnong Huayin Sizhou commanderies of the same province 





Anding Wushi Yongzhou commanderies of the same province 
  
Anle 安樂  duke 266 Youzhou Yanguo unknown   ruling line of Shu Han 
Rongcheng 容城 
marquis 
      266? 
Youzhou Fanyang Fanyang 
Fangcheng 
Youzhou neighboring prefectures within the same commandery 
Shanggu 上谷 duke 291 Youzhou Bohai Dongguang Jizhou   
Liaoxi 遼西  duke 302 Youzhou unknown   probably outside realm 






Yuzhou commanderies of the same province 
Langling 朗陵 duke 266 Yuzhou Runan Chenguo Yangxia Yuzhou prefectures in two neighboring commanderies  
Shangcai 上蔡 count 266 Yuzhou Runan  Runan Xiping  Yuzhou neighboring prefectures within the same commandery 
Juping 鉅平 marquis 266 Yuzhou Taishan Taishan Nancheng Yuzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Shen 慎縣 
viscount       266? 
Yuzhou Ruyin Yingchuan 
Xuchang 
Yuzhou commanderies of the same province 
Nancheng 南城 
marquis 277 
Yuzhou Taishan Taishan Nancheng Yuzhou prefectures in the same commandery including the home 
prefecture 
Yiyang 弋陽 viscount 300 Yuzhou Qiaoguo Zhi Yuzhou commanderies of the same province 







Yuzhou neighboring prefectures within the same commandery 
Yiyang 弋陽 marquis 306 Yuzhou Qiaoguo Zhi Yuzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Dongping 東平  marquis/duke  311 (306) Yuzhou Henei Shanyang Sizhou   
Wuyang 舞陽  












Yuzhou the same prefecture and commandery 
Xiping 西平  duke 314 Yuzhou Runan Anding Wushi Yongzhou   
  
Pingling 平陵 baron 266 unknown Taiyuan  Bingzhou   
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Youzhou   
Guang‟an 廣安  duke 266 unknown unknown     
Changlu 昌陸 viscount       266? unknown Chenliu Yucheng Yanzhou   
Jingyuan 涇原 viscount       266? unknown Beidi Niyang Yongzhou   
Qingquan 清泉 marquis 269 unknown Beidi Niyang Yongzhou   
Guiming 歸命  marquis 280 unknown Wujun Wu Yangzhou ruling line of Wu 
Guiyi 歸義 marquis 283 unknown unknown   probably outside realm 





unknown Beidi Niyang Sizhou Lingchuan was native place of one of Fu Zhi's ancestors 
Yiju 弋居  count 313 unknown Dunhuang  Liangzhou 涼   
Guangrao 廣饒  marquis      < 317 unknown Qi Qingzhou   
 
 
Tab. 8 Prefecture Lordships (Xianhou 縣侯) Awarded during the Western Jin ad Location of thein Fiefs (266-317) 
 
fief 












Jingling 京陵  Wang Hun 王渾  266 Bingzhou Tiayuan Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou 
neighboring prefectures in one commandery, 
apanage of 6500 households
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Guangwu 廣武  Zhang Hua 張華 280 Bingzhou Yanmen 
Fanyang 
Fancheng Youzhou   
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 Not all of the dignities listed here as prefecture lordships are mentioned as such in the contemporary sources. The distinction between the peerage marquisates and 
prefecture lordship is often obscured with the sources referring to both simply as XY hou. In these cases I tried to determine the status of the dignity in question by taking into 
account other known facts and these are indicated in separate notes. The rest of the dignities are explicitly mentioned as lordship titles, however, I do not claim that the list of 
the prefecture lords is complete. I may have either missed some of the titles, or misidentified lordship dignity for a peerage or peerage for a lordship title. Nevertheless, I 
believe that the list, however big its shortcomings, still can provide some clues concerning general trends in choosing location of the fief.  
194
 As the quotas set the apanage of a peerage marquis to 1400-1600 households, anything above this number indicates that the particular dignity belongs to lordships.  
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Guangwu 廣武  Liu Kun 劉琨  306 Bingzhou Yanmen 
Zhongshan 
Weichang Jizhou  apanage of 2000 households 
  
Shangyong 上庸 Tang Bin 唐彬  280 Jingzhou Luguo Zou Yanzhou  apanage of 6000 households 
Xiangyang 襄陽 Wang Jun 王濬 280 Jingzhou Hongnong Hu Sizhou   
Dangyang 當陽  Du Yu 杜預  280 Jingzhou Nanjun Jingzhao Duling  Yongzhou  apanage of 9600 households  
Jiangling 江陵  Wang XY 王氏 280 Jingzhou Nanjun Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou   
Wudang 武當 
Teng Xiu/You 
 滕脩  280 
Jingzhou 
Nanxiang Nanyang Xi'e Jingzhou 
neighbouring commanderies in one province, created 
after the fall of Wu
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Wuchang 武昌  Pei Gai 裴該 291 Jingzhou Hedong Wenxi Sizhou  conferred by special grace196 
Xicheng 西城  He Pan 何攀  291 Jingzhou Weixing Shujun Pi Yizhou  apanage of 10 000 households 
Guanjun 冠軍  Guo Zhang 郭彰            291-299 Jingzhou Nanyang Taiyuan Yangqu Bingzhou   
Wuling 武陵  Wang Yi 王廙  306 Jingzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou   
Chaisang 柴桑 Tao Kan 陶侃                 316> 
Jingzhou 
Wuchang Lujiang Xunyang Yangzhou 
neighboring commanderies of two provinces, 
apanage of 4000 households 
  
Fulu 福祿  Zhang Shi 張寔           312-316 
Liangzhou 
Jiuquan Anding Wushi Yongzhou 
neighboring provinces, Fulu was under control of the 
Zhangs 
  
Changguo 昌國 Ren Kai 任愷 266 Qingzhou Qi Le'an Bochang Qingzhou nighboring commanderies in one province 
Chang‟an 昌安  Shi Jian 石鑒  290 
Qingzhou 
Chengyang Leling Yanci Jizhou   
  
Anyang 安陽  Shi Chong 石崇  280 Sizhou Weijun  Bohai Nanpi Jizhou   
Xiu/Youwu 脩武  Li Ju 李矩           312-316 Sizhou Jijun Pingyang  Sizhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Yangwu 陽武  Li Ju 李矩            312-316 Sizhou Xingyang Pingyang  Sizhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
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 All titles given in reward for the merit on the successful conquest of Wu in 280 AD were liehou lordships. Therefore we may assume that Wudang was very probably 
prefecture lordship too. 
196
 The Wuchang dignity was conferred in 291 AD to a son of the duke of Julu as a special grace (tui‟en 推恩). The titles bestowed by special grace to younger sons of the 
peerage were generally lower titles within the liehou ranks. Therefore it is highly probable that Wuchang was only prefecture lordship.   
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Pingyang 平陽 Li Ju 李矩  317 Sizhou Pingyang Pingyang  Sizhou same prefecture of the same commandery 
  
Wanling 宛陵 Tao Huang 陶璜  280 
Yangzhou 
Xuancheng Danyang Moling Yangzhou 
neighboring commanderies in one province, created 
after the fall of Wu 
Linhai 臨海  Pei Kai 裴楷            291-299 Yangzhou Hedong Wenxi Sizhou  apanage of 2000 households 
Wucheng 烏程 Zhou Qi 周玘                <313 Yangzhou Wuxing Yixing Yangxian Yangzhou prefectures of the same commandery 
Ping‟a 平阿 Zhao You 趙誘                 <317 
Yangzhou 
Huainan Huainan  Yangzhou prefectures of the same commandery 
Xunyang 尋陽  Zhou Fang 周訪                 <317 Yangzhou Lujiang Runan Ancheng Yuzhou   
  
Xue 薛縣 Wu Gai 武陔  266 Yanzhou Luguo Peiguo Zhuyi Yuzhou neighboring commanderies in two provinces 
Fenggao 奉高  Ma Long 馬隆  290 Yanzhou Taishan Dongping Pinglu Yanzhou commanderies of the same province  
  
Liangzou 梁鄒  Liu Song 劉頌  301 
Yongzhou 
Jingzhao Guangling  Xuzhou   
Lantian 藍田  Wang Cheng 王承  306 
Yongzhou 
Jingzhao Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou   
  
Anfeng 安豐  Wang Rong 王戎  280 Yuzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou   
Chengwu 成武  Zhou Jun 周浚  280 Yuzhou Jiyin Runan Ancheng Yuzhou 
commanderies of the same province, yet quite far 
apart, apanage of 6000 households 
  
Minyang 敏陽  Wang Yu 王聿                297> unknown Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou  conferred by speacial grace 











Tab. 9 Township Lordships (Xianghou 鄉侯) Awarded during the Western Jin (266-317) 
 
 








Anling 安陵  Xun Yun 荀頵  266 unknown Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou 
Gao‟an 高安  Xiahou Shao 夏侯劭  266 Jiaozhou Jiuzhen Peiguo Qiao Yuzhou 
Lexiang 樂鄉 Hua Jiao 華嶠  291 Jingzhou Yiyang Pingyuan Gaotang Sizhou 
Pingxiang 平鄉  He Feng 何逢 291 Jizhou Julu Shujun Pi Yizhou 
Pingyang 平陽 Jia Mo 賈模 291 Sizhou Pingyang 
Pingyang 
Xiangling Sizhou 
Pingle 平樂  Yan Zuan 閻纘                   <300 Guangzhou Shi'an Baxi Anhan  Liangzhou 
Anle 安樂  Zhang Gui 張軌  305 Youzhou Yanguo Anding Wushi Yongzhou 
Anyang 安陽  Xue Jian 薛兼                   306> Sizhou Weijun Danyang Yangzhou 
Dongxiang 東鄉 Gu Zhong 顧眾                   <317 unknown Wujun Wu Yangzhou 
Dongxiang 東鄉  Tao Kan 陶侃              300-316 unknown Peiguo Xiang Yuzhou 

















Tab. 10 Village Lordships (Tinghou 亭侯) Awarded during the Western Jin (266-317 AD) 
 




Fengle 豐樂  Du Yu 杜預  266   
Fengsheng 奉聖  Kong Zhen 孔震  266   
Wuting 蓩亭  Yang Wenzong 楊文宗  266   
Ganlu 甘露  Yang Xiu 羊琇  266   
Wuchang 武昌  Ji Han 嵇含                   266?   
Gaoyang 高陽 Pei Jing 裴憬  271   
Anyang 安陽 Han Gai 韓蓋   280   
Runan 汝南  He Yu 和郁  280 fief in their home commandery 
Xincheng 新城 Han Chang 韓暢   280   
Yangli 陽里 Jia Hun 賈混 280   
Yangxiang 楊鄉  Wang Yi 王彜  280   
Dongming 東明 Fu Jun 傅雋  291   
Wuxiang 武鄉 Fu Chang 傅暢  291   
Xuanchang 宣昌  Hua Jiao 華嶠  291   
Anle 安樂  Suo Jing 索靖                   306?   
Anyang 安陽  Xue Jian 薛兼                   306?   
Jianwu 建武  Zhang Shi 張寔                <313?   
Dongming  東明 Li Ju 李矩            313-316   
Xianting 咸亭  Xie Kun 謝鯤             313-316   
Yuanxiang 原鄉 Liu Chao 劉超             313-316   
Jiyang 吉陽 Guo Song郭誦  317   
Anling 安陵 Bian Dun 卞敦                  <317   
Yichang 宜昌  Zhang Fu 張輔                  <317   
Zhangpu 漳浦 Zhou Zha 周札                  <317   
Anshou 安壽  Wang Qian 王虔            unknown   
Qingliu 清流  Zhou Mao 周懋           unknown   
Qingming 清明  Xiahou Zhuang 夏侯莊            unknown   




Remaining border provinces of Pingzhou 平州 and Youzhou 幽州 occupied similar 
peripheral position in the east. The actual extent of the Jin control over the Liao River 遼河 
basin and North of the Korean Peninsula is actually questionable. The Jin interests in the 
region must have inevitably collided with the interests of Kogurjǒ and the Xianbei 鮮卑 tribes 
which despite their occasional alliances with the Jin remained potential threat to the Jin 
authority in the region. With all three powers vying with each other the control of the Far East 
must have been an elusive mirage, being subjected to the ever changing balance of power. 
During his long reign Wudi never bestowed a fief within Pingzhou province and this decision 
was probably deliberate. It was only after his death when the system of ennoblement was 
adjusted to become a useful tool for strengthening one‟s political position through bestowing 
unprecedented honors on one‟s followers, that a barony was created in the Pingzhou 
Commandery of Daifang 帶方. Daifang, lying south of present day P„yŏngyang, was one of 
the four commanderies which were established in the North of the Korean Peninsula 
following the victorious campaigns of Han Emperor Wudi 漢武帝 (141-87 BC). In view of 
the peripheral position of Daifang and its considerable distance from the imperial capital it 
seems to me rather unlikely that there was more than just a formal connection of the barony of 
Changcen 長岑 with prefecture of that name which was shortly to be annexed by Koguryǒ 
King Mich‟ǒn 美川王 (300-331 AD) together with the rest of the Jin possessions on the 
Korean Peninsula in 313 AD. 
Youzhou, the other of the far-eastern provinces, may have been much closer to the 
capital than Pingzhou but certain features of insecure and potentially volatile border zone 
applied to it as well and peerage fiefs located within its borders were rather exceptional. The 
dukedom of Anle 安樂 which Wudi bestowed on Liu Shan 劉禪, the ex-emperor of Shu Han, 
actually corresponded with the ancestral home of this branch of the Liu imperial clan which 
was Zhuo commandery 涿郡 of Youzhou. As in case of other peerages created for the ex-
rulers and members of dethroned or abdicated imperial lines, the revenue flowing from 
dukedom of Anle should have ensured the continuation of regular sacrifices to the imperial 
predecessors of the Jin and is to be seen as a ritual step taken on the way to establishing one‟s 
legitimacy. The second of Wudi„s creations, the marquisate of Rongcheng 容城, is only 
hinted at by the sources. It was in fact a continuation of the original Wei title bestowed on the 
Fanyang Lu 范陽盧氏 family which belonged to the staunchest supporters of the Simas 
before the establishment of the dynasty. As Fanyang was new Jin designation for Zhuo 
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commandery it is obvious that the main reason for bestowing fief exactly in Youzhou was 
again the proximity to the ancestral home of the family. 
The second half of the dynasty saw creation of three new peerage fiefs within 
Youzhou. While dukedom of Shanggu 上谷 was an irregular peerage creation typical of 
period of political infighting during the reign of Emperor Huidi, the remaining dukedoms, 
Liaoxi 遼西 and Guangning 廣寧 represent altogether different kind of noble title. They were 
granted to members of Duan 段 family, the ruling clan of the Eastern Xianbei who wielded 
considerable influence along the border. These men may have acknowledged the suzerainty of 
the Jin, yet they were often living outside the empire being virtually independent of the 
central authority and its local representatives. Bestowal of these titles was very likely a 
gesture of political expediency acknowledging the position of Xianbei leaders as semi-
independent lords of the border which nevertheless formally integrated this unpredictable 
power within the framework of the empire hierarchy. By formally becoming members of the 
titled nobility of the realm they became subjects to the Jin emperor at the same time. Through 
conferring the highest noble title available for non-royals the Jin court hoped to win 
allegiance of the Duans and instill in them sense of loyalty to the throne which would bind 
them in useful alliance protecting the frontier of the empire against the raids of more hostile 
steppe tribes.
197
 Yet as these titles were conferred on tribal leaders who were not subjected to 
direct control of the centre it is arguable whether the titles actually entitled their holders to 
any of the rights enjoyed by the peers. As long as these dukes remained outside of the realm, 
the creations must have remained purely nominal and commanderies of Youzhou were chosen 
only for their proximity to the border and sphere of activity of the Xianbei Duan clan.               
While in the central core region the fiefs were more or less evenly distributed over the 
whole area, with even the provinces of northern border zone used regularly, albeit less often, 
for creating new peerages, the provinces in the far south and southwest of the empire evince 
conspicuous absence of any peerage fiefs and initially were not used at all. During Wudi‟s 
reign the territory of Guangzhou 廣州 and Jiaozhou 交州 in the far south stretching from the 
basin of the Pearl River (Zhujiang 珠江) to the delta of the Red River (Honghe 紅河 or Sông 
Hồng) in northern Vietnam was apparently used only for granting low township lordships 
while Ningzhou 寧州 in present day Yunnan and both Sichuan provinces of Yizhou 益州 and 
Liangzhou 梁州 were left with no fief at all. The situation changed shortly before the collapse 
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 For the complicated relations between the Xianbei and other steppe ethnic groups and Chinese empires since 
the collapse of the Xiongnu autority over the steppe see Barfield, Thomas (1992): pp. 85-97.   
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of the dynasty and transfer of its capital to Jiankang 建康 when there were two peerages 
newly created in Ningzhou and Yizhou, but as they were in all probability bestowed by 
regime of the future emperor Yuandi, they reflect the Eastern Jin practices which differed in 
many respects from the system instituted by Wudi.  
The southwestern and southern provinces represented in a certain sense continuation 
of the northern border zone, yet the reasons which rendered them hardly admissible as proper 
areas for a fief to be located in were quite different and were related to specific political 
conditions of the region and peculiar nature of the state control over it. Despite the on-going 
territorial expansion of the Chinese empire southwards large areas of the Lingnan 嶺南 region 
were actually still ruled by native chieftains and hereditary tribal rulers who often remained 
the real masters of the region. The control of the state over these political entities was frail 
and depended on the ability of the government to integrate at least partially the local rulers 
into power structure of the dynasty represented by the local administration and also on the 
good will of the native chieftains and their willingness to cooperate with the Jin court and its 
local representatives. 
Contemporary sources offer us a notion of full-fledged administrative structure with 
network of provinces, commanderies and prefectures which seemingly existed in the south, 
yet it would be mistaken to take the information gleaned from the sources at its face value. 
The state may have officially established provinces and prefectures and even appointed their 
administrative staff, but such creation often remained only on paper, so to speak, and did not 
necessarily imply smooth running of the office or even the existence of a centrally governed 
administrative unit per se as the reality was often conditioned by the balance of power and 
attitude of the local native rules. Not much could have been expected from governors and 
prefects who if not living in overtly hostile surroundings were at best tolerated but ignored.
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The regions where even the overall control of the government was subject to current mood of 
the native elites were hardly suitable for establishing noble fiefs and apanages which should 
have become sources of stable annual income enabling perpetual remembrance of meritorious 
deeds through regular offering of sacrifices.                    
Even though the above description of the conditions in the far south may to some 
degree apply also to certain parts of Sichuan, especially the south-west frontier of Liangzhou 
bordering on tribal region traditionally known as Nanzhong 南中, the reasons for absence of 
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 For excellent discussion of the situation in the southwest regions of China, especially present day Yunnan, 




noble fiefs in Sichuan are probably different. The vast and fertile Chengdu basin has been 
known for its wealth and prosperity since time immemorial and therefore its economy, even 
though temporarily impaired by the mismanagement under the last Shu Han emperor could 
have not been the issue. Therefore, it seems plausible that military and security concerns 
mentioned by Yang Guanghui in connection with all border regions may have actually played 
crucial role here. Beside its proverbial wealth Sichuan was also known as region of utmost 
strategic importance with unique geophysical conditions making it a well defensible place of 
last resort, either safe haven for political refugees fleeing the turmoil of the Central Plain or 
convenient self-sufficient local base for any malcontent trying to set up independent regime of 
his own. The territory of Sichuan was annexed to the Wei-Jin Empire only after the conquest 
of Shu Han in 263 AD. The fall of the independent kingdom was shortly followed by 
rebellion of Zhong Hui 鍾會 one of the victorious commanders who tried to take advantage of 
unstable political situation at court which occupied itself with impending dynastic transition 
and establish a separate regime. Even though the rebellion had been swiftly suppressed this 
abortive attempt convinced the emperor that Sichuan remained potentially unstable and 
insecure and therefore possible bestowal of fiefs within this region might have presented 
security risks which the emperor was not ready to run. Practical concerns may have 
influenced the final decision as well. The relative remoteness of Sichuan provinces and 
overall inaccessibility of the region, connected with the capital, where majority of the 
prospective peers were supposed to reside, though only handful of perilous mountain roads 
may have contributed to undesirability of Sichuan, disqualifying it in the process of selection 
of the fief territory. 
The last remaining province of the empire was Yangzhou 揚州 stretching south of the 
Yangzi River and comprising economically expanding regions of Jiangnan 江南  and 
Jiangdong 江東. Having been originally the core region of the independent kingdom of Wu 
Yangzhou was incorporated into the territory of the Jin realm only in 280 AD. Yet even 
before the final subjugation of the rival regime did Wudi confer peerages which used in their 
appellation names of existing administrative units of southern kingdom. Because these places 
were nevertheless out of reach being controlled by the Wu government the connection 
between the peerage and the territory in question must have been only nominal with actual 
apanage being situated elsewhere. Unfortunately we don‟t know any details about the dignity 
of Linhai 臨海 but at least in case of dukedom of Kuaiji 會稽 and marquisate of Danyang 丹
陽 Wudi was intentionally playing game of symbolics claiming the supreme authority as the 
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sole legitimate Son of Heaven. His claim was even more poignant as the recipients of both 
dignities were members of the Wu ruling family who had previously defected to the Jin camp. 
By creating fiefs within the enemy territory Wudi challenged the authority of the Wu emperor 
and unscrupulously threatened his position as this deliberate act was to be seen as gesture of 
support of refugee princes and their claims to the southern throne. At the same time, situating 
the fief within their home territory of Wu must have felt as a mighty incentive prompting the 
defectors to strive hard and serve the Jin well so as to turn the symbolic claims over the 
territory into its permanent hold. 
Due to its economic potential Yangzhou had joined other populous and developed core 
provinces with seven more fiefs having been allotted within its borders during the later period 
of the dynasty. As the political situation in the Central Plain worsened with the capital city 
being repeatedly threatened by incursions of rebellious Xiongnu and their allies, part of the 
court elite began to contemplate a move of the imperial seat to the safety of the southern bank 
of the Yangzi. The southern families which had retained their local influence even after the 
fall of Wu now helped to maintain the stability of the region suppressing several rebellious 
attempts aiming at recreating an independent southern kingdom. In view of these 
developments it is no wonder that later fiefs located within Yangzhou tended to reflect the 
rising importance of local prominent families which were to play crucial role in transferring 




Apart from general economic and geopolitical considerations there were also other 
factors at play determining the exact location of the fief with a place of family origin being 
actually often decisive for the final choice of the territory. Time and again we encounter 
examples of fiefs being somewhat related to the ancestral home of the family honored by its 
bestowal, as it appears in the family choronym. At the beginning of the Jin Dynasty the 
choronym still often corresponded if not to the actual place of residence of the noble family, 
then at least to its provincial base where the family held some landed property and might have 
exercised considerable influence over the affairs of the local community. When we compare 
the family choronyms with exact locations of the bestowed fiefs it becomes clear that at least 
during the reign of Emperor Wudi it was usual to select suitable territory as close to the 
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 For the conditions in Jiangnan after the fall of Wu and the role of the local prominent families of Wu origin in 
establishing of the Eastern Jin see Fang Beichen (1991): pp. 61-81 and Wang Xiaorong (2002): pp. 89-92; for Jin 
policy of appeasing the former Wu elites see Chen Jinfeng (2001): pp. 78-82.   
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ancestral home of the family as possible, provided by the fact that the selected territory would 
meet all necessary requirements concerning available land and number of apanage households.  
The following tables (Tab. 11-16) provide the list of all peerage dignities and 
prefecture lordships awarded during the Western Jin arranged chronologically by the date of 
creation with special regard to comparison of the exact location of the fief and location of the 
ancestral home of the particular family. For better understanding of the wider changes in the 
selection process affecting the relationship between the fief and ancestral home I have divided 
the reign of the Western Jin into three distinct periods. The first pair of tables shows situation 
during the reign of Wudi (266-289 AD) when the system was first institutionalized and was 
presumably still working flawlessly with all the regulations governing the bestowal of the fief 
being generally observed. Tables 13 and 14 cover the reign of hapless Emperor Huidi 惠帝 
(290-306 AD) with a period of political infighting of the waiqi-dominated court factions 
giving way to subsequent internecine warfare brought about by rivalry within the imperial 
house. Powerful men of the time, regents and princes used the enfeoffment system as a means 
how to achieve their political ends without bothering too much about the rules and provisions 
set by Wudi. The last period (Tables 15 and 16) comprises the reigns of emperors Huaidi 懷
帝 (307-313 AD) and Mindi (313-316 AD) and brief regency of Sima Rui 司馬睿 (316-317 
AD) before he ascended the throne as the first emperor of the Eastern Jin. In the aftermath of 
the Upheaval of the Eight Princes the war-torn country found itself at the mercy of rebellious 
nomadic mercenaries who were constantly chipping away at the Jin territory gradually 
building state of their own. The practice of ennoblement must have deteriorated even further 
as the insecurity of the time called more for the emergency measures than for strict 
observance of the prescribed norm. The refugee court in Chang„an did not have enough time 
and power to enforce its authority over the rest of the empire with Sima Rui establishing a 
rival centre of power and later on even conferring his own noble titles in the capacity of the 
protector of the realm and emperor‟s surrogate in the South. 
Out of fifty peerage fiefs with known locations conferred by Emperor Wudi twenty six 
other fiefs were actually situated either very near of the place of origin of the particular family 
or at least within the same administrative unit. The exact proximity to the ancestral seats may 
have differed ranging from neighboring prefectures of one commandery to commanderies 
within the same province. Even the home prefecture itself could have become the territory of 
the newly created fief, even though this appears to be rather an exceptional case. Sometimes 
the fief was not situated in the same province where the ancestral family home was to be 
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found, nevertheless both territories bordered on one another. Six other fiefs were granted to 
families which hailed from the imperial home province of Sizhou. As the imperial domain 
was very likely to remain fief-free it is only natural that these families must have been given 
their fiefs somewhere else and ancestral home proximity factor gave way to more urgent 
concerns of geopolitical nature. The same holds true for ten peerages which were created for 
members of ex-ruling families, yet in some cases their fief did also correspond to ancestral 
homes of the families in question as we have already seen in the discussion above. Spatial 
proximity between fief and family home appears to be for some reason very important and 
there were only eight fiefs where we can find no connection to the ancestral home of the 
family of their holders. It seems that the same applied in principle to the prefecture lordships 
as well even though the ratio is more balanced with six fiefs having no connection to the place 
of origin against six fiefs corresponding to it and one more being granted to a Sizhou family, 
presumably in an alternative location.  
With no ready explanation being offered by the contemporary sources it is difficult to 
decide, what was the reason for this widespread and obviously favored practice of locating 
fiefs close to the ancestral homes of the noble families. We know that the families still 
maintained some kind of connection to the locality identified as their ancestral home through 
the use of the respective choronym. If that was the case then the spatial proximity could have 
been desirable for purely practical reasons as it solved many a logistic problem connected 
with collection of taxes and generally made the management of the apanage households easier. 
But since we do not know enough details about economic background of the titled nobility, 
working of their family bases and process of levying taxes from the apanage households it is 
rather hard to say whether the distance between the fief and family base really played such an 
important role. It is by no means sure that the apanage stipend was collected directly from the 
apanage households with the collected grain and silk being afterwards transported to the 
native place of the fief holder. As the peers and lords usually resided in the capital with only 
occasionally taking official position in the provincial administration they may have simply 
received certain  amount of silk and grain corresponding to their annual stipend from the state 







Tab. 11 Peerages Created during Reign of Emperor Wudi (266-289) 
 
 
fief rank creation fief Location family choronym 
choronym 
location 
realtionship between fief and family place of origin 
Boling 博陵  duke 266 Jizhou Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou None 





Shangdang Tongdi Bingzhou neighboring commanderies of the same province 
Pingling 平陵 baron 266 unknown Taiyuan  Bingzhou unknown 
Leling 樂陵 duke 266 Jizhou Bohai Nanpi Jizhou neighboring commanderies in one province 





Pingyuan Gaotang Jizhou 
none 
Xunyang 循陽  count 266 unknown Pingyuan Gaotang Jizhou unknown 








Liangzou 梁鄒 marquis 266 Qingzhou Le'an Jinan Zhuo Qingzhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Linhai 臨海 marquis 266 Yangzhou Donglai Ye Qingzhou none 








Shouguang 壽光 duke 266 Qingzhou Le'an Xingyang Kaifeng Sizhou outside Sizhou 






Xingyang Kaifeng Sizhou if Mixian is Miling, two commanderies of the same province  
Xinta 新沓 count 266 Qingzhou Qi Henei Huai Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Gaoping 高平  duke 266 Yanzhou Linhuai Dongyang Xuzhou none 
Suiling 睢陵 duke 266 Xuzhou Xiapi Langye Linyi Xuzhou two commanderies of the same province, not neighboring 
Jiqiu 即丘 viscount 266 Xuzhou Langye Langye Linyi Xuzhou two prefectures in the same commandery 









Chenliu Yu Yanzhou two prefectures in the same commandery 





Anding Linjing Yongzhou two commanderies of the same province, not neighboring 























Yuzhou Runan Chenguo Yangxia Yuzhou prefectures in two neighbouring commanderies in one 
province 












Yuzhou two commanderies of the same province, not neighboring 
Juping 鉅平 marquis 266 Yuzhou Taishan Taishan Nancheng Yuzhou two prefectures in the same commandery 
Shangcai 上蔡 count 266 Yuzhou Runan Runan Xiping  Yuzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 
Anle 安樂  
duke 266 Youzhou 
Yanguo 
Zhuojun Zhuo  Youzhou 
 
ruling line of Shu Han, neighboring prefectures within one 
commandery 
Gaoyi 高邑  duke 266 Jizhou Zhaoguo Peiguo Qiao   ruling line of Cao Wei 








ruling line of Cao Wei 







ruling line of Cao Wei 






  unknown 
Shanyang 山陽  duke 266 Sizhou Henei unknown   ruling line of Han 
Shaoling 邵陵 duke 266 Jingzhou Peiguo Qiao  Yuzhou  ruling line of Cao Wei 





       266? 
Xuzhou 
Donghai 




       266? 
Xuzhou 
Donghai 
Donghai Tan Xuzhou two prefectures in the same commandery 
Changlu 昌陸 viscount        266? unknown Chenliu Yucheng Yanzhou unknown 
Jingyuan 涇原 viscount        266? unknown Beidi Niyang Yongzhou unknown, not sure if the Wei title was confirmed by the Jin 
Rongcheng 容城 
marquis 





Youzhou neigboring prefectures in one commandery 
Shen 慎縣 
viscount 
       266? 
Yuzhou Ruyin Yingchuan 
Xuchang 
Yuzhou two commanderies of the same province, not neighboring 






Xiangyang  Jingzhou two commanderies of the same province, not neighboring 
Kuaiji 會稽 duke 270 Yangzhou Wujun Wu Yangzhou  ruling line of Wu 











Hongnong Huayin Yongzhou 




Yuzhou Taishan Taishan 
Nancheng 
Yuzhou prefectures in the same commandery including home 
prefecture 
Pingchun 平春侯  
marquis 












Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou prefectures in the same commandery 
Guiming 歸命  marquis 280 unknown Wujun Wu Yangzhou ruling line of Wu 
Yongping 永平 
marquis 







Yongshi 永世  
marquis 
      280 > 
Yangzhou 
Danyang 
Langye Linyi Xuzhou 
none 
Guiyi 歸義 marquis 283 unknown unknown   probably outside realm 
Guangxing 廣興  
marquis 








Tab. 12 Prefecture Lordships Created during Reign of Emperor Wudi (266-289) 
 
fief 









relationship between fief and family place of 
origin 
Jingling 京陵  Wang Hun 王渾  266 Bingzhou Tiayuan Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou neighboring prefectures in one commandery 
Changguo 昌國 Ren Kai 任愷 266 Qingzhou Qi Le'an Bochang Qingzhou nighboring commanderies in one province 
Xue 薛縣 Wu Gai 武陔  266 Yanzhou Luguo Peiguo Zhuyi Yuzhou neighboring commanderies in two provinces 
Guangwu 廣武  Zhang Hua 張華 280 Bingzhou Yanmen 
Fanyang 
Fancheng Youzhou none 
Shangyong 上庸 Tang Bin 唐彬  280 Jingzhou Luguo Zou Yanzhou none 
Xiangyang 襄陽 Wang Jun 王濬 280 Jingzhou Hongnong Hu Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Dangyang 當陽  Du Yu 杜預  280 Jingzhou Nanjun Jingzhao Duling  Yongzhou none 
Jiangling 江陵  Wang XY 王氏 280 Jingzhou Nanjun Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou none 
Wudang 武當 
Teng Xiu/You  
滕脩  280 Jingzhou Nanxiang Nanyang Xi'e Jingzhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Anyang 安陽  Shi Chong 石崇  280 Sizhou Weijun  Bohai Nanpi Jizhou none 




Moling Yangzhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Anfeng 安豐  Wang Rong 王戎  280 Yuzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou none 
Chengwu 成武  Zhou Jun 周浚  280 Yuzhou Jiyin Runan Ancheng Yuzhou 









fief location family choronym 
choronym 
location 
realtionship between fief and place of family 
origin 
Guanyang 觀陽 duke       290 (266) Jingzhou Lingling Pingyuan Gaotang Jizhou none 
Chang‟an 昌安  
maquis 290 Qingzhou 
Chengyang 
Leling Yanci Jizhou none 
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Xunyang 循陽 maquis 290 unknown Pingyuan Gaotang Jizhou unknown 












Donghai Tan Xuzhou 
none 
Chengyang 成陽 viscount 291 Yanzhou Jiyin Jiyin Yuanju Yanzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 
Zhuangwu 壯武  
duke 
        291-300 
Qingzhou 
Chengyang 







Nanyang  Jingzhou two prefectures in the same commandery 




Yuzhou Qiaoguo Zhi Yuzhou two commanderies of the same province, not 
neighboring 
Lanling 蘭陵 duke               300? Xuzhou Donghai Hedong Anyi Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Xingjin  興晉 maquis             300 > Jingzhou Weixing Taishan Nancheng Yanzhou none 
Chengyang 成陽 duke       301 (291) Yanzhou Jiyin Jiyin Yuanju Yanzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 
Anchang 安昌 duke 301 Jingzhou Yiyang Xingyang 
Zhongmou 
Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Pingshou 平壽  duke 301 Qingzhou Peihai Xingyang Kaifeng Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Anxiang 安鄉  duke 301 Jizhou Julu unknown   unknown 
Fengqiu 封丘  duke 301 Yanzhou Chenliu unknown   unknown 






  unknown 
Pingyin 平陰  duke 301 Yanzhou Jibei unknown   unknown 
Xiaohuang 小黃 duke 301 Yuzhou Chenliu unknown   unknown 
Wuqiang 武強 maquis             301 > Jizhou Anping Fanyang Fangcheng Youzhou none 
Jiaxing嘉興 count 302 Yangzhou Wujun Wuguo Wu Yangzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 






Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 
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Donglai Ye Qingzhou commanderies of neigboring provinces, not far 
distant 
Xingjin  興晉 duke             < 304 Jingzhou Weixing Taishan Nancheng Yanzhou none 
Xuancheng 宣城  duke             < 305 Yangzhou Peiguo Xiang Yuzhou none 
Yanling 延陵 duke             < 306 Yangzhou Piling Chenliu Yucheng Yanzhou none 
Chengyang 成陽 baron        300-306 Yanzhou Jiyin Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou none 
Daling 大陵 
duke 306 Bingzhou 
Taiyuan 
Taiyuan Qi Bingzhou in the same commandery 
Jiangxia 江夏 duke 306 Jingzhou Hedong Anyi Sizhou outside Sizhou 





Guangling  Xuzhou 
none 
Nanxiang 南鄉  maquis 306 Jingzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou none 
Yiyang 弋陽 maquis 306 Yuzhou Qiaoguo Zhi Yuzhou two prefectures in the same commandery 







ruling line of Wu 
 
 
Tab. 14 Prefecture Lordships Created during Reign of Emperor Huidi (289-306) 
 
fief 









relationship between fief and family place of 
origin 
Chang‟an 昌安  Shi Jian 石鑒  290 Qingzhou Chengyang Leling Yanci Jizhou none 
Fenggao 奉高  Ma Long 馬隆  290 Yanzhou Taishan Dongping Pinglu Yanzhou commanderies of the same province  
Wuchang 武昌  Pei Gai 裴該 291 Jingzhou Hedong Wenxi Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Xicheng 西城  He Pan 何攀  291 Jingzhou Weixing Shujun Pi Yizhou none 
Guanjun 冠軍  Guo Zhang 郭彰      291-299 Jingzhou Nanyang Taiyuan Yangqu Bingzhou none 
Linhai 臨海  Pei Kai 裴楷      291-299 Yangzhou Hedong Wenxi Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Minyang 敏陽  Wang Yu 王聿           297> unknown Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou unknown 
Liangzou 梁鄒  Liu Song 劉頌  301 Yongzhou Jingzhao Guangling  Xuzhou none 
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Jinxing 晉興  Sun Hui 孫惠  301 unknown Wujun Wu Yangzhou unknown 
Guangwu 廣武  Liu Kun 劉琨  306 Bingzhou Yanmen 
Zhongshan 
Weichang Jizhou none 
Wuling 武陵  Wang Yi 王廙 306 Jingzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou none 
Lantian 藍田  Wang Cheng 王承  306 Yongzhou Jingzhao Taiyuan Jinyang Bingzhou none 
 
 





fief location family choronym 
choronym 
location 
relationship between fief and place of family 
origin 
Wuling 武陵  marquis       306-311 Jingzhou Langye Linyi Xuzhou none, created but never accepted 
Xincheng 新城 duke       306-311 Jingzhou Peiguo Xiang Yuzhou none 
Jiuquan 酒泉  duke       307-313 Liangzhou 涼 Wuwei Guzang Liangzhou 涼 commanderies in the same province 
Bacheng 霸城  
marquis 
      310-312 
Yongzhou 
Jingzhao 
Anding Wushi Yongzhou commanderies in one province 
Dongping 東平 duke     311 (306) Yuzhou Henei Shanyang Sizhou outside Sizhou 
Dingxiang 定襄 
marquis 







Wuyang 舞陽  
duke 
          312 > 
Yuzhou 
Xiangcheng 
Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Yiju 弋居  count 313 unknown Dunhuang  Liangzhou 涼 unknown 






Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou the same prefecture and commandery 
Shangluo 上洛  duke       313-316 Sizhou Dunhuang  Liangzhou 涼 none 
Wucheng烏程  
duke 
      313-316 
Yangzhou 
Wuxing 
Yixing Yangxian Yangzhou neighboring prefectures within one commandery 
Quling 曲陵  duke       313-316 Jingzhou Jiangxia Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou none 
Xiping 西平  duke 314 Yuzhou Runan Anding Wushi Yongzhou none 
Changcen 長岑 
baron 
          < 316 






Jiaxing 嘉興 duke     316 (302) Yangzhou Wujun Wuguo Wu Yangzhou neigboring prefectures in one province 
Han‟an 漢安 marquis 316 Yizhou Jiangyang Langye Linyi Xuzhou none 
Sheyang 射陽  
duke 
          316 > 
Xuzhou 
Guangling 
Yingchuan Linying Yuzhou 
none 
Guangrao 廣饒  marquis           < 317 unknown Qi Qingzhou unknown 
Wugang 武岡 
marquis 
          < 317 
Jingzhou 
Shaoling 
Langye Linyi Xuzhou 
none 
Yongning 永寧 count           < 317 Ningzhou Yunnan Runan Ancheng Yuzhou none 
Bohai 渤海 duke           < 317 Jizhou unknown   probably outside realm 
Guangning 廣甯  duke           < 317 Youzhou unknown   probably outside realm 
Zhu‟a 祝阿 viscount           < 317 Qingzhou Jinan unknown   unknown 
 
 
Tab. 16 Prefecture Lordships Created during Reigns of Emperor Huaidi and Mindi and regency of Sima Rui (307-317) 
 
fief 









relationship between fief and family place of 
origin 
Wucheng 烏程 Zhou Qi 周玘          <313 Yangzhou Wuxing Yixing Yangxian Yangzhou prefectures of the same commandery 
Fulu 福祿  Zhang Shi 張寔     312-316 Liangzhou Jiuquan Anding Wushi Yongzhou 
neighboring provinces, Fulu was under control of 
the Zhangs 
Xiu/Youwu 脩武  Li Ju 李矩     312-316 Sizhou Jijun Pingyang  Sizhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Yangwu 陽武  Li Ju 李矩      312-316 Sizhou Xingyang Pingyang  Sizhou neighboring commanderies in one province 
Chaisang 柴桑 Tao Kan 陶侃           316> Jingzhou Wuchang Lujiang Xunyang Yangzhou neighboring commanderies of two provinces 
Ping‟a 平阿 Zhao You 趙誘           <317 
Yangzhou 
Huainan Huainan  Yangzhou prefectures of the same commandery 
Xunyang 尋陽  Zhou Fang 周訪           <317 Yangzhou Lujiang Runan Ancheng Yuzhou none 








Even though the ancestral family home ceased to be the actual place of residence of 
the main branch of the family, the officials at court still maintained close contact with their 
home localities and relatives who may have continued to live there. The mutual ties remained 
strong with the local family base supposedly supplying economically the family members 
living in the capital. The families often managed to retain traditional influence as the main 
pivot of the local social network and the family ties and patron-client relationship with the 
members of local community constituted a vital link between the central administration and 
lowest level of the local society already since the end of the Han.
200
 The authority of the 
central government on the local level often depended on the influence of the local prominent 
families and could be implemented only through their mediation. Therefore, awarding fief in 
or near one‟s home territory could have reflected the position of the family within the local 
society acknowledging on symbolical level its preeminent influence over the locality and its 
population and probably also conferring additional symbolic power. Even though the 
bestowal of the fief did not entail any jurisdictional rights, there was at least formal 
connection between the title, the territory used in the appellation and people living within its 
boundaries. Bestowal of the noble title thus perhaps confirmed the standing of the family 
within its ancestral home territory and confirmation by the highest authority without doubt 
strengthened their position vis-à-vis all possible rivals. Such an arrangement allowed the 
central government to integrate these families into wider hierarchy of the empire making them 
partly responsible for its well-being and survival. At the same time it also enabled the court to 
maintain the vital link between the centre and the local community which secured its control 
over the locality. 
It is not entirely clear when the practice of awarding fief in correspondence to the 
ancestral home of the family emerged or what the origins were. It might have been a distant 
echo of the Zhou enfeoffment system even though the Zhou princes were actually first 
enfeoffed and then sent to their fiefs which subsequently became their place of residence and 
home of their offspring and not the other way round as was the case of later noble families. 
Unfortunately the contemporary sources are not of much help as the explicit mentions of the 
fief – ancestral home connection are extremely rare. Even circumstantial mentions are fairly 
vague, not going into any particular details: 
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 For the emergence of the local prominent families during teh Eastern Han see Cui Xiangdong (2004): pp. 
227-254; for thein further development see Mao Hanguang (1990): pp. 73-80 and also (1966): pp. 48-66; for the 
case study of the Boling Cui 博陵崔氏 family and their connection to local community see Ebrey, Patricia B. 




“For the merit [achieved during] chastisement of Yang Jun [Fu Zhi] should have been 
enfeoffed as a commandery duke with [apanage] of eight thousand households, but he firmly 
declined [to accept it. Then, the apanage] was reduced by half and he was enfeoffed [with a title 
one grade] lower as prefecture duke of Lingchuan with [apanage] of one thousand eight hundred 
households. The remaining two thousand two hundred households [became the apanage] of his 
younger son [Fu] Chang who was enfeoffed as village lord of Wuxiang. Moreover, Fu Zhi‟s 
original title of [the lord of the royal domain] was bestowed upon [Fu] Jun, son of [Fu Zhi‟s] 
elder brother, who became village lord of Dongming.”
201
     
 
Fu Zhi 傅祗 was member of an ancient lineage of Han and Wei court officials. His 
relatives supported the ambitions of the Simas and were duly rewarded with titles and honors 
once the dynasty was established. Fu Zhi belonged to a collateral branch the merit of which 
was apparently not so high as he had been given just guanneihou lordship. Only after the 
palace coup of 291 AD when the Empress Jia 賈皇后 got rid of self-appointed regent Yang 
Jun 楊駿 , was Fu Zhi awarded a ducal dignity. The appellation of Lingchuan 靈川  is, 
however, scribal error for Lingzhou 靈州 which, according to the History of the Later Han 
(Hou Han shu 後漢書) corresponds to the ancestral home of Fu Zhi‟s family.202 Therefore, 
the appellation of the newly created peerage dignity was clearly chosen according to the place 
of origin of the Fu family.
203
 Moreover, the village lordship of Wuxiang 武鄉亭侯 bestowed 
by the act of special grace on Fu Zhi‟s younger son was in fact kind of recreation of older title 
used by the family during the Wei, as it was first created after the accession of Duke of 
Gaogui in 254 AD for Fu Zhi‟s father Fu Jia 傅嘏. Practice of recreation of older titles used 
during previous dynasties was not uncommon and probably stems from the same concern for 
symbolic continuity of family traditions and local influence which was also at play in 
selecting fiefs within or near the ancestral home area of the family. Indeed, both practices 
were sometimes interconnected as is the case of the Jin barony of Anzhong created at the 
beginning of the 4
th
 century:        
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 Jinshu juan 47, Fu Zhi zhuan, p. 1331. 
202
 Jinshu juan 47, note 7, p. 1334. 
203
 Unfortunately I was not able to locate Lingzhou and compare its location with the family choronym (Beidi 
Niyang 北地泥陽). But whatever the connection between the fief and the choronym, Lingzhou was clearly a 
place where Fu Zhi‟s ancestors resided at some point. 
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“Liu Qiao, whose honorary style was Zhongyan, hailed from Nanyang. His ancestors 
were members of the Han imperial family and were enfeoffed as marquises of Anzhong. This 
title was inherited for three generations. [Liu Qiao‟s] grandfather Liu Yi served as Palace 
Attendant (shizhong 侍中) under the Wei. His father Liu Fu was Administrator (xiang 相) of the 
Chenliu [princely fief]. As a young man Liu Qiao was appointed Assistant in the Palace Library 
(bishulang 祕書郎) and General Establishing Authority (jianwei jiangjun 建威將軍) Wang 
Rong drafted him as his Adjutant (canjun 參軍). During the campaign against Wu Wang Rong 
had sent Liu Qiao together with Adjutant Luo Shang across the Jiang River, where they 
captured Wuchang. When he returned, he was given the post of the Magistrate (ling 令) of 
Xingyang. [Later on] he was promoted to Frontrider of the Crown Prince (taizi xima 太子洗馬). 
For merit of [assisting] the execution of Yang Jun, the title of lord within the passes 
(guanzhonghou 關中侯) was bestowed on him and Liu Qiao was appointed Right Aide to the 
Imperial Secretary (shangshu youcheng 尚書右丞). After participating in the execution of Jia 
Mi he was enfeoffed as Baron of Anzhong and later on promoted to the position of Cavalier 
Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍).”204 
 
It is clear that the fief selected for this new baronial peerage was no random choice. 
One of Liu Qiao‟s 劉喬 ancestors was enfeoffed, most likely as a younger son of a Han prince, 
as Marquis of Anzhong 安眾侯. Having been created a royal marquis, he had to depart the 
capital or paternal fief and settle down in his own domain accompanied by his immediate 
family. Generations of his descendants continued to reside in the locality which was part of 
Nanyang 南陽 commandery, so that Nanyang gradually became their choronym. The creation 
of barony of Anzhong on the one hand referred to unquestionably noble descent of the family 
through resurrection of an ancient Han title which the family used to hold. At the same time, 
the government clearly fulfilled the ideal of selecting fief close to ancestral home of a family 
by choosing Anzhong of all possible locations, a prefecture within the home commandery of 
the Lius where the family had lived for couple of centuries. Thus both factors contributed to 
the final decision and it is rather hard to determine which one was more prominent. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the Jin did not invent this practice and as in case of other 
imperial institutions they were only following more or less established procedures known and 
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 Jinshu juan 61, Liu Qiao zhuan, p. 1672-1673. 
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practiced under their predecessors.
205
 There is plenty of evidence that similar practice guided 
the process of fief selection at least under the Cao Wei if not already during the Han. The 
good example may be the Yingchuan Chen 潁川陳氏 family whose ancestral home lay in 
Xuchang 許昌  prefecture of Yingchuan commandery in Yuzhou. During the reigns of Wei 
emperors Wendi 魏文帝 (220-227AD ) and Mingdi 魏明帝 (227-240 AD) a member of the 
family acquired first title of the township lord of Yingxiang 潁鄉侯 and later the marquisate 
of Yingyin 潁陰侯. Both appellations referred to localities within Yingchuan commandery 
close to the home territory of the Chen family.
206
        
Whatever the origins of this practice, it is obvious from tables above that the ideal of 
conferring fief near the ancestral home of the noble family played an important role in the 
process of selection of suitable locality alongside wider economical and geopolitical concerns. 
I would argue that at least during the reign of Emperor Wudi the place of family origin was 
the most important consideration in determining the location of the new fief with other 
concerns playing secondary role, coming into play only if the ancestral home territory was for 
some reason unable to meet all the requirements regarding number of households and size of 
the territory or happened to be within the imperial domain. 
Following the death of emperor Wudi, more and more fiefs were created in open 
disregard of the rules set at the beginning of the dynasty. New peerages were created for 
members of non-royal families with the whole process being accelerated by rivalry of hostile 
court factions which uniformly used noble dignities as means how to strengthen their 
positions and widen the ranks of their followers. Owing to rising number of existing peerage 
and lordship dignities it was increasingly difficult to meet all requirements and the fiefs were 
increasingly chosen irrespective of the ancestral home of the particular family. The reasons 
for this change are self-evident. The number of households in a given locality which might 
have been turned into apanage households was not infinite and there were simply not enough 
households to satisfy the quotas of ever rising number of fiefs. As the population of home 
area and neighboring administrative units was already divided between existing fiefs the court 
had to locate the territories allotted to the new dignities elsewhere. The government might 
have also tried to prevent unwanted concentration of the fiefs in particular province or area 
and maintain certain balance between the fiefs and other regular administrative units. 
                                                 
205
 As any deteailed research of all known fiefs granted under the Wei and the Han would be out of scope of this 
thesis, we cannot be sure when exactly the practice of locating fief near the ancestral home of the family 
emerged.  
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 For the Yingchuan Chen family see Sanguozhi juan 22, pp. 472-478; for bestowal of both dignities see Chen 
Qun zhuan, p. 473.  
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During the reign of Emperor Huidi the number of fiefs conferred near the family‟s 
ancestor home sharply decreased. The four fiefs of Sizhou families and six fiefs of unknown 
location taken aside, only ten fiefs were situated in close proximity to the family place of 
origin while fifteen peerages, almost half of the total number, were situated elsewhere. And 
the same trend continues during the last phase of the dynasty with only six fiefs out of twenty 
two having been conferred close to the ancestral home and eleven which were demonstrably 
located somewhere else. If Huidi may have actually tried to keep to well-established practice 
the economic and maybe even political concerns compelled the later rulers to revise the 
process of fief allocation with the result that the fiefs located near the ancestral home of a 
family became rather exceptional. This assumption holds true especially for the peerage 
dignities as the rules governing their bestowal were more demanding in respect of suitable 
territory with enough tax-paying households. Results of comparison of prefecture lordships 
created during the reign of Huidi and his successors are not so conclusive. While only one 
prefecture lordship conferred by Huidi was somehow connected to the ancestral home of the 
family against seven which were clearly situated elsewhere, the ratio is quite reversed during 
the last phase of the Jin with six lordship fiefs corresponding to the choronyms of the title 
holders and only one having been located somewhere else. 
It seems that the tradition of fief – ancestral home correspondence was to a certain 
degree maintained even under the Eastern Jin, even though its implementation must have been 
even harder, as the constrained geographical situation of the southern regime did not provide 
enough place for maneuvering. The main reason preventing the resurrection of this ideal, 
however, was the fact that the majority of influential court families whose members stood 
good chance of entering ranks of the titled nobility were émigré families which had fled their 
ancestral homes in the north seeking new life in Jiangnan. As the Central Plain came under 
the sway of various non-Han regimes and the original family bases were lost, the southern 
court was obliged to provide its titled nobility with alternative sources of income drawn from 
new fiefs located within the territory south of the Yangzi. 
After discussing the connection between the fief territory and the ancestral home area 
we should once again reconsider the overall distribution of the fiefs within the empire. Low 
number of fiefs situated in border provinces is explicable by more than just one reason. The 
military and security concerns might have played some role as it was in ruler‟s interest to 
maintain control over these strategic regions. Creating potentially unstable fief which might 
have collaborated with the enemy across the border would endanger the security of the border 
zone. Yet, in view of the fact that the fiefs were in most cases only nominal with their holders 
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residing permanently in the capital, they didn‟t have an opportunity to evolve into semi-
independent entity threatening the centre. Therefore I would argue that the overall distribution 
of the fiefs reflects economic possibilities of the provinces and above all the distribution of 
the influential court families and their places of origin as the practice of bestowing fiefs close 
to their ancestral home was clearly the main factor determining the location of the allotted fief, 
at least during Wudi‟s reign. Low number of fiefs in peripheral regions thus simply attests to 
relative unimportance of the local families which could not rival the court families of some 
consequence, the majority of which hailed from economically well developed core region of 
Central Plain and the imperial domain around the traditional seat of power. 
The same considerations of economic prosperity and practicability of fief allocation 
with regard to the place of origin of the recipient family were behind unusual and rather 
confusing practice of conferring noble dignities with the same appellation simultaneously to 
two or even more different families. The contemporary sources attest that there were 
sometimes two or perhaps even more noble lineages existing side by side using the same 
appellation, albeit usually with different noble rank, and yet, they were neither challenging 
position of one another, nor vying for the claims over the particular territory. This situation 
was possible only due to the peculiar nature of the ennoblement system. Bestowal of a noble 
dignity did not entail any territorial rights, as there was no direct connection between the 
appellation and jurisdiction over the territory in question. The grant of noble title simply 
entitled its recipient to receive annually portion of a tax-levies collected from certain number 
of households presumably residing within the area used in the title appellation. We have 
already seen that these apanages tended to be smaller than the total number of households 
living within the boundaries of the administrative units and prosperous and populous areas 
were therefore able to provide sufficient number of households to fill the apanage quotas of 
more than just one noble dignity. The ability of a given administrative unit to accommodate 
apanages allotted to noble dignities depended, at least theoretically, solely on its area and size 
of its population. 
We cannot rule out that some of the cases of parallel use of the same noble appellation 
were actually second creations of the title, that is titles newly conferred on a different family 
after the lineage of previous title holders had died out. Nevertheless it is hard to determine 
whether the title in question was actually used simultaneously by two different families or 
simply reappeared again, utilized in an act of new creation after the family of the original 
holders had become extinct. First of all, it is not always clear when the respective dignities 
were actually created. Precise dating is often lacking, being narrowed down only to imperial 
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eras or the reigns of respective emperors. The exact year of creation is therefore to be 
estimated from sequence of events described by the Jinshu and other sources. And even in the 
cases when we are lucky enough to know the exact year of creation, it is almost impossible to 
determine the time of the final demise of a noble line. We may know some details from life 
and career of a founder of family‟s fortune, but our knowledge of the generations of his 
successors who inherited the noble dignity is limited, to put it mildly, as the sources did not 
record much more apart from their existence.  
Out of ten cases when the same appellation was used in titles of more than one noble 
family,
207
 the circumstances of only two, Liangzou 梁鄒 and Yinping 陰平, seem to suggest 
that these may have been used for second creations after the original title had become extinct. 
Liangzou was first used as an appellation of a peerage marquisate bestowed on Xie Xiu 解脩 
following the establishment of the Jin Dynasty. This dignity was later inherited by his son Xie 
Xi 解系 who unfortunately got into conflict with Sima Lun, Prince of Zhao 趙王司馬倫, was 
slandered and subsequently deprived of his offices and apparently even his peerage dignity. In 
300 AD, when Prince of Zhao staged a palace coup which ended the political hegemony of 
Empress Jia and her family, he did not forget his old adversary and had Xie Xi executed 
together with his whole family. Even though Xie Xi was posthumously rehabilitated two 
years later as a hapless victim of the vengeful usurper, his family had been exterminated and 
there was no one who could continue the family line and revive the noble title.
208
  However, 
during his short tenure as regent and hegemon the Prince of Zhao managed to use the 
appellation of Liangzou in conferring new noble dignity of his own. In 301 AD Liu Song 劉
頌 was posthumously ennobled as prefecture lord of Liangzou in lieu of merit he had 
achieved in bringing down the Jia family. The new title was immediately inherited by Liu 
Song‟s heir who became second Lord of Liangzou.
209
 Thus, we are justified to assume that 
the first creation, marquisate of Liangzou, ceased to exist before 300 AD and its later 
reappearance as a prefecture lordship is to be viewed as the second creation of the title. 
The case of Yinping is similar. It was first created as a peerage marquisate following 
the Wudi‟s ascending the imperial throne in 266 AD for Lu Zhi 魯芝, a trusted and loyal 
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follower of the Sima cause. The Marquis of Yinping, however, died already in 273 AD and 
contemporary sources do not record continuation of his family line.
210
 Even though we can 
never be sure we may presume that the original peerage dignity became extinct and was later 




On the other hand, the parallel usage of the same appellation for two unrelated noble 
lines is also confirmed by the sources. In case of Chengyang 成陽 the first noble title using it 
as its appellation was created as a viscountcy for Bian Cui 卞粹 shortly after the death of 
Wudi. In 301 AD Bian Cui was promoted to the ducal dignity only to end his life on the 
scaffold two years later during the Upheaval of the Eight Princes. His son Bian Hu 卞壺 
subsequently inherited his father‟s title and became the second Duke of Chengyang. He used 
this title until the beginning of the Eastern Jin, when Emperor Yuandi bestowed on him new 
peerage dignity of prefecture duke of Jianxing 建興縣公.212 While the ducal title was used 
continuously from 301 until at least 317 AD, a new barony of Chengyang was created 
approximately in 304 AD for Xun Zu 荀組 who was promoted at the beginning of the 
Jianxing era (313-316 AD) as imperial waiqi and enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Linying 臨
潁縣公.213 Thus there were two peerage lines, one ducal and one baronial, with their apanage 
located in Chengyang verifiably existing side by side for some ten years. 
Another example is Linhai 臨海 which was first conferred as a peerage marquisate on 
Houshi Guang 侯史光 probably in 266 AD. The title was later inherited by Guang‟s son and 
grandson and even though we do not know any exact dates regarding their life, we may 
reasonably presume that the noble lineage survived at least till the beginning of the 4
th
 century. 
The second noble dignity with appellation of Linhai emerged shortly before 291 AD, when a 
prefecture lordship of Linhai was conferred on Pei Kai 裴楷 together with an apanage of two 
thousand households to be later passed on his son and possibly other descendants.
214
  
Sometimes, the noble dignities using the same appellation might have even been created at 
the same time as was the case of Anyang 安陽. In 280 AD, after the accomplishment of the 
unification process the emperor rewarded his officers and commanders who had been 
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instrumental in bringing about the final victory over the southern state of Wu by mass 
creation of lordship dignities. Anyang tax-paying households were allocated to two separate 
lordship dignities. The prefecture lordship of Anyang was conferred on Shi Chong 石崇 and 
became extinct after his execution in 301 AD.
215
 The village lordship of Anyang was 
bestowed on Han Gai 韓蓋, a grandson of the great minister Jia Chong. As the Jia family and 
their relatives did not survive coup of the Prince of Zhao, this lordship dignity probably 
became extinct in 301 AD as well.
216
 The practice of creating different noble dignities with 
the same appellation is well attested even for the subsequent period of the Eastern Jin. For 
example in 329 AD Emperor Chengdi 成帝 (326-343 AD) created viscountcy of Fengcheng 
豐城 as well as prefecture lordship of Fengcheng for two of his commanders who had helped 
to put down rebellion of Su Jun 穌峻.217 
The possibility of two distinct noble dignities sharing the same territorial appellation 
demonstrates yet again peculiar nature of relationship between the noble title and its fief. 
Despite their appellations the titles were not so much connected with the territory mentioned 
in the appellation as with precisely defined apanages reflecting the rank of the noble dignity 
as well as family origin and larger factors of economy and demography. As we have already 
seen in some cases the title appellation and the location of the actual apanage did not 
correspond to each other at all. The high peerage dignities created for members of the Wu 
ruling family who had defected to the Jin cause referred in their appellations to territories out 
of control of the Jin court. Such a bestowal was tantamount to laying symbolic claim over 
territories of the enemy and these political ends were clearly more important than usual need 
for following the tradition in choosing appellation which would have corresponded with the 
allotted apanage. Yet these noble dignities were probably an exception as majority of the 
conferred titles corresponded somehow to the fief locations. The exact nature of this 
correspondence is, however, hard to determine, for the available sources hardly ever provide 
direct and unequivocal links between the titles and particular territories, inhabitants of which 
were allotted as their apanage. Presumably, the exact location of the apanage was specified in 
the imperial edict by which the noble dignity in question was created, not unlike the number 
of allotted households, as is indicated by the following passage from the Jinshu: 
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“[Pei] Xiu devised the five ranks peerages and more than six hundred persons were 
enfeoffed starting with [the offices of] the Cavalry Commanders (jidu 騎督) and higher. [Pei] 
Xiu himself was enfeoffed as a Marquis of Jichuan with territory of sixty miles and an apanage 
of one thousand four hundred households. The prefecture of Gaoyuan and the wilderness of 




Even though the actual ennoblement occurred in 264 AD, i.e. technically speaking 
before the founding of the dynasty, the creation of the Jichuan marquisate was a part of 
establishment of the five ranks peerages which in many respects prefigured the form and 
usage of the Jin ennoblement system. It is obvious that the fief corresponded to the 
appellation used in the title, yet the correspondence was only partial as there was additional 
territory of or within Gaoyuan prefecture assigned to form the apanage of the new peerage 
dignity beside the eponymous locale of Jichuan. This is also the case of the only explicit 
mention of a peerage fief location dating back to the Western Jin period:    
 
“When the five [peerage] ranks were [first] established [Yang Hu] was enfeoffed as 
Viscount of Juping with apanage of six hundred households … When Emperor [Wudi] accepted 
the [Wei] abdication, [Yang Hu] was promoted due to the merit of assisting [in establishing] the 
mandate to the position of General of the Capital Army (zhongjun jiangjun 中軍將軍) and 
Additional Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (jia sanji changshi 加散騎常侍). His enfeoffment 
was changed to that of a commandery duke with apanage of three thousand households, but 
[Yang Hu] firmly declined the enfeoffment and did not accept it. Then his current noble dignity 
was raised to that of a marquis, the office of Marquisate Chamberlain (langzhongling 郎中令) 
established together with position of nine offices [which formed the marquisate staff]. Yang 
Hu‟s wife was given seal and ribbon of a [marquisal] Spouse (furen 夫人) … Later, the imperial 
edict ordered that five prefectures of Taishan [commandery], Nan Wuyang, Mou, Nancheng, 
Liangfu and Pingyang, were to become a new commandery of Nancheng. [Yang] Hu was then 
enfeoffed as Marquis of Nancheng. The post of Administrator (xiang 相) was established [to 
lead the fief administration] as was the case with commandery duke. Yang Hu declined [to 
accept the enfeoffment]: “In the past Zhang Liang asked for permission to accept ten thousand 
households of Liu and the Han Founder did not force him to change his decision. Your subject 
accepted Juping from the previous emperor, how could I ever dare to disgrace [myself by 
accepting] high noble title and invite slander for being incompetent and undeserving [of such 
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Apart from interesting details concerning the administrative structure of the peerage 
fief the above quotation offers unique example of exact delineation of the prospective fief. 
The fact that the fief was not accepted and therefore never actually existed in this form is 
immaterial to the questions concerning practice of fief demarcation and fief – appellation 
correspondence. In this case the new administrative unit, Nancheng commandery 南城郡 was 
to be created especially out of five neighboring prefectures of an already existing 
commandery to become territory of the new fief and its name was used as the appellation of 
the marquisate. Yet again, the original Nancheng prefecture was but one of five prefectures 
forming larger administrative unit. Sometimes the apanage could have been distributed over 
much larger area comprising even two commanderies as was the case of dukedom of Boling 
博陵 bestowed on the Wangs of Taiyuan 太原王氏. Nevertheless, such an expansion of 
apanage was rather exceptional and was achieved through further loyal service with the 
apanage having been gradually increased in course of couple of generations:           
 
“When Emperor [Wudi] accepted the [Wei] abdication, [Wang Shen] was promoted for 
his merit of assisting [in establishing] the mandate to Cavalry General (piaoji jiangjun 驃騎將
軍), Overseer of the Department of State Affairs (lu shangshu shi 錄尚書事) and Additional 
Cavalier Attendant-in-ordianry (jia sanji changshi 加散騎常侍) supervising all military affairs 
outside the capital. He was enfeoffed as commandery duke of Boling, but he firmly declined 
[the enfeoffment] and did not accept it. Then his noble dignity was [at least] promoted to that of 
prefecture duke with apanage of one thousand eight hundred households … [after Wang Shen‟s 
death] his son Wang Jun inherited [the peerage] … In the Xianning era (275-279 AD) [Wang] 
Shen was again posthumously promoted to commandery duke … When Emperor Huidi returned 
back to Luoyang, [Wang] Jun was appointed Great Cavalry General (da piaoji jiangjun 大驃騎
將軍), Commander-in-chief supervising all military affairs concerning Eastern barbarians north 
of the Yellow River, Concurrent Regional Inspector of Youzhou (ling cishi 領刺史 ) and 
territory of his fief was enlarged by adding Yanguo to that of Boling … [Wang Jun was 
beheaded and died] without siring a son. In the second year of the Taiyuan era (377 AD) the 
imperial edict ordered to pick up the threads of the severed succession and revive the line which 
became extinct. Wang Shen‟s step-grandson Wang Daosu was enfeoffed as Duke of Boling. 
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When he died his son Wang Chongzhi succeeded [to the title]. In the eleventh year of the Yixi 
era (415 AD) the enfeoffment was changed to that of commandery duke of Dongguan. When 




In addition to the eponymous Boling, commandery in Jizhou, where the majority of 
one thousand eight hundred households representing the apanage of the ducal fief were 
presumable to be found, the inheritor of the dukedom was later given another commandery, 
Yanguo 燕國 in Youzhou. Unfortunately, as we do not know exact number of households by 
which the ducal apanage was increased, we are unable to determine how much of Yanguo 
territory, or its population to be precise, was added to the original fief. The interesting thing is 
that Boling and Yanguo were not neighboring commanderies which means that the apanage 
did not have to be concentrated in one locality and could have been dispersed over wide area, 
interspersed with territorial units under full control of central administration. 
The Taiyuan Wang family history and fate of the dukedom of Boling raise another 
interesting point which should be of particular interest to us as they attest to the practice of 
enfeoffment change (gaifeng 改封) which might elucidate the complexity of the appellation-
territory correspondence. In 415 AD Wang Chongzhi 王崇之, the fourth Duke of Boling, was 
proclaimed first Duke of Dongguan 東莞. It was not a promotion as both ducal dignities were 
of the same rank and presumably entitled their holder to an apanage of the same size. Nor was 
it mere change of the fief territory or the households which constituted its apanage. The 
original title was abolished and replaced by a new peerage dignity created in an act of 
enfeoffment change. It would appear that because commanderies of Boling and Yanguo, the 
original apanage territories belonging to the dukedom of Boling, were long lost to the rival 
northern regimes the court now tried to change the enfeoffment so that the new fief would be 
situated within the territory under its control. But that was not the case. As the dukedom of 
Boling had been revived already in 377 AD, its apanage must have been allotted in some 
alternative location already for almost four decades. The reasons behind this particular 
enfeoffment change are rather complex and are related to the power struggle which kept the 
Jiankang court occupied towards the end of the Eastern Jin Dynasty.  
Liu Yu 劉裕, future founder of the Liu Song Dynasty 劉宋 (420-479 AD), was 
carefully orchestrating the usurpation process, gradually strengthening his power through 
series of military exploits and administrative changes and biding his time, waiting for the 
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right  moment to stage an abdication ceremony which would raise him to the throne. The 
military campaigns against the enemy in the North led with the aim of recovering the original 
core territory of the Jin state in the Central Plain were to play crucial role in legitimization of 
Liu Yu‟s claim to the throne. In 410 AD Liu Yu destroyed the Xianbei state of Southern Yan 
南燕 (Nan Yan, 398-410) and seized territory of present day northern Jiangsu and Shandong 
up to the Yellow River. Even though serious internal troubles in the south prevented him from 
immediately pursuing his victory, Liu Yu was determined to prove his worth by retaking the 
Central Plain and it was only matter of time before he would proceed against Luoyang.
221
 The 
Taiyuan Wang‟s enfeoffment change was a symbolic expression of this determination. While 
Boling and Yanguo remained out of reach, territory of the newly created peerage of 
Dongguan was situated in Xuzhou, which had been reclaimed after the fall of Southern Yan. 
By situating apanage in fairly recently conquered Shandong Liu Yu was laying claim to this 
territory as an integral part of the Jin realm (and its successor regimes) and at the same time 
expressed strong resolve to maintain full control over the conquered areas against all odds. No 
apanage would have ever been situated in the territory in potential danger of being retaken by 
the enemy any time soon. Thus, on the symbolic level, the enfeoffment change was 
tantamount to public statement declaring the hold of the conquered Shandong to be permanent. 
At the same time it became a memento of the great achievements of Liu Yu and his success in 
recovering ancestral lands, tangible proof of the will of Heaven heralding to the court society 
the impending change of the mandate. 
The practice of enfeoffment change is attested for the period of the Western Jin as well, 
even though the reasons for its use were motivated by practical concerns of administration 
rather than abstract political ends of self-promotion:        
 
“At that time the imperial mounds were opened [and ransacked]. [Xun] Song sent his 
Recorder (zhubu 主簿) Shi Lan with an armed force to enter Luoyang and repair the imperial 
mounds. For this merit [Xun Song] was elevated to [the peerage dignity of] prefecture duke of 
Wuyang. He was promoted to Commander-in-chief (dudu 都督) supervising all military affairs 
of Jingzhou region north of the Yangzi River and he was to defend [the garrison city of] Wan as 
General Pacifying the South (pingnan jiangjun 平南將軍). His enfeoffment was changed to that 
of duke of Quling.”
222
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Xun Song 荀崧 hailed from a collateral branch of the powerful Xun family of 
Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 and originally held minor title of township lord of Anling 安陵鄉侯 
which he had inherited from his father. His promotion to the ducal dignity occurred after the 
fall of Luoyang in 313 AD when his distant relatives wielded authority at the court of 
Emperor Mindi who happened to be their nephew. It is interesting that despite the prevailing 
practice towards the end of the dynasty the territory of the new peerage still corresponded to 
the ancestral home of the family as Wuyang 舞陽 was a prefecture of Xiancheng 襄城 
commandery which was neighboring on Yingchuan. However, it did not take long before Xun 
Song‟s enfeoffment was suddenly changed to that of duke of Quling 曲陵. It is possible that 
the enemy forces started to penetrate the area south and southeast of the fallen capital and Shi 
Le 石勒 and his commanders were slowly encroaching upon the home of the Xun family 
making their position there untenable which led to the change of enfeoffment from purely 
practical reasons of safety and defensibility of the fief. Yet I would argue that the key to 
understanding of this particular change is to be found in official promotion of Xun Song‟s. It 
is no coincidence that the enfeoffment change is mentioned right after the appointment to a 
regional command of Jingzhou. 
It has been a long established practice of the Jin to somewhat coordinate the 
appointment of the imperial princes to position of regional commanders over the strategically 
most important regions with their enfeoffment and location of their respective fiefs. From the 
very beginning of the dynasty Wudi relied heavily on his close relatives and entrusted them 
with command of the key military regions control of which was vital to the survival of the 
recently established regime. In 277 AD the system of princely enfeoffment became officially 
interconnected with the system of regional command. The location of the princely fief was to 
correspond to a regional command the particular prince was entrusted with and should be 
situated within the territory under its jurisdiction. Such an arrangement made the position of 
the princely Commanders-in-chief stronger and their control over the entrusted territory more 
effective. It should have ensured better mobilization of all resources of the area commands 
which would enable the Jin to mount the war effort necessary to subdue the recalcitrant state 
of Wu, the mere existence of which remained a stain on legitimacy of the Luoyang court.
223
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Even though this practice was apparently never used for the non-royal peerages and 
was later even abolished as impractical following the death of Emperor Wudi, it is not 
implausible that it was revived in times of imminent danger when the very existence of the 
dynasty was threatened by mounting pressure of the Xianbei and other non-Han ethnic groups. 
Xun Song‟s enfeoffment was changed at the same time when he was appointed Commander-
in-chief of Jingzhou. Whereas Wuyang was situated near his ancestral home in Yuzhou, 
Quling was a prefecture of Jiangxia 江夏 commandery in Jingzhou. Thus the new fief was 
part of the military command under his jurisdiction and moreover, it was located further south 
of the garrison seat in Wan 宛 in the middle reaches of the Yangzi River, far away from the 
battlefront and therefore safe from plundering of the raiding hordes. 
Such an interpretation of this particular enfeoffment change might be corroborated by 
similar case of Wang Shen 王沈, Duke of Boling mentioned above.224 In or shortly after 306 
AD Wang Shen was appointed Concurrent Regional Inspector of Youzhou and Commander-
in-chief of important regional command with a task of defending territory north of the Yellow 
River against the attacks of the barbarians, i.e. the Xianbei and other non-Han ethnic groups. 
At that time part of the area officially under his jurisdiction was in open rebellion against the 
authority of the court and the rest was constantly threatened by the devastating raids of the 
insurgents.
225
 In Wang Shen‟s case the original enfeoffment was not changed, perhaps 
because Boling, being part of Jizhou, might have actually been within the area under the 
duke‟s command. But in addition to the current fief, Yanguo, the largest commandery of 
Youzhou was bestowed on Wang Shen in obvious effort to enhance his position as the new 
provincial commander. It is possible that bestowal of an additional commandery served the 
same purpose as the enfeoffment change in case of Quling. Both can be perceived as 
emergency measures giving additional authority and resources at disposal of important area 
commanders at the time of dire crisis. The imperial court and central government were in no 
position to help the governors who remained loyal to the dynasty and despite bearing the 
brunt of the enemy offensive maintained vigorous resistance fighting for the survival of the 
dynasty. 
Not all the enfeoffment changes recorded by the Jinshu were envisaged either as 
special emergency means in time of need or public statements serving higher political ends. 
Sometimes they may have reflected purely practical concerns:                     
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“[Mao Muzhi] inherited the noble dignity of Marquis of Zhouling … Because Huan 





In 356 AD Huan Wen 桓溫 , powerful Eastern Jin general, launched northern 
campaign against Yao Xiang 姚襄 during which he managed to once again secure hold over 
symbolically important Luoyang region with its imperial mausolea and other vestiges of the 
Jin imperial past. Following his victories in the field the court was compelled to take into 
account such an outstanding achievement and reward him accordingly.
227
 Therefore, in late 
350s Huan Wen was enfeoffed as commandery duke of Nanjun 南郡, rich and populous 
commandery in Jingzhou. Unfortunately we do not know how large the awarded apanage 
actually was, nevertheless with regard to the import of the accomplished deed we may safely 
presume that the apanage grant probably encompassed the majority of tax-paying households 
living within commandery limits. Zhouling 州陵, the original fief of the Mao 毛 family, was 
apparently situated within the Nanjun commandery. However, with creation of a new ducal 
fief Mao Muzhi‟s 毛穆之 apanage had to be moved elsewhere as there were not enough 
households in the area to form adequate apanages for both the dukedom and the marquisate. 
Yet, the marquisate of Zhouling was not simply transferred. Clearly, such situation 
called for change of the whole peerage dignity, not only location of its apanage. The dignity 
of Zhouling was abolished and Mao Muzhi was newly enfeoffed as Marquis of Jian‟an 建安 
with apanage of the new dignity having been situated in Yangzhou where the demographic 
situation was more congenial to fulfilling the prescribed apanage quotas. This again attests to 
two important features of the enfeoffment system. First, the fief was not so much defined by 
the territory as by the households allotted as its apanage. Had there been enough state tax-
paying households in Nanjun, there would have been no need to change Mao Muzhi‟s 
enfeoffment. The parallel existence of several fiefs within the limits of the same territorial 
unit was quite common and their jurisdictions overlapped only seemingly. In fact, as there 
was no territorial jurisdiction per se entailed in the enfeoffment grants there was also no 
possibility of a conflict over territory between the fiefs sharing the same area for these were 
defined strictly in number of apanage households. Several prefecture fiefs could have existed 
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within a commandery which was itself given as a fief to a commandery duke or a prince. The 
dukedoms of Suiling 睢陵 and Shouguang 壽光 may provide good example of this practice. 
Both were created in 266 AD for meritorious ministers who had supported the Jin cause and 
had helped to establish the dynasty. Both were inherited for three generations and existed 
almost till the demise of the Western Jin being regarded as premier nobles of the realm. And 
yet, both apanages were in fact situated within commanderies which were given as princely 
fiefs to Wudi‟s relatives already in 266 AD. Suiling was a prefecture of Xiapi 下邳 
principality, whereas Shouguang was part of domain of Le‟an 樂安. Both princely lines 
thrived till the first half of the 4
th
 century side by side with the ducal lineages.
228
 However, the 
dukedoms were never considered to be a part of either of the principalities and existed as 
separate entities dependent on the central government in the same way as the princely 
domains themselves. After all, all the noble fiefs, regardless of their rank and grade, were 
administered along the same lines with majority of the officials being appointed by the centre. 
Subordination implied by the commandery – prefecture hierarchy of administrative units did 
not apply to noble fiefs simply because these were not defined in terms of territory but only 
by number of the tax-paying households.  
Secondly, the practice of enfeoffment change shows the complexity of appellation and 
apanage location correspondence. It seems clear that it was considered more appropriate when 
the appellation corresponded with the apanage territory. Therefore when the apanage was for 
some reason changed the appellation tended to change accordingly in order to retain certain 
required degree of connection between the title and apanage territory, between the name and 
reality. The peerages created for Wu commanders who had defected to the Jin were the only 
exception. But as these creations pursued rather specific objectives being used as a weapon in 
the inter-state propaganda warfare for supremacy they should not be considered as a standard 
feature of the system. Indeed, all these dignities were abolished in 280 AD once the state of 
Wu surrendered for their raison d‟être disappeared with the independence of the southern 
regime. The situation changed after the fall of the Western Jin. Majority of the titled nobles 
who managed to flee to safety of the southern bank of the Yangzi River retained their original 
noble dignities and used them throughout the whole period despite the fact that the territories 
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which their titles referred to were overrun by the enemy and therefore out of reach of the 
southern regime. The old titles became important symbols of status at the slowly emerging 
imperial court in exile. They became hallmark of noble descent, the last surviving link to the 
more glorious past. On the one hand, the ancient name supported the claim to social 
preeminence of its bearers and ensured the membership of the elite circles. On the other hand, 
retaining the original noble dignities reflected prevalent belief of the exiles that the stay in the 
unfamiliar and inhospitable South was to be only temporary expressing their ardent hope that 
they all would return home soon. 
 
Noble Dignities with Symbolic Meaning 
 
As we have already seen the selection of suitable noble fief and corresponding 
appellation was rather complex process during which the final location of the noble fief was 
determined by various economic, strategic, demographic, ritual and political factors with the 
relative importance of the factors being different from case to case. However, apart from these 
factors, more or less practical in nature, there were also other considerations at play which 
may be described as symbolic. Sometimes a fief was bestowed in open disregard of the usual 
practice only for the sake of its name as some of the existing administrative territorial units 
bore names with auspicious connotations. Once bestowed as noble dignities, these 
appellations either commemorated certain deed which merited the bestowal of the particular 
noble dignity or were considered capable of inviting the future peace and prosperity of the 
realm in general and the imperial house in particular. Examples of such practice are to be 
found not only during the Jin period but already long before the establishing of the dynasty 
and probably originated in the reign of the Han:                          
 
 “When Duke of Gaogui ascended the throne, [Lu Zhi] was granted title of a lord of the 
royal domain with apanage of two hundred households. After Guanqiu Jian was suppressed his 
apanage was increased by two hundred households as was the usual practice [for those who had 
helped to suppress a rebellion]. He was appointed General Raising Authority (yangwu jiangjun 
揚武將軍) and Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Jingzhou. When Zhuge Dan rose up in 
Shouchun [against the Simas], Emperor Wendi (Sima Zhao) took the Wei emperor and 
launched the punitive expedition [against Zhuge Dan]. He summoned armed forces from all 
around the empire and [Lu] Zhi, leading both civil and military officials of Jingzhou, rushed 
ahead [of others to respond to the summons]. After Zhuge Dan was suppressed, Lu Zhi was 
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Lu Zhi‟s active support of the Sima cause is well attested by sequence of military 
appointments as well as repeated involvement in suppressing of armed uprisings challenging 
the power of the regent family. However, the most important achievement of his career was 
his engagement with Zhuge Dan 諸葛誕 who had risen in Shouchun 壽春 and hoped to 
reverse the tide with the help of Wu reinforcements. Lu Zhi‟s contribution to the victory over 
the rebel forces during this symbolic last stand of the political opponents of the Sima house 
was duly commemorated by bestowal of village lordship of Wujin 無進亭侯.230 As we cannot 
ascertain the exact location of Wujin village (the historical maps of China seldom show lower 
administrative units below prefecture level) we cannot rule out that the territory of the new 
lordship dignity was situated in or near the ancestral home of Lu Zhi (Fufeng 扶風  in 
Yongzhou), yet it seems to me that Wujin was selected simply for its name, the meaning of 
which: “no advance” or less literally “You shall not pass!” was an apt commemoration of Lu 
Zhi‟s valor and importance of the victory achieved. The next example from the very 
beginning of the Cao Wei Dynasty is even more telling: 
     
 “When [the Wei] Emperor Wendi ascended the throne, [Jia] Xu was appointed 
Defender-in-chief (taiwei 太尉) and he was promoted to township marquis of Weishou and his 
apanage was increased by three hundred households, [enjoying some] eight hundred households 
in total. Additional two hundred households were singled out as an apanage for [Jia Xu‟s] 
younger son [Jia] Fang who was ennobled as a lord (liehou 列侯). His eldest son [Jia] Mu was 
appointed Commandant-escort (fuma duwei 駙馬都尉)”231 
    
Jia Xu 賈詡  was a trusted advisor of Cao Cao. When the powerful regent was 
vacillating unable to decide which of his sons should be officially named his heir the timely 
intervention of Jia Xu secured the succession for the eldest Cao Pi who later became the first 
emperor of the Cao Wei Dynasty. Grateful ruler later rewarded Jia Xu for his advice by 
bestowing on him township marquisate of Weishou 魏壽. Again, the choice of the appellation 
is hardly coincidental and “Long live the Wei!” must have indeed be an apt appellation for 
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someone who had made the existence of the dynasty possible. If it were not for Jia Xu, Cao 
Pei would not be appointed heir and the Wei might have never been actually established. The 
noble title commemorated his merit and at the same time should have symbolically ensured 
that the dynasty would indeed be a long-lived one. 
The same concerns probably determined the choice of appellation of two noble 
dignities created during tumultuous period of internecine warfare at the beginning of the 4
th
 
century for local military commanders who worked their way up in the service of the imperial 
princes who struggled for political domination over the court:      
 
“At the beginning of the Yongning Era (301 AD) [Sun Hui] joined the righteous forces 
of [Sima] Jiong, Prince of Qi, and chastised [Sima] Lun, Prince of Zhao [who had usurped the 
imperial authority]. For his merit he was enfeoffed as prefecture lord of Jinxing and was 
entrusted with the office of Revenue Section Clerk (hucao yuan 戶曹掾) [in the administration 
of] Commander-in-chief (dasima 大司馬 ) [only to be later] transferred to a position of 
Subsidiary Clerk in Eastern Section (dongcao shu 東曹屬).”232 
 
Sun Hui‟s 孫惠 participation in a punitive campaign against Prince of Zhao earned 
him a prefecture lordship the appellation of which clearly hinted at the circumstances of 
Zhao‟s fall. The meaning of Jinxing 晉興 was not only “prosperous Jin” or “May the Jin 
flourish!” which in itself would suffice to explain the reasons behind choosing such an 
appellation but it also implied the fight with a usurper and symbolic rebirth of the legitimate 
Jin regime. As the expression zhongxing 中興 was often used for the Han restoration after the 
fall of Wang Mang in 23 AD, appellation of Sun Hui‟s fief can be read also as “restoration of 
the Jin.” Like Wang Mang before him, Prince of Zhao overstepped his authority and usurped 
the imperial throne which prompted Prince of Qi to play the role of second Guangwudi, 
raising the righteous army, bringing down the usurper and restoring the main imperial line to 
its proper place. Despite the ardent desire expressed by the government the future prosperity 
of the Jin appeared to be an impossible dream. The political situation at court remained highly 
volatile and before long it was Prince of Qi who was declared a usurper by his cousins and 
swiftly dealt with:    
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“After [Sima] Jiong, [Prince of Qi] was executed, [Gu] Rong was enfeoffed for merit of 
chastising [prince‟s henchman] Ge Yu as count of Jiaxing and was transferred to position of 
Palace Cadet to the Crown Prince (taizi zhongshuzi 太子中庶子).”233  
      
The situation repeated itself. Gu Rong 顧榮, member of locally powerful southern 
family, helped to eliminate Prince of Qi who had become too powerful and overbearing for 
his cousins‟ taste. As the timely involvement of the princes allegedly saved the incumbent of 
the imperial throne from peril of being deposed once again the notion of revival or restoration 
was not totally out of place. Thus, the barony of Jiaxing 嘉興 (“fine restoration”) could have 
been bestowed with such a notion in mind even though the evidence is not as conclusive as in 
the previous case, for Jiaxing happened to be the ancestral home of the Gu family since the 
founding of Wu. Even though the choice of the fief might have been determined by the place 
of family origin, the auspicious connotations of the name would not be lost on Gu Rong and 
his contemporaries. 
The commemorative aspect of the appellations mentioned above accounted for only 
one side of the practice with soliciting of future blessing being at least equally important. 
Within the framework of correlative thinking the bestowal of an appropriate title with apt 
appellation could either reaffirm already existing reality or induce certain ideal state of affairs 
to become reality in the future. The affairs of men reflected the will of heaven but at the same 
time the right actions of the emperor and his government could ensure positive reaction of 
heaven which might be induced to give its blessing to the dynasty. Given the importance of 
correlative thinking it is no wonder that every early medieval imperial regime tried to secure 
the goodwill of heaven and nothing was ever left to chance especially where the well-being of 
the imperial line and emperor‟s immediate family was concerned. The Jin were no exception 
as we can see from noble dignities bestowed on the imperial in-laws: 
            
“Yang Jun … hailed from Huayin in Hongnong commandery. When he was young, he 
became an official of the [Jin] royal [administration] and served [successively] as Prefecture 
Magistrate (ling 令) of Gaolu, Commander (sima 司馬) in the Office of the Imperial Guards 
(xiaoji fu 驍騎府) and Defending General (zhenjun fu  鎮軍府). Later, as the father of the 
empress he was elevated [surpassing other deserving ministers] and attained important position 
[at the court]. He was promoted from General of the Defending Army (zhenjun jiangjun 鎮軍將
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As an uncle to Yang Yan 楊艷, the first empress of Wudi, Yang Jun 楊駿 was head of 
the most important waiqi family in the realm from the very beginning of the dynasty. But he 
became a prominent political figure at Wudi‟s court only later, when his own daughter Yang 
Zhi 楊芷, assumed the place of her recently deceased cousin and was installed as the new 
empress.
235
 Wudi relied on him during last years of his reign eventually naming Yang Jun 
regent for his incompetent successor. The emperor hoped that he would be able to act as a 
faithful guardian of the young prince who, after all, was his grand-nephew and administer the 
realm in his best interest. The unique position of Yang Jun and the house of Yang as a future 
support of Wudi‟s descendants may have been reflected by the choice of fief and appellation 
of the peerage dignity bestowed on him shortly after his daughter entered the rear palace. 
The Yangs hailed from Hongnong 弘農 commandery in Sizhou. As their ancestral 
home lied within the imperial domain the noble fief had to be located elsewhere. Linjin 臨晉 
was a prefecture in Fengyi 馮翊 commandery in Yongzhou near the Yang ancestral home, 
bordering Hongnong on the east. The close proximity to the family place of origin thus 
undeniably contributed to the final choice. Yet, the choice of Linjin as an appellation for a 
waiqi family peerage is too conspicuous to be coincidental and symbolic meaning probably 
played some role as well, as Linjin was not the only prefecture bordering on Hongnong. The 
name itself means “close to Jin” or “facing Jin” and probably reflects geography of the 
particular territory as was the case of many other toponyms using the same syntactic structure 
(for example Linying 臨潁, Linhuai 臨淮 or Linwei 臨渭). On the other hand “close to Jin” 
could be understood not only in terms of geographic proximity to the region of the ancient Jin 
state (that is modern Shanxi), but also in terms of kinship proximity suggesting close 
cooperation and mutual support, an apt appellation for father of the empress and grand-uncle 
of the future emperor.  
If the bestowal of the marquisate of Linjin may have been determined by various 
factors, in case of the following waiqi peerage the symbolic meaning of the appellation was 
probably the main reason behind its bestowal:  
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“Yang Xuanzhi was father of the Empress Hui (second wife of Emperor Huidi). He was 
a son of the Right Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs (shangshu youpuye 尚書右
僕 射 ) [Yang] Jin. At first, [Yang] Xuanzhi served as Secretarial Court Gentleman 
(shangshulang 尚書郎) [but later on], as the father of the empress, he was appointed Grand 
Master for Splendid Happiness (guanglu dafu 光祿大夫), Lord Specially Advanced (tejin 特進) 
and Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍). His enfeoffment was enlarged to 
that of Marquis of Xingjin. He was promoted to Right Vice Director of the Department of State 
Affairs (shangshu youpuye 尚書右僕射), Additional Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中) and he 




Yang Xuanzhi 羊玄之 was enfeoffed after 299 AD as marquis of Xingjin 興晉侯 
shortly after his daughter Yang Xianrong 羊獻容 became the second empress of Huidi.237 
Because Xingjin prefecture lay in Jingzhou, far from the ancestral home of the Yangs 
(Taishan 泰山 in Yanzhou), the symbolic meaning of the appellation, “Make the Jin prosper”, 
was apparently the main reason behind the choice. The auspicious connotations of the name 
were of utmost importance especially at the time when the court had just recovered from a 
serious crisis caused by the preceding empress and her family. The only son and heir of 
Emperor Huidi perished, murdered on trumped up charges due to the intrigue of Empress Jia 
whose family monopolized political power for almost a decade, bringing the realm on the 
brink of devastating military conflict. The choice of the appellation for the new imperial in-
laws expressed an ardent hope that the family of the new empress would assume the proper 
place of the waiqi and would duly give its wholehearted support to the imperial line. 
Unfortunately the exact time of creation is unknown to us as the sources only indicate that it 
followed the official installation of the empress in 300 AD. Under the given circumstances the 
phrase “Make the Jin prosper!” could also refer to a wish that the empress would eventually 
give birth to a son and heir to the imperial throne, for the continuation of the imperial line of 
succession was seriously endangered when all three surviving sons of the assassinated crown 
prince died within three years in 300-302 AD.
238
 If the peerage had been created before the 
sad demise of the infant princes the wish behind the appellation is probably to be understood 
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in more general terms. It was hoped that Empress Yang‟s entrance into the palace could bring 
peace and prosperity to the imperial family and as the emperor and empress were perceived as 
the father and the mother of all subjects also peace and prosperity to the whole empire. 
The similar concerns of universal prosperity and well-being of the common people led 
to the posthumous enfeoffment of He Zhun 何準, father-in-law of the Eastern Jin Emperor 
Mudi 晉穆帝 (344-361 AD).239 Even though He Zhun‟s son refused to accept the honor as 
going against the dying wish of his father, the effort of the court to bestow noble dignity 
bearing auspicious appellation upon an important waiqi family is self-evident:  
    
“He Zhun was father of Empress Mu Zhang. He was of noble mind and modest in his 
desires. [Despite his youth] he gained [quite a] reputation [for it]. Both provincial administration 
and ministerial offices of the central government summoned him, yet he did not take up the 
[offered] positions. His elder brother [He] Chong, who was Cavalry General (piaoji jiangjun 驃
騎將軍), [tried to] persuade him to accept the office, but He Zhun answered: “Why should the 
appellation of „the fifth one‟ be any worse than „cavalry general‟?” Zhun was the fifth [born] 
among his brothers, that is why he talked like that. [He] Chong held the influential position of a 
premier minister of the realm and at that time became all-powerful, yet [He] Zhun [preferred] to 
live in seclusion and did not pay attention to the mundane affairs. He only used to chant the 
sutras and erect or repair pagodas (stupas) and temples, nothing else. When he was summoned 
to court as Gentleman Cavalier Attendant (sanjilang 散騎郎) he did not take up the position. He 
died when he was forty-seven. In the first year of the Shengping Era (357 AD) he was 
posthumously granted the title of Grand Master of the Palace with Golden Seal and Purple 
Ribbon (jinzi guanglu dafu 金紫光祿大夫) and he was also enfeoffed as prefecture lord of 
Jinxing. But his son [He Tan] petitioned the throne that his father was always noble and 
unsullied [living life of austerity and reclusion] and therefore declined the honor and did not 
accept the enfeoffment.”
240
            
     
The practice of selecting peerage and lordship appellations according to the symbolic 
meaning of the existing toponyms seems to be quite widespread, being used not only by the 
Eastern Jin but also by other successor regimes which emerged in northern China after the fall 
of the Western Jin. One of these was the semi-independent kingdom of Former Liang (Qian 
Liang 前涼 , 320-376 AD) in Liangzhou 涼州  ruled by the Zhang 張氏  family which 
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flourished in Gansu Corridor for almost six decades till it was conquered by Fu Jian 苻堅 of 
Former Qin 前秦  (Qian Qin, 351-394 AD) in 376 AD. The Zhang princes maintained 
semblance of subordination to the Jin emperors, sending regular embassies to Jiankang and 
professing to be loyal and obedient subjects of the southern court. However, within their own 
domain they behaved like independent and sovereign rulers using all kinds of royal 
prerogatives including bestowal of noble dignities which was normally an inalienable right of 
the emperor: 
    
“Zhang Yaoling … was only ten when he succeeded [his father in] administering the 
affairs [of Liangzhou]. He proclaimed himself Commander-in-chief (dasima 大 司 馬 ), 
Commandant Guarding the Qiang (hu Qiang xiaowei 護羌校尉), Regional Inspector (cishi 刺
史) [of Liangzhou] and Duke of Xiping. His uncle Zhang Zuo, Marquis of Changning, was by 
nature crafty and deceitful and was good at ingratiating himself with those within and without 
[the palace]. First he had become sworn brothers with Zhao Chang and Wei Qi, favorite 
ministers of [Yaoling‟s late father Zhang] Chonghua. Zhao Chang and his colleague pretended 
to be acting upon bequest of the testamentary edict of [Zhang] Chonghua and appointed [Zhang] 
Zuo area commander with special powers supervising all the military affairs of the state. As 
General of Pacification Army (fujun jiangjun 撫軍將軍 ) he should have assisted the 
government [and became a regent to the young lord]. Zhao Chang and his colleagues were of 
opinion that [Zhang] Yaoling was too young and weak [to rule] and as the times were difficult 
and [the realm still] not at peace it would be [more] suitable to enthrone a grown man as the 
new lord. As Zhang Zuo had earlier an affair with Zhang Chonghua‟s mother (and his step-
mother), Lady Ma, [the dowager now] followed Wei Qi‟s advice and ordered Yaoling to be 
dethroned and demoted to Marquis of Liangning. Zhang Zuo was enthroned in his stead. Soon 
after that Zhang Zuo sent Yang Qiuhu to murder Yaoling in Eastern Orchard and had him 
buried in a sand pit conferring on him posthumous name Sorrowful Duke.”
241
 
                 
Following the successful palace coup the hapless Zhang Yaoling 張曜靈, the fifth 
prince of Liang, was dethroned by his uncle in 353 AD after only three months rule and 
confined to life in seclusion of his residence. The usurper Zhang Zuo 張祚 (353-355 AD) and 
Lady Ma 馬氏, matriarch of the ruling clan, bestowed on the ex-ruler title of Marquis of 
Liangning 涼寧侯. The choice of the appellation, “Liang[zhou] at peace”, expressed their 
hope that the boy prince would accept his deposition as a fait accompli abandoning all wild 
                                                 
241
 Jinshu juan 86, Zhang Yaoling zhuan, pp. 2245-2246. 
172 
 
hopes of being reinstated. At the same time, the use of Liangning also expressed belief that 
this act of violent deposition would bring peace and prosperity to Liangzhou. Yet, it is hard to 
say how earnest this belief actually was for Zhang Zuo decided not to leave anything to 
chance. Obviously, despite the hopefully sounding title the unfortunate boy remained too 
much of a threat to be left alive. 
All the noble appellations discussed above referred to existing administrative or 
territorial units which we can find on the map of the Jin Empire, using the symbolic meaning 
of the place names to commemorate certain achievement or ensure some future blessing. But 
there were also noble dignities appellation of which did not refer to any real locality and were 
made up ad hoc, chosen simply for the conveyed symbolic meaning of the particular 
collocation. Such peerages and lordships were nevertheless regular noble dignities within the 
noble hierarchy presumably entitling their holders to the same kind of rights and privileges as 
well as apanage as were enjoyed by other titled nobles whose appellations referred to existing 
administrative units. The example at hand could be Sun Hao 孫皓 the defeated ruler of Wu 
who had surrendered to the victorious Jin generals in 280 AD and was later taken to the 
imperial capital where he became living reminder of the successful accomplishment of the 
unification process: 
 
“In the first year of the Taikang Era (280 AD) during the fifth month on day xinhai Sun 
Hao was enfeoffed as Guiming Marquis (Marquis Returning to Allegiance). His heir apparent 
was appointed Palace Attendant (zhonglang 中郎) and all other sons became Gentlemen of the 
Interior (langzhong 郎中). The [members of the] ancient houses of Wu were elevated [to 
suitable positions] according to their talent. The families of the high commanders of the house 
of Sun who were killed during the fights were moved to Shouyang. The commanders and 
officers who had crossed the River were to be exempt from paying taxes for ten years. Common 




“[Sun] Hao together with his family was taken west and [they all] gathered together in 
the capital city on the dinghai day, fifth month, in the first year of the Taikang Era. [Before that,] 
in the fourth month, on the jiashen day [the emperor issued an imperial] edict: “Hard pressed 
and having no way out Sun Hao was forced to surrender. The previous edict ordered to treat him 
[with leniency] and spare his life. Now [Sun] Hao is just about to come and it is still [our] 
intention to have mercy on him. Let the title of Guiming Marquis be bestowed upon him. Let 
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him be given [official] clothes and carriage, thirty qing of fields and annually provisions of five 
thousand hu of grain with [additional] five hundred thousand coins, five hundred bolts of silk 
and five hundred jin of silk floss.” [Sun] Hao‟s heir apparent [Sun] Jin was appointed Palace 
Attendant (zhonglang 中郎) and other sons who [used to] be princes [of the blood] were 
appointed Gentlemen of the Interior (langzhong 郎中). In the fifth year [of the Taikang Era (284 




The legitimizing nature of the ex-ruler‟s presence at Wudi‟s court is confirmed by the 
choice of appellation which was to go with his new marquis title. Guiming 歸命 was no place 
name. The meaning of this collocation can be roughly translated as “return to allegiance” or 
“return to give one‟s allegiance to the right master” and its use for Sun Hao‟s marquisate 
implied unconditional acknowledgement of the Jin authority. Despite the reality of a military 
campaign which was instrumental in subjugation of Wu, the appellation formally stressed the 
commanding authority and virtue of Wudi as supreme sovereign suggesting that Sun Hao had 
recognized his previous mistakes and submitted to the Jin emperor, renouncing his dignity as 
independent ruler and accepting subordinate position at his court for he had realized who the 
true son of heaven was. Sun Hao‟s title thus symbolically confirmed the change of mandate of 
heaven and legitimacy of the Jin Dynasty.  
The Jinshu records one more unusual noble appellation used exclusively for its 
symbolic meaning: 
  
“In the fourth year of the Taikang Era (283 AD) in the eighth month country of 
Shanshan sent a son [of the king] to wait upon [the emperor] in the palace. [The Shanshan 




Shanshan 鄯善 (Kroraina) was one of ancient oasis kingdoms in Eastern Turkestan 
which used to acknowledge suzerainty of the Han dynasty. After the fall of the Han the 
mutual contacts were interrupted due to the division of the empire and coming of the embassy 
or tributary mission to the Jin court soon after the conquest of Wu was therefore of great 
symbolic importance. The title chosen for the young Krorainian prince, Guiyi 歸義 means 
“return to righteousness” and again expresses the notion of the Jin emperor being the chosen 
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one, legitimate prince who rules with the blessing of Heaven. In light of this unexpected visit 
Wudi indeed seemed to be the universal sovereign whose virtue (de 德) reached far and wide, 
making the barbarians realize the superiority of China, coming of their own will to the court 
of the Jin Son of Heaven to bask in his favor and be gradually transformed and civilized by 
his noble influence. Since the times of the Han the tributary missions from far-off lands 
became important forms of legitimization attesting to superior moral qualities of the ruling 
emperors and Wudi readily used the opportunity to herald this moral superiority of his 
dynasty to the world through creation of peerage dignity commemorating this legitimizing 
event.             
The appellation of Guiyi was later used practically in the same sense as Sun Hao‟s title 
of Guiming Marquis:  
 
“In the first year of the Taiyuan Era (376 AD) Fu Jian [the Emperor of Qin] sent his 
commanders Gou Chang, Mao Dang, Liang Xi and Yao Chang to raid [the territory of 
Liangzhou] … [Zhang] Tianxi (prince of Liang) led ten thousand men and they stopped in 
Jinchang fortress. Ma Da led ten thousand men to confront Yao Chang and others. But because 
he asked for surrender his army dissolved and soldiers scattered. Chang Ju and Xi Li both died 
in battle. Military Administrator (sibing 司兵) Zhao Chongzhe engaged Yao Chang in tough 
fighting but he also died … Zhang Tianxi got scared and came out of the fortress to fight 
himself. [Immediately] the garrison in the fortress mutinied. Being in dire straits Zhang Tianxi 
surrendered to Yao Chang and others. Before that, the Anchang Gate and Pingzhang Hall of 
Tianxi‟s residence had suddenly collapsed without a cause. Ten days later the state perished … 
Fu Jian had already a residence built in advance for Zhang Tianxi [to live in once he is captured 
and comes to Chang‟an]. When he arrived [to the Qin capital] he was appointed imperial 
secretary (shangshu 尚 書 ) and enfeoffed as Guiyi Marquis (Marquis Returning to 
Righteousness).”
245
                           
 
King Fu Jian of Former Qin was apparently the first to follow the Jin precedent. After 
his commanders marched west and conquered Liangzhou, Zhang Tianxi 張天錫 (364-376 
AD), the last of the independent Liang princes, was captured and brought to Chang‟an where 
he became a symbol of Qin legitimacy in the same way in which Sun Hao confirmed the 
superiority of the Jin court almost one hundred years earlier. Guiming and Guiyi later became 
popular titles for all defeated rulers of rival regimes and were bestowed time and again 
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 Jinshu juan 86, Zhang Tianxi zhuan, pp. 2251-2252. 
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throughout the history of China by victorious conquerors seeking additional legitimization of 
their claims to the imperial throne.  
    
No Dignity without Merit – Reasons for Ennoblement 
 
One of the principle notions of the Jin (or more generally medieval Chinese) 
ennoblement system was that noble dignity of any rank and grade has to be merited by loyal 
service to the sovereign and the dynasty. Bestowal of a noble title was dependent neither on 
family origin nor on high official post in the government. It could not have been bought either 
by wealth of the family, or by its social preeminence derived from the possible affiliation to a 
“noble” line of descent. It could be obtained only as a special mark of distinction and imperial 
favor for those worthy and deserving servitors of the ruling house who had proved their 
ability and discharged their duties with aplomb contributing significantly to the great cause of 
the dynasty. The meritorious deed of any kind was absolutely prerequisite if one hoped to be 
enfeoffed. The traditional maxim Fei gong bu hou 非功不侯 sums up the situation nicely: 
There was no noble dignity without merit. Yet, what exactly was considered to be meritorious 
differed quite widely from case to case for the concept of merit was rather abstract and wide 
comprising all kinds of meritorious service, both military and civil in character, and could 
have been employed flexibly according to the current needs of the ruler and regime. 
The following tables (No. 17 and 18) list all the peerage and lordship dignities 
respectively bestowed during the Western Jin Dynasty which I managed to come upon while 
browsing through the contemporary sources together with reasons for their creation.  
                        
Tab. 17 Reasons for Ennoblement of the Western Jin Peerage 
noble title 




reason for ennoblement 
Daliang 大梁侯  Lu Qin 盧欽  266 continuation of Wei title 
Miling 密陵侯  Zheng Mao 鄭袤  266 continuation of Wei title 
Rongcheng 容城侯  Lu Fan 盧藩  266 continuation of Wei title, not confirmed 
Yinping 陰平侯  Lu Zhi 魯芝  266 continuation of Wei title 
Shangcai 上蔡伯  He Jiao 和嶠  266 continuation of Wei title 
Xinta 新沓伯  Shan Tao 山濤  266 continuation of Wei title 
Xunyang 循陽伯  Liu Shi 劉寔  266 continuation of Wei title 
Jiqiu 即丘子  Wang Lan 王覽  266 continuation of Wei title 
Kangfu 亢父男 Jiang Tong 江統   266 continuation of Wei title 
Xiayang 夏陽侯  Hu Fen 胡奮  266 continuation of Wei title, waiqi 
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Guanyang 觀陽伯  Hua Biao 華表  266 contunuation of Wei title 
Guanglu 廣陸侯  Li Yin 李胤  266 founding of the dynasty 
Liangzou 梁鄒侯  Xie Xiu 解脩  266 founding of the dynasty 
Linhai 臨海侯  Houshi Guang 侯史光  266 founding of the dynasty 
Chungu 鶉觚子  Fu Xuan 傅玄  266 founding of the dynasty 
Juyang 劇陽子  Wei Shu 魏舒  266 founding of the dynasty 
Tangyang 堂陽子  Shi Jian 石鑒  266 founding of the dynasty 
Xiayang 夏陽子  Hu Fen 胡奮  266 founding of the dynasty 
Pingling 平陵男  Guo Yi 郭奕  266 founding of the dynasty 
Gaoping 高平郡公  Chen Qian 陳騫  266 gongchen 
Julu 鉅鹿郡公  Pei Xiu 裴秀  266 gongchen 
Juping 鉅平郡公 Yang Hu 羊祜  266 gongchen 
Langling 朗陵公  He Ceng何曾  266 gongchen 
Leling 樂陵郡公  Shi Bao 石苞  266 gongchen 
Linhuai 臨淮公  Xun Yi 荀顗  266 gongchen 
Lu 魯郡公  Jia Chong 賈充 266 gongchen 
Shouguang 壽光公  Zheng Chong 鄭沖  266 gongchen 
Suiling 睢陵公  Wang Xiang 王祥  266 gongchen 
Ziyang  菑陽公  Wei Guan 衛瓘  266 gongchen 
Jibei 濟北侯  Xun Xu 荀勖  266 gongchen 
Qi 祁侯  Li Xi 李憙  266 gongchen 
Boling 博陵縣公  Wang Shen 王沈  266 gongchen 
Juping 鉅平侯  Yang Hu 羊祜  266 gongchen 
Anle 安樂公  Liu Shan 劉禪  266 ritual 
Gaoyi 高邑公  Cao Jia 曹嘉  266 ritual 
Juancheng 
 鄄城縣公  Cao Zhi 曹志  266 
ritual 
Linqiu 廩丘公  Cao Xi 曹翕  266 ritual 
Shanyang 山陽公  Liu Kang 劉康  266 ritual 
Shaoling 邵陵公 Cao Fang 曹芳 266 ritual 
Wei 衛公  Ji Shu 姬署  266 ritual 
Linwei 臨渭公  Guo Jian 郭建  266 supporters of Sima cause 
Guang‟an 廣安公  Zhen De 甄惪  266 waiqi and partisan of Simas 
Lanling 蘭陵侯  Wang Xun 王恂  266 
waiqi, Wei title, not sure if it was revived 
after 266 
Changlu 昌陸子 Gao Hun 高渾        266? continuation of Wei title 
Zheng 氶子  Wang Xun 王恂        266? continuation of Wei title 
Jingyuan 涇原子 Fu Zhi 傅祗        266? continuation of Wei title, not confirmed 
Shen 慎縣子  Chen Wen 陳溫        266? continuation of Wei title, not confirmed 
Qingquan 清泉侯 Fu Xuan 傅玄  269 posthumously promoted for past service 
Xi‟e 西鄂侯  Luo Xian 羅憲  270 
posthumously promoted for administrative 
service 
Kuaiji 會稽公  Sun Xiu 孫秀  270 surrendered enemy commander  
Yidu 宜都公  Bu Chan 步闡  272 surrendered enemy commander  
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Danyang 丹楊侯  Sun Kai 孫楷  276 surrendered enemy commander  
Linjin 臨晉侯  Yang Jun 楊駿  276 waiqi 
Nancheng 南城侯  Yang Hu 羊祜  277 promotion by Wudi  
Pingchun 平春侯  Hu Wei 胡威        <280 
 
unknown 
Guiming 歸命侯  Sun Hao 孫皓  280 ritual 
Jingling 京陵公  Wang Hun 王渾  280(266) subjugation of Wu 
Yongping 永平侯  Jia Hun 賈混        280> unknown 
Yongshi 永世侯  Wang Jun 王俊        280> unknown 
Guiyi 歸義侯  prince of Shanshan 283 outside realm? 
Guangxing 廣興侯  Zhu Zheng 朱整        <289 unknown 
Guanyang 觀陽公 Hua Yi 華廙 290 Yang Jun after the death of Wudi 
Xunyang 循陽侯  Liu Shi 劉寔  290 Yang Jun after the death of Wudi 
Chang‟an 昌安公  Shi Jian 石鑒  
290 Yang Jun for supervising the erection of 
burial mound 
Chengyang 成陽子 Bian Cui 卞粹 291 after the death of Yang Jun 
Lingchuan/Lingzhou 
靈川 縣公/靈州縣公  Fu Zhi 傅祗  291 
after the death of Yang Jun 
Shandu 山都縣公  Wang Kai 王愷  291 after the death of Yang Jun 
Shanggu 上谷郡公 Meng Guan 孟觀  291 after the death of Yang Jun 
Zhuangwu 壯武郡公  Zhang Hua 張華   291-300 service to Empress Jia 
Yiyang 弋陽子  Ji Shao 嵇紹  300 after the fall of the Jia faction 
Anzhong 安眾男  Liu Qiao 劉喬 300 after the fall of the Jia faction 
Guangling 廣陵郡公  Chen Zhun 陳準  300 partisan of Lun of Zhao 
Lanling 蘭陵郡公  Wei Guan 衛瓘        300? 
posthumously, rehabilitation presumably 
after the fall of the Jias  
Xingjin  興晉侯  Yang Xuanzhi 羊玄之        300> waiqi, father of the empress 
Chengyang 成陽縣男  Xun Zu 荀組   300-306 uknown 
Chengyang 成陽公 Bian Cui 卞粹 301(291) 
partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Anchang 安昌公 Pan Ni 潘尼  301 partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Anxiang 安鄉公  Liu Zhen 劉真  
301 partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Fengqiu 封丘公  Han Tai 韓泰  301 
partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Mouping 牟平公  Ge Yu 葛旟  301 
partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Pingyin 平陰公  Wei Yi 衛毅  301 
partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Xiaohuang 小黃公  Lu Ji 路季  301 
partisan of prince of Qi, chastisement of 
Lun of Zhao 
Pingshou 平壽公  Zheng Qiu 鄭球  301 
when Ying of Chengdu rebelled against 
Lun of Zhao 
Wuqiang 武強侯  Lu Zhi 盧志        301> advisor of Ying of Chengdu 
Jiaxing 嘉興伯  Gu Rong 顧榮  302 
chastisement of Jiong of Qi and his 
advisor Ge Yu 
Xihua 西華縣公  Xun Fan 荀藩  302 chastisement of Jiong of Qi 
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Yinping 陰平男  Huwu Fuzhi 胡毋輔之  302 chastisement of Jiong of Qi 
Liaoxi 遼西公  
Duan Wuwuchen  
段務勿塵  302 
outside realm? 
Zhuxu 朱虛縣公  Liu Tun 劉暾  303 chastisement of Jiong of Qi 
Xuancheng 宣城 公 Liu Hong 劉弘        <304 for merit and virtue, enfeoffed by Huidi 
Xingjin  興晉公  Yang Xuanzhi 羊玄之        <304 waiqi 
Yanling延陵縣公  Gao Guang 高光        <306 for campaigning against Ying of Chengdu 
Moling 秣陵侯  Dai Yuan 戴淵  306 chastisement of the rebels 
Daling 大陵縣公 Wen Xian 溫羡  
306 chastisement of Ying of Chengdu, return 
of Huidi 
Yiyang 弋陽侯  Xi Shao 嵇紹  306 
postuhumous rehabilitation by Yue of 
Donghai 
Jiangxia 江夏郡公  Wei Zao 衛璪  306 
promotion by Yue of Donghai, 
rehabilitation of Wei Guan 
Linxiang 臨湘縣公  Sun Hui 孫惠  306 return of Huidi to Luoyang 
Nanxiang 南鄉侯  Wang Cheng 王澄  306 return of Huidi to Luoyang 
Xincheng 新城郡公  Liu Hong 劉弘   306-311 
posthumously by Yue of Donghai for help 
against Ying of Chengdu 
Wuling 武陵侯  Wang Yan 王衍   306-311 unknown, created but never accepted 
Dongping 東平郡侯  Gou Xi 苟晞   306-311 created by Yue of Donghai 
Jiuquan 酒泉公  Jia Shu 賈疋   307-313 
under Huaidi, for chastisement of the 
rebels 
Bacheng 霸城侯  Zhang Gui 張軌   310-312 defense of Luoyang against Qian Zhao 
Dingxiang 定襄侯  Liu Yu 劉輿        <311 
posthumously by Yue of Donghai for past 
services 
Wuyang 舞陽縣公  Xun Song 荀崧        312> restoration of the imperial burial mound 
Dongping 東平郡公 Gou Xi 苟晞  311(306) after the death of Yue of Donghai 
Yuanling 苑陵縣公  Hua Heng 華恒  313 accession  of Mindi 
Yiju 弋居伯  Suo Chen 索綝  313 accession  of Mindi 
Linying 臨潁縣公  Xun Zu 荀組  313 accession of Mindi, waiqi  
Shangluo 上洛郡公  Suo Chen 索綝   313-316 
chastisement of Liu Yao, defense of 
Mindi 
Quling 曲陵公  Xun Song 荀崧   313-316 transfer from Wuyang 
Wucheng 烏程公  Zhou Qi 周玘  313-316 conferred by Yuandi as King of Jin 
Xiping 西平郡公  Zhang Gui 張軌  314 help during the siege of Chang'an 
Changcen 長岑男  Yu Min 庾珉       <316 unknown 
Han‟an 漢安侯  Wang Dun 王敦  316 chastisement of Du Tao 
Jiaxing 嘉興開國公  Gu Rong 顧榮  316(302) posthumously by Yuandi as King of Jin 
Linxiang 臨湘侯 Ji Zhan 紀瞻       316> unknown 
Sheyang 射陽公  Xun Kai 荀闓       316> Yuandi as King of Jin 
Wugang 武岡侯  Wang Dao 王導       <317 chastisement of Hua Yi 
Yongning 永寧伯  Zhou Fu 周馥      <317 chastisement of Chen Min 
Guangrao 廣饒侯  Cao Yi 曹嶷       <317 unknown 
Zhu‟a 祝阿子  Shao Xu 邵續       <317 unknown 
Bohai 渤海公  Duan Pidi 段匹磾      < 317 outside realm? 




Tab. 18 Reasons for Ennoblement of the Western Jin Liehou Lordships 
noble title rank first Jin holder 
year of 
creation 
reason for ennoblement 
Fengle 豐樂亭侯  tinghou Du Yu 杜預  266 continuation of Wei title 
Wuting 蓩亭侯  tinghou Yang Wenzong 楊文宗  266 continuation of Wei title 
Ganlu 甘露亭侯  tinghou Yang Xiu 羊琇  266 Sima partisan 
Anling 安陵鄉侯  xianghou Xun Yun 荀頵  266 continuation of Wei title 
Gao‟an 高安鄉侯  xianghou Xiahou Shao 夏侯劭  266 continuation of Wei title 
Changguo 昌國縣侯 xianhou Ren Kai 任愷 266 continuation of Wei title 
Jingling 京陵侯  xianhou Wang Hun 王渾  266 continuation of Wei title 
Xue 薛縣侯  xianhou Wu Gai 武陔  266 continuation of Wei title 
Wuchang 武昌鄉侯  tinghou Ji Han 嵇含          266? 
may have been continuation 
of Wei title 
Fengsheng 奉聖亭侯  tinghou Kong Zhen 孔震          266? 
new title for descendant of 
Confucius 
Gaoyang 高陽亭侯 tinghou Pei Jing 裴憬  271 tui'en 
Anyang 安陽亭侯 tinghou Han Gai 韓蓋   280 subjugation of Wu 
Runan 汝南亭侯  tinghou He Yu 和郁  280 
tui'en for brothers merit on 
defeat of Shu 
Yangxiang 楊鄉亭侯  tinghou Wang Yi 王彜  280 
tui'en for father's  merit on 
subduing of Wu 
Xincheng 新城亭侯 tinghou Han Chang 韓暢   280 
tui'en for Jia Chong's merit 
on subduing Wu 
Yangli 陽里亭侯 tinghou Jia Hun 賈混  280 
tui'en for Jia Chong's merit 
on subduing Wu 
Wanling 宛陵侯  xianhou Tao Huang 陶璜  280 
original Wu governor 
acknowledged by Wudi 
Wudang武當侯  xianhou Teng Xiu/You 滕脩  280 
original Wu governor 
acknowledged by Wudi 
Anfeng 安豐縣侯  xianhou Wang Rong 王戎  280 subjugation of Wu 
Anyang 安陽縣侯  xianhou Shi Chong 石崇  280 subjugation of Wu 
Chengwu 成武侯  xianhou Zhou Jun 周浚  280 subjugation of Wu 
Dangyang 當陽縣侯  xianhou Du Yu 杜預  280 subjugation of Wu 
Guangwu 廣武縣侯  xianhou Zhang Hua 張華 280 subjugation of Wu 
Shangyong 上庸縣侯  xianhou Tang Bin 唐彬  280 subjugation of Wu 
Xiangyang 襄陽縣侯  xianhou Wang Jun 王濬 280 subjugation of Wu 
Jiangling 江陵侯  xianhou Wang XY 王氏 280 
tui'en for father's merit in 
subjugation of Wu 
Fenggao 奉高縣侯  xianhou Ma Long 馬隆  290 bestowed by Yang Jun 
Chang‟an 昌安縣侯  xianhou Shi Jian 石鑒  290 
bestowed by Yang Jun for 
supervising the erection of 
burial mound 
Wuxiang 武鄉亭侯 tinghou Fu Chang 傅暢  291 
tui'en for brothers merit on 
death of Yang Jun 
Dongming 東明亭侯 tinghou Fu Jun 傅雋  291 
tui'en for brothers merit on 
death of Yang Jun 
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Xuanchang 宣昌亭侯  tinghou Hua Jiao 華嶠  291 unknown 
Lexiang 樂鄉侯 xianghou Hua Jiao 華嶠  291 after the death of Yang Jun 
Pingyang 平陽鄉侯 xianghou Jia Mo 賈模 291 after the death of Yang Jun 
Pingxiang 平鄉侯  xianghou He Feng 何逢 291 
tui'en for brothers merit on 
death of Yang Jun 
Xicheng 西城侯  xianhou He Pan 何攀  291 after the death of Yang Jun 
Wuchang 武昌侯  xianhou Pei Gai 裴該 291 
tui'en for father's merit on 
death of Yang Jun 
Linhai 臨海侯  xianhou Pei Kai 裴楷    291-299 
during supremacy of 
Empress Jia 
Guanjun 冠軍縣侯  xianhou Guo Zhang 郭彰    291-299 relative of Empress Jia 
Minyang 敏陽侯  xianhou Wang Yu 王聿        297> 
tui'en as inheritance of a 
princess dignity 
Pingle 平樂鄉侯  xianghou Yan Pu 閻璞         <300 
recreation of Wei title for 
unknown reasons 
Dongxiang 東鄉侯  xianghou Tao Kan 陶侃    300-316 chastisement of the rebels 
Liangzou 梁鄒縣侯  xianhou Liu Song 劉頌  301 
chastisement of Ji Mi, 
awarded by Lun of Zhao 
Jinxing 晉興縣侯  xianhou Sun Hui 孫惠  301 
partisan of prince of Qi, 
chastisement of Lun of Zhao 
Anle 安樂鄉侯  xianghou Zhang Gui 張軌  305 defense against Xianbei raid 
Guangwu 廣武侯  xianhou Liu Kun 劉琨  306 return of Huidi to Luoyang 
Lantian 藍田縣侯  xianhou Wang Cheng 王承  306 return of Huidi to Luoyang 
Wuling 武陵縣侯  xianhou Wang Yi 王廙  306 return of Huidi to Luoyang 
Anyang 安陽亭侯  tinghou Xue Jian 薛兼          306? partisan of Yue of Donghai 
Anle 安樂亭侯  tinghou Suo Jing索靖          306? 
posthumously during the 
upheaval of eight princes 
Anyang 安陽鄉侯  xianghou Xue Jian 薛兼         306> partisan of Yue of Donghai 
Xiu/Youwu 脩武縣侯  xianhou Li Ju 李矩    312-316 
defense of Luoyang against 
Qian Zhao 
Yangwu 陽武縣侯  xianhou Li Ju 李矩    312-316 
defense of Luoyang against 
Qian Zhao 
Fulu 福祿縣侯  xianhou Zhang Shi 張寔   312-316 
chastisement of rebels in 
Liangzhou 
Xian 咸亭侯  tinghou Xie Kun 謝鯤    313-316 chastisement of Du Tao 
Dongming 東明亭侯 tinghou Li Ju 李矩   313-316 chastisement of Qi Wannian 
Yuanxiang 原鄉亭侯 tinghou Liu Chao 劉超    313-316 partisan of Yuandi 
Chaisang 柴桑侯  xianhou Tao Kan 陶侃         316> 
pacification of Guangzhou 
rebels 
Wucheng烏程縣侯  xianhou Zhou Qi 周玘        <313 chastisement of rebels 
Jianwu 建武亭侯  tinghou Zhang Shi 張寔      <313? chastisement of rebels 
Anling 安陵亭侯 tinghou Bian Dun 卞敦         <317 chastisement of Du Tao 
Zhangpu 漳浦亭侯 tinghou Zhou Zha 周札         <317 chastisement of rebels 
Yichang宜昌亭侯  tinghou Zhang Fu 張輔         <317 unknown 
Dongxiang 東鄉侯 xianghou Gu Zhong 顧眾         <317 chastisement of Hua Yi 
Ping‟a 平阿縣侯  xianhou Zhao You 趙誘         <317 chastisement of Du Tao 
Xunyang尋陽縣侯  xianhou Zhou Fang 周訪         <317 
chastisement of rebels Hua 
Yi and Du Tao 
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Jiyang 吉陽亭侯 tinghou Guo Song郭誦  317 restoration of the dynasty 
Pingyang 平陽縣侯  xianhou Li Ju 李矩  317 restoration of the dynasty 
Qingming 清明亭侯  tinghou Xiahou Zhuang 夏侯莊  unknown may be a Wei title 
Yingyang 潁陽亭侯  tinghou Xun Xian 荀顯  unknown tui'en for grandfather's merit 
Anshou 安壽亭侯  tinghou Wang Qian 王虔  unknown unknown 
Qingliu 清流亭侯  tinghou Zhou Mao 周懋 unknown unknown 
Anchang 安昌鄉侯  xianghou Suo Yu 索聿  unknown unknown 
 
As we have already seen the highest rungs of imaginary ladder of merit were occupied 
by those who had helped to establish the dynasty, long time followers of the Sima family 
whose unwavering support made the dynastic change possible. In fact, during the reign of 
Wudi the merit of assisting with founding of the dynasty (zuoming zhi gong 佐命之功) was 
the only qualification for peerage enfeoffment. None of the future meritorious deeds was 
considered to be as important as the loyal support prior to 266 AD. According to Wudi the 
peerage titles were to be reserved for the meritorious ministers who were to form kind of 
exclusive and closed group of high nobility of the empire the membership of which remained 
out of reach for everyone else as the act of dynasty founding was naturally not repeatable. All 
future service to the dynasty, whatever its import, was to be deemed only secondary in 
comparison to the great merit of the dynastic founders and should be rewarded only by 
bestowal of less prestigious lordship dignities.  
Like the concept of merit itself, merit of assisting with founding of the dynasty is by 
no means well defined and in case of the Western Jin it can range from active support 
bordering on committing treason against the Wei Dynasty, as was for example Jia Chong‟s 
role in regicide of Duke of Gaogui, to biding one‟s time and tacitly consenting to the dynastic 
change at the last possible moment. In compiling the tables I tried to take into consideration 
these differences and even though all dignities created at the beginning of the dynasty in 266 
AD were, theoretically speaking, conferred as a reward for the support of the Simas, I tried to 
differentiate between them as the degree of willing cooperation of the particular title holders 
may have differed considerably.  
Therefore, only those of the new Jin peers who are explicitly mentioned by the sources 
as meritorious ministers or as acquiring the merit of helping in establishing of the dynasty are 
listed as gongchen together with holders of the ducal dignities, the rank of their title being 
sufficient proof of momentousness of their service. Few other titles were granted for 
unspecified past service to the dynasty or for support of the Sima house. The same reason for 
enfeoffment is to be expected in case of all other peerage titles which were newly created 
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immediately after the establishment of the dynasty. But there were also many titles which 
were originally bestowed already during the preceding Wei Dynasty and were simply adopted 
by the Jin to continue unaltered as their own peerages and lordships. 
It is hard to determine the exact reason behind survival of any of these particular 
dignities. Some of them were of course created only in 264 AD during the establishment of 
the five ranks peerages. They were indeed theoretically bestowed under the aegis of the last 
Wei monarch, yet as the whole system of the enfeoffment change was orchestrated by the 
Simas, these peerages undoubtedly reflected the importance of their holders for the regent 
family and its plans for usurping the throne. Despite being members of the Wei titled nobility, 
their allegiance in fact belonged to the Simas. Therefore, once the dynasty changed their titles 
were confirmed and they became part of the Jin titled nobility. On the other hand, there were 
also established Wei families which tried to stand aloof from the power struggle waiting for 
an opportune moment to change their allegiance. The Simas tried hard to win their support 
and later rewarded their goodwill by allowing them to retain their original noble dignities 
which may have been conferred long before the ascent of the Simas began. Thus the 
“continuation of the Wei title” may actually refer to both the peerages awarded in 264 AD to 
the loyal supporters of the Simas as well as the old Wei dignities bestowed in the first half of 
the 3
rd
 century on meritorious ministers and commanders of the Wei. 
While the majority of the peers and lords created in 266 AD acquired their noble 
dignities in virtue of their more or less tangible service to the Simas, there were also some 
dignities created for specific reasons of ritual legitimacy in case of which the crucial notion of 
merit becomes rather abstract. Following the established precedents Wudi enfeoffed princes 
of the deposed ruling family as dukes, thereby ritually accomplishing the act of usurpation 
sanctioned by Heaven. But at the same time Wudi went one step further when he enfeoffed in 
the same way not only descendants of the former imperial house of Han but even a scion of 
the great Zhou whose origin, half a millennium since the last Zhou king ceased to reign, must 
have been obscure at best. These were ritual enfeoffments partially dictated by tradition, 
partially necessitated by an urgent need for legitimacy of the Jin regime which was an heir to 
the time of disunion when the line of rightful imperial succession (zhengtong 正統) was by no 
means clear. The symbolic value of these noble dignities was of utmost importance for the 
new regime aspiring to unification of all under heaven. Through the ritual enfeoffment of the 
members of the preceding dynastic houses the Jin symbolically espoused their governmental 




As we can see from the tables, the founding of the dynasty was not the only moment 
when one could achieve promotion into the ranks of titled nobility. New noble dignities were 
created during the whole period of the Western Jin even though the prospects of ennoblement 
were less bright and as a rule limited to noble dignities of considerably lower rank, at least 
during Wudi‟s reign. When we look at the tables, we can see that majority of noble dignities 
created after the founding of the dynasty from 267 AD onwards were bestowed in virtue of 
meritorious service which was more or less military in nature. It is not surprising as the Han 
enfeoffment system derived substantially from the system of the Qin noble ranks (cijue 賜爵) 
which were awarded according to bravery on the battlefield and number of severed enemy 
heads. It seems that the merit on which the bestowal of noble dignities depended was always 
connected more with military exploits than efficiency in civil office and noble dignities in 
general retained strong military nature. Circumstantial evidence is provided by discussion of a 
ritual issue of conferring posthumous names which occurred at the beginning of the Eastern 
Jin. It clearly attests to the prevalent understanding that the noble titles were rewards reserved 
exclusively for military achievements: 
 
“Since the Han and the Wei [dynasties] bestowal of posthumous names was mostly 
[done in consequence] of noble rank. Even though one may have achieved position of authority 
and great virtue, one was not [entitled] to receive posthumous name unless one had been given a 
noble title first. [Wang] Dao therefore petitioned the throne arguing that: “The military officials 
get the noble rank and [therefore] necessarily even the posthumous name. But [the civil] 
ministers and advisors won‟t get the posthumous name unless they hold a noble rank. The 
original meaning of the system is lost indeed!” [The emperor] followed his advice. Later on the 
posthumous names were conferred on the great officials of state even though they did not hold 




The military merit required for bestowal of a noble dignity might have been gained in 
many different ways. At the time when China was divided into three and later two 
independent regimes the easiest way would be to take part in a military campaign against the 
rival state or defending the border against the raids of the enemy forces: 
 
 “[Jia] Kui was appointed Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Yuzhou … As the southern 
part of the region [under his jurisdiction] bordered on Wu, [Jia] Kui understood [the importance 
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of] gathering information [about the enemy], he had the armor and weaponry repaired and got 
ready, making [all kinds of] preparation for [both] defense and attack so that the enemy did not 
dare to encroach on [the territory of the realm]. He was building an army [to be used] outside 
[the region and at the same time he was also taking care of] internal affairs of governing the 
people. He dammed the Yan and the Ru rivers building new dykes. He was also cutting through 
mountains regulating the flow of the streams and rivers building the Small Yiyang Barrage. He 
also constructed a shipping canal more than two hundred miles long, which is the so called 
Canal of Lord Jia. During the Huangchu Era (220-226 AD) he followed all the [Wei] military 
commanders in campaigning against Wu and defeated Lü Fan at Dongpu, being afterwards 
promoted in rank to village marquis of Yangli with additional title of General Establishing 
Authority (jianwei jiangjun 建威將軍). After Mingdi‟s accession to the throne his apanage was 





The enfeoffment of Jia Kui 賈逵 actually took place at the beginning of the Wei 
Dynasty and strictly speaking does not illustrate the practice of the Jin. However, the Jin in 
many ways followed the precedents set by the Han and the Wei and once Sima Yi and his 
sons usurped the authority of the Emperor it was the Simas who actually decided about all 
promotions and ennoblements. Therefore, some of the Wei practices clearly prefigured later 
official system of the Jin. This and following examples from the Wei Dynasty are used 
deliberately in order to show continuity in both the practice and  the “noble” lineage as I have 
selected only members of the families which were to figure prominently at the Jin court. For 
example, Jia Kui was father of Jia Chong, the most influential gongchen of Wudi‟s reign and 
father to Empress Jia. 
While Jia Kui without doubt still owed allegiance to the Wei, Wang Chang 王昶 who 
fought the Wu forces in neighboring Jingzhou some three decades later was already acting on 
command of the Sima regent: 
                        
“In the second year of the Jiaping Era (250 AD) … [Wang] Chang had all the repeating 
crossbows shoot simultaneously [at the Wu forces], the great commander of the enemy, Shi Ji, 
fled during the night and withdrew behind the walls of Jiangling. [Chang‟s men] pursued [the 
fleeing enemy] and cut off hundreds of heads. [Wang] Chang wanted to lure them out [of the 
city] to engage them in a battle on the open plain. Therefore, he first [feigned retreat by] sending 
five army units back using [all the] main access routes to the city so that the enemy would be 
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able to observe [the retreat] and rejoice at it. [Then] he rode quickly round the city [parading] 
captured armored battle horses and severed heads [of their fallen comrades] in order to enrage 
them, leaving some men lying in ambush waiting for the [Wu soldiers coming in pursuit].  Shi Ji 
indeed pursued [the Wei forces] and a battle was fought in which [Wang Chang] vanquished 
him. Shi Ji [himself] fled and escaped [with his life], but his officers Zhongli Mao and Xu Min 
lost their heads. [When the victors] gathered [severed] heads, banners, drums, valuables and 
weapons [of the enemy], the army regrouped and returned [north] … Then Wang Chang was 
promoted to Great General Conquering the South (zhengnan dajiangjun 征南大將軍 ), 
Unequaled in Honor (yitong sansi 儀同三司) and enfeoffed as Marquis of Jingling. When 
Guanqiu Jian and Wen Qin rose up in rebellion, he gained [further] merit by leading his forces 
against Jian and Qin. [For these achievements] two [of his younger sons] were enfeoffed as a 
village marquis and a lord of the royal domain respectively with Wang Chang himself being 
promoted to position of Cavalry General (piaoji jiangjun 驃騎將軍).”248 
 
Wang Chang not only became Marquis of Jingling 京陵侯 following his victory over 
Wu forces, establishing a noble lineage of Taiyuan Wangs 太原王氏 which was to thrive 
during the Western Jin, but he also proved his loyalty to the Simas even further when he 
helped to suppress the rebellion of Guanqiu Jian 毌丘儉 and Wen Qin 文欽.249 Feats of arms 
meriting the ennoblement were obviously not limited to fighting the external foe behind the 
border. Bringing down a rebellion or annihilating the internal enemy was also a reason for 
enfeoffment and if he had not been enfeoffed before Wang Chang would have undoubtedly 
earned a noble rank for this timely intervention of his. However, as he was already a 
prefecture marquis, he could not have been promoted in rank for under the Wei the higher 
noble dignities were reserved for the princes of the blood. Nevertheless, his achievement was 
too great to be overlooked and the court at least granted lower noble titles to his younger sons 
to compensate him for his effort. Such an arrangement might have actually been even more 
advantageous to the family because together with the eldest son, who was to inherit his 
father‟s marquisate there were now no less than three family lines enjoying hereditary noble 
status. The chances of the Jingling family to survive as a member of the elite were thereby 
greatly enhanced.  
Military achievements meriting enfeoffment were not limited to actual fighting. 
Offering sound advice, devising useful strategy or simply supervising the preparations for the 
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military campaign or overseeing the logistics and coordination of supplies were also seen as 
important contributions to overall war effort as was the case of Zheng Mo 鄭默 during the 
final conquest of Shu in 263 AD:      
 
“[Zheng] Mo started his official career as Assistant in the Palace Library (bishulang 祕
書郎) carefully studying and examining the old documents … [later] he was transferred to 
position of Gentleman of Bureau of Evaluation within the Department of State Affairs 
(shangshu kaogonglang 尚書考功郎) and [in this capacity] he supervised conquest of Shu for 
which he was enfeoffed as lord of the royal domain and promoted to Left Aide to Minister of 
Education (situ zuo zhangshi 司徒左長史).”250 
 
In case of commanders and officers who had already been enfeoffed or who had 
inherited a noble dignity from their fathers or other close relatives their new achievements 
called for promotion either in rank or in size of the apanage. Career of Du Yu 杜預 offers 
more than one example of such promotion: 
 
“When Wendi (Sima Zhao) succeeded to the position of [the regent], [Du] Yu married 
his younger sister, Princess of Gaolu (daughter of Sima Yi), and [later] started his official career 
as Secretarial Court Gentleman (shangshulang 尚書郎) and inherited his grandfather‟s noble 
title of village marquis of Fengle. He had served in this office for four years before he was 
transferred to Adjutant in the Grand Councilor‟s office (can xiangfu junshi 參相府軍事). When 
Zhong Hui campaigned against [the state of] Shu, [Du] Yu was named Aide to the [General] 
Defending West (zhenxi zhangshi 鎮西長史). When [Zhong] Hui rose in rebellion, all officials 
and adjutants [under his command] met their doom and perished, only [Du] Yu managed to 
avoid [this disaster and escaped with his life] thanks to his wisdom and his apanage was 




 “At that time the emperor harbored a secret plan [aiming at] annihilation of [the 
southern state of] Wu, but the deliberations of the court [ministers] were mostly against [the 
campaign]. Only [Du] Yu, Yang Hu and Zhang Hua were of the same opinion as the emperor. 
[Yang] Hu fell ill and had raised Du Yu to take up his position as [a coordinator of planned 
campaign]. [Du Yu] was therefore in addition to his current official post commissioned with a 
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warrant to be Acting General Pacifying East (xing pingdong jiangjun 行平東將軍 ) and 
Concurrent Chastising South Army Supervisor (ling zhengnan junsi 領征南將軍). When [Yang] 
Hu died, [Du Yu] was appointed Great General Defending South (zhennan dajiangjun 鎮南大
將軍), Commander-in-chief supervising all the military affairs of Jingzhou. Moreover, he was 
given a fast zhuifeng carriage and two [additional] side horses [as a mark of honor]. When [Du] 
Yu arrived to his garrison post he had the armour and weaponry [of his troops] mended and 
made the military might resplendent. Then he selected crack troops and made a surprise attack 
on Zhang Zheng, Wu Supervisor (du 督) of Xiling, and routed him. For this merit [the apanage 




 Du Yu gradually became one of the main advocates of aggressive advance against the 
state of Wu, masterminding necessary preparations in border military commands along the 
course of the Yangzi River as well as strategic plans for the final campaign. Even though the 
overall command of the operations was in the end entrusted to someone else and Du Yu was 
to be just one of the commanders contributing to the final victory, his long-standing 
commitment to the task of subduing the rival regime in the South earned him new 
enfeoffment as a prefecture lord of Dangyang 當陽縣侯 with generous apanage of almost ten 
thousand households and an additional village lordship for one of his sons.
253
  
The conquest of Wu in 280 AD was the main military enterprise of Wudi‟s reign and 
the event of great consequence, second only to the establishment of the dynasty itself. The 
importance of this victory is reflected by the exceptional rewards for the victorious 
commanders. The tables above attest to Wudi‟s reluctance to create new noble dignities after 
266 AD. Apart from occasional enfeoffments of surrendered enemy commanders, imperial 
distaff relatives and descendants of loyal servants of the dynasty the emperor appears to be 
rather stingy with granting the ultimate honor of ennoblement. But the symbolic importance 
of the fall of the independent South called for extraordinary reward. After all, the military 
victory not only brought peace to the realm ending decades of armed struggles for supremacy 
after the disintegration of the Han Empire, but in the first place achieved the unity of the 
empire proving the Jin to be the rightful possessor of the heavenly mandate and legitimate 
successor to the Han. Therefore, the conquest of Wu was followed by collective enfeoffment 
of the commanders responsible for this outstanding success of the Jin arms. Thirteen new 
noble dignities were created which represents the largest number since the establishment of 
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the Jin. Yet the imaginary hierarchy of merit was maintained as the victorious commanders 
were granted only lordship dignities which stood far below the peerages bestowed on 
meritorious ministers who had contributed to the founding of the dynasty. The only exception 
was Wang Hun 王渾, son of Wang Chang mentioned above, who was adjudged the main 
credit for the fall of Wu and duly given the ducal rank within the peerage with standing and 
apanage comparable to the old gongchen:  
    
“Sun Hao‟s Minister of Education (situ 司徒 ) He Zhi and General Establishing 
Authority (jianwei jiangjun 建威將軍) Sun Yan sent their official seals and credentials and 
surrendered to [Wang] Hun. At the same time Wang Jun had already seized the [fortress of] 
Shitou and received the submission of Sun Hao and his military reputation was greatly 
enhanced by it. It was only next day that Wang Hun crossed the Yangzi River and ascended the 
[terraces of] the palace in Jianye where he held sumptuous feast and served fine wine. Because 
he had first occupied the upper reaches of the Yangzi River and defeated Sun Hao‟s main army, 
he halted his troops and did not proceed [any further]. That is why he reached [Jianye only] 
after Wang Jun. He felt ashamed and resentful, repeatedly submitting memoranda accusing and 
incriminating Wang Jun, [gradually] becoming laughing-stock of his contemporaries. The 
emperor issued the following edict: “Commander-in-chief Commissioned with Special Powers 
(shichijie 使持節 ) supervising military affairs of Yangzhou, General Appeasing the East 
(andong jiangjun 安東將軍) Wang Hun, Marquis of Jingling, led troops under his command 
and [duly] invested Moling and thereby compelled that miscreant Sun Hao to save what could 
be saved and guard his [position in Jianye], preventing him from dividing his army and sending 
[reinforcements] upstream. Thus he made possible the great achievement of the western 
contingent [led by Wang Jun]. Moreover, he had destroyed the great enemy host capturing 
Zhang Ti, leaving Sun Hao with no other option but to beg to surrender with his hands tied 
behind his back. Eventually, he pacified Moling [as well] and his merit is outstanding indeed! 
Let the [apanage of] his fief be increased by eight thousand households, let him be promoted in 
rank to duke [of Jingling], His son [Wang] Cheng is to be enfeoffed as a village lord and 
younger brother [Wang] Zhan as a lord of the royal domain. [The family] shall be granted eight 
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The rewards were bestowed not only upon commanders who distinguished themselves 
on the battlefields, but strangely enough even on court ministers who were only formally 
charged with supervising the campaign. The men like Jia Chong or Xun Xu gained additional 
noble titles for their younger relatives despite the fact that they did not actively take part in 
the fighting and actually even vehemently opposed the campaign as such demanding the 
heads of Du Yu and other advisors responsible for the attack on the very day when Sun Hao 
capitulated.
255
   
 
“When Wang Jun submitted memorial to the throne requesting permission to launch an 
attack against Wu, [Xun] Xu and Jia Chong vigorously remonstrated [with the emperor 
claiming that the attack] was impossible. The emperor did not lend an ear to their [objections] 
and yet, eventually, Wu was vanquished. When the merits [of the officials taking part in 
conquest of Wu] were assessed, a son [of Xun Xu] was enfeoffed as a village lord with apanage 
of one thousand households [despite Xun Xu‟s original protests] for his father‟s [merit of] 
transmitting imperial orders and supervising [that they were carried out]. He had been granted 





The same kind of reward was bestowed on Jia Chong whose rather formal and 
unwilling engagement in the enterprise secured village lordships for two of his grandsons and 
a younger brother.
257
 To understand Jia Chong‟s and Xun Xu‟s disapproval of the southern 
campaign as well as reasons for the special grace enfeoffment of their junior relatives it is 
crucial to realize that both Jia Chong and Xun Xu were meritorious ministers whose political 
preemince was based on their past service to the Simas. Naturally they were painfully aware 
of the consequences of the eventual fall of Wu. The final unification of the empire would call 
for wholesale promotion of the new men who would become new titled nobility challenging 
their authority and prominent standing of the founding members of the regime. Their 
vociferous remonstrations and unscrupulous diatribes against the “warmongers” bordering on 
sabotaging the war effort in fact mirrored their fear that they might lose their power and 
influence at court. Wudi seemed to have understood the reasons behind their opposition and 
tried to mollify their fears by first entrusting them with command along with the new military 
men, thereby making them eligible for possible rewards and later by bestowing special grace 
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on their brothers, sons and grandsons strengthening the position of their families by further 
enfeoffments which helped them to retain their pride of place among the elite.
258
     
With the fall of Wu the prospects of further military engagements diminished for the 
empire for the time being did not face any serious military threat. The possibility of 
enfeoffment consequently became rather limited as the military merit prerequisite for 
bestowal of a noble dignity was not to be had so easily with the occasional minor rebellions 
remaining the only option opened for those who hoped for ennoblement to prove their worth 
in a battle. We have already seen that taking part in a punitive campaign launched against 
internal enemies and political opponents of the Simas was an important way how to secure 
promotion and coveted noble dignity even before the founding of the dynasty. Career of 
Wang Xiang 王祥, founder of the Western Jin ducal branch of the famous Langye Wang 琅邪
王氏 family may offer another example: 
    
 “Wang Xiang was nominated for Cultivated Talent (xiucai 秀才 ) and appointed 
Prefecture Magistrate (ling 令) of Wen Prefecture. Eventually he was promoted to Chamberlain 
for the National Treasury (dasinong 大司農). When Duke of Gaogui ascended the throne he 
bestowed on Wang Xiang a noble title of lord of the royal domain for his merit of establishing 
the governmental policies. He was named Chamberlain for Attendants (guangluxun 光祿勳) 
[only to be] transferred to Metropolitan Commandant (sili xiaowei 司隷校尉) [soon afterwards]. 
For taking part in punitive campaign against Guanqiu Jian his apanage was increased by four 
hundred households, he was promoted to Chamberlain for Ceremonials (taichang 太常) and 




It is obvious, however, that the merit of suppressing a rebellion was considered 
inferior to other military exploits achieved during the campaigns against the rival regimes and 
was rewarded only with dignities on the lower end of the noble hierarchy:   
 
“[Li Ju] won outstanding merit in fighting Di [leader] Qi Wannian and [as a reward he] 
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Even though Li Ju 李矩 in 299 AD managed to quell large and dangerous uprising of 
several ethnic groups lead by a Di 氐 leader Qi Wannian 齊萬年 which ravaged the region of 
present day Shaanxi and northern Sichuan for more than three years, he was enfeoffed as a 
mere village lord.
261
 As this happened ten years after Wudi‟s death when strict rules for 
enfeoffment gave way to more flexible use of the system with the court bestowing noble 
dignities rather freely, not shunning even occasional creation of a new peerage, village 
lordship awarded to Li Ju clearly shows low regard for his accomplishment. Guanlong 關隴 
was far away from the capital and the court society preoccupied with power struggle between 
the princes and Empress Jia could not be bothered to fully appreciate the value of this military 
achievement. 
The same holds true for a minor Jingzhou uprising at the beginning of the 4
th
 century 
in which Tao Kan 陶侃 , future Commander-in-chief of the Eastern Jin forces, first 
distinguished himself. Fairly low lordship dignity reflects the view of the court that these 
local disturbances were just nuisances of no importance, unworthy of too much attention and 
therefore left to local civil or military personnel to be dealt with: 
  
“It happened that Liu Hong was appointed Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Jingzhou. 
When he was just about to depart [for the provinces and] assume the office, he summoned [Tao] 
Kan and made him Aide of Southern Aborigines (nan Man zhangshi 南蠻長史), dispatching 
him ahead [of the travelling party] to Xiangyang where he was to chastise the rebel [leader] 
Zhang Chang. [Tao Kan] duly defeated him. When [Liu] Hong [finally] arrived [to his garrison], 
he said to [Tao] Kan: “When I was Adjutant (canjun 參軍) to His Lordship Yang [Hu], he told 
me once that I would later take up his place. Now when I look at you, I am sure [that one day] 
you will become successor of this old fellow (i.e. myself)!” Then he was enfeoffed for his 




This attitude changed dramatically during the second half of the Western Jin Dynasty. 
The authority of the central government deteriorated following the disastrous Upheaval of the 
Eight Princes and local rebellions and uprisings of the non-Han ethnic groups became more 
frequent. Progressively worsening situation compelled the court to reassess its attitude to 
regional commanders who succeeded in suppressing a rebellion. With the central forces 
depleted by internal strife the central government was increasingly dependent on these men 
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whose armies still managed to maintain some semblance of control over the territory under 
their jurisdiction. Therefore, the court spared no expense and bestowed generous rewards for 
quelling uprisings in order to encourage the faltering loyalty of the army leaders: 
 
“After Ji Sang destroyed Ye, [Sima] Yue, Prince of Donghai, led [the army into the 
field] in order to chastise Ji Sang and encamped at Guandu, ordering [Gou] Xi to command the 
vanguard. Ji Sang had been always afraid of him and now had a stockade built outside the city 
walls to defend his position. When Gou Xi arrived to [vicinity of Ye] he halted his march and 
let the soldiers rest. He sent a single rider ahead to reconnoiter the situation. Ji Sang‟s hordes 
were so frightened that they abandoned the stockade and fled under cover of night, fortifying 
themselves in the city and defending it tenaciously. [Gou] Xi seized nine fortified encampments 
[of the enemy one by one] and when the situation in Ye became stabilized he returned back [to 
the capital]. He marched to the West, [leading] punitive campaign against Lü Lang and [duly] 
vanquished the enemy. Later on, [Gou Xi] participated in punitive campaign against a Qingzhou 
rebel Liu Gen, routed Ji Sang and Gongshi Fan, former general under command of [Sima] Ying, 
Prince of Chengdu and he also defeated Shi Le north of the Yellow River. His reputation for 
military prowess quickly spread far and wide and his contemporaries compared him to Han [Xin] 
and Bai [Qi]. He was promoted in rank to General of the Pacification Army (fujun jiangjun 撫
軍將軍), Commissioned with a Warrant (jiajie 假節), Commander-in-chief supervising all 
military matters in Qingzhou and Yanzhou and was enfeoffed as commandery marquis of 




As the court of Emperor Huaidi grew more desperate, hard pressed by the attacking 
forces of the emerging regime of Former Zhao, no noble dignity was high enough to reward 
sufficiently the loyal services of the regional commanders. While Gou Xi 苟晞 was granted 
high peerage title of a commandery marquis, Zhang Gui 張軌, whose timely reinforcements 
helped to repel the attack of insurgents and saved the capital from capture, was rewarded with 
a ducal title, the highest dignity attainable for non-royals:  
   
“Suddenly Wang Mi raided [the capital region around] Luoyang. Zhang Gui sent 
Beigong Chun, Zhang Zuan, Ma Fang and Yin Jun leading regional forces [of Liangzhou] to 
attack and destroy him. Moreover, he also defeated Liu Cong (King of Zhao) in Hedong. 
Following song circulated in the metropolis [after these victories]: “The great horse from 
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Liangzhou galloped quickly and freely across all under heaven, the sparrow hawk of Liangzhou 
dispersed the vile bandits. When sparrow hawk stirs but a little, men are dying of fear.” The 
emperor commended his loyalty and promoted him in rank to commandery duke of Xiping but 




Zhang Gui‟s intervention carried the day and the imperial government tried hard to 
court his favor as it was in constant need of his protection. Even though Zhang Gui refused to 
accept such a high honor, probably in a gesture of commendable modesty which should have 
attested to his professed loyalty, the emperor did not press him to accept the ducal dignity but 
at least conferred additional village lordship on one of Zhang Gui‟s sons with reference to his 
merit of crushing yet another local rebellion:   
 
“[Zhang Gui‟s son] Zhang Shi … was well-learned and perceptive. He revered the wise 
and loved the scholars. As a Cultivated Talent (xiucai 秀才) he was appointed Gentleman of the 
Interior (langzhong 郎中). At the beginning of the Yongjia Era (307-312 AD) he firmly refused 
[to accept] appointment to Cavalry General (piaoji jiangjun 驃騎將軍 ) and asked for 
permission to return to Liangzhou. [The Emperor Huaidi] granted his request and he was newly 
entrusted with a different post of Court Gentleman for Consultation (yilang 議郎). When he 
reached Guzang (capital of Liangzhou) he was enfeoffed as village lord of Jianwu for the merit 




Unfortunately, Zhang Gui‟s Gansu domain was too distant from Luoyang to provide 
an efficient succor to the court in need. In the end the capital fell and remnants of the ruling 
circles tried to sustain some control over peripheral regions of the empire where they planned 
to regain their strength in order to strike back later. While Mindi maintained precarious hold 
over Guanzhong region, constantly threatened by inroads of the Zhao forces, Sima Rui, future 
founding emperor of the Eastern Jin, found refuge in Jiangnan where he strove to establish 
administration of his own, a viable alternative to the doomed regime of his distant cousin in 
Chang‟an. Officially acting as a Counselor-in-chief (chengxiang 丞相) and surrogate to the 
emperor (chengzhi 承制) he created noble dignities of his own, rewarding members of locally 
prominent southern families as well as regional commanders who efficiently asserted 
authority of the Jiankang court over Lingnan, the far South of the empire where indigenous 
                                                 
264
 Jinshu juan 86, Zhang Gui zhuan, p. 2223. 
265
 Jinshu juan 86, Zhang Shi zhuan, p. 2226. 
194 
 
rulers and governors tried to take advantage of the collapse of central government and 
establish independent regimes of their own: 
 
“… the people of Guangzhou turned their back on the Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) 
Guo Ne and invited [certain] Wang Ji, native of Changsha, to be their Regional Inspector. Wang 
Ji sent a messenger to Wang Dun imploring him to be appointed [the Regional Inspector of] 
Jiaozhou [instead]. Wang Dun granted [his request], yet Wang Ji in the end did not set out [for 
Jiaozhou and stayed in Guangzhou]. It happened that Du Hong seized Linhe. As Wang Ji 
begged for surrender he was instigating Du Hong to capture Jiaozhou. Subsequently, Du Hong 
together with Wen Shao and Jiaozhou Cultivated Talent (xiucai 秀才) Liu Shen conspired to 
raise a revolt against the state. Someone tried to persuade Tao Kan to settle temporarily in 
Shixing, observe the situation and bid his time. But Tao Kan would not listen to him and 
marched straight to Guangzhou. Du Hong sent a messenger [to him] offering submission, but as 
Tao Kan knew this submission being only pretended, he had some catapults constructed at 
Fengkou [getting ready for the attack]. It was not long before Du Hong arrived with his light 
infantry force. But when he found out that Tao Kan had taken precautions [against his attack], 
he withdrew [immediately]. Tao Kan pursued him and utterly routed his force with Liu Shen 
having been taken captive at Xiaogui. [Tao Kan] also dispatched his commander Xu Gao to deal 
with Wang Ji and [Xu Gao had him duly] beheaded and sent his head to the capital. All the 
commanders and officers begged for permission to pursue the victory and attack Wen Shao, but 
Tao Kan laughed at them: “With my outstanding renown for military prowess it won‟t be 
necessary to send any troops. Sending single letter should be enough!” and then he send a letter 
of admonition to [Wen Shao]. Wen Shao was seized with fear and fled. But he was chased and 
caught in Shixing. For these achievements [the court] enfeoffed [Tao Kan] as marquis of 
Chaisang with apanage of four thousand households.”
266 
 
The urgency of the situation sometimes called for emergency measures and the court 
was compelled to offer a bounty on a head of an insurgent leader and actually promise a noble 
dignity as a reward for the quelling of the rebellion: 
     
“And then it happened that [Sima] Yong, Prince of Hejian summoned Liu Qiao to arms 
[and ordered him to] take punitive measures against [Sima] Xiao, [Prince of Fanyang] in 
Xuchang. He fabricated the following edict: “Governor (taishou 太守) of Yingchuan Liu Yu 
coerced Xiao, Prince of Fanyang [to take up arms]. He defied the imperial decree appointing 
                                                 
266
 Jinshu juan 66, Tao Kan zhuan, p. 1773. 
195 
 
great number of his own followers [to official positions], plundering commandery and 
prefectures on his own authority and gathering a great military force. [Liu] Yu and his brothers 
used to wield great power as in-laws of the Prince of Zhao, being vicious and deceitful. They 
should have been exterminated long ago! But [due to their good fortune] an amnesty edict 
applied to them and he was able to keep his head and neck intact. However, the small men do 
not dread [the consequences of their deeds] and acts of his wickedness multiply day by day. 
And now he used Gou Xi and made him [regional inspector of] Yanzhou, thereby ignoring 
totally the royal/princely edict. Let the Great General Defending South (zhennan dajiangjun 鎮
南大將軍) Hong, General Pacifying South (pingnan jiangjun 平南將軍), [Sima] Shi Prince of 
Pengcheng and the Great General Chastising East (zhengdong dajiangjun 征東大將軍) Zhun 
lead forces under their command and meet at Xuchang where they are to join their forces with 
Liu Qiao … in order to get rid of Liu Yu and his brothers. Whoever dares to raise arms in order 
to oppose [this] royal order [of ours] shall be executed with all his relatives up to the fifth 
degree. Whoever manages to kill Liu Yu and his brothers and delivers their heads shall be 
enfeoffed as a prefecture lord with apanage of three thousand households and rewarded with 




It is rather symptomatic that the phenomenon of an enfeoffment offered as a bounty on 
a head of an alleged rebel appears at the time of culminating political crisis during the 
Upheaval of Eight Princes. With the world torn by universal warfare and alliances and pacts 
practically ever changing the princes were forced to employ highly unorthodox measures in 
order to enhance one‟s power base and attract followers who might support one‟s cause and 
decide the struggle in one‟s favor. Offering of a noble dignity for getting rid of an 
uncomfortable political opponent might have attracted just the right kind of would-be 
supporters who might have come handy sometimes in the future. Whatever the exact reason, 
using enfeoffment as a bounty was obviously an extreme measure employed at the time of 
crisis and as such reflects worsening situation of the empire with the court gradually losing 
control to successive princely dictators and later on to independent regional commanders.      
After the restoration of the dynasty south of the Yangzi River the mounting tension 
between the central government and Wang Dun 王敦, highly ambitious regional commander 
of Jingzhou, compelled the southern court to resort to the same emergency measures. Eclipsed 
by an all-powerful subject the court was struggling for its survival and the young Emperor 
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Mingdi announced punitive campaign against the offender and his cronies offering rich 
rewards for their heads including enfeoffment as a prefecture lord:  
        
“After [Wang] Dun reached Wuhu he again submitted memorial impeaching Diao Xie. 
The Emperor [Mingdi] was greatly enraged and issued the following imperial edict: “Wang Dun, 
taking advantage of the [emperor‟s] kindness and grace [bestowed upon him] dares to indulge 
[his wild ambitions] and willfully defies [our authority]. He compares us to [hapless] Taijia 
(incompetent young ruler of Shang who was deprived of his power by minister Yi Yin who later 
ruled in his name as a regent), and wants us to be imprisoned. If this could be tolerated, then 
what [other outrage] couldn„t?! Now we will personally lead the six [imperial] armies to punish 
this [act] of high treason. Whoever kills Dun, let him be enfeoffed as a lord/marquis with 




“… [the generals] shall have command over all the armies to chastise [Qian] Feng‟s 
crime. Yet, the blame lies with this one man only and we shall not employ excessive 
punishments [of other people involved]. Whoever is able to kill [Qian] Feng and deliver his 
head, let him be enfeoffed as [prefecture] lord with apanage of five thousand households and 




Even though Mingdi‟s punitive campaign ended in failure the government forces 
prevailed after Wang Dun had unexpectedly died and all commanders responsible for the final 
victory were duly enfeoffed. The same appeal was repeated later in time of another dire crisis 
of the Eastern Jin when the rebel hordes of Su Jun 穌峻 captured Jiankang and took Emperor 
Chengdi prisoner. At that time, desperate regents even offered a peerage marquisate for the 
heads of the main culprits.
270
 
Besides taking part in military offensive against external threats or fighting the 
insurgents in punitive campaigns it was also possible to gain the merit necessary for 
enfeoffment by defending the realm against the incursions of hostile nomadic groups living 
along the border: 
  
“During the Yongxing Era (304-305 AD) Xianbei [leader] Ruoluo Baneng repeatedly 
raided [the territory of the empire]. [Zhang] Gui sent [his] Commander (sima 司馬) Song Pei to 
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attack [the intruder] and [Song] had Ruoluo Baneng beheaded and he also took more than ten 
thousand [tribal] people prisoner and the military might of [Zhang Gui] became awe-inspiring. 
The Emperor Huidi sent [messengers to award Zhang Gui] an additional title of General 
Appeasing the West (anxi jiangjun 安西將軍) and enfeoff him as township lord of Anle with 




While during the Western Jin the ready defense of the frontier regions remained only a 
marginal factor in awarding noble dignities, it gained in importance during the Eastern Jin 
when the southern court repeatedly faced the imminent danger of invasion by an aggressive 
northern neighbor. The southern campaign of Fu Jian, king of the Former Qin would be the 
best known example. The forces of the northern court invaded the Huai River basin in 383 
AD. The southern court dispatched an army commanded by members of the Chenjun Xie 陳
郡謝氏 family which encountered the enemy on the Fei River 淝水 in a series of skirmishes 
and battles. Eventually, the Jin commanders emerged victorious and the Battle of the Fei 
River became celebrated by surviving sources as the greatest victory crowning the unequal 
struggle in which the very existence of the dynasty was at stake. The importance of this 
military engagement for the southern court is attested by momentous rise in number of 
peerage enfeoffments bestowed collectively upon the victorious commanders, not unlike the 
collective enfeoffment of conquerors of Wu some one hundred years before them.
272
 The 
example of Xie Shi 謝石 who was charged with overall command of the military operations 
will suffice to illustrate the point:  
     
“[Xie] Shi … was initially appointed Assistant in the Palace Library (bishulang 祕書郎) 
and eventually promoted to Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs (shangshu puye 尚
書僕射). He campaigned against Gou Nan and for his merit was [later] enfeoffed as prefecture 
count of Xingping. During the campaign on the Fei and the Huai Rivers imperial edict relieved 
him of his office of Vice Director and as a general commissioned with a warrant, the Great 
Commander-in-chief supervising the punitive campaign he was sent together with his nephews 
[Xie] Xuan and [Xie] Yan to defeat Fu Jian (King of Qin) … despite the fact that the defeat of 
Fu Jian was actually initiated first by Liu Laozhi and then accomplished by [Xie] Xuan and [Xie] 
Yan, they were [formally] acting under [Xie] Shi‟s command. [Xie Shi] was therefore promoted 
to General of the Capital Army (zhongjun jiangjun 中軍將軍), Director of the Department of 
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State Affairs (shangshuling 尚書令) and his enfeoffment was changed to that of commandery 
duke of Nankang.”
273      
 
Apart from the enfeoffments based on the military achievements gained either during 
offensive campaigns or punitive expeditions against the rebels, there was a parallel tradition 
of bestowing noble dignities as a reward for outstanding civil merit which again can be traced 
back to the Han Dynasty. At the end of the Han Cao Cao had one of his trusted advisors 
enfeoffed as a village marquis: 
 
“In the eighth year of the Jian„an Era (203 AD) Taizu (Cao Cao) petitioned the throne 
and had [Xun] Yu enfeoffed as village marquis of Wansui, taking into consideration [Xun] Yu‟s 




Pei Songzhi‟s commentary provides valuable additional information regarding the 
nature of these services by quoting Cao Cao‟s memorandum suggesting Xun Yu‟s 荀彧 
enfeoffment and subsequent deliberations: 
 
“Your subject has heard that to ponder on [the affairs of state] is the heart of a 
meritorious service and to offer [good] advice is the root of a reward. Accomplishments of the 
battlefield do not surpass [service for the] ancestral temple [and imperial court] and feats of 
arms cannot outdo the achievements for the state. That is the reason why the bestowal of Qufu 
did not come after Yingqiu and the land of Xiao He had precedence over [the fief of] Pingyang. 
Rare stratagems and far-reaching plans, that is something which has been esteemed in the 
ancient times as well as nowadays. Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中), Probationary Director of 
the Imperial Secretariat (shou shangshuling 守尚書令 ) [Xun] Yu accumulated virtue and 
repeatedly acted according to it having nothing to regret during his entire life. Even though he 
was unfortunate to encounter world in turmoil and confusion he cherished [the feelings of] 
loyalty and longed for the [orderly] rule. Since your subject has raised the righteous army I was 
fighting and campaigning all around [the empire], I and Xun Yu were united in our effort and 
worked as one. He served the royal enterprise and in making statements or devising tactics, 
there was nothing which was not carried out successfully. It was only thanks to Xun Yu‟s 
achievements that your subject was relieved. He pushed aside the floating clouds and made sun 
and moon shine. When your majesty graced Xu [by Your august presence], Xun Yu enjoyed 
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influential position of confidence as a member of [the imperial] entourage, being faithful and 
devoted, respectful and obedient. He handled all the affairs very carefully, [always] 
concentrating all his attention [to the task] and sharpening his senses as if he were treading on 
thin ice. Indeed, it is Xun Yu‟s achievement that all under heaven is [once more] stable and 
calm. It would be fitting if he could enjoy [benefits of] a high noble rank. Then we would extol 
this outstanding merit [of his].” Xun Yu firmly refused [to accept the honor saying that] he had 
won no distinction on the battlefields and therefore [the reality] does not correspond to what 
Taizu had claimed in his memorandum. Taizu sent Xun Yu a letter saying “Since we [have 
started to] work together, we have established an imperial court. You have rectified [the 
shortcomings of administration] and remedied [the flaws in government] for me, you have 
elevated men [worthy to be appointed to the offices] for me, you have laid the [great] plan for 
me and you have devised secret schemes for me. Truly, haven‟t you done an awful lot? And 
where the merit is concerned, it is not necessarily achieved [only] on the battlefields. I wish 




Xun Yu‟s refusal to accept the enfeoffment as a village marquis does not only attest to 
his modesty which was to be expected in case of virtuous and moral courtier but also to 
prevalence of a general notion that noble dignity should be bestowed as a consequence of 
outstanding feats of arms and valorous conduct on the battlefield risking one‟s life for 
sovereign and dynasty. On the other hand, Cao Cao‟s memorandum voices unequivocal denial 
of the fact that gaining military achievement was the sole criterion for bestowing noble 
dignities and asserts that the merit required for the ennoblement is not necessarily achieved on 
the battlefield. Moreover, Cao Cao‟s argument directly questions the superiority of the 
military merit as it assigns far greater importance to civil achievements referring to Zhou and 
Han precedents. The great merit of Duke of Zhou 周公 whose son Boqin 伯禽 was enfeoffed 
as Duke of Lu 魯 naturally took precedence before Jiang Ziya 姜子牙 (Lü Wang 呂望), who 
had helped King Wuwang of Zhou 周武王 in fighting the Shang and was later given the fief 
of Qi 齊 (capital Linzi 臨淄 a.k.a. Yingqiu 營丘). Guiding of the young and inexperienced 
ruler and administering affairs of state was obviously far more important for the survival of 
the dynasty than a military assistance. In the same way, among the advisors of the Han 
founder Gaozu 漢高祖 Cao Shen 曹參 (died 190 BC) Marquis of Pingyang 平陽侯 may have 
achieved important military victories, but when he had succeeded to the office of Han 
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chancellor, he was considered inferior to his predecessor Xiao He 蕭何  (died 193 BC) 
becoming epitome for someone merely following in somebody‟s footsteps not being able to 
contribute anything of one‟s own. 
Thus, under certain circumstances, the Wei and later the Jin rulers were wont to 
bestow noble dignity as a reward for purely civil exploits in open disregard of the originally 
exclusive connection with military merit. Shortly before the establishment of the Wei dynasty 
Xiahou Shang 夏侯尚 performed important ritual assignment which earned him a village 
marquisate: 
 
“When the royal fief of Wei was first established, [Xiahou] Shang was promoted to 
Gentleman Attendant at the Palace Gate (huangmen shilang 黃門侍郎). The Hu [barbarians] 
from Dai commandery rose up [against the authority of the throne] and [Cao] Zhang, Marquis 
of Yanling launched punitive campaign [against them. Xiahou] Shang became Zhang‟s Adjutant 
(can junshi 參軍事). After [control over] the territory of Dai had been reasserted, he returned. 
When Taizu (Cao Cao) had died in Luoyang [Xiahou] Shang was commissioned with special 
powers to fetch the royal coffin made of catalpa wood and escort [the body of Cao Cao] back to 
Ye (capital city of the Wei Principality) [to be buried there]. For this and [all] previous 
meritorious services he was enfeoffed as village marquis of Pingling and was appointed 
Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍) and later promoted to the position of 
Capital Commandant (zhonglingjun 中領軍).”276 
 
 Apparently attending to the deceased regent who was soon to be proclaimed founding 
emperor of the Wei on his last journey was a great achievement as Xiahou Shang was further 
promoted in rank to township marquis immediately after Cao Cao‟s son Wendi ascended the 
throne. The same symbolic value of the ceremonial functions connected with the person of 
living or dead ruler was in all probability behind the enfeoffment of Zheng Mao 鄭袤, even 
though his promotion was undoubtedly initiated by Sima Shi and not the Wei ruling family:  
 
“When Duke of Gaogui ascended the throne [Zheng] Mao and Governor of Henan 
Metropolitan Area (Henan yin 河南尹) Wang Su took the imperial equipage (fajia 法駕) and 
came to Yuancheng to fetch [the young emperor to be and accompanied him to the capital. Later 
on] Zheng Mao was enfeoffed as village marquis of Guangchang. He was transferred to position 
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of Chamberlain for Attendants (guangluxun 光祿勳) and Concurrent Chamberlain for the 
Imperial Clan (ling zongzheng 領宗正)”277 
 
After the deposition of Cao Fang 曹芳 in 255 AD Zheng Mao, a trusted advisor of 
Sima Shi, was sent by him to meet an imperial prince who was to replace Cao Fang on the 
throne. It is possible that Sima Shi wanted to keep an eye on the future sovereign from the 
very beginning and Zheng Mao should have seen to it that no one would have had the 
opportunity to get hold of either emperor‟s person or his ear and set him against the regent. 
Zheng Mao‟s enfeoffment thus may have been reward for faithful service to the Simas as well 
as appreciation of his ceremonial role in the enthronement of the new emperor. 
Emperor Wudi of the Western Jin invoked the same Han precedent of enfeoffment for 
civil achievements as Cao Cao in case of Xun Yu when he bestowed additional honors on 
some of the most influential of his meritorious ministers who were responsible for 
promulgation of the new Jin Code (Jinlü 晉律): 
 
“The new law code established by [Jia] Chong was already promulgated in all under 
heaven and common folk benefited by it. [Emperor Wudi issued the imperial] edict: “Since the 
[time] of the Han [dynastic] house the laws and ordinances were strict and severe. From the 
reigns of [Emperors] Yuan[di] and [Cheng]di until the Jian‟an and Jiaping eras, all [rulers] 
wanted to clarify the old regulations and revise the penal code. Despite great amount of legal 
works [written since that time] the [effort] brought no results. The previous emperor was moved 
by the fact that the common people fall into a dense net of oppressive and harsh laws and 
personally uttered gracious words (i.e. issued the imperial edict) ordering [his ministers] to 
rectify the name and reality [behind the law code]. Chariot and Horse General (cheji jiangjun 車
騎將軍) Jia Chong encourages and clarifies the intension of the sages and seeks advice from the 
righteous path. Grand Mentor (taifu 太傅) Zheng Chong together with Minister of Works 
(sikong 司空) Xun Yi, Secretariat Supervisor (zhongshujian 中書監) Xun Xu, General of the 
Capital Army (zhongjun jiangjun 中軍將軍) Yang Hu, Capital Protector (zhonghujun 中護軍) 
Wang Ye, and Chamberlain for Law Enforcement (tingwei 廷尉) Du You, Governor of Henan 
Metropolitan Area (Henan yin 河南尹) Du Yu, Gentleman Cavalier Attendant (sanji shilang 散
騎侍郎) Pei Kai, Governor of Yingchuan (taishou 太守) Zhou Xiong, Princely Administrator 
(xiang 相) Guo Qi, Commandants of Cavalry (jiduwei 騎都尉) Chenggong Sui and Xun Hui 
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and Secretarial Court Gentleman (shangshulang 尚書郎) Liu Gui all refined and corrected the 
[final] thing. Whenever we observed their commitment [to this task], we always felt deeply 
[moved] and praised their [effort]. Now, the laws and regulations are already done and they 
have been just promulgated for the first time in all under heaven. The punishments are lenient 
and bans easy [to comprehend], [the result] being true to the original intent. In the past Xiao He 
received enfeoffment for establishing the laws and Shusun Tong became chamberlain for 
ceremonials [as a reward] for ordering the ceremonies, [having been] given five hundred jin of 
gold. His younger brothers and sons were all appointed [court] gentlemen (lang 郎). After all, 
gaining merit and establishing [one‟s reputation through meritorious] deeds was something the 
people of old had held in great esteem. Let all [those ministers] from Grand Mentor and Chariot 
and Horse General down be rewarded by raising their official emoluments. All the details 
should be done according to the ancient precedents.” Whereupon a title of the lord of the royal 
domain was bestowed on a son or younger brother of Jia Chong together with [grant of] five 





As the Wei before them, the Western Jin Dynasty attached great importance to 
services rendered in connection with the state ritual and worshipping of the imperial ancestors: 
  
“After the demise of Emperor Wudi [Shi] Jian and Capital Protector (zhonghujun 中護
軍) Zhang Shao supervised the construction of his imperial mound. At that time the Grand 
Mentor (taifu 太傅) Yang Jun did not trust the Commander-in-Chief (dasima 大司馬) [Sima] 
Liang, Prince of Runan, and [prince therefore] did not dare to attend the emperor‟s funeral. He 
left the capital and encamped outside the city walls. Current rumors had it that Sima Liang 
wanted to rise in arms against Yang Jun. Yang Jun was scared and wanted the empress dowager 
to order the emperor to write an edict in his own hand which would command Shi Jian and 
Zhang Shao to lead the troops [guarding] the mausoleum to chastise Sima Liang. Zhang Shao 
was Yang Jun‟s nephew and therefore summoned [troops] under his command and urged Shi 
Jian to launch [the attack] speedily but Shi Jian did not believe the rumors, he remained inactive 
and sent someone to spy in secret on [Prince of Runan] and watch Sima Liang‟s moves. But [the 
prince] had already returned to Xuchang by a different rout. Therefore, Yang Zhi desisted and 
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people praised [Shi Jian„s prudence]. Once the [construction of the] imperial mausoleum was 




Construction of the imperial burial mound with accompanying ceremonial places 
where the offerings prescribed by the cult of imperial ancestors could be performed was 
naturally assignment of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of such a task was 
thought to influence directly the well-being of the imperial family and resilience of the 
dynasty. Even though Shi Jian‟s 石鑒 enfeoffment partially falls under the ennoblement 
inflation triggered by Yang Jun after the death of Emperor Wudi the rank of the created 
peerage is surprisingly high in comparison to other noble dignities conferred at the same time 
and presumably reflects the importance of his assignment. The same holds true for the 
reconstruction of the imperial tumuli after they had been looted during the fighting towards 
the end of the dynasty: 
  
“At that time the imperial mounds were opened [and ransacked]. [Xun] Song sent his 
Recorder (zhubu 主簿) Shi Lan with an armed force to enter Luoyang and repair the imperial 
mounds. For this merit [Xun Song] was elevated to [the peerage dignity of] prefecture duke of 
Wuyang. He was promoted to Commander-in-chief (dudu 都督) supervising all military affairs 
of Jingzhou region north of the Yangzi River and he was to defend [the garrison city of] Wan as 
General Pacifying the South (pingnan jiangjun 平南將軍). His enfeoffment was changed to that 




The symbolic value of Xun Song‟s 荀崧 deed was perhaps even more important than 
the original construction of the mausolea. Reparation of the desecrated tombs of the first 
rulers could have been perceived as a promise of future recuperation of governmental forces 
and return of the righteous rule of their legitimate successors. Hence the staggeringly high 
title of a prefecture duke bestowed on the man, title which would be normally reserved for 
royal peers or meritorious ministers who had contributed to the founding of the dynasty. And 
in a way it was in place. If the restoration of the imperial burial ground in a symbolic way 
founded the hope of overall resurgence of the regime, then Xun Song‟s achievement was 
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nothing short of the merits attributed to the dynastic founders and he indeed deserved the 
highest of the peerages.    
Another building of highly symbolic importance the maintenance of which might have 
secured promotion was the ancestral temple in the capital city: 
      
“[Zhou] Jun was transferred to position of Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues (shaofu 
少府) and with this office he was concurrently charged [to perform the duties of] Chamberlain 
for the Palace Buildings (jiangzuo dajiang 將作大匠) [and supervise the reconstruction of the 
ancestral temple]. When the rebuilding of the temple of imperial ancestors was completed, the 





However, unlike Shi Jian or Xun Song, supervising the reconstruction of the ancestral 
temple did not earn Zhou Jun 周浚 high peerage rank. It is possible that either his 
achievement was not deemed to be high enough for such a promotion or the ennoblement was 
seen as unnecessary for Zhou Jun was one of the victorious commanders conquering Wu and 
as such he had been enfeoffed as prefecture lord of Chengwu 成武侯 already in 280 AD. 
Whichever the reason, increase of the apanage by five hundred households was nevertheless 
certainly not negligible and accounted for a fair reward.  
The last example of a noble dignity awarded for more or less civil achievements is 
marquisate of Bacheng 霸城  created for Zhang Gui, lord of Liangzhou, who had been 
mentioned couple of times before:  
 
“Chamberlain for Attendants (guanglu 光祿) Fu Zhi and Chamberlain for Ceremonials 
(taichang 太常) Zhi Yu sent [Zhang] Gui a letter in which they informed him that the capital 
region suffers from famine and shortage [of supplies. Zhang] immediately dispatched his 
Adjutant (canjun 參軍) offering five hundred horses and five hundred bolts of fine woolen cloth. 
Emperor [Mindi] sent his messenger to promote [Zhang Gui] in title to General Defending West 
(zhenxi jiangjun 鎮西將軍), Commander-in-chief supervising all military affairs in Longyou 
(West of the Long Ridge), enfeoff him as Marquis of Bacheng and elevate him further to 
Chariot and Cavalry General (cheji jiangjun 車騎將軍), Unequaled in Honor (yitong sansi 儀同
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三司) with right of employing his own staff and right of direct appointment of officials under 
one‟s command (kaifu bizhao 開府辟召).”282  
 
Zhang Gui‟s peerage is in a way exceptional. Whereas other enfeoffments based on 
civil achievements were connected in one way or another to the state rituals and ceremonial 
activities of the court and imperial family, the marquisate of Bacheng was granted for a timely 
succor sent to the court in need from Zhang‟s Liangzhou domain. It should be seen in 
connection with other activities of this loyal regional commander as a part of his long-term 
military support of the western capital and protection of the exiled court of Emperor Mindi. 
On the other hand, in a situation when dearth of food directly threatened the existence of the 
imperial court and its survival was totally dependent on supplies sent from Liangzhou, Zhang 
Gui‟s merit may not have been dissimilar in substance to the previously mentioned civil 
achievements of repairing the imperial mausolea or the ancestral temple. Indeed, in this case 
the rescue of the court and dynastic institution was much more tangible because without 
supplies the court would have not only famished but its very existence would have been 
jeopardized as well. Saving the court was tantamount to resurrecting the dynasty and again 
somewhat equaled the deeds of dynastic founders with peerage marquisate being an 
appropriate recognition of Zhang Gui‟s credit. 
As we have seen the term “civil achievements” might be slightly misleading as it does 
not denote just any merit achieved in civil pursuits but rather specific kind of meritorious 
service to the state and the imperial house. Discharging duties of one‟s office was simply not 
enough, no matter how high the office was, unless the task transcended the usual 
administrative routine and was charged with special symbolic impact pertaining to the 
existence of the dynasty. Welcoming of a new emperor, escorting funeral cortege of a 
deceased ruler, repairing of the ancestral temple of the imperial clan or renovation of the 
imperial burial grounds were all ceremonial and ritual acts of great symbolic importance for 
the legitimacy and survival of the imperial regime. The continuous sacrifices to the imperial 
ancestors were hardly less important than safeguarding of the altars of soil and grain. In this 
respect, these civil achievements were in a way emulating the matchless merit of the dynastic 
founders and were second only to them. 
Even compiling and promulgating of the new Jin Code should not be seen as part of 
day-to-day administrative routine. Promulgation of the law code was a part of gradual process 
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of founding of the dynasty. The new code was being created as a revision of the current code 
used during the previous dynasty expressing the eagerness of the new regime to prove one‟s 
worth through rectifying shortcomings and failings of their predecessors. Besides imparting 
additional legitimacy for promising redress of the most oppressive laws of the past the new 
code in symbolic way ordered society and established the authority of the dynasty, thus 
completing the process of dynastic foundation. The merit of Jia Chong and his colleagues was 
in fact mere continuation of their achievements connected with the establishment of the Jin. 
The case Xun Yu with whom we have started our discussion of civil achievements was rather 
similar. According to Cao Cao‟s memorandum Xun Yu was instrumental in installing the last 
Han Emperor Xiandi in Xuchang 許昌 assisting with the resurgence of the regular imperial 
court following the unfortunate captivity of the emperor in Chang‟an. He was truly a 
meritorious minister in the last of the Han restorations. 
Yang Guanghui argues that the evolution of the enfeoffment system evinces gradual 
shift from noble dignities having been bestowed on commanders and army officers for purely 
military exploits to increasing enfeoffment of civil officials and court dignitaries (Yang calls 
them shiren 士人).283 Whereas he might be quite right in asserting that the recipients of the 
noble titles were increasingly often court ministers, advisors and civil officials of the central 
government the achievements which had merited creation of noble titles remained, with some 
exceptions, military in nature. Leaving the achievements of founding the dynasty aside (and 
some of it was clearly of military nature as well) tendency of military exploits securing 
enfeoffment remained prominent throughout the period of the Western Jin. As we cannot be 
certain how big a portion of all the fiefs and titles we know of (indeed, we know that there 
must have been quite a few other creations which were not recorded by our sources), we 
cannot speak about percents and exact numbers. The facts in the tables of peerage and 
lordship creations simply indicate possible trend. The enfeoffments may have been given 
mostly to civil officials, yet the honor was bestowed in virtue of exploits which were more 
often than not military. The tendency towards civil achievements connected with regular 
administrative routine getting more prominent is not discernible from the data collected from 
the Jinshu. The ennoblement seems to have retained quite strong character of a reward for 
achievements which were primarily of military nature, be it feats of arms performed on the 
battlefield during conquest of rival regimes, defense of the border against intrusion of the 
warlike neighbors or quelling of internal rebellions.  
                                                 
283
 Yang Guanghui (2004): pp. 125-131. 
207 
 
Bestowal of Noble Dignities during the Civil Strife 
 
There is one further aspect of bestowal of noble dignities which merits our attention 
and that is its usage as a ready tool for strengthening one‟s position through securing support 
of political allies, cementing loyalty of one‟s partisans and legitimizing one‟s claim to 
authority over the affairs of state. This aspect of the enfeoffment system becomes more 
prominent only during the second half of the Western Jin and is connected to marked 
proliferation (one could even say inflation) of noble dignities following the death of Emperor 
Wudi. When we look at the tables of peerage and lordship creations above there is a clear 
pattern in frequency of ennoblement. Mass creation of peerage dignities immediately after the 
establishment of the dynasty is followed by striking decrease in number of creation during the 
rest of Wudi‟s reign with only occasional promotions in peerage and one further collective 
enfeoffment raising victorious commanders who had helped to conquer Wu to prefecture 
lords in 280 AD. Whereas in 266 AD almost fifty peerage titles were created either for the 
meritorious ministers of the Jin or members of the ancient Wei court families, there were only 
thirteen peerages created in remaining twenty-odd years of Wudi‟s reign. The pattern evinced 
by lordship bestowals is similar with ten lordship dignities havening been granted right at the 
beginning of the dynasty‟s rule and another fifteen having been created after the conquest of 
Wu in 280 AD. There was only one lordship awarded in between as an act of special grace for 
a younger offspring of a meritorious minister. Obviously, for Wudi enfeoffment was the 
highest possible reward reserved for only the most loyal and trusted servants of the dynasty 
and as such it should have not been bestowed recklessly. Throughout his reign ennoblement 
remained exclusive honor, without doubt highly coveted by everyone yet attainable only to 
those lucky few who had happened to devote their life to the Sima cause long before there 
was any chance of a Jin Dynasty ever being founded.  
The frequency of peerage and lordship creation conspicuously rises again after the 
death of the Jin founder. More than sixty peerages and forty lordships were created in the last 
two decades of the existence of the Western Jin, which is slightly more than during Wudi‟s 
reign which was, however, somewhat longer. The titles were granted more or less regularly, 
their creation closely following the political development and shifts in balance of power 
between various princes of the blood and quarrelling court factions as the ennoblement 
system became a useful tool for strengthening positions of successive would-be regents and 
princely dictators during the Upheaval of the Eight Princes. Yet the ennoblement inflation had 
started before the internecine conflict of the Sima princes even erupted for the first one to 
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break Wudi‟s strict rules regulating enfeoffment eligibility was regent to Wudi‟s successor, 
Yang Jun 楊駿. He did so immediately after Wudi‟s demise, even though promotion in ranks 
and bestowal of new noble titles after the death of a sovereign were totally unprecedented and 
apparently considered highly inappropriate by some of the courtiers: 
    
“Emperor [Wudi] died and his body was placed into a coffin [made of] catalpa wood 
and taken to the place of burial when Grand Mentor (taifu 太傅) Yang Jun assumed the 
government as a regent [for Emperor Huidi]. He wanted to please hearts of the multitude and 
therefore entertained thoughts of general promotion in noble ranks. [Fu] Zhi wrote Yang Jun a 
letter [in which he] said: “There has never been [a precedent] for evaluation of merit of the 




Yang Jun‟s reasons for breaking the rules set by Wudi are explained in his biography 
in the Jinshu: 
 
“Yang Jun knew that he lacked [necessary] renown and was afraid that he would not be 
able to rally [support] of those far and near. Therefore he resorted to [the same policy as was 
used by] Wei Emperor Mingdi when he ascended the throne and he began to bestow awards and 
noble dignities extensively. He wanted to please the multitude. In governing he was severe yet 
garrulous, often stubborn and unyielding, unable to listen to an advice and he did not win the 
esteem and hearts of the multitude. Governor (taishou 太守) of Fengyi, Sun Chu, used to be a 
close friend of Yang Jun‟s. He [tried to] persuade him: “As an imperial relative Your Grace 
holds position of consequence [same as] Yi Yin and Huo Guang [used to have had]. You wield 
great authority providing assistance to a feeble ruler. You should recall the way of utmost 
fairness, complete sincerity and modest humility [practiced by] the ancient ones. There was 
never a case of a minister of non-royal blood arrogating control over the court, either during the 
Zhou when Dukes of Zhou and Shao acted as stewards [of the realm] or under the Han when 
Marquises of Zhuxu and Dongmou [helped to annihilate the Lü clan] who would be lucky 
enough to die a natural death. Now [the members of the] imperial clan are both close [to the 
throne and held in] high esteem and the princes in their fiefs [wield] great power and yet, Your 
Grace does not share [the responsibility of the government and does not let them] participate in 
the affairs of state, thus suspicion and jealousy are harbored within and favorites and confidants 
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are planted outside [forming factions]. The disaster will come soon enough!” But Yang Jun 




Even though confirmed by the testamental edict of the dying emperor, the regency 
arrangements at the beginning of Huidi‟s reign were apparently result of some scheming on 
part of Yang Jun and his daughter, Wudi‟s widow, for the emperor originally intended to 
entrust his heir to a regency council headed by the premier princes of the blood. Yang Jun„s 
position was in consequence anything but stable. He had to face hostility of Huidi‟s wife, 
Empress Jia, backed by prominent families of meritorious ministers who did not take kindly 
that a mere waiqi, imperial relative by marriage, is arrogating the right to act as a regent. As 
the founding ministers of the state they felt entitled to guiding young sovereign and 
administering the realm in his best interest. The resentment felt by the princes, brothers, 
cousins and uncles of Emperor Huidi, was even stronger. After all Wudi made always clear 
that the Jin dynasty was above all enterprise of the Simas, a family business depending on 
loyalty and support of the imperial kin who were intended to play an active role in the politics. 
Yang Jun in a way dangerously overstepped his position of an imperial in-law challenging the 
rights of the imperial kin to act as rightful guardians of the emperor and protectors of the 
throne (in both senses of the word). No wonder that he tried to strengthen his position by all 
possible means, the well nigh unattainable and therefore coveted enfeoffment having been the 
most powerful inducement at hand. General promotion of noble ranks and bestowal of 
completely new or additional noble dignities should have bought loyalty and support of the 
established court families and mollified their misgivings regarding future intents of the regent.      
Sun Chu‟s 孫楚 admonition represents sober analysis of current balance of power and 
precarious position of Yang Jun which Sun Chu perceives as untenable. Pointing to the fact 
that unlike celebrated regents and guardians of the throne of the ancient and not so ancient 
past Yang Jun was not a member of the imperial clan but a mere imperial in-law he warned 
Yang Jun against overstepping his place by indirectly hinting at the unenviable fate of the Lüs, 
a waiqi clan of notorious would-be usurpers of the Han times. In this respect Sun Chu‟s 
mention of marquises of Zhuxu 朱虛 and Dongmou 東牟 sounds especially ominous. Besides 
being members of the imperial clan and guardians of the throne they were also instrumental in 
orchestrating a coup which led to the downfall and extermination of the Lüs in 180 BC.
286
 
Thus Yang Jun is indirectly compared to infamous ministers of non-royal blood who had 
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unlawfully arrogated control over the throne. Undoubtedly he had been seen as such by 
imperial princes and members of founding elite of the dynasty including Empress Jia. 
Yang Jun‟s unorthodox use of the enfeoffment system did not go unopposed. A vision 
of new noble titles might have been effective in securing loyalties of those who had yearned 
for it and otherwise would have no chance of getting it. However, the established titled 
nobility of Wudi‟s reign was naturally less enthusiastic as the new peers and lords were 
challenging their pre-eminent social and political standing laying claim to the same kind of 
privileges and benefits. Following memorandum of Shi Chong 石崇, a younger son of Duke 
of Leling 樂陵  and erstwhile protégé of Emperor Wudi, voices their concern quite 
unequivocally pointing to the fact that the inflation of enfeoffment would inevitably lead to 
devaluation of the prestige brought by noble dignities: 
             
“At the beginning of the Yuankang Era (290-299 AD) Yang Jun held the reins of 
government in his hands and he was forming faction of his partisans and supporters extensively 
granting rewards and noble titles. [Shi] Chong and Gentleman Cavalier Attendant (sanjilang 散
騎郎 ) He Pan of Shujun had jointly expressed reservations petitioning Emperor Huidi in 
following words: “The sagely virtue of You Majesty extends everywhere. Since Your august 
imperial father established the imperial rule [of your dynasty] You have held your proper place 
in the Eastern Palace [as the rightful heir to the throne] for more than twenty years and the 
[Confucian] ethic and right morals spread far and wide and ten thousand states came to pay 
allegiance [to the Jin]. Now you have inherited the great enterprise [of imperial rule] and that is 
Heaven‟s doing. But when it comes to ordering rewards and practicing ennoblement you are 
exceeding even the dynastic change at the beginning of the Taishi Era. That is the first thing we 
are uneasy about. The impostors from Wu and Kuai[ji] defied [the rightful authority] for almost 
one hundred years. The border regions were afflicted by their raids and the court [was so 
preoccupied with this problem that the ministers found no time to] eat [before] the nightfall. The 
late emperor with determined resolution and astuteness strove to fulfill the great scheme of 
divine warrior and [in the end] annihilated roving bandits easier than if he had broken a 
withered [branch]. Focusing their mind and sparing no effort, the wise advisors and valiant 
generals acquired great achievements as well. And yet, the noble dignities bestowed [now] out 
of favor exceed those [granted in reward of] merit of extinguishing Wu. That is the second thing 
we are uneasy about. The Great Jin indeed enjoys affectionate protection of Supreme Heaven 
and divining the number of generations it is impossible to know the years [allotted to it]. The 
system which we introduce today should be handed down to posterity. If we are to honor the 
mean without any discrimination and promote whoever happens to have got a noble title then in 
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couple of generations there won‟t be anyone who would not be either a duke or a marquis. That 
is the third thing we are uneasy about. Your subjects have ventured to expound [our thoughts] 
for [Your Majesty‟s] consideration. With regard to [the events of] the beginning of the Taishi 
Era (266 AD) and the evaluation of merit once Wu had been pacified we dare say that the 
system is still extant as are the rolls/letters patent. Even though we cannot honor the ancient 
institutions we should at least act according to the old precedent.” The memorandum was sent 




At the end Yang Jun was discouraged neither by admonitions of his friends nor by 
petitions of the meritorious officials. Again, as we don‟t know details about all Jin noble 
dignities it is hard to determine how many promotion and new creations actually took place 
during the short spell of Yang Jun‟s regency. For possible creations connected with regent‟s 
policy of self-strengthening see the tables above. As an example of the policy may serve 
promotion of Hua Yi 華廙 from Count of Guanyang 觀陽 to a duke:288  
 
“When Huidi ascended the throne [Hua Yi] was appointed Concurrent Palace Attendant 
(jiashizhong 加侍中), Grand Master for Splendid Happiness (guanglu dafu 光祿大夫) and 





Political friction came to a head in April 291 AD when Empress Jia staged a coup and 
had Yang Jun executed and his daughter, unwanted Empress Dowager deposed and interned 
in a secluded palace where she died not long afterwards. However, if Yang Jun had been 
blamed for bestowing excessive rewards violating the rules of enfeoffment system introduced 
by the dynastic founder, his political rivals forgot their objection at the very moment when 
they replaced him as the main force behind the throne. They quickly draw on the precedent set 
by unfortunate regent and set about strengthening their own position by the same means:    
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“At that time Great Steward (taizai 太宰) [Sima] Liang Prince of Runan acted as regent. 
[Fu Xian] sent him a letter: “I always thought that both Taijia [of Xia] and Chengwang [of Zhou] 
were still ignorant minors and therefore [there was regency] of Yi [Yin and Duke of] Zhou. 
Even the sages [like them] were not able to avoid suspicion, let alone a subject who is not a sage 
[acting as a regent for] a king who is no infant. Is it even possible to re-enact the regency of Yi 
Yin and Duke of Zhou if this is the case?! His majesty was in mourning and yielded to 
[suggestions of] the steward. Yang Jun was unworthy and yet he played Yi Yin and Duke of 
Zhou claiming that he was bringing peace to all under heaven. That is what led to his death. His 
guilt could have not been greater than this as Your Highness has seen for yourself. The impulse 
for chastisement of Yang Jun came from the Emperor and Meng Guan and Li Zhao were acting 
only on secret imperial instructions. Thus when it came to assessing the merit the greatest praise 
should have gone to His Imperial Majesty. [Besides,] Meng Guan and others were already 
prefecture lords with [apanages of] couple of thousand households each. And yet, the Sagely 
Majesty was very generous in evaluating merit in order to show his favor as there was no one 
who would not rejoice in death of Yang Jun. In this way [the principle that] the subjects [and 
their merits] should be judged according to their actual deeds was shattered. [The Duke of 
Dong‟an] was enfeoffed as a prince, Meng [Guan] and Li [Zhao] became commandery dukes. 
The remaining marquises, counts, viscounts and barons were also promoted in disregard of their 
real achievements. Moreover, there was also special universal promotion in three grades [for 
everyone]. The momentum of such an action shook both Heaven and Earth for since the ancient 
times there was never bestowing of honors and rewards on such a large scale. If those without 
merit are generously rewarded than there will be no one who would not rejoice in the country 
facing disaster because once a disaster strikes the great achievements would inevitably follow! 
People rejoicing in disaster, is it not extreme?! This all happened because of Duke of Dong„an. I 
dare say Your Highness should scotch [this abuse] and rectify it according to the [proper] Way. 
If you rectify it with the [proper] Way, what could the multitude be angry about?  For what 
makes the multitude angry is the unfairness [in dealing], nothing else. Now the evaluation [of 
merit] was confused and wrong and there is no one who would not be disappointed. Myself 
being ignorant and unable, I am not only disappointed, I am sadly grieved by it! Moreover, 
Your Highness even was not at court when it came to chastising Yang Jun, this was truly 
nothing you were in charge of. Now they want to entrust you with an important position and 
that is why you have been ordered to evaluate the merits. But evaluation of merit is indeed 
never easy to accomplish. [In this respect] there is nothing better than sit and observe successes 
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The rewards in question were naturally mainly enfeoffments and promotions in noble 
or official rank for the instigators of Yang Jun‟s downfall whose effort made successful coup 
possible. In comparison to Yang Jun‟s enfeoffments widely perceived as excessive and 
inappropriate in both ritual and moral way the creation of new noble dignities following his 
violent death retained at least some semblance of ritual propriety. Once Yang Jun had been 
proclaimed traitor and official enemy of the dynasty, participation in a punitive or in this case 
rather preventive action became a righteous deed of utmost importance meriting appropriate 
reward. When altars of soil and grain were at stake, the situation called for intervention of the 
loyal subjects mindful of the future well-being of the dynasty. It could have been argued that 
as it was only timely action of these people which saved the dynasty their claim to 
enfeoffment became legitimate for in a way they re-enacted the great achievement of the 
meritorious ministers who had originally established the Jin regime. Besides Sima Yao 司馬
繇 Duke of Dong‟an 東安公,291 whose participation in the coup earned him a princely dignity, 
the above cited Fu Xian‟s 傅咸 letter also mentions Meng Guan as one of the leaders of the 
coup: 
     
“Soon after Huidi had ascended the throne [Meng Guan] was promoted to Palace 
Attendant within Palace Directorate (dianzhong zhonglang 殿中中郎 ). Empress Jia acted 
against the norms of propriety between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and secretly wanted 
to execute Yang Jun and depose Empress Dowager. Because Yang Jun usurped the authority 
she repeatedly talked about this to the emperor and also sent someone to set Meng Guan against 
him. When it happened that Sima Wei, Prince of Chu, wanted to chastise Yang Jun, Meng Guan 
received an order from Empress Jia to promulgate the edict and he fabricated many false 
charges against him. After Yang Jun had been executed Meng Guan was named Gentleman 
Attendant at the Palace Gate (huangmen shilang 黃門侍郎) and forty of his relatives and 
followers were presented [with] special [rewards]. [Meng Guan] was promoted to General of 
Crossbowmen (jinu jaingjun 積弩將軍) and enfeoffed as commandery duke of Shanggu.”292 
 
Unlike the reign of Wudi when suppressing a rebellion or successful leading of a 
punitive campaign would have been rewarded with a lordship title far below the peerage ranks 
of the founding titled nobility, the highly volatile political situation together with need of 
securing wider support for one‟s regency rule called for more generous rewards which would 
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disregard the original strict rules of Wudi. Thus Meng Guan was enfeoffed as commandery 
duke, the highest title attainable for a non-royal and was actually placed on par with the most 
important and the most meritorious of the gongchen. And he was not to be alone as shows 
example of Wang Kai 王愷: 
   
“[Wang] Kai … for the achievement of chastising Yang Jun was enfeoffed as prefecture 




Unfortunately, we don‟t know what role did Wang Kai play in the 291 AD coup, yet 
we can surmise that he might have not been one of the main initiators. Ducal rank, which is 
actually one grade lower than Meng Guan‟s dukedom, could be explained not only by his 
direct involvement in Yang Jun‟s death but also by his overall standing at the Jin court. Wang 
Kai was not only one of the wealthy and influential favorites of the late emperor but he was 
also Wudi‟s uncle, his sister having been emperor‟s mother. Thus Wang Kai was also a waiqi, 
close relative of Emperor Huidi as Yang Jun himself used to be. His enfeoffment may have 
symbolically stressed his authority as senior imperial in-law and at the same time provided 
additional legitimacy to Empress Jia and her faction who constituted the real power behind 
the throne. Whatever his actual part in the coup, by being granted high peerage title Wang Kai 
appears to be involved in it, acting hand in hand with Empress Jia in a rightful attempt to 
purge the court of baleful influence of unworthy waiqi family threatening the throne. Thus the 
coup does not look like private bit for power on part of the Jia faction but rather as an action 
of conscious imperial relatives worried of one of their midst getting too powerful. 
Apparently, not all the achievements rewarded after the execution of Yang Jun by 
bestowal of noble dignities were as tangible as those of Meng Guan. In some cases the 
participation may have been rather symbolic and timely change of allegiance or even quiet 
acquiescence of the fait accompli were considered to be as important as taking part in actual 
fighting: 
           
“[Fu Zhi] was summoned to the palace as Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中). At that 
time [there was a conspiracy aiming at] executing Yang Jun, but Yang Jun himself did not know 
about it. Fu Zhi was waiting upon Yang Jun. The Cloud Dragon Gate was closed and the inner 
and outer palaces were cut off from one another. Fu Zhi begged for permission to go with 
Imperial Secretary (shangshu 尚書) Wu Mao to [find out] whereabouts of Lord of the Realm. 
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He made bow [to Yang Jun] and descended the flight of steps [in front of the hall], yet Wu Mao 
was still sitting. Fu Zhi looked back and called: “Isn‟t Your Honor a subject to the Son of 
Heaven?! Now how can you sit there calm [and unmoved] when the inner palace is isolated 
from the outside world and we don‟t know where the Lord of the Realm is!” Thereupon Wu 
Mao got up, startled [and perturbed]. [In the end] Yang Jun was executed … For his 
achievement on chastising of Yang Jun [Fu Zhi] should have been enfeoffed as commandery 
duke with apanage of eight thousand households, but when he firmly refused the honor was 
decreased by half and he was enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Lingchuan (should be Lingzhou) 
with apanage of one thousand eight hundred households. The remaining two thousand two 
hundred households ware granted to his younger son [Fu] Chang who was created village lord 
of Wuxiang. His original noble dignity [of lord of the royal domain with apanage of three 





Again, Fu Zhi 傅祗 was to be rewarded with the highest peerage dignity and even 
though he declined such an honor, part of the apanage which would have come with 
commandery dukedom was granted to Zhi‟s younger son and nephew in order to make up for 
the declined dignity. His actual involvement may have not gone beyond deserting Yang Jun 
shortly before the arrival of the armed men dispatched to apprehend the regent, yet Fu Zhi 
was apparently considered important enough for his allegiance to be actively sought after. 
Generosity of the reward may reflect his importance as veteran courtier staunchly loyal to the 
dynastic house whose support was sought as source of both actual power and political 
legitimacy for he was known to have opposed Yang Jun‟s unorthodox policies and 
reprimanded him for his misdemeanors (see the petition mentioned above penned by Fu Zhi). 
In this respect he was certainly not alone, as family of He Pan 何攀, another critic of Yang 
Jun‟s excessive use of enfeoffment system, also benefitted greatly from his fall: 
     
“When Yang Jun held the reins of government in his hands, he often appointed his own 
relatives and confidants [to official positions] and extensively granted rewards and 
ennoblements. In that way he wanted to protect his position through bestowing favors. [He] Pan 
considered it wrong and together with Shi Chong petitioned the throne stating their opinion … 
but the emperor did not accept [their objections]. For his part in execution of Yang Jun he was 
enfeoffed as Marquis of Xicheng with apanage of ten thousand households and granted ten 
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thousand bolts of silk. His younger brother He Feng became Marquis of Pingxiang and an elder 




Presenting killing of Yang Jun as righteous act of punishment executed on a traitor and 
enemy of the state became a useful excuse for strengthening one‟s position and influence over 
the government through bestowing noble dignities on close relatives and political allies at 
court. The degree of their actual role in either planning or executing the coup was probably 
irrelevant with securing of the possible future support of the new peers and lords being more 
important than the wish to reward particular deeds. The example of Pei Wei 裴頠 who 
became one of the main ministers for a short period of time immediately after Yang Jun‟s 
death may attest to it: 
    
“As Jia Chong was husband of [Pei] Wei‟s aunt, he petitioned the throne: “[Pei] Xiu 
had earned the great achievement of assisting the founding of the dynasty but he was 
unfortunate in that his eldest son born of the main wife died young and the orphan he had left 
behind was still immature and weak. Wei„s talents and moral integrity are outstanding, [which 
is in itself] sufficient [guarantee] of [future] prosperity and thriving of the line of noble 
descent.” The imperial edict ordered Wei to succeed to his father‟s peerage [dignity of Duke of 
Julu instead of Xiu‟s underage grandson]. Pei Wei firmly declined but [the emperor] would not 
permit it. In the second year of the Taikang Era (281 AD) he was summoned as Palace Cadet of 
the Heir Apparent (taizi zhongshuzi 太子中庶子) and promoted to Cavalier Attendant-in-
ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍). When Huidi ascended the throne he was transferred to 
position of Chancellor of the National University (guozi jijiu 國子祭酒 ) and Concurrent 
General of the Right Army (jian youjun jiangjun 兼右軍將軍). At first, Wei‟s nephew [Pei] 
Jing was a commoner [but] Wei expounded the achievements of the [previous] generation and 
afterwards [Jing] was granted noble title of village lord of Gaoyang. At the time when Yang Jun 
was just about to be executed, Jun‟s partisan, General of the Left Army (zuojun jiangjun 左軍將
軍) Liu Yu deployed his soldier at the gate(s) where he encountered Pei Wei. He asked Wei 
where Grand Mentor (taifu 太傅) [Yang Jun] was. Wei deceived him: “I have just met his 
lordship at Xiye Gate. He rode out in a common carriage heading west, accompanied by two 
retainers.” Liu Yu asked him: “Where should I go?” Wei answered: “You should go to 
Chamberlain for Law Enforcement (tingwei 廷尉) [and await punishment].” Yu followed Wei‟s 
advice, handed [the command of his forces] to Wei and left. Soon, the imperial edict ordered 
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Wei to take up Liu Yu‟s command as General of the Left Army and occupy the Wanchun Gate. 
After Yang Jun‟s execution he should have been [further] enfeoffed as Marquis of Wuchang. 
Wei asked for this dignity to be bestowed upon [his nephew] Pei Jing. [But] the emperor in the 
end enfeoffed Wei‟s second son [Pei] Gai. Pei Wei vehemently argued that Jing should have 
succeeded to [the ducal dignity of] Julu for he was originally an heir of the main line. [“]Due to 
the favor of the late emperor my renunciation [of the title] did not met with his approval. The 
dignity of Wuchang was graciously bestowed upon myself. Therefore I am asking for 
permission to have it granted to Jing.[”] Because Pei Gai was at that time married to a an 




In case of Pei Wei‟s cousin Pei Kai 裴楷 the reasons for enfeoffment are even more 
complex. Pei Kai was a loyal and honest official who started his career in service of the Simas 
even before the establishment of the dynasty. Unlike Pei Wei he cannot be considered a friend 
of Jia Chong as he was quite outspoken in his criticism of the mighty minister. Yet his 
reputation of a righteous minister who is not to be intimidated by power and wealth was 
apparently an important factor in the quest for legitimacy because it may have served as a 
symbolic guarantee of the high moral profile of the ascending faction behind the throne. On 
the other hand, the marquisate may have been kind of compensation for Pei Kai‟s son Pei Zan
裴瓚 lost his life during the coup, executed for being Yang‟s son-in-law, and Pei Kai himself 
may have died as well if it were not for timely intervention of Fu Zhi:
297
 
    
“Grand Guardian (taibao 太保) Wei Guan and Great Steward (taizai 太宰) [Sima] 
Liang commended [Pei] Kai as upright and unyielding, not fawning [over Yang Jun] and 
[argued] that it would be fitting if [Pei Kai] received peerage and fief as well. Hence [Pei Kai] 




The intercession of Wei Guan and Sima Liang Prince of Runan was no coincidence. 
Pei Kai‟s older son Pei Yu 裴輿 was married to Liang‟s daughter and a girl born out of this 
union became in turn wife of Wei Guan‟s son. Thus the enfeoffment undoubtedly helped to 
cement the bonds of kinship between the leading politicians of the time and considering Pei 
Kai‟s reputation it could have also strengthened their political position and legitimacy.   
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Another member of the Empress Jia‟s faction who was newly enfeoffed was her 
distant cousin Jia Mo 賈模, albeit his enfeoffment was in comparison rather meager and 
probably reflected his so far inconsequential political position at court, which, however, was 




“For his part in executing Yang Jun [Jia Mo] was enfeoffed as township lord of 
Pingyang with apanage of one thousand households. When [Sima] Wei Prince of Chu on the 
pretext of imperial edict killed [Sima] Liang Prince of Runan and Grand Guardian (taibao 太保) 
Wei Guan the imperial edict instructed Jia Mo to lead two hundred men of palace cavalry to 
their rescue. At that time Empress Jia took part in government and she wanted to entrust 
[important matters of state to] her trusted partisans and close relatives. Therefore Jia Mo was 
appointed Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍) and in just two days 
elevated to position of Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍 中 ). He [immediately] tried 
wholeheartedly to rectify the flaws of government and be of assistance [to his sovereign]. He 
promoted Zhang Hua and Pei Wei and being of the same mind, they ruled [together] as regents. 





The high peerages were bestowed even later during the reign of Empress Jia even 
though there was no ready excuse available with the altars of soil and grain being perfectly 
safe, free of any threat except perhaps the ambitions of Empress Jia herself. Once the 
precedent was set which enabled non-royals to secure a peerage dignity it was readily used by 
all subsequent regents and dictators as a means of strengthening the bonds of loyalty within 
the ruling faction as well as its overall standing or, if the need be, for winning allegiance of 
influential men both at court and in the provinces who might otherwise remain hesitant in 
their endorsing of the political takeover or even potentially hostile. Thus a commandery 
dukedom laid in store for Zhang Hua 張華, principal advisor to Emperor Huidi and Empress 
Jia, even though it was connected with no particular deed and appears to be bestowed only in 
virtue of various unspecified loyal services the relative importance of which remains rather 
unclear:     
 
“Even though Empress Jia was vicious and jealous she held Zhang Hua in high esteem. 
After a long time she assessed his loyal achievements and faithful service past and present and 
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promoted him in rank to commandery duke of Zhuangwu. [Zhang] Hua declined more than ten 
times but the edicts from the palace admonished him and pressed further so in the end [Zhang 




Let us now return once again to the events immediately after the execution of the 
regent in April 291 AD. From the point of view of Empress Jia the coup was only partially 
successful. She may have got rid of one unwanted regent but now there were two new ones 
taking up his place; the fact which must have been highly frustrating for the ambitious woman. 
Especially when the validity of the regency government was rather questionable as Emperor 
Huidi was no minor. His impaired mental capacity was certainly an issue but as there was no 
precedent for either setting emperor aside for being mentally imbalanced or for his having a 
regent during the whole reign, all possible settling of this problem might have been perceived 
as arbitrary by one of the parties. Nevertheless the interim arrangement with patriarch of the 
imperial clan Sima Liang, Prince of Runan, and Wei Guan, senior official of Wudi‟s 
government acting as regents was certainly not to Empress Jia‟s liking. Therefore, just a 
month later she had orchestrated another coup in which both regents lost their lives: 
 
“When Yang Jun was executed Wei Guan became Overseer of Department of State 
Affairs (lu shangshu shi 錄尚書事) … and together with [Sima] Liang, Prince of Runan, acted 
as regent to [Emperor Huidi]. Sima Liang proposed to send all princes of the blood to their fiefs 
and when he deliberated upon this matter with other ministers in court conference there was no 
one who would dare to agree [with his suggestion], only Wei Guan praised it. That is how [Sima] 
Wei, Prince of Chu, came to bear a grudge against him. Empress Jia herself felt resentment 
against Wei Guan, moreover she was displeased with his honesty and uprightness as she was 
not able to give free play to her excesses. Now that she heard about the enmity between Wei 
Guan and Prince Wei of Chu, she slandered both Wei Guan and Prince Liang of Runan 
insinuating that they want to [re-enact the coup of] Yi [Yin]  and Huo [Guang] (two ministers 
who had eclipsed their masters and ruled in their stead). She made the emperor write an edict in 
his own hand whereby he commissioned prince Wei of Chu to deprive Wei Guan and others of 
their offices. Palace gatemen transmitted the imperial edict to Sima Wei. Because he was by 
nature both reckless and malicious he wanted to give free vent to his personal hatred and during 
the night sent [his brother Sima] Xia, Prince of Qinghe, to detain Wei Guan. As Wei Guan‟s 
retinue suspected that Xia was acting on a false edict they remonstrated with [Wei Guan]: 
“Among the penalties for offences against both the ritual and the law there has never been a 
                                                 
300
 Jinshu juan 36, Zhang Hua zhuan, p. 1072. 
220 
 
single one like this, applied to the highest minister of state. Thus we beg you to resist for the 
time being, submit your own petition to the throne and wait for the reply. [Then if the intent of 
the edict is confirmed,] it won‟t be late to suffer the punishment.” Wei Guan did not follow their 
[advice] and was subsequently killed together with his sons Heng, Yue and Yi and grandsons, 
nine persons altogether. He was seventy two years old. Two of Heng‟s sons, Zao and Jie were at 
that time in a house of a physician and therefore escaped [the fate of their family] … Because 
Wei Guan perished with his whole family despite being innocent the court traced back his 
meritorious achievements during the conquest of Shu and enfeoffed him as commandery duke 
of Lanling with the apanage [of the original enfeoffment] increased by three thousand 
households. He was granted posthumous name [Duke] Cheng [of Lanling] and [honor of] 




Empress Jia made Prince of Chu believe that he was to act under the imperial fiat and 
execute both Prince of Runan and Wei Guan. She was careful to strike a right chord 
insinuating that they wanted to follow in Yang Jun‟s footsteps and usurp the supreme 
authority of a lawful sovereign. Thus the responsibility of a protector to the throne paired with 
feeling of personal insecurity prompted Sima Wei to act practically on behalf of the empress 
and do all the dirty work for her. However, once the deed was done Sima Wei was charged 
with willfully forging an imperial edict and murdering innocent ministers loyal to the state. 
He was found guilty and summarily executed, with Empress Jia emerging as the sole victor of 
the violent power struggle. Leaving aside the political acumen of the empress the fate of 
unfortunate Wei Guan and his peerage dignity offers an interesting glimpse at another 
important aspect of the use of enfeoffment system during the second half of the Western Jin. 
Besides its usefulness in cementing the alliances and strengthening one‟s political standing 
posthumous bestowal of noble rank on a victim a political persecution or restoring of the 
original dignities and honors which had been taken away unlawfully brought considerable 
political capital.  
Wei Guan may have been heartily hated by Empress Jia and yet, his political 
rehabilitation followed immediately after the execution of his murderer. Not only were the 
original honors posthumously restored to him but his peerage was even raised from prefecture 
dukedom of Ziyang 菑陽公 to commandery dukedom of Lanling 蘭陵郡公 accompanied 
with substantial increase of the number of apanage households. This posthumous promotion 
redeemed by violent death of the main protagonist served at least two purposes. On the one 
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hand, by rehabilitating a victim of Sima Wei‟s she was publicly distancing herself from foul 
murder of the innocent servant of the state, formally denying prior knowledge of his plans 
preventing possible accusations of her complicity. At the same time she also asserted high 
moral ground as the righteous authority restoring order. Whereas both the imperial princes of 
the blood and senior officials of the dynasty failed in stabilizing the situation, with one of the 
princes even being perpetrator of such an outrageous crime against the throne, Empress Jia 
and her government appear as restorers of the order bringing peace and justice to the realm 
writhing in uncertainty. While other political entities has discredited themselves Empress Jia, 
acting in the name of her husband, emerges as the moral victor redressing wrongs and 
restoring balanced imperial rule. Wei Guan‟s posthumou promotion is to be seen as symbolic 
confirmation of legitimacy of this new power behind the throne. 
The same strategies connected with the enfeoffment system were later adopted and 
further elaborated by princes vying for power during the Upheaval of the Eight Princes. The 
first to use the same strategy to his own advantage was Sima Lun, Prince of Zhao. In 300 AD 
the prince staged a successful coup, deposed Empress Jia and compelled her to commit 
suicide comparing her and her family to the notorious Han Dynasty waiqi menace of the Lü 
clan. Members of her family and political supporters were executed including Zhang Hua and 
Pei Wei mentioned above.
302
 On the other hand, close advisors of Prince of Zhao were 
immediately promoted to the rank of peerage:              
 
“Sun Qi‟s son Bi and three sons of his younger brother Mao, Fu and Yan, four of them 
altogether, were all praised for their administrative talent by their contemporaries. Afterwards 
they joined their family to that of (Prince of Zhao‟s henchman) Sun Xiu. When [Sima] Lun 
Prince of Zhao staged military coup they followed Sun Xiu during the night, opened the 
Shenwu Gate of the palace, where they reviewed the weapons. Within weeks and months the 
brothers (sic! cousins) all became in turn Administrators (yuan 掾) of the ministerial office and 
Secretarial Court Gentlemen (shangshulang 尚書郎). [Sun] Bi became Elite Troops General 
(zhongjian jiangjun 中堅將軍) and Concurrent Assistant Director of the Left in Department of 
State Affairs (ling shangshu zuocheng 領尚書左丞) [only] to be transferred to Generalissimo 
(shangjiangjun 上將軍) and Concurrent Commandant of Bowmen Shooter by Sound (ling 
shesheng xiaowei 領射聲校尉). [Sun] Mao became Militant General (wuwei jiangjun 武衛將軍) 
and Concurrent Supervisor of the Household of the Heir Apparent (ling taizi zhanshi 領太子詹
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事 ). [Sun] Yan became Militant and Awesome General (wuwei jiangjun 武威將軍 ) and 
Concurrent Left Commandant of the Heir Apparent (ling taizi zuoshuai 領太子左率). They 
have all been granted the dignities of commandery marquis with right of inheritance … When 
[Sima] Jiong Prince of Qi rose in arms all four cousins suffered execution. Governor (taishou 太





“[Liu] Qiao in his youth became Assistant in the Palace Library (bishulang 祕書郎). 
General Establishing Authority (jianwei jiangjun 建威將軍) Wang Rong drafted him as his 
Aide (canjun 參軍). During the campaign against Wu [Wang] Rong sent [Liu] Qiao together 
with Aide Luo Xiang to cross the Jiang River where they captured Wuchang. When he returned 
he was given position of Prefecture Magistrate (ling 令) in Xingyang. [Later] he was promoted 
to Frontrider of the Heir Apparent (taizi xima 太子洗馬). For the merit of executing Yang Jun 
he was granted title of lord inside the passes and was appointed Assistant Director of the Right 
in Department of State Affairs (shangshu youcheng 尚書右丞). For his part in executing Jia Mi 
he was enfeoffed as Baron of Anzhong and later eventually promoted to Cavalier Attendant-in-
ordianry (sanji changshi 散騎常侍).”304 
 
Given the alleged seriousness of the threat which Empress Jia and her faction had 
posed to the altars of soil and grain the Prince of Zhao could afford to be generous to his 
followers. Creation of new noble dignities was perceived as apt and legitimate form of reward 
for the rendered loyal services to the throne. Sima Lun was able to consolidate his position 
quite conveniently through promotion of his partisans without causing too much alarm. 
Suggested rhetoric of a waiqi maladministration enabled the prince to present the whole coup 
as a timely act of loyal commitment to the Sima cause rescuing the dynasty from the brink of 
total destruction for comparison with the Han precedent of Empress Lü and her family was 
close at hand. 
In order to add more legitimacy to his purely military act Sima Lun, who himself used 
to support the regime of Empress Jia, now tried to present his coup as the culmination of long-
term opposition of certain court circles which deeply resented the empress meddling in the 
affairs of state. Therefore, besides bestowing noble titles for real military achievements Sima 
Lun was careful to reward those who for the past nine years remained aloof from the ruling 
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party. By formal endorsing the unyielding defiance of the corrupt and unlawful regime Sima 
Lun appeared as the legitimate restorer of the order meting out just punishment for the selfish 
officials as well as recognizing selfless subjects true to the dynasty: 
  
“At the beginning of the Yuankang Era (291-299 AD) [Ji Shao] became Palace 
Attendant (jishi huangmen shilang 給事黃門侍郎). At that time Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍
中) Jia Mi, enjoying [emperor‟s] grace as imperial relative assumed influential position despite 
being young and [men like] Pan Yue and Du Bin [were eager to] oblige and relied on him. [But 
when] Jia Mi sought to make his acquaintance Ji Shao distanced himself from him and refused 
[his overture]. When Jia Mi was executed Shao was in the office and he was enfeoffed as 
Viscount of Yiyang for not toadying to the evil house [of Jia] and promoted to Cavalier 
Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散 騎 常 侍 ), Concurrent Erudite of the National 
University (ling guozi boshi 領國子博士).”305 
 
Curious case of an enfeoffment used for its symbolic value which nevertheless attests 
to its mounting importance in the process of legitimizing one‟s actions and subsequent rule 
presents the posthumous bestowal of a prefecture lordship upon Liu Song 劉頌:   
 
“When [Sima] Lun, Prince of Zhao, murdered Zhang Hua, [Liu] Song cried bitterly for 
him. When he heard that [Zhang] Hua‟s son managed to escape, he remarked joyfully: 
“Maoxian (i.e. Zhang Hua), you still have got an offspring!” Zhang Lin, one of [Sima] Lun‟s 
partisans, overheard this [remark] and got enraged, but fearing his moral uprightness he was not 
able to kill him. Sun Xiu and others praised highly merits of Prince of Zhao urging for Nine 
Bestowals (jiuxi 九錫) to be conferred upon him as an appropriate [reward and honor] and there 
was no one among all the court official who would dare to oppose it. Only [Liu] Song said: “In 
the past the Han bestowed [these] upon the Wei and the Wei bestowed them upon the Jin. In 
both cases it was just one-off measure and [as such] it cannot be practiced universally. Indeed, 
today the temple of imperial ancestors is safe and stable [again], but even though an evil 
empress was demoted and power-abusing ministers were executed, neither Zhou Bo nor Huo 
Guang were granted Nine Bestowals despite the fact that [Zhou Bo] exterminated all the Lüs 
and revered Emperor Wendi and [Huo Guang] deposed [Marquis of] Changyi and enthroned 
Emperor Xuandi. To defy the ancient statutes and practice only what is suitable for one‟s time is 
not the order of the preceding kings [of old]. Thus I beg that the suggestion of Nine Bestowals is 
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not heeded.” Zhang Lin‟s rage mounted and he was about to kill [Liu] Song as a partisan of 
Zhang Hua but Sun Xiu told him: “We have already lost some prestige for executing Zhang 
[Hua] and Pei [Wei]. It is not possible to execute Liu Song as well.” Lin desisted … Soon [Liu] 
Song became ill and died. The [imperial] messenger was sent to offer condolences and 
sacrifices [to the dead] and he was granted two hundred thousand coins, one set of ceremonial 
court garment [to be buried in] and posthumous name of Zhen … Liu Song had no son of his 
own so he had adopted his nephew, Liu Yong, son of his younger brother Liu He, but he died 
prematurely. Thus Liu Yan, a son of Yong‟s younger brother Liu Xu became his adopted 
grandson and [later] inherited the noble title. In the first year of the Yongkang Era (300 AD) the 
imperial edict decreed that Liu Song should be posthumously enfeoffed as prefecture lord of 
Liangzou with the apanage of one thousand five hundred households for his merit on execution 




Unfortunately, the exact timing of Liu Song‟s posthumous enfeoffment poses some 
problems which make any interpretation rather tentative. The dynastic history indicates that it 
took place during the first year of the Yongkang Era (300/301 AD) but the commentary of the 
editors amends the date to the first year of the Yongning Era (301/302 AD) arguing that Liu 
Song‟s eventual promotion was possible only after Sima Lun‟s final defeat and execution in 
early summer of 301 AD.
307
 However, it is not necessarily impossible for the Prince of Zhao 
himself to bestow posthumous enfeoffment upon dead Liu Song for it was undeniably during 
the period of Sima Lun‟s political dominance that Liu Song‟s family was granted substantial 
honors following the demise of the man. Moreover, Liu Song was no victim of prince‟s 
revenge and had died the natural death. Even though there was certainly no love lost between 
them Liu Song was not considered an enemy of the new regent and it is therefore not 
impossible that it was Sima Lun himself who sanctioned the lordship grant. I would argue that 
even the formal reasons for enfeoffment indicate that the dignity might have been bestowed 
during Sima Lun‟s regency as they are referring to the rightful execution of Jia Mi rather than 
defying the usurper Prince of Zhao, which was generally the case with the enfeoffments 
accompanying Sima Lun‟s fall. 
If my assumption is correct then the bestowal of a lordship dignity upon Liu Song 
could be interpreted as a conscious effort on part of Prince of Zhao to use Liu Song‟s 
reputation and moral credit for legitimization of his own regency rule. Liu Song may have 
been political opponent of the prince, disagreeing with the murder of Zhang Hua and other 
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high officials associated with the regime of Empress Jia, yet his loyalty to the dynasty and 
high moral standards were exemplary. As the posthumous enfeoffment symbolically extolled 
these qualities the bestowal might have actually presented the regent as a righteous ruler 
appreciating men of worth, himself worthy of the great task of steering the realm. Sima Lun‟s 
effort to promote an opponent in order to consolidate his own political position was made 
easier by the fact that the death had meanwhile rendered Liu Song inconsequential and the 
prince did not have to worry about eventual rise of his power.  
The enfeoffment of Liu Song might appear purely ceremonial to us but keeping 
appearances was crucial for maintaining balance of power and legitimacy of one‟s authority. 
Sima Lun overstepped the line when he deposed Emperor Huidi and proclaimed himself ruler 
in his stead. At that moment he turned from more or less respected protector of the realm to a 
detested usurper. Emperor‟s brothers immediately rose in arms acting as loyal guardians of 
the throne protecting the hereditary right to succession of the primogeniturial imperial line. At 
the end of May 301 AD the forces of the princes entered the imperial palace, apprehended the 
usurper and re-installed the deposed Emperor Huidi.
308
 One of the allies Sima Jiong 司馬冏, 
Prince of Qi 齊王 , soon became the new power behind the throne and a new wave of 
enfeoffment duly followed rewarding fresh achievements of the victorious commanders of the 
princely forces:     
 
“When [Sima] Lun Prince of Zhao usurped the throne Sun Xiu monopolized all 
authority and all loyal and honest gentlemen met with disaster. [Pan] Ni subsequently became 
gravely ill and took leave [from his office] in order to sweep the ancestral graves. When he 
heard that Jiong prince of Qi rose in righteous uprising he rushed to Xuchang [to join him]. 
Jiong drafted him as his Aide (canjun 參軍) and he discussed the matters of policy [and strategy] 
with him and at the same time put him in charge of writing his documents. When the thing 




Not all of the newly created peers and lords were former court official. Like Sun Xiu 
孫秀, henchman of Prince of Zhao, who had attained high rank and office during his master‟s 
reign despite his rather obscure origin, the righteous uprising and subsequent execution of the 
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usurper opened the ranks of titled nobility to newcomers hailing from considerably less 
illustrious families often of only local importance connected with princely fief who rose in 
service to a prince without ever holding an office in the central government. Even though 
these men were given the highest peerages we don‟t know any details except the fact that their 
career was brief and did not survive the eclipse of political dominance of prince of Qi: 
    
“In the first year of the Yongning Era (301 AD) … in the sixth month … on the yimao 
day … the meritorious ministers of [Sima] Jiong Prince of Qi were enfeoffed as follows: Ge Yu 
as Duke of Mouping, Lu Ji as Duke of Xiaohuang, Wei Yi as Duke of Pingyin, Liu Zhen as 




Sima Jiong of Qi was not the only one whose commanders were newly promoted. We 
may expect that also men serving under other imperial princes who allied themselves with 
Sima Jiong were duly rewarded as is attested by the cases of Shi Chao 石超 and Zheng Qiu 
鄭球, officers of Jiong‟s cousin Sima Ying Prince of Chengdu 成都王司馬穎:311 
  
“When [Sima Ying] raised arms in righteous uprising he made [Shi] Chao Dashing 
General (zhechong jiangjun 折衝將軍) and [had him] chastise Sun Xiu. For his achievement he 




“When [Sima] Ying Prince of Chengdu became General-in-chief (dajiangjun 大將軍) 
and raised righteous uprising against [Sima] Lun Prince of Zhao. [Zheng] Qiu was promoted 
from Governor (taishou 太守) of Dunqiu to Right Administrator (you zhangshi 右長史). For his 




While Sima Lun of Zhao did not ever question the validity of Yang Jun‟s execution 
even though it had been orchestrated by Empress Jia and her faction, Sima Jiong Prince of Qi 
was in a different position. Prince of Zhao was not a mere “unworthy” minister exercising 
potentially harmful influence over the emperor but a usurper who had dethroned his rightful 
sovereign and tried to alter the legitimate succession. Therefore, the fact that Sima Lun had 
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turned usurper set his previous deeds into a different perspective, no matter how noble his 
original intentions may have been. Even if the deposition of Empress Jia had been originally 
motivated by loyalty to the crown, in light of subsequent usurpation the prince‟s motives must 
have inevitably appeared less selfless. As it was impossible to perceive Sima Lun‟s coup as 
beneficial to the dynasty without giving him the due credit for it, the downfall of the Jia 
faction had to be reassessed and in the process lost its momentousness of a timely rescue of 
the dynasty on the brink of a disaster. The need to discredit Sima Lun‟s rule as corrupt and 
unlawful led to posthumous rehabilitation of members of the Jia family and Empress Jia‟s 
faction. The political rehabilitation of the victims of prince of Zhao was necessary in order to 
justify the physical elimination of the prince and his faction. 
Empress Jia herself was still held responsible for the death of the crown prince 
Minhuai but some officials associated with her reign who had died during the coup were 
posthumously rehabilitated and the hereditary noble lineage of the Jia family was also 
formally resurrected:     
 
“After [Sima] Lun Prince of Zhao was defeated the court assessed the past 
achievements of Jia Chong and deliberated about [official] appointing his inheritor. They 
wanted to name Jia Chong‟s clan grandson Gentleman Cavalier Attendant (sanji shilang 散騎侍
郎) Jia Zhong his heir, but Jia Zhong pretended to be mad and thereby avoided [the inheritance]. 
His son Jia Tu was declared Chong‟s heir and enfeoffed as Duke of Lu. But he succumbed to an 
illness. During the Yongxing Era (304-305 AD) Chong‟s great-grandson Jia Zhan was installed 
as Duke of Lu in order to offer sacrifices to Chong. He perished during the upheavals [at the end 




Formal restoring of dukedom of Lu 魯  to the Jia family was of high symbolic 
importance in several respects. First of all, the last duke of Lu was Jia Mi 賈謐 (also Han Mi 
韓謐), grandson and adopted heir of Jia Chong, who had been presented as the main culprit 
blamed for the greatest excesses of Empress Jia‟s reign including the assassination of the heir 
apparent. Even though this view did not change, the restoring of the peerage for a collateral 
branch of the family signalized that the original punishment inflicted on the family might 
have been too severe and that an injustice had been done to the memory of Jia Chong, the 
leading meritorious minister of the Jin. By restoring the noble dignity Sima Jiong of Qi 
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redressed the wrong without actually revising the role of Jia Mi. Thus he managed to discredit 
at least partially the merit of his predecessor Sima Lun and at the same time strengthened 
legitimacy of his own rule even further by symbolically restoring the proper order of things. 
For Jia Chong should have not been denied an offspring who would continue offering 
sacrifices in memory of his great achievement during the founding of the dynasty. In this way 
Prince of Qi claimed to be the true heir to the more glorious reign of Wudi and as the restorer 
of the order he was able to vindicate his violent action and became the legitimate power 
behind the throne. 
Apparently, the posthumous rehabilitation of the Jia family was no isolated gesture 
and there were also other officials associated with the Jia faction whose honors and titles were 
posthumously restored either to them or to their relatives immediately after the fall of Prince 
of Zhao. One of them was Shi Chong 石崇, younger son of Duke of Leling and erstwhile 
favorite of Emperor Wudi: 
   
“After Jia Mi was executed [Shi] Chong was deprived of his office as member of his 
faction. At that time [Sima] Lun Prince of Zhao usurped the authority. There were feelings of 
enmity between Shi Chong‟s nephew Ouyang Jian and Prince of Zhao. Chong had a musician 
and dancer called Lüzhu who was graceful and beautiful, skilled in playing the flute. Sun Xiu 
(henchman of Prince of Zhao) sent someone to claim her. [Shi] Chong dwelled in his Jingu 
Villa and had just ascended a terrace for catching breeze and was admiring clear stream from 
above surrounded by his women waiting upon him. When the messenger conveyed [the request] 
Shi Chong ordered all his servants and concubines, couple of dozens, to come out and showed 
them to the messenger. They were all clad in thin gauze perfumed with rare scents of orchids 
and musk. Shi Chong challenged the messenger: “Choose right here!” The messenger demurred: 
“These trinkets and trappings of Your Honor are smart indeed but I have been ordered to 
demand only Lüzhu. I don‟t know which one is her, though!” Agitated, [Shi] Chong said: 
“Lüzhu is the one I love. You cannot have her!” The messenger reasoned with him: “Your 
honor is well versed in ancient learning as well as practices of our times, I wish you would 
ponder the distant as well as recent past and think it over!” But Shi Chong was adamant: “It is 
not going to happen!” The messenger left and then came again but in the end Shi Chong would 
not consent. [Sun] Xiu was enraged and prevailed on Prince of Zhao to execute both Shi Chong 
and [his nephew] Ouyang Jian. Both men knew about their plan and therefore in secret tried 
together with Gentleman of the Palace Gate (huangmenlang 黃門郎) Pan Yue to persuade 
[Sima] Yun Prince of Huainan and [Sima] Jiong Prince of Qi to conspire against [Sima] Lun 
and [Sun] Xiu. [Sun] Xiu got wind of [the hatching coup] and had [Shi] Chong, Pan Yue and 
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Ouyang Jian detained, pretending that he was acting on [the authority of] an imperial edict. [Shi] 
Chong just held a banquet on the top of a multi-storied pavilion when the armed men arrived at 
his gate. Chong said to Lüzhu: “Now I have committed offence for your sake.” Crying, Lüzhu 
answered: “Then I have to prove [my faithfulness] by dying in front of them.” Thence she threw 
herself down the pavilion and died. Chong said: “I will be merely banished to either Jiaozhou or 
Guangzhou, nothing more!” But then he was taken in a carriage to the Eastern Market [to be 
executed]. There [Shi] Chong sighed: “Slaves will profit from the wealth of my family.” The 
man who had arrested him answered: “If you knew that wealth may lead to doom, why did you 
not get rid of it earlier?” Chong was unable to answer. Chong‟s mother, elder brother, wife and 
children were all slain regardless of their age. There were more than fifteen victims. Shi Chong 
was fifty two years old … When Emperor Huidi returned to the throne [following the execution 
of Prince of Zhao] he decreed to re-bury [Shi Chong] with honors belonging to a court minister. 




The rehabilitation of Shi Chong was easily justified by his leading role in a frustrated 
attempt to remove ambitious regent and replace him with Sima Yun Prince of Huainan 淮南
王司馬允 who, being a brother to the emperor, was considered to be more fitting as a 
champion of the imperial house.
316
 This conspiracy, albeit unsuccessful, redeemed the 
political blunder of Shi Chong‟s inopportune connection with Jia Mi and qualified him for 
posthumous rewards as a righteous minister who was not hesitant to defy the usurper and 
sacrifice his life for the well-being of the dynasty. However, such was not the case of Zhang 
Hua, the leading member of the Jia faction and yet, Sima Jiong did attempt to rehabilitate him 
as well: 
    
“Later when [Sima] Lun and [Sun] Xiu suffered execution, [Sima] Jiong, Prince of Qi, 
assumed power as regent [to the emperor]. Yu Zhi sent Jiong a following communication: 
“After Zhang Hua was killed I entered the Secretariat (zhongshusheng 中書省) and found the 
original draft of Hua‟s answer to a decree of the late emperor. The late emperor was asking Hua 
who could be entrusted with regency and assigned the great responsibility of managing the 
affairs [of the state] after [emperor‟s death]. Hua‟s answer was: “In both bright virtue and 
closeness of blood nobody can surpass the late prince (he is referring to the then still living 
Sima You prince of Qi, younger brother of Wudi and father to the Prince of Qi who is the 
addressee of Yu Zhi‟s letter). It would be fitting to detain him [in the capital] as guardian of the 
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altars of soil and grain.” Indeed, he may be in nether world, yet his honest and loyal advice, his 
sincere and earnest words are outstanding even after his death. He cannot be mentioned in the 
same breath with those moving with the times, seeking temporary ease [and accommodating to 
current conditions]. Those discussing [his deeds tend to] blame [Zhang] Hua that in the matter 
of [deposing and assassination] of the Crown Prince Minhuai he did not stand fast to the moral 
principle and did not fight for him in the court [conference]. At that time all the remonstrants 
ought to have merited death for disobeying orders. [However according to] the teaching of the 
sages of yore [someone‟s] death is not held against people unless they profit by it. Thus, Yan 
Ying was a righteous dignitary in Qi and yet, he did not die during the disaster of Cui Zhu. Ji 
Zha was a venerated minister of Wu and yet, he did not criticize [anything] for going [either] 
against the principles or being in harmony with them. To exhaust one‟s reason and still achieve 
nothing, that is something that the teaching of the sages would originally not blame on anyone.” 
Thereupon [Sima] Jiong petitioned the throne: “Your subject has heard that to make flourish 
what has once declined and to pick up the threads of something that has been severed was the 
noble policy of the sagely kings and that to censure the evil and praise the good was the 
beautiful intent of the Springs and Autumns. That is why King Wuwang had a mound raised 
over the grave of Bi Gan and had Shang Rong praised in the neighborhood. Thus the causes of 
evil and good are truly intertwined. Sun Xiu rose in rebellion, annihilated the domain [lords] 
who had assisted with the establishing of the mandate and executed principled and honest 
ministers of the state in order to cut down the imperial house and indulge his viciousness and 
cruelty. Many an offspring of a meritorious minister was exterminated. Zhang Hua and Pei Wei 
were both executed because they were feared [as righteous ministers], Xie Xi and Xie Jie were 
both slaughtered as lambs. Ouyang Jian and others died innocent and all the people felt pity for 
them. Now Your Majesty‟s [aura] shines more than Sun and Moon as you have ushered in the 
new reign of reform, yet these noble lords still haven‟t been favored by your grace. In the past 
[the great aristocratic houses of] Luan and Xi sank in standing to become mere slaves and the 
Spring and Autumn Annals pass it down as erroneous. King Youwang cut off the lines of 
descent of the meritorious ministers and discarded the offspring of the wise ones and the poet(s) 
criticized him for it. Your subject may be unworthy of a high office he holds, yet his thoughts 
are those of utmost sincerity. If it meets wish of [Your Majesty‟s] sagely [mind], let the officials 
be ordered to thoroughly deliberate [upon this matter].” Each of the discussants had a view of 
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Sima Jiong‟s initiative to rehabilitate Zhang Hua and to restore to him his peerage 
dignity was obviously motivated not only by the need to discredit the perpetrator of his death 
but also by feelings of personal gratitude to the man who had supported Sima Jiong‟s late 
father, Sima You, recommending him to Wudi as a possible regent for his successor and 
executor of his last will.
318
 These are distant echos of the succession struggle which had 
occurred before Wudi decided to settle the succession upon future Huidi. Sima You was for 
some time considered to be prospective heir and if Wudi had not changed his mind it would 
have been Sima You and in turn his son Sima Jiong who would have sit upon the Jin throne. 
Clearly, Prince of Qi was well aware of it and his ambition in this respect was soon to cause 
alarm among his princely cousins.   
In case of Zhang Hua, Jiong‟s rehabilitation effort ended in failure. Unlike Shi Chong, 
Zhang Hua was the main minister of Empress Jia‟s government and therefore he was 
universally held morally responsible for the actions of the meddlesome empress and her 
haughty family. He was especially blamed for his failing in preventing the murder of the 
crown prince Minhuai in 300 AD. Apart from the fact that Minhuai‟s death meant direct 
threat to primogeniturial succession it also jeopardized the legitimacy of the imperial rule as it 
opened the door to ambitious Prince of Zhao and following usurpation: 
  
“Minister of Works (sikong 司空) Zhang Hua was executed by Lun, [Prince of Zhao] 
and [after the prince‟s fall] the advisers reassessed his case and wanted to restore him to his 
original peerage dignity], but Ji Shao protested: “When a subject serves his lord he is bound to 
remove the obstacles and dispel confusion. When [Zhang] Hua served in official positions of 
both central and provincial government, even though there were some things which were good, 
his blame [meriting] death is apparent far and wide. For the one who had ushered in the disaster 
and started the chaos was [no other than] Zhang Hua. In the past when Zheng suppressed the 
upheaval of Yougong, the coffin of Zijia was hacked [to pieces] and when Lu punished Yin‟s 
crime, the chapters [of the Annals] in the end censured Hui. Even not being able to bear [Zhang 
Hua‟s] heavy punishment is serious enough! [Let alone the effort to restore his dignity.] 
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Sima Jiong did not live to see Zhang Hua restored to his dignities, yet the worsening 
political situation with various princes vying for power and legitimacy called for pragmatic 
reassessment of previous decisions. No opportunity was to be lost which would enable the 
princes to appear as a restorer of the order and therefore eventually even Zhang Hua was 
posthumously fully rehabilitated and officially proclaimed innocent victim of a rebellious 
traitor: 
  
[Certain] Zhu Dao, a subject of Zhuangwu Dukedom, also approached Prince of 
Changsha and beseeched him to restore Zhang Hua‟s noble dignity but he [remained] hesitant 
for a long time. In the second year of the Tai‟an Era (302 AD) the following imperial edict was 
issued: “Love and hate are combating one another and treason and evil abhor uprightness. It has 
been always so since the ancient times. Late Minister of Works (sikong 司空 ) Duke of 
Zhuangwu [Zhang] Hua exhausted his loyalty and honesty, pondering the affairs of state and 
assisting the government. His achievements of devising [the strategies] and planning [the 
policies were great] and [We] have relied on him in every single matter. Previously, because of 
his merit of aiding [the government] it was suitable [for him] to be enfeoffed [as others], yet 
[Zhang] Hua had firmly refused up to eight or nine times widely explaining the great system [of 
state?] but he was unable to achieve anything. In the end he expressed his worries of [lurking] 
peril and [possible] humiliation and his protestations refusing [the honor] were so earnest that 
they sufficed to persuade everyone both far and near. Hua‟s sincerity [must have been] received 
from the gods. For his achievement on conquering Wu [Zhang] Hua received noble dignity from 
the late emperor. Later [he argued] that since the enfeoffment is not one of the main institutions 
of the state, it is inappropriate to increase the previous great reward for [any subsequent] small 
achievement. As for Hua‟s murder, he was wantonly assassinated, [becoming] innocent [victim 
of the] treacherous rebels who were plotting mischief. [The original] offices of Palace Attendant 
(shizhong 侍中), Secretariat Supervisor (zhongshujian 中書監), Minister of Works, duke and 
Marquis of Guangwu shall be restored to [Zhang] Hua together with the confiscated property as 
well as official seals, ribbons, tallies and other insignias. An imperial messenger shall be sent to 




The alliance of the imperial princes did not survive long the accomplishment of its 
purpose. Whereas Jiong of Qi seized the reins of government other princes withdrew to their 
regional commands where they waited gathering forces and watching the actions of Prince of 
Qi with mounting concern. Mutual distrust grew into poorly concealed enmity as the old 
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rivalries between the different branches of the imperial family gradually resurfaced. The 
unfortunate question of seniority of the main imperial lineage contested by the Qi princely 
line in the end cost Sima Jiong his life. Brothers of the emperor felt more entitled to regency 
for the inept ruler and one of them, Sima Yi, Prince of Changsha 長沙王司馬乂, staged a 
coup early in 303 AD and had Jiong of Qi killed.
321
 Successful military action was again 
followed by promotion of meritorious commanders and advisors as well as executions and 
demotions of the members of the losing party whose noble dignities were forfeited:
322
 
    
“For the achievement of following His Imperial Majesty in chastising [Sima] Jiong 




“After [Sima] Jiong, [Prince of Qi] was executed, [Gu] Rong was enfeoffed for merit of 
chastising [prince‟s henchman] Ge Yu as Count of Jiaxing and was transferred to position of 
palace cadet to the crown prince (taizi zhongshuzi 太子中庶子).”324  
 
Due to the rising political instability it was increasingly hard for succeeding regents 
and princely protectors of the realm to retain not only their position but also their moral credit 
and legitimacy of their authority. With one regent being replaced by another in ever faster 
succession of military coups and uprisings the validity of the claims to power of any new 
regent was seriously impaired. A political rival had to be declared a rebel in order to justify 
the violent action taken against him as a necessary punitive measure sanctioned by the throne. 
The question of high moral ground became highly important as the inflated frequency of the 
supposed usurpation attempts discredited all future attempts to “save the throne.” The 
strategic use of the enfeoffment and posthumous restoring of the honors for both their 
practical and symbolic value which was developed gradually since the death of Emperor 
Wudi was now employed on a regular basis. As every new would-be regent was eager to 
appear as a restorer of the order the restoring of noble dignities, titles and honors previously 
abolished by their political opponents became the norm during every subsequent power 
struggle. It goes without saying that political rehabilitation of the “victims” was accompanied 
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by elimination of the partisans of one‟s predecessor and forfeiture of the dignities bestowed 
upon them during his rule:
325
   
 
“Liu Tun was promoted to Princely Administrator (neishi 内史) of Taiyuan. When 
[Sima] Lun Prince of Zhao usurped the throne he bestowed on him title of General Fighting the 
Caitiffs (zhenglu jiangjun 征虜將軍) but he did not accept this [appointment] and instead joined 
the righteous uprising of the three princes. When Emperor Huidi returned to the throne [Liu] 
Tun was made Assistant Director of the Left in the Department of State Affairs (zuocheng 左丞) 
and as he was strict and unyielding in [discharging the duties of his office] the three agencies 
became earnest and impartial … When [Sima] Yi Prince of Changsha chastised [Sima] Jiong 
Prince of Qi, [Liu] Tun participated in planning the whole action and was [duly] enfeoffed as 
prefecture duke of Zhuxu with apanage of one thousand eight hundred households. But after 
Yi‟s death he was sentenced [as his partisan] to the loss of office … When Emperor Huidi 
graced Chang‟an with his presence he left Liu Tun behind to defend Luoyang. [Sima] Yong 
Prince of Hejian sent a messenger to poison Empress Yang, but Tun together with Vice Director 
of the Department of State Affairs of the temporary government (liutai puye 留臺僕射) Xun 
Fan and Governor of Metropolitan Area (Henan yin 河南尹) Zhou Fu petitioned him arguing 
that the empress was innocent [of all charges] … When Yong saw the memorandum, he seethed 
with rage and sent Chen Yan and Lü Lang leading five thousand riders to detain [Liu] Tun. Tun 
fled eastwards to [Sima] Lüe Prince of Gaomi … when Huidi came back to Luoyang Empress 
Yang returned to the palace. She sent a messenger to Liu Tun expressing her thanks: “All what 
is happening now is possible only because of loyal and sincere intents of Metropolitan 
Commandant (sili 司隷) Liu (i.e. you)!” For the old achievements the peerage dignity was 
restored to him and he became Additional Grand Master of Splendid Happiness (jia guanglu 
dafu 加光祿大夫).”326 
 
The achievements leading to the enfeoffment of Suo Jing 索靖 are also connected to 
the campaign against Jiong of Qi launched in 303 AD, nevertheless Suo Jing did not act in 
service to prince of Changsha in Luoyang but as a commander of Sima Yong Prince of Hejian 
河間王司馬顒, regional commander of Guanzhong and another important player in power 
struggle of the imperial princes:
327
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“During the Yuankang Era (291-299 AD) the Western Rongs rebelled and [Suo] Jing 
was appointed Left Commander (zuo sima 左司馬) to General-in-chief (dajiangjun 大將軍) 
Sima Rong, Prince of Liang. With honorific title of General Sweeping off the Bandits (dangkou 
jiangjun 蕩寇將軍) he stationed his troops in Suyi from where he assaulted the bandits and 
defeated them. Then he was promoted to Princely Administrator (neishi 内史) of Shiping. When 
Lun, Prince of Zhao, usurped the throne Suo Jing joined the righteous uprising of the three 
princes and as Left General of the Guard (zuo weijiangjun 左衛將軍) he achieved some merit 
on chastising Sun Xiu. Therefore, he was made Concurrent Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary 
(sanji changshi 散騎常侍) and promoted to General of the Rear (houjiangjun 后將軍). At the 
end of the Tai„an Era (302-303 AD) [Sima] Yong, Prince of Hejian, raised an army and 
[marched] on Luoyang. Suo Jing was Commissioned with Extraordinary Powers (shichijie 使持
節 ) to direct all the military affairs of the City of Luo and appointed General Striking 
Unexpectedly (youji jiangjun 遊擊將軍 ) commanding the righteous forces of Yongzhou, 
Qinzhou and Liangzhou. They engaged the insurgents and routed them but Suo Jing was 
wounded and died. Posthumously he was given title of Chamberlain for Ceremonials (taichang 
太常). He was sixty five years old. Later he was posthumously granted title of Minister of 





As the power struggle between the princes of the blood and descendants of Emperor 
Wudi continued unabated, other noble dignities were later awarded to courtiers and 
commanders, who had somehow contributed to the downfall of another of Huidi‟s brothers, 
Sima Ying, Prince of Chengdu, self-proclaimed heir apparent who tried to monopolize the 




“When [Sima] Lun Prince of Zhao was allowed to commit suicide [Sima] Jiong Prince 
of Qi became regent and again made [Gao] Guang Chamberlain for Law Enforcement (tingwei 
廷尉) and promoted him to the post of Imperial Secretary (shangshu 尚書) and Concurrent 
Commandant-in-chief of Chariots (fengche duwei 奉車都尉). Later he followed his Imperial 
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Majesty in chastising [Sima] Ying Prince of Chengdu and for his achievements was enfeoffed 




“Later [Wen Xian] followed his Imperial Majesty in chastising [Sima] Ying Prince of 
Chengdu and for his achievements was enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Daling with apanage of 




In summer of 306 AD Emperor Huidi who had been previously forced to resettle in 
Chang‟an under control of Prince of Hejian returned triumphantly back to Luoyang. He was 
welcomed by Sima Yue Prince of Donghai who placed himself in charge of the government. 
The war of the Eight Princes was almost over. The remnants of the independent forces of 
princes of Hejian and Chengdu were defeated and dispersed and both rivals eventually met 
their death. Yue of Donghai emerged as a sole victor of the internecine struggle with no other 
imperial prince being strong enough to challenge the authority he exercised over the court and 
the emperor.
332
 Emperor‟s return was accompanied by the last large-scale enfeoffment of the 
Western Jin when the newly restored imperial court under Prince of Donghai‟s supervision 
granted generous rewards to all those who had somehow contributed to the war effort aimed 
against princes of Chengdu and Hejian and made return to Luoyang possible. The new 
peerages and lordships were officially bestowed in acknowledgement of the ultimate 
achievement “of welcoming His Imperial Majesty” (ying jia zhi gong 迎駕之功) back from 
humiliating captivity of Chang‟an.
333
 
Not much has changed for the emperor, though. As so many times in his life he 
remained just a puppet in hands of a powerful clansman who was to reign in his name. 
Nevertheless, the appearances of legitimate authority seriously damaged by disastrous 
military defeat at Dangyin 蕩陰 and subsequent abduction of the sovereign were successfully 
restored. This “return to normal state of affairs” was symbolically confirmed by assessing past 
merits and revising judgments passed by various warring princes. By this time it was already 
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an established tradition for a victorious prince to reward one‟s followers with noble dignities, 
yet the situation of Prince of Donghai was slightly different. The victory might have left him 
with no serious political opponents but the empire now faced much greater danger of rival 
imperial regimes founded by various non-Han insurgents during the years of the civil disorder 
challenging the supreme authority of the Jin Son of Heaven and raiding the area under his 
control. Wrecked country ravaged by incessant warfare and court suffering from years of 
political infighting were in great need of consolidation in order to be able to maintain its 
existence vis-à-vis aggressive rival regimes. Yue of Donghai had to rally all possible support 
for the dynasty and strengthen the bonds of loyalty which might have got weekend as the 
years of suicidal faction struggle without doubt seriously discredited the dynastic cause. 
Therefore, apart from customary rewards to his own followers he was careful to bestow noble 
dignities also on men of local influence who might prove to be valuable allies of the court in 
its quest for re-establishing the order:  
    
“When [Sima] Yue, Prince of Donghai, welcomed the imperial equipage (i.e. the 
emperor) [back to Luoyang, Liu] Hong sent his Adjutant (canjun 參軍) Liu Pan to be Protector-
general (duhu 督護) and led all his forces to join Prince of Donghai. When Liu Pan returned he 
planned to resign from his office of Regional Inspector and Commandant (xiaowei 校尉) and 
was just about to distribute units under his command [to his generals and officers] for he felt old 
and infirm. Before he could have petitioned the court [and ask for permission] he had died in 
Xiangyang. Men and women mourned and lamented [his death] as if they had lost their own kin! 
Initially, when [Sima] Ying, Prince of Chengdu, fled to the South he wanted to go to his fief but 
[Liu] Hong cut him off [preventing his reaching the fief]. And when Liu Hong died, his 
Commander (sima 司馬) Guo Mai wanted to raise Sima Ying as a [new] master, but Liu Hong‟s 
son Liu Fan respected his father‟s intent even after his death and in black hempen mourning 
clothes led the soldiers of the office to deal with Guo Mai. The battle was fought on the Zhuo 
River where [Liu Fan] cut off [Guo Mai‟s] head and peace and tranquility was restored in [the 
regions] of Xiang[yang] and Mian. Initially [Sima] Yue, Prince of Donghai distrusted [Liu] 
Hong and Liu Qiao suspecting them of disloyalty to himself and even though [Liu Hong] 
resigned from his office the prince was still worried. [But] when Hong cut off [Sima] Ying 
[from his fief] and now Fan again beheaded Guo Mai, the court rejoiced and Yue [of Donghai] 
wrote a letter to Liu Fan in his own hand praising him highly. [At the same time] he also 
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petitioned the throne having Liu Hong posthumously promoted to commandery duke of 




Obviously, even though Sima Yue initially did not trust the Lius who remained more 
or less independent of the central government in Luoyang, he appreciated their loyalty when 
they denied support to defeated Prince of Chengdu and had Liu Hong 劉弘 posthumously 
enfeoffed as commandery duke of Xincheng 新城郡公. Despite its having been conferred 
posthumously it was no empty ceremonial gesture for this highest peerage dignity was of 
course heritable and Liu Hong‟s son Liu Fan 劉璠 would duly succeed to the title. As he had 
inherited the command of his father‟s troops and presumably remained in control of the large 
territory in today‟s Hubei the question of Liu Fan‟s allegiance was very important and the 
enfeoffment should have secured his loyalty for the future.  
The enfeoffment apparently may have served as a means how to win over potentially 
disloyal regional commanders as well as a kind of compensation for military authority which 
Sima Yue was forced to take from them in the process of consolidation of the dynastic power:  
 
“At the beginning [Sima] Yue Prince of Donghai was very grateful to [Gou] Xi 
(regional military commander of Yanzhou) for avenging his shame and took him in [as member 
of his entourage] handling official business and they became sworn brothers. Yue‟s Commander 
(sima 司馬) Pan Tao admonished him: “Yanzhou is [a region] of utmost strategic importance 
with which Wei Wu[di] (Cao Cao) assisted the House of Han as its  prime minister. Gou Xi is a 
man of great ambition, not a loyal minister. If you let him occupy that position for [too] long, a 
peril shall arise from among your trusted retainers. If you transfer him to Qingzhou and promote 
him in rank and title Gou Xi is bound to be pleased. Your lordship should shepherd Yanzhou 
yourself and thence administer the realm and protect the court. That is what is meant by 
planning before the emergency arises and acting before the trouble starts.” Yue thought it 
prudent and therefore promoted [Gou] Xi to the Great General Campaigning in the East 
(zhengdong dajiangjun 征東大將軍), Commander Unequalled in Honor (kaifu yitong sansi 開
府儀同三司), Concurrent Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中) Commissioned with Warrant (jiajie 
假節 ), Commander-in-chief (dudu 都督 ) [supervising] all military affairs of Qingzhou, 
Concurrent Regional Inspector of Qingzhou (ling cishi 領刺史 ) and he was promoted to 
commandery duke [of Dongping].”
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Sima Yue‟s effort to restore working imperial court and revive the feelings of 
affiliation with the dynasty manifests itself also by his willingness to take into his service 
advisors and officials who had previously served his rivals. At the same time his willingness 
was probably motivated by other reasons of rather practical nature. Despite the overall 
violence of the civil war the individual coups of the contending princes were generally not 
accompanied by extensive purges in the official ranks. Apart from a few closest followers of a 
defeated claimant who had been singled out to be made an example of and publicly executed 
the court officials generally tended to be absolved. After so many military coups and power 
takeovers there was hardly any official left who would have not served under at least one of 
the warring princes. If Sima Yue wanted to unite the court he had to transcend not only the 
faction bickering and old jealousies but also the past differences in allegiance of the 
respective courtiers:        
 
 “[Wang Cheng] was eventually promoted to position of Gentleman Retainer (congshi 
zhonglang 從事中郎) to [Sima] Ying Prince of Chengdu. Ying‟s favorite Meng Jiu had secretly 
killed Lu Ji and his brother [Lu Yun] and [Everyone] in all under heaven gnashed his teeth [in 
resentment]. [Wang] Cheng revealed that Meng Jiu has wrought his private vengeance upon 
[the Lu brothers] and persuades Ying to kill Meng Jiu and indeed, Ying had him duly executed. 
There was none among both gentlemen and commoners who would have not praised him. After 
[Sima] Ying‟s defeat [Sima] Yue Prince of Donghai invited him to be his Administrator to 
Minister of Works (sikong zhangshi 司空長史). For his merit on receiving His Imperial Majesty 




Despite their involvement in Sima Ying‟s military actions against the court Lu Ji 陸機 
and his brother Lu Yun 陸雲 were respected members of the officialdom venerated for their 
literary talents and their wrongful death caused by scheming of a detestable eunuch caused 
considerable outcry. The fact that Wang Cheng 王澄 won high esteem of the court for his 
redressing of what was generally considered to be a great injustice, was without doubt 
important factor influencing prince‟s decision. The political legitimacy which could be 
derived from the symbolic role of restorer of the order was as important for Sima Yue as for 
any of his predecessors. Thus we come back to the fate of Wei Guan and his family who fell 
victim of a ruthless prince right at the beginning of the disorder: 
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“When [Sima] Wei Prince of Chu set a trap for [Wei] Guan, [his son Wei] Heng had 
heard about the coup. He crept through a hole in the wall [and went to] call upon He Shao, 
father of his sister-in-law, to ask him what was going on. [Even though] He Shao knew he did 
not tell him. [And so it happened, that when Wei] Heng returned home, he passed the kitchen 
where the people sent to detain them were just eating [their supper]. Thus [Heng] met his death. 
Later he was posthumously named Commandant of Changshui (changshui xiaowei 長水校尉), 
and he had been granted posthumous name of Lanling Heir Zhen (Lanling Zhen shizi 蘭陵貞世
子). He had two sons, [Wei] Zao and [Wei] Jie. Zao … succeeded to [Wei] Guan‟s peerage. 
Later [Sima] Yue Prince of Donghai enlarged his fief by adding [the territory of] Lanling and 
changed his enfeoffment to commandery duke of Jiangxia with apanage of eight thousand five 
hundred households. When Emperor Huaidi ascended the throne he was named Gentleman 
Cavalier Attendant (sanji shilang 散騎侍郎). In the fifth year of the Yongjia Era (311 AD) he 
died at the hands of Liu Cong (lord of Zhao). Emperor Yuandi made [Wei] Guan‟s great-great-




Even though Wei Guan had been posthumously rehabilitated shortly after his death he 
remained sort of paradigmatic innocent victim of an unacceptable act of arbitrary violence 
associated with the power struggle of the princes and various court sections. Sima Yue 
decided to use it yet again in order to add much needed legitimacy to his own authority 
through formally redressing iniquities both imagined and real. Being a meritorious minister of 
Emperor Wudi Wei Guan was apparently considered important enough for his lineage to be 
preserved and peerage restored even under the Eastern Jin. Formal re-enfeoffment of Wei 
Guan‟s descendant which was by no means usual practice of Yuandi‟s court attests to Wei 
Guan‟s importance as a symbol of legitimacy connecting the émigré regime in the South with 
the dynastic founders.  
The last two passages also record cases of posthumous political rehabilitation initiated 
by Prince of Donghai, but at the same time they enable us to follow the turns of family 
fortune closely mirroring various political changes and show the mechanism of usage of the 
enfeoffment system for its symbolic legitimizing value in a nutshell. The first excerpt details 
the career of Bian Cui 卞粹, Viscount and later Duke of Chengyang 成陽 who had acquired 
his peerage dignity already in 291 AD for staying aloof of Yang Jun:  
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“At the beginning of Huidi‟s reign [Bian Cui] became Secretarial Court Gentleman 
(shangshulang 尚書郎). [At that time] Yang Jun held reins of government in his hands and 
many people attached themselves to him but [Bian] Cui remained upright and honest and did 
not [try to] ingratiate himself [with Yang Jun]. After Jun‟s execution [Bian Cui] was 
preferentially promoted to Assistant Director of the Right in the Department of State Affairs 
(youcheng 右丞) and enfeoffed as Viscount of Chengyang. Soon he was further promoted 
attaining the rank of General of the Right Army (youjun jiangjun 右軍將軍). When Zhang Hua 
was executed, Bian Cui as his son-in-law was deprived of his office. When [Sima] Jiong, Prince 
of Qi acted as a regent, [Bian Cui] became Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中), Secretariat 
Director (zhongshuling 中書令) and was promoted in rank to ducal dignity. But when [Sima] Yi 
Prince of Changsha monopolized power at court, Bian Cui maintained stern expression during 
the audiences and Yi was afraid of him and had him killed … when this disaster struck the 
family, [Bian Cui‟s eldest son Bian Hu] returned to his ancestral home. [Only] during the 
Yongjia Era (307-312 AD) he was appointed Editorial Director (zhuzuolang 著作郎) and 




Bian Cui‟s career suffered a setback when Prince of Zhao assumed power in 301 AD 
due to his unfortunate family connection with Zhang Hua who had been singled out as a 
principle accomplice of the crimes perpetrated by Empress Jia. However, as a victim of a 
treacherous usurper Sima Lun of Zhao he was rehabilitated and promoted to the rank of a 
duke soon after Jiong of Qi took over the power. Even though he had retained his title even 
after the fall of Prince of Qi, his badly concealed disapproval of Jiong‟s murderer made Prince 
of Changsha uneasy and cost Bian Cui his life. We don‟t know whether he was publicly 
executed as a supporter of Jiong of Qi or secretly murdered, nevertheless unlike other Jiong‟s 
partisans his family was certainly not wiped out for his son Bian Hu 卞壺 was allowed to 
retreat to family ancestral home. The ducal title, however, went into abeyance and it was only 
during the reign of Huaidi when Sima Yue of Donghai was in charge of state affairs that Bian 
Hu was recalled and officially succeeded to his father‟s ducal peerage.  
Besides recording vicissitude of a peerage dignity during Upheaval of the Eight 
Princes the passage also points to yet another factor influencing the demotion-rehabilitation 
dynamics. We have seen that the closest supporters of a defeated princely claimant usually 
did not survive his fall and at least some of the noble dignities bestowed by his order were 
forfeited as soon as a different court faction assumed power. Yet, there were also titles which 
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survived and were accepted by the victorious faction. Even though Bian Cui suffered 
demotion for being son-in-law to Zhang Hua he was not deprived of his viscountcy. 
Apparently Lun of Zhao was satisfied with having Bian Cui removed from office for the 
dynastic history does not mention any subsequent restitution of a noble dignity. Jiong of Qi 
had him simply promoted in rank and summoned to serve as a Palace Attendant. 
It appears that officials associated with a losing claimant may have suffered demotion 
but they usually retained their noble dignities unless they had directly participated in various 
offences a prince was blamed of or they actively defied the authority of a righteous restorer of 
the order. In that case the peerages and lordships were abolished. It seems possible that in 
politically volatile environment it was not prudent to deter possible supporters by stripping 
them off their noble titles, even though these may have been granted under the aegis of their 
rivals. The erstwhile opponents should have been won over and not turned into bitter enemies. 
The authority of the princes was lacking any institutional foundation and therefore was 
largely dependent on their current military might as well as on willingness of the court to 
support them. Their being members of the imperial clan did not entitle them to rule either the 
court or the empire. The princes needed obedient cooperation of the court dignitaries in order 
to establish semblance of normalcy which provided desired legitimacy of their rule. Thus they 
might have summarily dealt with the closest partisans of their rival but were careful not to set 
the court against themselves by any unwarranted reassessment of the past dignity grants. 
Unlike Bian Cui, Ji Shao 嵇紹 was actually deprived of his peerage dignity and 
demoted to the status of a commoner because he had actively opposed Ying of Chengdu 
personally leading the imperial guards in an attempt to defend Luoyang against prince‟s 
attack. Nevertheless Ji Shao‟s career and fate of his noble dignity confirm the importance of 
the court opinion for the legitimacy of the princely dictators who made quite an effort to 
appear as righteous rulers appreciating straightforward honesty and moral integrity of fearless 
courtiers, steadfastly loyal to their dynasty and ready to risk their lives for it. We have met Ji 
Shao as principled official who had shunned the overbearing Jia Mi and his associates which 
earned him viscountcy of Yiyang 弋陽 in 301 AD. Later he fearlessly criticized Jiong of Qi 
and his style of government and opposed his plan to have Zhang Hua rehabilitated. His 
unyielding moral stance won him reputation of a selfless and true subject of the dynasty 
which was fully justified by his sacrificing one‟s life for the emperor during the battle of 
Dangyin:   
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 “When [Sima] Yong Prince of Hejian and [Sima] Ying Prince of Chengdu raised an 
army and marched upon the capital city in order to get [the court] rid of [Sima] Yi Prince of 
Changsha, His Imperial Majesty dwelled [with the army] east of the city. Yi of Changsha made 
public proclamation addressing the [royal] host: “Today we shall fight in the west. Whom 
would you like to have as your commander?” The officers of the six royal armies replied: “If 
only Palace Attendant Ji [Shao] would join hands [with us] and lead the van then the death 
would be no different from life.” Hence Ji Shao was appointed General Pacifying the West 
Commissioned with Extraordinary Powers (shichijie pingxi jiangjun 使持節平西將軍). When 
Yi of Changsha was apprehended, Shao reverted to his original position of Palace Attendant. 
Everyone from great ministers and princes of the realm down repaired to Ye to beg Sima Ying 
for mercy. Ji Shao and others were all deprived of their offices and demoted to commoners. 
Soon, the court launched its northern campaign and Shao was summoned [to the presence] and 
his peerage was restored to him. Aware of [gravity of the situation when the emperor was 
practically forced] to exile, he obeyed the edict and rushed to the presence [of the emperor]. 
Exactly at that moment the imperial force was routed at Dangyin and there was none of the 
attending officials or imperial guardsmen who would not [forsake the emperor] and scatter in all 
directions. Only Ji Shao, majestic and solemn in his black court robe and high ceremonial cap 
defended the emperor with his own body. As the forces clashed around the imperial equipage, 
flying arrows were thick as rain. Thus, Ji Shao was slain by emperor‟s side and his blood 
stained the imperial garment. The Son of Heaven sighed and mourned for him very deeply. 
When everything calmed down, the emperor‟s retinue wanted to wash the clothes but the 
emperor would not let them: “That‟s Palace Attendant Shao‟s blood. Don‟t remove it!” … 
When Zhang Fang forced the emperor to move [the court] to Chang‟an [Sima] Yong, Prince of 
Hejian, petitioned the throne to award Ji Shao posthumously with the title Minister of Works 
(sikong 司空) and to promote him in rank to ducal dignity. But then it happened that the 
emperor returned to Luoyang and this business came to naught. When [Sima] Yue, Prince of 
Donghai stationed his troops in Xu[chang], he was once travelling through Xingyang where he 
passed Ji Shao‟s grave. He bemoaned [his death] expressing profound grief. He had a stone stele 
carved and erected [by the grave] and again petitioned [the throne] to bestow [upon him] 
posthumous office and noble rank. Then the emperor sent an imperial messenger with a letter 
patent posthumously appointing [Ji Shao] Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中), Grand Master for 
Splendid Happiness (guanglu dafu 光祿大夫) with golden seal and purple ribbon and creating 
him Marquis [of Yiyang]. He was further granted one qing of fields [for the upkeep of the] 
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Through his death at the side of Emperor Huidi Ji Shao became a potent symbol of 
staunch loyalty. Unlike the princes whose professions of loyalty were only a pretension for 
manipulating the emperor and acting in his name Ji Shao actually died in defense of the 
emperor, protecting him by his own body while assaulted by one of the “loyal” princely 
guardians of the throne. As so many of his colleagues he was caught in between various 
princes vying for power being forced to watch how the imperial kin usurps the authority 
which otherwise would have been theirs because only they were legitimate executors of the 
emperor‟s will as members of the state bureaucracy. Ji Shao died a martyr to the righteous 
cause of the Jin, true subject to his sovereign and moral hero respected by the court society. It 
was already Yong of Hejian who had tried to use this aspect of Ji Shao‟s death for 
legitimizing his own authority. He hoped to secure sympathy of the court officialdom through 
suggesting rehabilitation of Ji Shao and bestowal of the highest possible peerage. Yet the 
victorious campaign of Yue of Donghai compelled Yong to release the emperor from his 
custody before the promotion had taken place. It was to be Yue of Donghai who in the end 
took advantage of still unresolved case of Ji Shao‟s evaluation and validated his standing of 
the ultimate winner and restorer of the order by initiating a grant of a marquisate in due 
appreciation of his dauntless deed.     
    
Ritual Ennoblement of the Scions of the Former Ruling Houses 
 
Another interesting aspect of the symbolic use of the system of titled nobility was 
ritual enfeoffment of members of the former ruling families. Shortly after the establishment of 
the Jin Dynasty former rulers and some imperial princes of the blood were granted high 
peerage titles in order to become successors of the ruling lineages and continue the sacrifices 
offered to the emperors and kings of old. The pride of place naturally belonged to the 
abdicated last emperor of the Wei Dynasty, Cao Huan 曹奐 who was created Prince of 
Chenliu 陳留王 and became the premier prince of the realm enjoying precedence over even 
the most senior of the Jin princes of the blood: 
  
“In the first year of the Taishi Era (265/266 AD) in the winter, in the twelfth month on 
the day dingmao the Chamberlain for the Imperial Stud (taipu 太僕) Liu Yuan was sent to the 
ancestral temple to announce [the founding of the dynasty to the ancestors]. The Wei emperor 
[Cao Huan] was enfeoffed as Prince of Chenliu with apanage of ten thousand households. He 
245 
 





“In the first year of the Taishi era (265/266 AD) in the winter, in the twelfth month … 
on the day yisi an imperial edict [allowed] Prince of Chenliu to hoist the imperial standard of the 
Son of Heaven. He was equipped with attendant carriages of the five seasons. He was to use the 
calendar and the imperial era of the Wei and he should offer sacrifices to heaven and earth at the 
suburban altar. The rites and ritual music were all to follow the old customs of the Wei. When 
petitioning the throne [the prince] was not to refer to himself as subject (chen 臣).”341   
 
Privileges conferred upon the deposed emperor were clearly exceptional. From the 
ritual point of view he was to enjoy a semi-independent status symbolized by his right to 
maintain original calendar of the Wei. As the acceptance or rejection of the dynastic calendar 
was generally considered to be a sign of either submission to or rebellion against the 
sovereign authority of the emperor permission of maintaining calendar of a deposed dynasty 
must be viewed as an important concession. Cao Huan was to reside in Yecheng 鄴城 
traditional seat of the Cao family ever since the end of the Han when it became center of the 
newly formed fief of Wei, private domain of Cao Cao. Residing in the original detached 
imperial palace, Cao Huan retained even some ritual prerogatives of the emperor as he was 
permitted to perform annual sacrifices at the suburban altar (jiao 郊), presumably also located 
in Yecheng. Because this important sacrificial rite propitiating heavenly deities was under 
normal circumstances reserved for the sovereign emperor, by performing it the Prince of 
Chenliu was in a way acting as an emperor in his own domain of Ye. As the enfeoffment 
system itself, granting of high noble titles to ex-rulers was also inspired by notions of the 
ancient and glorious Zhou. By giving Cao Huan highly privileged position as a vassal lord of 
the original ancestral home area of the Wei Wudi was re-enacting the enfeoffment of the 
Shang princes by King Wuwang of Zhou 周武王 following the battle of Muye 牧野 when a 
son of deposed tyrant Di Xin 帝辛 was created lord of the original Shang 商 core region.            
Creation of the Chenliu princedom should have ensured ritual continuation of the Wei 
imperial line and worship of dynastic ancestors who after all used to be legitimate sovereigns 
and as such were important sources of legitimacy for all Jin emperors who presented 
themselves as their rightful successors. Unfortunately, as the titled members of the ex-ruling 
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families generally did not figure prominently in the politics of the dynasty they did not merit 
personal biographies in the dynastic history (with the only exception of Cao Zhi 曹志) and 
therefore we are left with not much more than dates of accession and death of respective 
princes and peers mentioned in the basic annals: 
 
“In the first year of the Xianhe Era (326 AD) during the winter in the tenth month a 
great-great-grandson of Emperor Wudi of Wei (Cao Cao) Cao Mai was enfeoffed as prince of 




“In the second year of the Shengping Era (358 AD) … during the winter in the tenth 




“In the first year of the Xingning Era (363 AD) … during the winter in the tenth month 





“In the third year of the Taiyuan Era (378 AD) during the summer in the fifth month on 




“In the eighth year of the Taiyuan Era (383 AD) … in the eleventh month … on the day 





“In the fourth year of the Yixi Era (408 AD) in the twelfth month Cao Lingdan Prince 




Apparently the Jin emperors took great pains to ensure the continuation of the Wei 
imperial lineage and even though the founders of the Eastern Jin had to find an alternative 
successor (shaofeng), presumably when the original line died out at the beginning of the 4
th
 
century, the princely lineage of Chenliu did eventually survive almost to the very end of the 
Eastern Jin. The amount of effort reflects the symbolic importance of the princely line 
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descended from the Wei emperors for the legitimacy of the Jin dynasty. In the process of 
gradual usurpation the usurper‟s claim to the throne was legitimized by the ultimate act of 
ritually expressed acceptance of the will of heaven on part of the resigning ruler through the 
uncoerced or at least non-violent abdication. Enfeoffing members of the former ruling house 
by the new regime and willingness of the deposed royalty to accept their new titles were in 
fact another formal, yet very tangible expression of acceptance of the dynastic transition. 
These honors were actually demotions referring to their new subordinate standing and by 
accepting them the former princes symbolically demonstrated that they were completely 
reconciled to their new lot, publicly declaring themselves to be subjects of the new sovereign 
lord. At the same time the new emperor assumed his authority through generous bestowal of 
peerage dignities, reordering the society according to the heaven‟s will and assigning the ex-
royals new place within the titled nobility of his realm as living reminder of the change of 
heavenly mandate.  
The grace of new masters was not limited only to the former imperial line of the Cao 
clan, even though the princely lineage of Chenliu remained the most exalted branch of the 
family throughout the whole period of the Jin Dynasty. As we have seen former princes of the 
blood were collectively demoted to prefecture lords, yet there were at least four branches of 
the family which were singled out for special treatment and were granted ducal dignity, the 
highest possible peerage opened to non-royals. Foremost among them was another Wei ex-
emperor, Cao Fang 曹芳 who had ruled from 240 to 254 AD when he was deposed by the all-
powerful regent Sima Shi and created Prince of Qi 齊王. After the abdication of the Wei 
Emperor Wudi created him Duke of Shaoling 邵陵公 clearly respecting his unique standing 
among the Wei princes of the blood:   
 
“After the Jin received abdication of [the Wei Dynasty], Prince of Qi (Cao Fang) was 
enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Shaoling. When he was forty-three years old, he passed away in 




Remaining three ducal lineages were all descended from younger sons of Cao Cao. 
Cao Jia 曹嘉 Duke of Gaoyi 高邑公 was son of the Wei Prince of Chu Cao Biao 楚王曹彪 
who had died in 249 AD as an innocent victim of unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the 
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powerful ministerial house of Sima staged by two provincial governors loyal to the Wei 
Dynasty: 
   
“In the first year of the Jiaping Era (249 AD) Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of 
Yanzhou Linghu Yu and Defender-in-chief (taiwei 太尉) Wang Ling conspired to install [Cao] 
Biao [Prince of Chu as a new ruler] with Xuchang as his capital … [Cao] Biao thereupon 
committed suicide. Princess and his sons were all demoted to commoners and were exiled to 
Pingyuan … In the first year of the Zhengyuan Era (254 AD) an edict was issued: “Late [Cao] 
Biao Prince of Chu turned his back on the state and resorted to treachery. He suffered death and 
his noble lineage ceased to exist. Even though he had himself chosen his course We still feel 
great pity for him. To swallow a disgrace and conceal a weakness that is indeed the way of 
loving one‟s relatives. Let Biao‟s son and heir [Cao] Jia be enfeoffed as Prince Zhending of 
Changshan.” In the first year of the Jingyuan Era (260 AD) his apanage was increased to the 




“During the Jin [Cao] Jia was enfeoffed as Duke of Gaoyi. During the Yuankang Era 
(291-299 AD) he served together with Shi Chong as Erudite of the National University (guozi 
boshi 國子博士) and later became Governor (taishou 太守) of Dongguan.”350 
 
Another ducal dignity was bestowed upon Cao Xi 曹翕, son of Cao Hui, Wei Prince 
of Dongping 東平王曹徽, who was created Duke of Linqiu 廩丘公: 
  
“[Cao] Hui, Prince Ling of Dongping passed away in the third year of the Zhengshi Era 
(242 AD). His son [Cao] Xi succeeded to [the dignity as Prince of Dongping]. During the 
Jingchu (237-239 AD), Zhengyuan (254-255 AD) and Jingyuan (261-263 AD) Eras the apanage 




“Under the Jin [Cao] Xi was enfeoffed as Duke of Linqiu. Within the imperial clan of 
the Wei Dynasty his fame was second only to the Duke of Juancheng (Cao Zhi). In the second 
year of the Taishi Era (266 AD) [Cao] Xi sent his heir apparent [Cao] Kun to come and seek an 
audience with the emperor and hand in his father‟s petition. Thereupon a following imperial 
edict was issued: “[Cao] Xi possesses great virtue and treads on the right Path. He is [truly] the 
[paragon of] honesty of the house of Wei. Now, [his son Cao] Kun came from afar, let him be 
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granted seal and ribbon of the [official ducal] Heir Apparent (shizi 世子), let him be made 
Concurrent Commandant of Cavalry (jiduwei 騎都尉) and given one set of garment and one 




Apparently Cao Xi was held in great esteem by Emperor Wudi, yet the highest renown 
for moral and cultural accomplishment was commanded by the third ducal lineage,  
Juancheng  鄄城, founded by Cao Zhi 曹志 son and heir of the famous Cao Zhi 曹植, favorite 
son of Cao Cao and once potential rival to the founder of the Wei Dynasty: 
 
“Cao Zhi … was a son of [Cao] Zhi Prince Si of Chen born of concubine. Since 
childhood he took great delight in studying and gained renown for his talent and moral integrity 
for he was unpretentious and magnanimous and highly skilled in horseback riding and archery. 
[His father Cao] Zhi once said: “This is a lord who will preserve [our] family!” and had him 
installed as his heir and successor. Later his fief was changed to that of prince of Jibei. When 
Emperor Wudi was still only a General of the Pacification Army (fujun jiangjun 撫軍將軍) he 
[went to] meet Prince of Chenliu in Ye (i.e. the last Wei Emperor). [Cao] Zhi called on him 
during the night and the emperor talked with him from dusk till dawn and greatly marveled at 
him. Then, when the emperor received the abdication he was demoted [from princely dignity] to 
Duke of Juancheng. An edict was issued which read: “Even though it was the destiny of all 
foregone generations of the past to replace one another, as far as the progeny of the ancestors is 
concerned the imperial throne was passed on without interruption and some of [them were made] 
regional lords defending the nine districts [of the earth] and according to [their ranks and 
precedence] acquired official positions in the government. To select the wise and talented and to 
support only the virtue, that is indeed the path of utmost justice. The princes and dukes of the 
house of Wei cultivated virtue and possessed hidden abilities and yet they were for a long time 
debarred from [holding an office]. And even if they were eventually summoned they had to 
undergo an evaluation [and wait for an assignment]. Because there was lack of [suitable] official 
posts they were in the end [unable to] obtain [an office] corresponding to their rank. Former 
Prince of Jibei, Cao Zhi is [always] honest and upright and practices virtue. His talent is 
outstanding and conduct impeccable. He takes delight in [things] ancient and is knowledgeable 
about [diverse] matters. He is the noble paragon of the House of Wei and We hold him in great 
esteem. Therefore let him be appointed Governor (taishou 太守) of Leping.””353 
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It seems that high peerage titles - much higher in fact than prefecture lordships which 
were universally bestowed on the former Wei princes of the blood – awarded to Cao Jia, Cao 
Xi and Cao Zhi reflected esteem in which the emperor held their abilities, for all three are 
coincidently praised by the sources for their moral integrity and promising talent and referred 
to as the cream of the house of Wei (Wei zong zhi ying 魏宗之英). Nevertheless, there was 
yet another dimension of the preferential treatment these three lineages were singled for. 
In case of Cao Jia, Duke of Gaoyi, the miserable fate of his father might have 
influenced emperor‟s decision. Cao Biao Prince of Chu was forced to commit suicide after 
two Wei loyalists rose in arms and declared for him as the rightful emperor. It seems that Cao 
Biao was not privy to the coup and was innocent of any treacherous intent. Unfortunately for 
him the conspiracy was too dangerous for the rising might of the Simas to let it go unpunished 
and the culprits had to be made an example of whether they were initiators or mere 
figureheads. Cao Biao‟s family initially suffered demotion and banishment but five years later 
the lineage was rehabilitated and Cao Jia created a prince in his own right. As this happened 
in 254 AD when the court was definitely under control of the Simas the formal rehabilitation 
must have taken place with their knowledge and consent. Even though Cao Biao‟s name was 
never fully cleared, rehabilitation of his heir as well as bestowal of a Jin ducal title might 
suggest that the Simas were aware of Cao Biao‟s innocence and tried to make amends for his 
forced death. At the same time Wudi had an opportunity to appear as a righteous ruler 
appreciating talent, magnanimously overlooking transgressions of his subjects and judging 
their past offences with utmost leniency. The symbolic value of this lenient stance was 
extremely important especially in comparison with the treatment accorded to the imperial 
kinsmen under the previous regime.  
Despite being universally respected men of talent Cao Jia, Cao Xi and Cao Zhi would 
have had no chance of ever holding an office under the Wei Dynasty. The Wei were notorious 
for their harsh and uncompromising policy of curbing power of the imperial kin (zongshi 宗
室). And there was no clan member who would better epitomize reprehensible oppression of 
one‟s own family than Cao Zhi‟s own father, Cao Zhi 曹植, highly talented yet victimized 
brother of Emperor Wendi. His chequered career with frequent transfers from fief to fief, 
demotions and reductions of apanage in consequence of transgressions of strict rules 
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controlling lives of the Wei princes gives evidence of harsh oppression of the Wei zongshi.
354
 
His case was well known through his writing - widely read at the time – which attests to his 
depression for being denied an opportunity to prove his worth in a consequential government 
post he thought he was born for. Given the fate of his father and other princes of the House of 
Cao the enfeoffment of Cao Zhi and his cousins had great symbolic meaning. When they were 
finally appreciated and given offices to prove their abilities in the service of the state, the new 
regime symbolically redressed the injustice once done to Cao Zhi and other worthy members 
of the dynastic house.  
This would not be lost on Wudi‟s contemporaries sending clear message that the new 
dynasty was going to employ everyone according to his talent even if he happened to be a 
member of an overthrown dynastic house who might have been otherwise debarred from 
holding an office as potentially disloyal. High peerage and public praise for Cao Zhi‟s son 
were no coincidence as they enabled Wudi to pass moral judgment on the previous dynasty 
and thereby strengthen the legitimacy of his rule. Support of the branch which had suffered 
most from unjust mistrust and incessant suspicion of the imperial court was clearly 
tantamount to public denunciation of the Wei policy as wrong and ill-advised. By creating 
Cao Zhi a duke and extolling his qualities Wudi was dissociating himself from the Wei, 
indirectly criticizing the maladministration of his predecessors. The new regime of the Jin 
appeared in comparison as a restorer of the order correcting the malpractices of the Wei for it 
was fully appreciating the men of talent as was expected from proper Confucian government. 
The Wei, however, were not the only deposed dynasty whose members were honored 
by bestowal of peerage dignities. A certain Ji Shu 姬署, alleged scion of the Zhou royal house, 
was created Duke of Wei 衛公 at roughly the same time as the abdicated last emperor of the 
Wei. But again the evidence is rather circumstantial due to the lack of sources:   
 
“In the seventh year of the Taishi Era (271 AD) … in the eleventh month on the dingsi 




If the formal revival of the Zhou royal line remained purely symbolic with Ji Shu‟s 
ancestry being necessarily obscured by centuries of undocumented succession the noble 
lineage of Dukes of Shanyang 山陽 which was to look after the proper sacrifices to the 
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illustrious ancestors of the Han could boast direct descent from the imperial line of the 
Eastern Han through Liu Kang 劉康, grandson of the last Han Emperor Xiandi 獻帝 (189-220 
AD): 
  
“In the third year of the Taishi Era (267 AD) … in the twelfth month … Liu Kang Duke 




“In the sixth year of the Taikang Era (285 AD) … in the ninth month on the day bingzi 




“In the tenth year of the Taikang Era (289 AD) … in the sixth month on the day gengzi 




“In the first year of the Yongjia Era (307 AD) during the summer in the fifth month 
Commissioner for Horse Pasturages (mamushuai 馬牧帥) Ji Sang gathered a multitude and rose 
in arms. He defeated Feng Song, Governor (taishou 太守 ) of Weijun, and subsequently 
captured the walled city of Ye where he killed [Sima] Teng Prince of Xincai. When he set fire 
to the palaces of Ye the conflagration did not cease for ten days. He also killed former Regional 
Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Youzhou Shi Xian in Leling. Then he raided Pingyuan where Liu Qiu 




By bestowing noble dignities upon descendants of the royal houses of Zhou, Han and 
Wei Wudi symbolically placed the Jin within the chain of legitimate imperial succession 
(zhengtong 正統) which was extremely important especially at the time when the supremacy 
of the new regime was still challenged by existence of a rival claiming the same kind of 
universal authority. As the decisive military victory over the southern state of Wu had to wait 
for another fifteen years Wudi sought different means how to assert legitimacy of the new 
dynasty. The emperor showed great concern for well-being of the former emperors whose 
place in the state cult was now taken by the ancestors of the Jin Dynasty. Therefore, one of 
the main reasons for enfeoffment was to ensure the continuity of line of descent and unfailing 
offering of the sacrifices to the ancestors of the respective lineage. By providing for the 
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ancestral cults of the previous dynasties the Jin declared themselves to be rightful successors 
of the long line of sovereign kings and emperors and legitimate heirs to their traditions. 
Question of legitimacy of the new dynasty was extremely important, especially given 
the circumstances of the gradual usurpation and unusual geopolitical situation of the realm 
divided into three independent policies vying for supreme authority. Because the Jin usurped 
the power from the Wei they could not question the legitimacy of their predecessors without 
jeopardizing their own claim as rightful heirs of the Han. Their legitimacy was therefore 
derived through the succession of the Cao emperors, the fact which was reflected by bestowal 
of princely dignity upon the Wei ex-emperor. Yet the Wei had not been alone in claiming 
political heritage of the Han. The rulers of Shu Han vigorously contested the authority of the 
Wei and, being direct descendants of the Han imperial family, were seen by many as the sole 
legitimate successors to the Han.
360
 Even though the conquest of Shu Han in 263 AD proved 
that Sichuan regime was not to possess mandate of heaven, the final victory was attained by 
forces and acumen of the Simas and therefore could neither validate nor disprove the alleged 
legitimacy of either Wei or Shu. Wudi did not leave anything to chance and while he chose to 
bestow highest honors on ex-emperor Cao Fang he also confirmed Wei ducal title of the last 
emperor of Shu, Liu Shan 劉禪, who had been created Duke of Anle 安樂公 shortly after the 
fall of Shu in 263/264 AD.
361
 At least we can infer so much from the following mention in 
Wudi‟s basic annals: 
   
“In the first year of the Taishi Era (265/266 AD) in the winter, the 12
th
 month … on the 
day yisi a son and a younger brother of Liu Kang Duke of Shanyang, and Liu Shan, Duke of 
Anle, were made Commandant-escorts (fuma duwei 駙馬督尉).”362  
 
The situation repeated itself after the fall of Wu in 280 AD when Sun Hao, the last 
sovereign ruler of the South, was taken to the capital and created Marquis Returning to 
Allegiance (Guiming hou 歸命侯) in order to mark the great military victory and become 
living symbol of the unification confirming legitimacy of the Jin:  
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“In the first year of the Taikang Era (280 AD) during the fifth month on day xinhai Sun 
Hao was enfeoffed as Guiming Marquis (Marquis Returning to Allegiance). His heir apparent 
was appointed Palace Attendant (zhonglang 中郎) and all other sons became Gentlemen of the 
Interior (langzhong 郎中). The [members of the] ancient houses of Wu were elevated [to 
suitable positions] according to their talent. The families of the high commanders of the house 
of Sun who were killed during the fights were moved to Shouyang. The commanders and 
officers who had crossed the River were to be exempt from paying taxes for ten years. Common 




As with other former royal houses enfeoffed by the Western Jin the information we 
may glean from the pages of the contemporary sources is extremely limited and we are left in 
almost complete ignorance regarding further fate of the noble lineage of Wu lords. We don‟t 
even know if the Guiming Marquisate was hereditary or not but Sun Hao‟s family must have 
retained some influence as one of his sons, Sun Fan 孫璠, later tried to make use of the 
political upheavals after the fall of the northern court to instigate a rebellion in a vain attempt 
to resurrect an independent dominion in the South: 
   
“In the first year of the Taixing Era (318 AD) … in the tenth month … [Sun] Fan, a son 





As we have seen the last rulers of the dethroned dynastic houses were not given equal 
noble titles. The descending grades of peerages within the hierarchy of the titled nobility 
mirrored complex political reality of the Three Kingdoms period and the gradual process of 
establishing the new dynasty. The hierarchy of the noble dignities in fact reflected the degree 
of legitimacy the Jin were willing to adjudge to the respective rival contenders. Whereas the 
Wei, considered as the legitimate predecessors and source of sovereign authority, were given 
the highest noble title of a prince and Cao Fang‟s line retained its position as the premier 
prince of the realm throughout the whole period of the Jin rule, the ex-emperor of the Shu 
Han had to be content with a ducal title. Even though in order of precedence he stood far 
below the princes of Chenliu his ducal title put him on an equal footing with the descendants 
of the Zhou and the Han. As the state of Shu had been vanquished already before the 
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establishment of the dynasty, Liu Shan was technically speaking never defying the authority 
of the Jin and as a legitimate blood descendant of the glorious Han was entitled to certain 
indulgence. On the other hand Sun Hao, deposed sovereign of Wu, was considered to be 
recalcitrant rebel constantly defying imperial authority who had to be brought to his senses by 
use of force. Therefore he eventually fared the worst having been given title of a mere 
marquis with a telling appellation which was, however, not entirely flattering.     
Regardless of the actual noble ranks the ritual enfeoffment of Cao Fang, Liu Shan and 
Sun Hao served the same purpose. By creating royals of the three kingdoms princes and peers 
Wudi exercised prerogatives of the Son of Heaven and asserted his indisputable authority as 
sole sovereign lord. At the same time the scions of the former ruling houses assumed their 
proper place within the social structure of the realm as subjects of the Jin emperor, thereby 
confirming the process of dynastic transition and unification of the empire as well as 
legitimacy of the new dynasty.  
Concern for indisputable legitimacy of the Jin was also behind another ritual 
enfeoffment made shortly after the beginning of Wudi‟s rule, when Kong Zhen 孔震, a 
descendant of Confucius was granted new noble dignity of Fengsheng village lord 奉聖亭侯 
within the new titled nobility of the Jin Empire: 
      
“In the third year of the Taishi Era (267 AD) … in the twelfth month Zongsheng 
Marquis (Revering the Sage) Kong Zhen was transferred and became Fengsheng village lord 




The line of Confucius‟ descendants was apparently honored already during the 
previous dynasties and Kong Zhen himself used to be Zongsheng Marquis 宗聖侯 during the 
Wei, but bestowal of a new title symbolized renewal of the Confucian orthodoxy under the 
new dynasty and its commitment to the Confucian cause. Wudi was publicly announcing his 
resolve to honor the legacy of the great sage and meet the obligations of a Confucian ruler.   
 
Ennoblement of the Tribal Leaders outside the Realm 
 
Another example of special and highly symbolic use of the ennoblement system would 
be bestowal of noble dignities upon tribal leaders and indigenous rulers of the semi-
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independent nomadic ethnic groups which were settled in a broad band of territory along the 
border of the empire stretching from northern Hebei and southern Manchuria in the Northeast 
across northern Shanxi to the Gansu-Shaanxi border in the Northwest. Rulers of various 
Xianbei 鮮卑 groups (Duan 段, Murong 慕容 and Tuoba 拓跋) as well as tribal kings of the 
Di 氐 and the Qiang 羌 were granted ducal peerages and integrated into the titled nobility of 
the empire. These titles may have been formally part of the established system, yet the 
circumstances of their bestowal differed somewhat from peerages conferred upon meritorious 
subjects and the grant of such a title was often prompted by serious considerations of state 
security or political expediency dictated by ever changing geopolitical reality of Northern 
China at the beginning of the 4
th
 century.  
It seems that one of the first peerage dukedoms ever created for a tribal ruler was 
Liaoxi 遼西 bestowed upon Duan Wuchen 段勿塵 (or Wuwuchen 務勿塵), leader of the 




“When [Sima] Yue Duke of Donghai was just about to welcome His Imperial Majesty 
[back in his capital], [Wang] Jun sent Qi Hong leading Wuwan crack cavalry as an advanced 
guard. When Emperor Huidi returned to Luoyang [Wang] Jun was transferred to position of 
Cavalry General-in-chief (piaoji da jiangjun 驃騎大將軍), Commander-in-chief supervising all 
military affairs of the Eastern barbarians north of the Yellow River, Concurrent Regional 
Inspector (ling cishi 領刺史) of Youzhou. His [ducal] fief of Boling was increased by adding 
the [territory] of Yanguo to it. When Emperor Huaidi ascended the throne, [Wang] Jun was 
appointed Minister of Works (sikong 司空) and Concurrent Commandant of the Wuwei tribes. 
Wuwuchen was appointed Great Shanyu (dashanyu 大單于). [Wang] Jun again petitioned the 
throne to enfeoff Wuwuchen as commandery duke of Liaoxi and his auxiliary commander 
Dapiaohua and an auxiliary commander of his younger brother Kemo by name of Datuweng 
were both made Kings Closely Related to the Jin (qin Jin wang 親晉王).”367 
 
As the tension among various branches of the imperial family vying for power and 
influence over the person of hapless emperor increased the nomadic groups rose in 
importance as potential allies. The rival princes were using tribal armies as a source of 
mercenary cavalry forces which often proved invaluable, beating the peasant armies made up 
of infantry recruited in the regions under the princes‟ command. With the escalation of 
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 centuries their military might gradually became 
indispensable with their allegiance being a valuable asset to be actively sought after.
368
 
The noble dignities of tribal rulers were generally not bestowed as a reward for certain 
merit but as a pledge of good will obliging the recipient to maintain allegiance towards the 
throne. The “fiefs” of these dukes were often peripheral regions on the border where the tribes 
began to settle during the centuries prior to the establishment of the Jin and which in turn 
became home territories of the nomads. The degree of state control over these territories is 
hard to determine but it seems quite plausible that the control was rather nominal with the 
obedience of the people being dependant on the overall balance of power in the region.
369
 
Bestowal of a ducal peerage sealed an alliance between the dynasty and a nomadic ruler who 
was in a symbolic way integrated into the administrative and social structure of the realm. By 
accepting noble title he got a place within the official hierarchy of the court acknowledging 
the supreme authority of the emperor and committing himself to be obedient subject of the 
dynasty.  
The practice of peerage bestowals upon tribal leaders seems to be mutually beneficial. 
On the one hand, the court was able to exercise at least some influence over the border 
regions and their inhabitants through the authority of these semi-independent rulers who 
became nominal vassals of the emperor and the symbolic value of such relationship for 
legitimacy of imperial authority was equally important. On the other hand, for tribal leaders a 
ducal dignity represented additional confirmation of their claims to rulership. Through 
peerage creation the court acknowledged and confirmed their leading position within the 
tribal society. Unlike the imperial succession determined by primogeniture the tribal 
leadership was hereditary within the ruling family with every able-bodied adult male member 
having at least theoretical right to succeed. Abilities and experience remained decisive factors 
determining the final choice, often more important than the proximity to the ruling lineage.
370
 
Official recognition on the part of the imperial court enabled the recipient of the peerage title 
to command additional respect among his own people. Rather unstable position of a tribal 
ruler was considerably strengthened by having been elevated far above all other possible 
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claimants for leadership who could have not boasted the same kind of acknowledgment by 
higher authority. 
Duan Wuchen, ruler of the Duan branch of the Xianbei (Jinshu calls them Wuwan 烏
丸 or Wuhuan 烏桓), was one of these tribal allies whose support became important towards 
the end of the Western Jin. He married a daughter of Wang Jun 王浚 Duke of Boling and 
regional governor of the Northeast and was named great shanyu (i.e. the ruler) of the 
Wuwan/Xianbei by Emperor Huaidi. He and his family remained staunchly loyal to the Jin 
cause, repeatedly offering assistance to the Luoyang court and fighting its arch-enemy Shi 
Le.
371
 His son Duan Juan 段眷 (also known as Jilujuan 疾陸眷) inherited the ducal dignity of 
his father and later was one of the Jin loyalist commanders of the Northeast who entreated 
Sima Rui Prince of Langye to ascend the throne and restore the dynasty in the South: 
     
“In the first year of the Jianwu Era (317 AD) … in the sixth month on the day bingyin 
Minister of Works (sikong 司空) and Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Bingzhou Liu Kun 
Marquis of Guangwu, Regional Inspector of Youzhou, Left Wise King (zuoxianwang 左賢王) 
Duan Pidi Duke of Bohai, Vice Commandant Guarding the Wuwan (i.e. the Wuhuan tribes) 
(ling hu Wuwan xiaowei 領護烏丸校尉), General Defending the North (zhenbei jiangjun 鎮北
將軍) Liu Han, shanyu Duan Chen Duke of Guangning, Duan Juan Duke of Liaoxi, Regional 
Inspector of Jizhou Shao Xu Viscount of Zhu‟a, Regional Inspector of Qingzhou Cao Ni 
Marquis of Guangrao, Regional Inspector of Yanzhou Liu Yan Marquis of Dingxiang, 
Commandant of the Eastern Barbarians (dongyi xiaowei 東夷校尉) Cui Bi, Xianbei Area 
Commander-in-chief (dadudu 大都督) Murong Hui and others, altogether one hundred eighty 




Besides Duan Juan there are two other members of the Duan family among the co-
signers of the letter, both mentioned with ducal title. While Duan Pidi 段匹磾 Duke of Bohai 
勃海公 and Left Wise King of the Wuwan/Xianbei (i.e. something as viceroy) was another 
son of Duan Wuchen, the shanyu Duan Chen 段辰 Duke of Guangning 廣寧公 is probably 
identical with Duan Wuchen‟s younger brother Shefuchen 涉復辰.373 Thus there were at least 
three ducal titles bestowed upon the Duan ruling family which together with the association 
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with Wang Jun and other Jin loyalist commanders attest to the importance of the family and 
its Xianbei tribal army as an important ally in the desperate struggle to preserve the remnants 
of the dynastic power in the North against insurgents and self-declared usurpers. The Duans 
were apparently fighting long after the fall of the western court in Chang‟an: 
 
“In the third year of the Taixing Era (320 AD) … during the summer in the fourth 
month … Shi Le attacked Yanci and seized it. General of the Pacification Army (fujun jiangjun 
撫軍將軍), Regional Inspector of Youzhou Duan Pidi fell victim to Shi Le.”374 
 
The Liaoning-based Duans were not the only Xianbei group whose leaders maintained 
contact with the Jin court receiving titles in acknowledgement of their loyalty to the dynasty. 
The Tuoba Xianbei whose grazing lands stretched in southern Inner Mongolia and northern 
Shanxi may have not been as powerful and important as their cousins from the Northeast, yet 
they were able to intervene in the power struggle, assisting the loyalist forces in fighting the 
Xiongnu state of Former Zhao:  
 
“Because of the achievement of [Xianbei] shanyu [Tuoba] Yituo who had rescued 
[Sima] Teng Duke of Dongying, [Liu] Kun petitioned the court to enfeoff Yituo‟s younger 




The bestowal of the commandery dukedom of Dai 代郡公 upon Yilu 猗盧, younger 
brother of the Tuoba shanyu Yituo 猗㐌, laid foundation for the first independent state of the 
Tuoba Xianbei. The Principality of Dai flourished from 310 to 376 AD when it was overrun 
by forces of the Former Qin only to be revived a decade later as the Northern Wei 北魏 
Dynasty which eventually reunited the whole of northern China.
376
  
With the fall of the Western Jin and commencement of the period of disunion the 
symbolic meaning of the peerage bestowals upon semi-independent tribal rulers became even 
more important. Apart from the practical concerns of securing alliances for possible 
coordinated attack against the northern rivals the peerage bestowals and their acceptance on 
the part of tribal leaders constituted formal declaration of allegiance to the dynasty. At the 
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time when there were two or even more Sons of Heaven vying for supreme authority the 
question of allegiance of the tribal ethnic groups became an important indicator of the 
legitimacy of rival imperial courts. We have seen that even Wudi, being at the height of his 
power, did not hesitate to use the diplomatic mission sent from the oasis kingdom of Kroraina 
(Shanshan) for proclaiming his supreme authority of the Confucian universal ruler whose 
virtue attracts voluntary submission of the various barbarian entities.377 The same strategy was 
used by his descendants in time of crisis when the exiled court in Jiankang was desperately 
trying to strengthen its faltering legitimacy contested by the emperors of Former Zhao whose 
claim to the emperorship was validated by right of conquest. Bestowal or confirmation of a 
ducal peerage enabled the court to formally integrate the nomadic entities within the realm 
even though the territories of the tribal rulers were often out of control of the southern regime, 
separated by vast dominions of its northern rivals. Accepting a peerage title within the 
hierarchy of titled nobility of the realm was tantamount to acknowledging allegiance to the 
dynasty and was viewed as a token of submission to the rightful sovereign chosen by the will 
of Heaven. In this way the southern court reinforced its position vis-à-vis northern usurpers 
with the legitimacy of the restored regime confirmed and moral claims to supreme authority 
vindicated by uncoerced submission of the barbarians drawn by virtue and moral superiority 
of the true Sons of Heaven in Jiankang.      
The Eastern Jin court apparently maintained contacts with the Duan Xianbei even after 
their influence in the region ebbed, eclipsed by rising power of the Murongs, another branch 
of the Eastern Xianbei group, who were soon to establish independent state of Former Yan 前
燕 (Qian Yan, 337-370 AD). When certain Duan Kan 段龕 proclaimed allegiance to the 
southern regime, bringing over the whole province of Qingzhou 青州, the court awarded him 
with newly created dukedom of Qi 齊 (the appellation clearly referred to Qingzhou province 
which was under Duan Kan‟s sway) in appreciation of his gesture: 
  
“In the seventh year of the Yonghe Era (351 AD) during the spring in the first month … 
on the day xinchou Xianbei [leader] Duan Kan surrendered with whole of Qingzhou … in the 
second month on the day wuyin Duan Kan was appointed General Defending the North (zhenbei 
jiangjun 鎮北將軍) and enfeoffed as Duke of Qi.”378 
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Roughly at the same time the Jiankang court bestowed official ducal title on Yang Chu 
楊初, king of the Di, whose strategically placed dominion stretching over the territory of 
northern Sichuan, southwest Shaanxi and Southeast Gansu constituted an important 
communication channel with Liangzhou-based regime of the Zhang family in the Far West.     
Yang Chu was enfeoffed as Duke of Chouchi 仇池公 and again his title referred to a territory 
under his direct authority, Chouchi being the seat of his court located on the eponymous 
mountain in Longnan 隴南, Gansu Province: 
 
“In the third year of the Yonghe Era (347 AD) … during the winter in the tenth month 
on the day yichou … Di King in Wudu Yang Chu was named General Conquering the South 
(zhengnan jiangjun 征南將軍), Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Yongzhou, Commandant 
Pacifying the Qiang (ping Qiang xiaowei 平羌校尉) and Duke of Chouchi and together with 
[Zhang Chonghua Regional Inspector of Liangzhou] was Commissioned with a Warrant (jiajie 
假節).”379 
 
The ducal dignity of Chouchi became hereditary in the house of Yang and was 
confirmed on regular basis following accession of every new king of the Di:  
 
“In the eleventh year of the Yonghe Era (355 AD) Commandant Pacifying the Qiang 
(ping Qiang xiaowei 平羌校尉) Yang Chu Duke of Chouchi was murdered by his commander 
Liang Shi. Yang Chu‟s son [Yang] Guo succeeded to the ducal dignity and was subsequently 
appointed General Defending the North (zhenbei jiangjun 鎮北將軍) and Regional Inspector 
(cishi 刺史) of Qinzhou.”380 
 
Frequent contacts between the southern court and Di kings of Chouchi were 
maintained not only throughout the whole period of the Eastern Jin but also by all successor 
regimes residing in Jiankang up to the mid 6
th
 century. The status of the Di rulers was later 
even raised as they were promoted in rank to Princes/Kings of Chouchi.
381
    
Another powerful ethnic group whose allegiance the southern court tried to secure 
were the Qiang. After the collapse of the Later Zhao Dynasty (Hou Zhao 後趙, 319-351 AD) 
                                                 
379
 Jinshu juan 8, Mudi zhuan, p. 194. 
380
 Jinshu juan 8, Mudi zhuan, p. 200. 
381
 For the history of the Di kingdom of Chouchi see Ma Changshou (2006b): pp. 54-59; and Yang Ming (1991): 
pp. 105-130; for Yang Chu see especially p. 111. 
262 
 
Qiang tribal rulers Yao Yizhong 姚弋仲 and his son Yao Xiang 姚襄 controlled the region 
south of Luoyang and the Eastern Jin without doubt planned to use their influence to bring the 
heart of the Central Plain with the ancient capital once again under their sway. High military 
titles and ducal dignities of Gaoling 高陵 and Pingxiang 平鄉 (or Jiqiu 即丘) bestowed upon 
the erstwhile enemy commanders reflect the desperate effort of the court to win them over as 
potential allies in the planned northern campaign: 
      
“In the seventh year of the Yonghe Era (351 AD) … in the eleventh month Shi Zhi‟s 
commander Yao Yizhong and Ran Min‟s commander Wei Tuo (or Wei Tong) each sent a 
messenger asking to surrender [to the Jin]. [Yao] Yizhong was made Chariot and Cavalry 
General (cheji jiangjun 車騎將軍), the great shanyu and was created commandery duke of 
Gaoling. His son [Yao] Xiang became General Pacifying the North (pingbei jiangjun 平北將軍), 
Commander-in-chief supervising all military affairs of Bingzhou, Regional Inspector (cishi 刺
史) of Bingzhou and was enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Pingxiang (according to different 




The Jin hopes of recovering the Central Plain with help of the Qiang were dashed 
though when Yao Xiang led his tribesman westward planning to establish an independent 
state of his own in Guanzhong. His advance, however, was checked by the forces of Di 
kingdom of Former Qin. The Qiang were defeated and Yao Xiang himself perished on the 
battlefield. The tribal elites were incorporated into the government structure of the Former 
Qin and it was only after its disintegration that Xiang‟s younger brother Yao Chang 姚萇 
managed to found a state of his own, the Later Qin (Hou Qin 后秦, 384-417 AD).383    
The last influential ethnic group, which was significantly involved in the history of 




 centuries, were the Murong Xianbei who had gradually 
replaced the Duans as the strongest power of the Northeast. We have already met their ruler 
Murong Hui 慕容廆 as one of the co-signers of the petition of Jin loyalist commanders 
urging future Yuandi to announce restoration of the dynasty and mount the imperial throne in 
Jiankang. Few years later Murong Hui‟s importance was further affirmed by bestowal of 
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ducal dignity of Liaodong 遼東, appellation of the fief again referring to the home territory of 




“In the fourth year of the Taixing Era (321 AD) … in the twelfth month Murong Hui 
was Commissioned with Special Powers (chijie 持節), appointed Commander-in-chief of the 
two regions of Youzhou and Pingzhou supervising all military affairs of the eastern barbarians, 
Shepherd (mu 牧) of Pingzhou and he created commandery duke of Liaodong.”385 
 
“In the eighth year of the Xianhe Era (333 AD) … in the fifth month … Chariot and 
Horse General (cheji jiangjun 車騎將軍) Murong Hui Duke of Liaodong died. His son [Murong] 




Facing worsening military situation in the North the court withdrew behind the 
seemingly insurmountable barrier of the Yangzi River virtually abandoning remnants of the 
Jin loyalist forces in the Central Plain. Former regional governors and local rulers as Murong 
Huang 慕容皝 in Youzhou and Zhang Chonghua 張重華 in Liangzhou were forced to fight 
for themselves. Some of them gradually aspired to higher dignities which would be more 
fitting to their standing of virtually independent warlords. In order to retain their allegiance 
the court was eventually forced to grant concessions far greater than ducal peerages and 
confirm princely or kingly ranks and titles (we are speaking about the same rank of wang 王 
here) which the local rulers had the audacity to adopt despite their professed loyalty to the 
dynasty: 
           
“In the third year of the Xiankang Era (337 AD) … during the winter in the tenth month 




“In the sixth year of the Xiankang Era (340 AD) during the spring in the second 
month … on the day yimao Murong Huang sent a messenger and begged for a seal and 
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The formal submission and allegiance of the Murong ruler was so important for the 
southern regime that the court was willing to surrender part of the imperial prerogatives and 
bestow a princely dignity on Murong Huang even though he was not a member of the 
imperial clan. Both parties maximally exploited the hidden potential of the wang title and its 
dual nature. While Murong Huang undoubtedly viewed the confirmation of the wang title as 
an official acknowledgment of his sovereign authority as a king ruling an independent domain, 
the imperial court considered Murong ruler to be a non-royal prince of the realm (yixingwang 
異姓王) being on par with royal kinsmen. And like the princes of the blood he was still 
officially only a subject of the emperor formally dependent on his will and obedient to his 
authority.     
Interesting reflection of the Murong adoption of the royal title of wang as well as 
delicate diplomatic effort of the Eastern Jin to maintain allegiance of the independent northern 
warlords is provided by case of diplomatic mission sent in 347 AD to Liangzhou governor 
Zhang Chonghua who intended to proclaim himself King of Liang 涼王: 
 
“The imperial edict ordered Imperial Censor-in-attendance (shiyushi 侍御史) Yu Gui to 
be sent to appoint [Zhang] Chonghua Commandant Guarding the Qiang (hu Qiang xiaowei 護
羌校尉), Regional Inspector (cishi 刺史) of Liangzhou, Commissioned with a Warrant (jiajie 
假節) … At the time when Censor Yu Gui arrived in Liangzhou [Zhang] Chonghua was just 
considering proclaiming himself King of Liang and [therefore] he would not accept the imperial 
edict. He sent his trusted follower Shen Meng to address [Yu] Gui: “Lords of our family were 
for generations loyal to the House of Jin and yet, they cannot compare to a Xianbei! The court 
has given Murong Huang a title of King of Yan and now grants lord of our province title of 
[mere] Commander-in-chief (dajiangjun 大將軍). Is this the way how to encourage a loyal and 
righteous subject with great achievements?! The illustrious court should now move to the other 
bank of the Yellow River (Heyou 河右, i.e. Liangzhou) and together urge the province lord to 
become King of Liang. When Your Honor was sent on this mission [it was in order to] benefit 
the altars of soil and grain. [I am sure] it would be possible to act without authorization [and 
confirm Zhang Chonghua as the King of Liang].” [Yu] Gui replied: “The system of princes 
prevents anybody who is not from the royal family from declaring oneself a prince. Within the 
nine districts [of all under heaven] there is no higher noble dignity than that of a duke. Indeed, 
there were once non-royals made princes during the reign of Han Gao[zu] but all of them were 
executed and [their families] exterminated soon enough. It was just a matter of temporary 
expediency and not an established institution of old. Therefore Wang Ling said: “If there is 
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someone reigning as a prince who is not of the Liu House, all under heaven would launch an 
attack against him.” As far as the Barbarians are concerned this is not applied to them. During 
the Springs and Autumns Period [rulers of] Wu and Chu declared themselves kings and yet the 
noble lords did not consider it wrong, for they considered them to be mere barbarians. But if it 
had been [rulers of] Qi or Lu who had declared themselves kings, would the noble lords have 
not launched an attack against them?! Therefore his Sagely Majesty has enfeoffed His Noble 
Grace as supreme duke (i.e. commandery duke) for his loyalty and wisdom and has him 
appointed regional governor. How could a barbarian Xianpei ever compare to him! Therefore, 
you erred by asking me. Even if I would answer [your request], whenever there is someone 
whose achievements are unique and outstanding his reward ought to be outstanding as well. 
Suppose His Noble Grace is made a king today and later His Noble Grace with all the might of 
Heyou (i.e. Liangzhou) would pacify Ba and Shu in the south, wipe out Zhao and Wei in the 
east, build the old capital anew and invite Son of Heaven [to assume his rightful place upon the 
throne]. What noble title, what official position would Son of Heaven be able to reward him 
with? I hope you would think it over once again.” [Shen] Meng conveyed everything what [Yu] 




It is clear that in view of the court there was a great difference between a tribal ruler, a 
barbarian, who cannot be expected to abide by ancient rules guiding Chinese society, and 
loyal official of the dynasty, scion of a Han family of provincial dignitaries, whose authority 
was derived from the fact that he was acting as a representative of the legitimate imperial 
court. Yu Gui 俞歸 is rather articulate on this point. Unlike Murong Huang who is as ignorant 
as he is arrogant, Zhang Chonghua should know better where his proper place is and should 
not ask for impossible for the imperial court would not be blackmailed. The imperial envoy 
promptly and vigorously defended prerogatives of the dynasty as he was not ready to grant 
any concession which would compromise the supreme authority of the Jin emperor unless 
absolutely necessary. Obviously, the dynasty developed double standards for “barbarian” 
tribal rulers on the one hand and centrally appointed Han officials on the other. Through their 
ducal peerages the semi-independent nomadic leaders may have been, at least formally, a part 
of the titled nobility of the realm, nevertheless they never ceased to be perceived as barbarians 
defying the common rules and their fiefs were in fact existing outside the established 
hierarchy being dependent on different factors than noble dignities of ordinary meritorious 
subjects of the dynasty. 
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Inheriting Noble Dignity and Bestowal of Special Grace 
 
Succession and Inheritance 
 
As the Jin system of titled nobility was derived partially from the ancient Zhou 
practice of enfeoffment it took over also one of the most distinguished features of its model, 
the principle of heredity of noble dignities. Like the princely titles awarded to the members of 
the imperial clan and indeed, like the imperial throne itself, noble dignities bestowed on non-
royal meritorious ministers and commanders were hereditary and ideally meant to be held in 
perpetuity in the family of the first recipient as an eternal memento of meritorious services 
rendered to the state or ruling house by the family ancestors as well as reminder of ensuing 
mutual bond of loyalty between their descendants and the dynasty. The succession within the 
noble lineage was basically primogeniturial in nature with the eldest son born of the main 
wife succeeding to his father‟s title and all the privileges and duties connected with it.
390
 Due 
to the various factors it was not always possible to follow the ideal pattern of succession and 
the noble lineages in which the primogeniturial succession would last for more than two or 
three generations in a row were rather exceptional.
391
 One of them was the ducal lineage of 
Gaoping 高平 founded by Chen Qian 陳騫, a loyal supporter of the Simas whose assistance 
was essential for accomplishing the great enterprise of founding the new dynasty: 
       
“When Emperor Wudi received the abdication of the Wei Dynasty [Chen Qian] was 
promoted for his achievement of assisting in founding of the dynasty to Chariot and Horse 
General (cheji jiangjun 車騎將軍) and created commandery duke of Gaoping … In the second 
year of the Yuankang Era (292 AD) [Chen Qian] passed away in the age of eighty-one. He was 
granted privilege of being encoffined in full ceremonial garment and the office of Grand Mentor 
(taifu 太傅) was posthumously bestowed upon him together with posthumous name Wu. At the 
time of the burial the emperor (i.e. Huidi) [himself] took part in the funerary obsequies, watched 
the bier [pass by] from atop of the Dasima Gate and shed tears. The rites were conducted 
according to the precedent set by [funeral of] Commander-in-chief (dasima 大司馬) Shi Bao. 
[Chen Qian‟s] son [Chen] Yu succeeded to the peerage … When he died his son [Chen] Zhi … 
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succeeded [to the title] and he eventually attained the office of Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary 
(sanji changshi 散騎常侍). When he died his son [Chen] Cui succeeded [as the third Duke of 
Gaoping]. He was killed during the Yongjia Era (307-312 AD). [Later, the Eastern Jin Emperor] 
Xiaowudi had a great-great-grandson of [Chen] Qian‟s inherit the dukedom. When he died a son 
of his younger brother, [Chen] Haozhi succeeded [to the title]. The fief was abolished [in 420 




During the Western Jin the title was inherited in unbroken line from father to son for 
three generations and despite the hiatus caused by the overall political disorder of 310s the 
ducal lineage of Gaoping managed to survive the fall of the northern court being resurrected 
during the reign of Xiaowudi 孝武帝 (373-396 AD) of the Easter Jin, becoming one of only a 
few noble lineages lasting from the very beginning of the Western Jin in 266 AD up to the 
dynastic transition of 420 AD which brought the Liu Song 劉宋 Dynasty to the throne.393  
Even though the succession of all peerage and lordship titles was primogeniturial in 
nature there were certain limitations imposed by the existence of concubinage which ran 
parallel to primogeniture. The eligibility of a son to inherit and succeed to a noble dignity was 
determined not only by the order of birth but also by the status of his mother. No son of a title 
holder, regardless of his possible seniority, was entitled to succeed to the title unless he was 
born in the official wedlock. Only sons of the main wives (dizi 嫡子) were considered to be 
true heirs to their fathers and they held precedence over their brothers born of concubines 
(shuzi 庶子) even though these might have been actually older. It seems that Emperor Wudi 
tried to impose strict distinction in status between the main wives and concubines and their 
respective offspring and even proclaimed special edict regarding this issue:  
 
“In the tenth year of the Taishi Era (274 AD) … in the intercalary first month on the day 
dinghai [Emperor Wudi] issued the following edict: “The distinction between the main wife 
[and her children] and secondary wives (i.e. concubines) [and their children] are the means how 
to differentiate between the high and the low and make clear [the difference between] the 
distinguished and the mean. But nowadays many a favorite attained position of the main consort 
and thus violated precedence order of the honored and the lowly. From now on it shall not be 
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Wudi‟s effort may have been practical reaction to a prevalent (mal)practice of the 
preceding dynasties or simply an act of the dynastic founder reinstituting the proper norms of 
ritual behavior. Maintaining clear distinction between the di 嫡 and the shu 庶 was considered 
extremely important for the lack of it was traditionally seen as a cause of untoward and 
potentially disastrous events threatening the social and political order of the realm.
395
   
The example of practical application of the distinction between sons of the main wife 
and sons born of concubines is provided by inheritance of the ducal dignity of Suiling 睢陵 in 
the family of Wang Xiang 王祥:  
 
“[Wang] Xiang [Duke of Suiling] had five sons: Zhao, Xia, Fu, Lie and Fen. [Wang] 
Zhao was son of a concubine. [Wang] Xia died young [and therefore Wang] Fu succeeded [to 
the ducal dignity]. At the beginning of the Xianning Era (275-279 AD) as [Wang] Xiang‟s 
family was very frugal and poor it has been granted three hundred bolts of silk and [Wang] Fu 
was appointed Governor (taishou 太守 ) of Shangluo. When he died, he was granted 
posthumous name Xiao and his son [Wang] Gen succeeded [to the peerage. Later] he became 
Gentleman Cavalier Attendant (sanjilang 散騎郎). [The eldest, Wang] Zhao attained the post of 
Governor of Shiping. His son [Wang] Jun held an office of Secretary of the crown prince (taizi 
sheren 太子舍人) and was created Marquis of Yongshi.”396  
 
As the Jinshu usually lists all sons according to their birth order we may presume that 
Wang Zhao 王肇 was actually the eldest. However, because he was born of a concubine he 
was naturally excluded from the inheritance and the heir presumptive must have been the 
second son Wang Xia 王夏 as the eldest born of the main wife. Unfortunately, he had died 
young (that is before his father) and very probably did not manage to sire a son of his own. 
Therefore it was only Wang Xiang‟s third son Wang Fu 王馥 who eventually succeeded to 
the peerage and became second Duke of Suiling. The succession then continued through his 
line of the family. It is interesting to note the fate of Wang Zhao and his line. The fact that he 
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was born of a mere concubine may have prevented him from claiming the ducal peerage for 
himself but was apparently no hindrance to his official career. His origin may have been less 
glamorous in comparison with his brothers yet he was a Wang of Langye and son of a duke 
and as such he was entitled to same kind of material and social privileges as his brothers, 
including the privileged access to the state service. Being a concubine‟s son obviously was 
not detrimental to having distinguished career in the state bureaucracy. Wang Zhao himself 
served as commandery governor and his son Wang Jun 王俊 was later even created Marquis 
of Yongshi 永世侯 in his own right, thereby establishing another noble lineage within the 
well ramified clan of Langye Wangs.       
The earnest endeavor on the part of the Jin to protect the rights of the offspring born of 
the main wife found an appropriate expression also on the institutional level. Whereas in the 
past the primogeniturial succession was more or less matter of tradition with the standing of 
the heir much dependent on the decision of a title holder under the Jin the standing of the 
official heirs became institutionally protected. A brand new title of Heir Apparent (shizi 世子 
for sons and shisun 世孫 for grandsons) was introduced to be bestowed already during the 
lifetime of a title holder upon the designated heirs, eldest sons born of the main wife or in 
case of their premature death their eldest sons:  
   





“When Liu Yao came to raid and harass the royal capital [of Chang‟an Suo] Chen was 
appointed Commander-in-chief and Great General Conquering the East (dudu zhengdong da 
jiangjun 都督征東大將軍), Commissioned with Special Powers (chijie 持節) to chastise the 
rebels. He crushed [Liu] Yao‟s [commander] Hurizhu King Huyanmo and for his achievement 
was enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Shangluo with apanage of ten thousand households. His 
spouse, lady Xun was created Lady of Xinfeng and his son [Suo] Shiyuan was named the [ducal] 





It seems that the official heirs apparent had even their own official staff looking after 
their household which might have been much simpler then but still not unlike the 
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establishment of the Eastern Palace of the crown prince. As the title of Heir Apparent was 
considered to be an official post with an official rank attached to it, a complex hierarchy 
emerged copying the hierarchy of the “parent” noble dignities with heirs of different peerage 
ranks having different court ranks. Heirs Apparent of the imperial princes
399
 naturally took 
precedence over all non-royal Heirs Apparent whose official and social standing was 
descending with descending ranks of their fathers‟ peerages.
400
 It is not clear whether the 
holders of the lordship dignities were also entitled to appoint official Heir Apparent but it 
seems that all mentions of the title in the sources refer to the heirs of a peerage dignity, 
especially the higher peerage ranks of duke, marquis and count:  
 
“When Emperor Mindi proclaimed himself crown prince [Xun] Zu was as a maternal 
uncle of the crown prince charged with administering the office of Metropolitan Commandant 
(sili xiaowei 司隷校尉) and was acting regional commander of Yuzhou. With [his brother Xun] 
Fan they guarded Kaifeng in Xingyang [Commandery]. At the beginning of the Jianxing Era 
(313-316 AD) the imperial edict entrusted charge of the government in exile to [Xun] Fan. 
Suddenly, Xun Fan passed away and the emperor made [Xun] Zu Minister of Works (sikong 司
空) and Concurrent Left Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs (ling shangshu 
zuopuye 尚書左僕射 ) and at the same time had him take charge of the affairs of both 
Metropolitan Commandant and government in exile … He was promoted in rank to prefecture 
duke of Linying and the seals and ribbons for the Dowager Duchess (taifuren 太夫人) and 
[ducal] Heir Apparent (shizi 世子) were bestowed as well.”401 
 
The case of Xun Zu 荀組 and dukedom of Linying 臨潁 poses another interesting 
question, the answer to which nevertheless remains elusive. One might be born an heir to a 
peerage title, yet obviously one has to be officially appointed the Heir Apparent and granted 
the official seal and other credentials of the office. But was this appointment automatic, 
following every creation of a new peerage as a formal confirmation of the heredity of the 
noble title as is suggested by the case of Linying or was it a special gesture, either an act of 
grace or granting the plea of a title holder himself as was evidently the case with Zhang Gui, 
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“At that time Liu Yao again raided [commandery of] Beidi. [Zhang] Gui sent his Aide 
(canjun 參軍) Qu Tao in command of three thousand men to guard Chang‟an. The emperor sent 
Chief Minister for Dependencies (dahonglu 大鴻臚) Xin Pan to appoint [Zhang] Gui Palace 
Attendant (shizhong 侍中), Defender-in-chief (taiwei 太尉), Shepherd (mu 牧) of Liangzhou 
and Duke of Xiping. [Zhang] Gui again firmly declined [the honor]. After administering the 
province for thirteen years, he fell gravely ill … he petitioned the throne to have his son [Zhang] 
Shi named the Heir Apparent (shizi 世子). Then he died in the age of sixty years and was 
granted posthumous name of Duke Wu.”
402
 
          
It is not entirely clear to what title should have Zhang Shi 張寔 actually succeeded. 
After Zhang Gui‟s death Zhang Shi became Duke of Xiping 西平公 but this was in all 
probability a new creation. The imperial court in Chang‟an repeatedly tried to bestow this 
ducal dignity already upon his father but Zhang Gui refused to accept such an honor as 
undeserved. He was willing to accept only peerage of a lower rank and in the end was created 
Marquis of Bacheng 霸城侯. It is highly probable that it was this marquisate that Zhang Shi 
was supposed to inherit. If that is the case then the official appointment of the Heir Apparent 
did not follow automatically the creation of a peerage as Zhang Gui had become a marquis 
couple of years before his death. It was only a dying wish of the loyal commander which 
prompted the court of Mindi to approve of his choice of a successor and appoint Zhang Shi  
the official Heir Apparent. Such an act was without doubt highly important as a symbolic 
confirmation of the hereditary leadership of the Zhang family over the Liangzhou region and 
its military forces which the court was dependent on. 
Unfortunately, the sources do not provide enough relevant information to solve this 
problem. With majority of peerage dignities we simply don‟t know anything about official 
appointment of the Heir Apparent and even though this might be just an omission we do know 
about the cases of heirs succeeding to the peerage dignities without ever having been 
appointed Heir Apparent (see Wang Jun becoming second Duke of Boling below). The 
question would merit further research and it would be useful to compare the situation under 
the Western Jin with its successor regimes in the South. 
Being the officially appointed Heir Apparent or not, the inheritor of a noble dignity 
apparently did not succeed immediately after the death of his predecessor:           
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“When Luoyang has still not fallen, [Liu Yu] was taken ill, having a deep-rooted ulcer 
on his finger, and succumbed to it. He was forty-seven years old at the time. He was 
posthumously promoted to Cavalry General (piaoji jiangjun 驃騎將軍 ). For his previous 
achievements he was enfeoffed as Marquis of Dingxiang and granted posthumous name Zhen. 
His son [Liu] Yan inherited [the title] … Liu Yan … was first drafted as Clerk to Defender-in-
chief (taiwei yuan 太尉掾) and then appointed Secretarial Court Gentleman (shangshulang 尚
書郎). He left the office when he went into mourning for his father. After he had completed [the 
prescribed period of] mourning he succeeded to the noble dignity [of his father] and Grand 
Mentor (taifu 太傅) [Sima] Yue Prince of Donghai had him summoned as his Recorder (zhubu 
主簿).”403 
 
Certain prescribed period of mourning was to be observed before the heir could 
succeed to a peerage or a lordship.
404
 The heir had to leave all the official posts he was 
holding at the moment of his predecessor‟s demise and fulfill the ritual requirements of the 
funeral obsequies and subsequent mourning. For the time being he remained a mere 
commoner with the noble dignity left temporarily vacant and the final settlement of the 
succession pending. Even though leaving one‟s office during the period of mourning was 
required of all officials regardless of their being a member of a noble lineage, the succession 
practice of the titled nobility was probably not so much a consequence of observing the norms 
of Confucian ritual behavior as a trace of much older tradition hearkening back to the 
feudatories of the Zhou. The zhuhou 諸侯 of the Zhou realm apparently were wont to observe 
the ritual period of mourning before they ascended the throne. The peerages and lordships 
thus retained something of the original quality of these titles which after all originally used to 
denote sovereign rulers of the Zhou state and its feudatories. This ancient practice of 
succession after completion of the official mourning period was partially applied even to the 
imperial succession. Unlike the titled nobility, an emperor succeeded to the throne 
immediately after the demise of his predecessor, however, even he had to observe period of 
ritual mourning (liang‟an 諒闇) taking personal charge of the state affairs only after its 
completion.  
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 For other examples of succeeding to a noble dignity only after a period of mourning see Xun Sui 荀邃, Duke 
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Circumstantial evidence attesting to the practice of succession to the noble dignity 
after period of mourning together with formal confirmation of its connection with the ancient 
Zhou tradition is to be found in record of a curious judicial case involving an heir of a comital 
dignity being charged of corruption:      
       
“At the beginning of the Taishi Era [Hua Yi] was promoted to Supervisor of the 
Entourage (rongcong puye 冗從僕射). When he was young Emperor Wudi respected him [and 
therefore he was now in turn] appointed Gentleman Attendant at the Palace Gate (huangmen 
shilang 黃門侍郎), Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍), General of the 
Front Army (qianjun jiangjun 前軍將軍), Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中), Southern Leader 
of the Court Gentlemen (nanzhonglangjiang 南中郎將) and Commander-in-chief supervising 
military affairs north of the Yellow River. When his father fell gravely ill he returned [back to 
the capital]. According to the old rules for suffering a loss [in the family] he should have 
resumed his position once the interment was done but he firmly refused defying the imperial 
decree. Previously, [Hua Yi‟s father Hua] Biao [Count of Guanyang] had been granted some 
tenants (dependent people, ke 客) in Bi. He sent Hua Yi to go to prefecture magistrate Yuan Yi 
and had them registered in the tax rolls. All three tenants were exchanged for slaves (nu 奴). 
Later when Yuan Yi was brought to trial for bribery his confession was confused and imperfect 
and it was no longer evident that the slaves were given in exchange for tenants. It just said that 
he had given three slaves to [Hua] Yi. And after all, Yi was son-in-law of Lu [Yu] (a fact that 
somehow incriminated him even further). Secretariat Supervisor (zhongshujian 中書監) Xun 
Xu had once before asked the hand of Hua Yi‟s daughter for his middle son but Yi did not give 
his consent and incurred [Xun‟s] wrath. Therefore, he had now secretly reported to the emperor 
that there are so many who had been bribed by Yuan Yi that it is not possible to bring them all 
to justice. Therefore it would be fitting to put the blame on someone who stands closest to 
[him/the throne?] and he pointed out that it should be [Hua] Yi. As he was already guilty of 
offence of defying the imperial order he was stripped of his office even though he was currently 
in mourning and the apanage [of his peerage] was reduced. Chief Minister for Dependencies 
(dahonglu 大鴻臚) He Zun petitioned the throne that Hua Yi should be demoted to commoner 
and should not be allowed to succeed to the peerage. He begged for permission to install Hua 
Biao‟s primogeniturial grandson (shisun 世孫) [Hua] Hun as Biao‟s heir. But the officials 
responsible submitted following memorandum: “[Hua] Yi suffered removal of his name from 
the list of eligible candidates for office and reduction of the fief for what he had committed. It 
may have been [only] a preliminary measure, [but] the fact that Hua Yi is [himself] the Heir 
Apparent (shizi 世子) is clearly written in the records. If we don‟t let him succeed to the 
274 
 
peerage it would amount to applying another punishment. As far as the noble lords breaking the 
law are concerned when persons enjoying any of the eight kinds of immunity are judged then 
the merit should be extolled and noble dignity honored. It is too harsh a punishment for a son 
born of the main wife [of a peer], who had not committed any capital offence, to be disinherited. 
According to the law he ought to be allowed to succeed to the noble dignity.” The imperial 
decree stated: “When a lord passes away after a year (yunian 踰年) his son mounts the throne. 
Indeed, that is the ancient order. When we disinherit someone who ought to succeed than [his 
chances of ever] receiving the noble dignity [albeit reduced in apanage] are gone. So what 
another punishment [are you talking about?]. Moreover, I blame Hua Yi because [I want to] 
eradicate corruption. Therefore [the case] should not be judged by standard law. The wise 
[counselors] were not able to follow my intention and had therefore distorted and contradicted 
the rites and the laws. Not understanding the law, the subjects would have reinstalled someone 
who had been disinherited by the order of [their] sovereign lord. Thus the position of those 
above and those below were completely reversed!” Then the responsible officials called for all 
those discussing the matter to be stripped of their offices but the edict ordered that they could 
redeem their offence by paying a fine. As a grandson heir [Hua] Hun should have received the 
peerage but he ran away and had his hair cut off pretending to be mad. He became mute and 
was unable to speak. That is how he managed to remain unenfeoffed and the world praised him 
for it … at the beginning of the Taikang (280-289 AD) [after almost ten years] the great 
amnesty was proclaimed and [Hua] Yi was at last able to succeed to [his father‟s peerage as 
second Count of Guanyang] … after Huidi‟s accession he became Palace Attendant (shizhong 
侍中), Grand Master for Splendid Happiness (guanglu dafu 光祿大夫) and Director of the 
Department of State Affairs (shangshuling 尚書令) and he was promoted in noble rank to duke 
[of Guanyang].”
405
         
 
It seems that Hua Yi 華廙 was an official Heir Apparent to his father Hua Biao 華表, 
Count of Guanyang 觀陽伯. Unfortunately for him he was incriminated in a corruption case 
not long after his father had died. Even though he was probably innocent he was to be 
punished by reduction of the fief (xiao juetu 削爵土). Yet because the investigation of the 
case coincided with the period of mourning for deceased Count of Guanyang and Hua Yi still 
did not succeed to the peerage himself, it was apparently just a preliminary decision which 
would take effect only after Hua Yi eventually succeed to the title. Another proof that the 
peerage was left vacant for the time being is the ensuing dispute between some officials and 
Emperor Wudi discussing adequacy of the punishment meted out so far. It is significant that 
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the emperor did not wish to deprive him of his peerage which would have been the case if he 
had any but denied him the right to succeed at all. Wudi explicitly stated that the tradition of 
succession to a title after a period of mourning went back to the feudatories of the Zhou times 
claiming that the heir usually succeeded after roughly a year‟s time (yunian jiwei 踰年即位). 
We may presume that the Western Jin practice was similar. 
Wudi decided to make an example of Hua Yi and his alleged crime and decreed that 
he was not to inherit arguing that the objections of double punishment are not valid for if Hua 
Yi had not inherited anything as yet the reduction of the fief‟s apanage could hardly be 
considered a punishment. However, it was to be a personal punishment for Hua Yi with the 
rest of the family standing free from any charges. It was clearly important for the emperor that 
the noble lineage should be preserved and ritual sacrifices continued by a grandson of the 
founding peer.
406
 Hua Yi‟s son Hua Hun 華混 was called upon to succeed in his father‟s stead 
but he displayed commendable loyalty to his father and rather than act against the ideal of 
filial piety he had defied the imperial order and fled pretending to be mad. Feigned madness 
as well as dumbness naturally disqualified him as an eligible heir because physical health and 
mental sanity were important criteria determining succession of noble dignities. The emperor 
did not pursue the matter and the peerage laid in abeyance for nearly a decade, yet it was 
never abolished. That is why Hua Yi was not only able to finally succeed with emperor‟s 
permission to the title once the great amnesty cleared him of his past offence but even secure 
a promotion to a ducal dignity during Huidi‟s reign. 
We have seen that the right to succeed to a noble dignity was limited only to the heirs 
male born of the main wife, that is primogeniturial sons and grandsons (dizi 嫡子, disun 嫡孫) 
of a title holder with the order of birth determining the precedence of eligible heirs. The eldest 
son of the main wife was naturally seen as an heir presumptive and his exclusive position was 
in fact often recognized officially by appointing him Heir Apparent of the given noble dignity.  
Nevertheless, the choice of successor was often influenced by biological factors as a lack of 
an heir or his premature death which necessitated change of the ideal succession pattern. In 
case of premature demise of the eldest son born of the main wife, his own eldest son, i.e. the 
primogeniturial grandson of a title holder stood next in line to succession. If the heir died 
without siring any male offspring of his own, the right to succeed was transferred to the eldest 
of his younger full brothers or his heirs male in case he was not alive either (see Table 19). 
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 Note that shisun 世孫 here denotes simply a grandson in the direct primogeniturial line and not the official 
Heir Apparent. We may presume that even the term shizi 世子 was not always used in the sense of officially 
designated heir but as an equivalent to dizi 嫡子, a son born of the main wife.   
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When none of the brothers or nephews was living then the the main primogeniturial line 
became extinct and the noble lineage was discontinued (guojue 國絕). Strictly speaking, such 
a fief should be abolished (guochu 國除) for it should have been descendants in unbroken 
primogeniturial line who should have offered sacrifices to their ancestors who had won the 
noble dignity in the first place. But unlike some of the preceding dynasties (especially Eastern 
Han)
407
 the Western Jin again resorted to an ancient system of the Zhou feudatories and 
introduced a practice of providing an alternative heir who would continue the broken line and 
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The alternative succession (shaofeng 紹封 or shaofeng jijue 紹封繼絕) was kind of 
intra-family adoption which transcended the distinction between offspring born of the main 
wife and a concubine as well as seniority of the different branches of the family. Should the 
main primogeniturial line fail to prove viable the noble dignity could be inherited by the 
eldest surviving son born of concubine (shuzi 庶子) or his eldest son (shusun 庶孫) in case he 
was no longer alive. If the title holder is left with no progeny at all a younger member of the 
clan could be selected, a son or grandson of his brother or even more distant descendant of the 
previous title holders, and adopted as an heir of a given peer or lord (see Table 20). This 
formal adoption could have taken place even years after the death of the last title holder and 
given the sheer size of the medieval aristocratic families the alternative heirs were almost 
always available. Thus the extinction of a noble lineage was rather temporary and as long as 
the dynasty lasted emperor could choose to revive it whenever he liked appointing alternative 
heir even decades after the lineage became officially extinct.  
The example of change of the ideal pattern of primogeniturial succession would be the 
Marquisate of Liling 醴陵 in case of which early death of the heir necessitated succession 
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Wu, the family of Gu Yong 顧雍 belonged to the locally powerful families entrenched south 
of the Yangzi and was to play an important role in the politics of the Western and Eastern Jin 
with his grandson Gu Rong 顧榮 even attaining the rank of a duke:  
 
“[Gu Yong‟s] eldest son [Gu] Shao died young. And as his second son [Gu] Yu was 
gravely ill [Yong‟s] youngest son [Gu] Ji succeeded [to the dignity of Marquis of Liling]. He 
died without progeny and the [noble lineage] got interrupted. In the first year of the Yong‟an 
Era (258 AD) [Sun Xiu] issued the following edict: “The late Counselor-in-chief (chengxiang 
丞相) [Gu] Yong was highly virtuous and principled, loyal and wise. He did serve the state with 
all propriety and yet, the lordly lineage of his had declined and died out and We are extremely 
sorry for it. Let Gu Yong‟s younger son [Gu] Yu succeed the noble dignity and become Marquis 




It seems that all three brothers were sons of the main wife. The eldest Gu Shao 顧邵 
died young without siring a son. Next in line would be the second born Gu Yu 顧裕 but 
because he was dangerously ill there were serious doubts as to whether he would be able to 
continue the family line and ensure future existence of the noble dignity. Therefore his claim 
to the title was disregarded to the benefit of the youngest brother Gu Ji 顧濟 who succeeded 
their father as the second Marquis of Liling. Survival of the noble dignity was obviously of 
utmost importance as it was connected with regular offering of sacrifices to the lineage 
founder which at the same time served as a ritual reminder of obligations to the dynasty. The 
eternal perpetuation of the bond of loyalty which had merited the original enfeoffment was 
from the ritual point of view the raison d‟être of the hereditary noble dignities. Therefore the 
heirs mentally or physically impaired were generally disqualified from the succession as they 
were conceived of as weak links in the chain of succession and threats to the survival of the 
noble lineage. Sometimes these disinherited heirs were granted alternative enfeoffments 
(biefeng 別封) so as to make up for their loss, but these were generally much lower than the 
original dignity (see Pei Wei‟s succession to the dukedom of Julu below). That is why the 
elder Gu Yu was skipped over. He was simply not expected to live long enough to establish 
family of his own. It is rather nice irony that it was his younger brother Gu Ji who in the end 
died childless with title reverting back to Gu Yu and his descendants who were to thrive 
during the Jin.   
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The similar reasons probably lead to change of the usual succession pattern in case of 
fairly low lordship of Anling 安陵, originally a Wei dignity which was retained even after the 
dynastic change and was inherited within the illustrious Yingchuan Xun family: 
 
“At the beginning of the Taishi Era (266-274 AD) the imperial edict ordered [Xun] 
Song to succeed to his father‟s title [of township lord of Anling] instead of his elder brother and 





It seems that the most usual deviation of the established pattern of the father-to-son 
succession still within the primogeniturial line of descent was a nephew succeeding his uncle 
who either did not have any sons of his own or his male offspring was born of a concubine. 
As the nephew was himself a son of younger primogeniturial son his claim to succession was 
stronger having precedence even over sons of the title holder born out of the wedlock. The 
fact that these were his own flesh and blood and therefore much closer to the title holder than 
his nephew was from the ritual point of view irrelevant. If we are to stay with the Yingchuan 
Xun family, the inheritance of the ducal dignity of Jibei 濟北 offers a nice example of a 
marquis being succeeded by his nephew because his own son(s) were presumably born of 
concubine:     
    
“When the emperor (Wudi) ascended the royal throne of the Jin Kingdom he made 
[Xun] Xu his Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中) and had him enfeoffed as Viscount of Anyang 
with apanage of one thousand households. After Wudi received the abdication [of the Wei Xun 
Xu‟s enfeoffment] was changed [and he became] commandery duke of Jibei. However, because 
Yang Hu had declined [the similar honor], he firmly refused [the dukedom] and became a 
marquis instead ... He died in the tenth year of the Taikang Era (289 AD) … leaving behind ten 
sons … [One of  them, Xun] Ji succeeded [to the peerage] and he attained position of Defender-
in-chief (taiwei 太尉). When he died, he was granted posthumous name of Jian and his son 
[Xun] Jun succeeded. When Jun died, he was granted posthumous name of Lie. As he did not 
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The dukedom of Jibei might have been rather a special case. Usually, the uncle-to-
nephew succession was mainly adopted either when the current title holder died sonless or 




“[Zheng] Chong [Duke of Shouguang] did not have son [of his own]. Therefore, his 
nephew [Zheng] Hui became his heir [and succeeded to the ducal title]. He eventually attained 
the office of Princely Administrator (neishi 内史) of Pingyuan. When he died his son [Zheng] 




“[Liu] Song had no son of his own so he had adopted his nephew, Liu Yong, son of his 
younger brother Liu He, but he died prematurely. Thus Liu Yan, a son of Yong‟s younger 
brother Liu Xu became his adopted grandson and [later] inherited the noble title. In the first year 
of the Yongkang Era (300 AD) the imperial edict decreed that Liu Song should be 
posthumously enfeoffed as prefecture lord of Liangzou with the apanage of one thousand five 
hundred households for his merit of execution of Jia Mi and also because he supervised various 




None of the cases mentioned above would be considered an alternative succession 
(shaofeng). The changes of the heir were made within the limits of primogeniturial succession 
with all brothers presumably being sons of the main wife (dizi). But the sources also offer 
quite a few instances of various types of alternative succession to noble dignities of both 
peerage and lordship ranks. Interesting example would be Wang Jun‟s 王浚 succession to the 
peerage dignity of Duke of Boling 博陵公:  
 
“[Wang Jun‟s] mother was a woman of the Zhao clan. She was daughter of a good 
family but she was poor and of low standing. She entered [Wang] Shen‟s house and there she 
gave birth to [Wang] Jun. Shen used to hold them in contempt. [But] when Jun was fifteen years 
old [Wang] Shen passed away. As he did not have any son [born of his main wife] the relatives 
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together raised Jun to be the heir and he was appointed Commandant-escort (fuma duwei 駙馬
都尉).”414 
 
Wang Shen 王沈, the founder of the ducal lineage was officially married to a lady of 
the Xun 荀氏 family and Wang Jun‟s mother was clearly just a concubine. Wang Shen 
therefore never considered him as his heir and held him in contempt. His standing changed 
dramatically after Wang Shen‟s death. For an unknown reason Wang Jun was chosen by his 
relatives to succeed to the peerage and with the approval of the court was duly installed as the 
second Duke of Boling. Wang Jun might have impressed his relatives by his abilities which 
promised to be sufficient guarantee of the safe future of the noble lineage or there simply 
might have been no better candidate closer in blood to Wang Shen for we know that Wang 
Shen was orphaned quite early and was brought up in the family of his uncle. Whatever the 
reason the rules of primogeniturial succession were circumvented and Wang Jun was 
established as an alternative heir. But the interesting thing is that it was clearly the family who 
decided the case and nominated an heir with the court subsequently confirming their 
choice.
415
 That was not always the case and the emperor often personally intervened in 
settling succession of the peerage dignities in danger of extinction: 
  
“[Because Yang Hu died without siring a son] Emperor [Wudi] made [Yang] Ji, a son 
of Hu‟s elder brother an heir. But Yang Ji [argued] that as his [own] father had already died, he 
cannot become an heir of someone else. Then the emperor ordered Ji‟s younger brother [Yang] 
Yi to become the heir of Yang Hu but he did not heed the imperial edict either. The emperor 
was enraged and had them both detained and stripped of their offices. In the second year of the 
Taikang Era (281 AD) Yang Pian, younger brother of Yi, became Marquis of Juping to provide 
for [the offerings] as Yang Hu‟s heir. He behaved honestly and with utmost circumspection in 
all his offices. Once, his own cow calved in the official quarters. When he was promoted [to 
different office] he left [the calf there as a property of the state]. He eventually attained position 
of Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍) and died young. In the Taiyuan 
Era (376-396 AD) of Emperor Xiaowudi [certain] Yang Faxing, a son of a great-great-grandson 
of Hu‟s elder brother was enfeoffed as Marquis of Juping with apanage of five thousand 
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Yang Hu 羊祜 was one of the most trusted ministers of Emperor Wudi who provided 
invaluable advice during the preparation of the 280 AD campaign which eventually brought 
the rival state of Wu to submission. Wudi evidently felt great concern for his deceased servant 
and made it his personal quest to secure proper heir and successor to his dignity who would 
continue in offering the sacrifices to Yang Hu. It is hard to understand what made Yang Hu‟s 
nephews defy the imperial order but I would venture to say that the main problem of the 
suggested adoption was that their father, brother to Yang Hu, had died before these events. 
That means that the eldest nephew had already became his heir and his shifting to Yang Hu‟s 
line would leave his father bereft of the proper sacrifices by his lineal descendants, a thought 
of which must have been horrifying for a filial son. His younger brother perhaps tried to avoid 
the appointment out of fear that by accepting the noble dignity he would have deprived his 
elder brother of something which was rightfully his by birth. It is quite interesting to note that 
the fear of being unfilial was stronger than the allure of a marquisate with all its benefits and 
privileges. 
Later succession of the marquisate of Juping 鉅平 offers an interesting glimpse at 
another usage of the alternative succession (shaofeng) which enabled the court to revive a 
noble lineage which became extinct in its direct line of descent by appointing an alternative 
heir from among the members of wider family to continue the sacrifices offered to the lineage 
founder. This was called “picking up the threads of a broken lineage” (jijue 繼絕) and could 
have taken place decades after the main line had died out for unless the dignity had been 
officially abolished sometime in the past it could have been revived at any given time. This 
became important especially after the fall of the Western Jin. Many a noble lord lost his life in 
the incessant fighting of the first decades of the 4
th
 century and just a few noble lineages 
managed to survive and made it to the safety of the Jiangnan Region. The southern court soon 
established its own titled nobility reflecting the current services rendered to the Eastern Jin 
claimant of the throne but some of the ancient Western Jin lineages were eventually revived 
later during the dynasty. 
Juping happens to be one of the peerages revived around year 376 AD by the order of 
Emperor Xiaowudi. It seems that the collective resurrection of ancient lineages was instigated 
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by Xie An 謝安  following a series of natural calamities which struck the core area of 
Jiangnan. Thus this endeavor should probably be seen as a ritual measure restoring the order 
of the imperial rule. As the Eastern Jin derived their legitimacy from their northern 
predecessor, they could not afford to be indifferent to the fate of the founding meritorious 
ministers of the Western Jin. To maintain uninterrupted sacrifices to the gongchen became an 
important duty of the rightful sovereign and current absence of the official heirs to the 
original gongchen dignities naturally undermined the legitimacy of the imperial authority. By 
reviving several gongchen noble lineages through usage of alternative succession Xie An and 
Emperor Wudi tried to rectify the omission for which the southern court had incurred 
displeasure of Heaven and at the same time strengthened the legitimacy of the Eastern Jin by 
claiming direct connection with the last rightful imperial regime ruling the whole of China. 
The dukedom of Linhuai 臨淮 awarded first to Xun Yi 荀顗 was another of the 
peerages resurrected by Xiaowudi in 376 AD but this case the alternative succession was 
practiced more than once as the first attempt to revive the lineage immediately after the 
restoration ended in failure:       
        
“At the beginning of the Xianxi Era (264-265 AD) [Xun Yi] was enfeoffed as Marquis 
of Linhuai. When Wudi ascended the throne he was promoted in rank to a duke with apanage of 
one thousand eight hundred households … [Xun] Yi did not have son of his own and therefore a 
grandson of one of his brothers [Xun] Hui succeeded [to the peerage]. At the beginning of the 
restoration great-great-grandson of Yi‟s elder brother [Xun] Xu was [officially] made Yi‟s heir 
and was enfeoffed as Duke of Linhuai. But when Xu died, the lineage was again discontinued. 
The Emperor Xiaowudi enfeoffed Xu‟s son [Xun] Heng as an adoptive heir to Yi. When [Xun] 
Heng died, his son [Xun] Longfu succeeded to the title. The fief was abolished when the Liu 




Interesting details about the first attempt to revive the Dukedom of Linhuai are given 
in the biography of Xun Yi‟s great-nephew once removed, Xun Song 荀崧, who was himself 
progenitor of a noble lineage of the dukes of Quling 曲陵: 
 
“When Yuandi ascended the throne [Xun Song Duke of Quling] was summoned and 
appointed Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs (shangshu puye 尚書僕射). Then 
together with Diao Xie they were to fix the rites and ceremonies of the dynastic restoration. His 
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cousin [Xu] Kui had died young [leaving behind] two sons, [Xun] Xu and [Xun] Xin both only 
few years old. [Xun] Song had taken them into his house and made them dwell with his family, 
being as kind to them as if they were his own sons. The noble line of Defender-in-chief (taiwei 
太尉) Duke of Linhuai Xun Yi died out and the court considered [Xun] Song to be close [in 
blood to him] and wanted one of Song‟s sons to succeed the peerage. [Xun] Song was grieved 
to see [his nephew Xun] Xu orphaned and destitute and therefore declined the enfeoffment and 




It is clear that in case of alternative succession, especially when the main line of 
descent became extinct and the dignity was long left vacant, the final choice of a successor 
was influenced by many factors with proximity of the line of descent being just one of them. 
Despite being the closest surviving relative of the last Duke of Linhuai Xun Song renounced 
his right to the title in order to provide for orphaned sons of his cousin. His own family line 
was secure with the eldest son having prospect of succeeding to the dignity of Quling and 
other sons enjoying the highest possible privileges as sons of a duke. Accepting another ducal 
title for a younger son would not change the standing of the lineage as a whole. On the other 
hand, by refusing the honor and redirecting it to orphaned nephew whose social standing and 
chance of future official career was seriously impaired by early demise of his father Xun Song 
lived up to the Confucian ideal and gained moral credit through fulfilling his duty to protect 
the family and share the benefits with the orphaned and the poor relatives. At the same time 
he strengthened the position of the family as a whole for the chances of the Yingchuan Xuns 
to survive as members of the elite suddenly multiplied. Yet another branch of the family 
which could boast a ducal title meant that more members of the clan became eligible for 
privileged treatment and especially for privileged entry into bureaucracy.  
As we have seen, the alternative succession was kind of adoption which provided a 
noble lineage on the brink of extinction with an alternative heir, yet it was not possible to 
adopt just anybody. The adopted successor should have been of the same kin as the title 
holder, bearer of the same family name. Members of different families, even though closely 
related through marriage to the noble lineage were generally excluded as the noble dignities 
could traditionally be inherited only by heirs male. Daughters of the family and their offspring 
had no right to succeed even if death of their father eventually meant extinction of the noble 
lineage due to the lack of suitable heir. Yet there is a unique case of alternative succession in 
the lineage of dukes of Lu when Emperor Wudi sanctioned highly unorthodox and 
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controversial succession of a waisun 外孫, grandson of the title holder born to his daughter 
married into a different family:   
 
“[Jia] Chong‟s wife Lady of Guangcheng Guo Huai was of a very jealous nature. First, 
when their son Limin was three years old his wet nurse was once holding him in her arms, 
leaning against the door when Limin saw his father enter and laughed with joy. Jia Chong 
approached [them] and fondled him. Guo Huai saw it from a distance and thought that Ji Chong 
was actually having an affair with the wet nurse and had her whipped to death at once. Limin 
longed and yearned for her [so much] that he fell ill and died. Later she gave birth to another 
boy but after some time it happened that Chong stroke his head while he was in his wet nurse‟s 
arms and Lady Guo again started to suspect the wet nurse and had her killed. The son again died 
of longing after her. Thus Jia Chong was left without an heir [of his flesh and blood]. When he 
died [Lady Guo] Huai made their grandson Han Mi [an adoptive] son of Limin to provide for 
[the sacrifices] as Jia Chong‟s heir. Chamberlain for Attendants (langzhongling 郎中令) Han 
Xian and Commandant-in-ordinary (zhongwei 中尉) Cao Zhen remonstrated with Lady Guo 
Huai: “According to the Rites, when there is no progeny in the main line than younger sons of 
the cadet branches [of the family are adopted as] heirs. There is no mention of a member of a 
different family ever becoming an heir. Don‟t let the late duke be ashamed and embarrassed in 
the netherworld and dutiful and honest historians record [such a] transgression [against the rites]. 
Wouldn‟t it be distressing?!” Lady Guo Huai did not follow their advice. [Han] Xian and other 
petitioned the throne asking for a change of successor but the whole matter was laid aside. Lady 
Guo Huai petitioned the emperor explaining that this was [Jia] Chong‟s dying wish. The 
emperor thereupon issued the following edict: “The Great Steward (taizai 太宰) Duke of Lu Jia 
Chong honored virtue and gained great merit, having unceasingly toiled to make the 
establishing of the mandate [possible]. He turned his back to this world and died. I do grieve 
whenever [I think about it]. Moreover, his offspring died [and his line] ended [with him] with 
no heir having been appointed as yet. In the ancient times when there was no heir in one of the 
states they took a younger member of a cadet branch descended from the founder of the fief to 
continue the family line. Yet nowadays, such a fief is abolished. [When we think] about Duke of 
Zhou under the Zhou or Xiao He under the Han, one has appointed his heir in advance, the other 
had his main wife enfeoffed. Thus honoring the outstanding achievements of illustrious men 
transcends the prevalent rules. The Great Steward had earlier chosen his daughter‟s son Han Mi 
to become the successor to his heir Limin. When I think over [this affair and] consider [all the 
facts] then I come to a decision that one‟s grandson, albeit born of a daughter, is the closest in 
flesh and blood and to bestow one‟s kindness and tender feelings on him [is only natural], 
conforming to people‟s hearts. Let [Han] Mi be appointed the Heir to Duke of Lu (shisun 世孫) 
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in order to succeed to the dukedom. As there is no achievement like the Grand Steward‟s neither 
[such a misfortune] of a founding peer being left with no heir like the Grand Steward‟s. There is 
also no better [candidate] like the one the Grand Steward had himself already chosen. No other 




While she may have been personally responsible for the unfortunate death of her sons 
and lack of an heir to her husband‟s peerage Lady Guo Huai 郭槐 tried hard to secure the title 
for direct descendants of Jia Chong. Despite the opposition of the ducal administration of Lu 
she had installed Han Mi 韓謐, a son of her younger daughter, as an heir of her dead son. She 
appealed to the emperor and secured his approval. It is clear that Wudi‟s decision was 
unprecedented and the inter-family succession remained exceptional even in context of 
subsequent development of the enfeoffment system. Even though the emperor in his edict 
points to the ancient tradition of alternative succession and argues that it should be revived his 
argumentation for a waisun inheriting from his grandfather totally lacks support in tradition. 
In fact, his approval of the suggested succession went against the basic principles of the 
patrilineal clan structure of the Chinese families and as such must have caused quite an outcry. 
Nevertheless, Wudi‟s decision prevailed and Han Mi was adopted into the family becoming 
Jia Mi 賈謐 and eventually succeeding to the peerage as second Duke of Lu. (He was the 
infamous cousin of Empress Jia whose extermination later became cause for creation of 
couple of new noble lineages following the coup of 300 AD) 
Wudi must have been aware of the unorthodox nature of this succession, yet there 
were compelling reasons for permitting it. First of all, Jia Chong was the most prominent of 
his meritorious ministers and the Simas literally owed him their throne. By obliging his 
widow and granting his alleged dying wish Wudi was proving his gratitude for his past 
services fulfilling his moral obligations to a meritorious minister. Meaning of this concession 
could have not been lost on other gongchen families either. His obliging attitude must have 
assured them of emperor‟s good will and strengthened the bonds of loyalty of these influential 
families to the dynasty. On the other hand Jia Chong was closely related to the imperial 
family as his elder daughter was married to the crown prince and future Emperor Huidi. Jia 
Mi was in fact Huidi‟s nephew, his mother and Empress Jia being full sisters. Thus the Jias 
were without doubt seen as future support of the throne and Wudi would not permit their 
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position to be weakened by transfer of the peerage dignity to some other branch of the family 
which would have happened if the rules of the shaofeng had been observed.          
Preferential treatment of the gongchen noble lineages and the effort to ensure their 
survival through alternative succession, however unorthodox, was not limited only to the 
Western Jin period. We have seen that even the Eastern Jin emperors, especially Yuandi and 
Xiaowudi showed great concern for the well-being of the descendants of the founding 
ministers of the dynasty and repeatedly tried to revive those which became extinct or 
temporarily vacant through appointing distant clansmen as alternative heirs (jijue). 
Continuation of these lineages was apparently of great symbolic importance as it touched 
upon the question of legitimacy of the restored court as the successor to the northern regime 
and the legitimacy of the southern emperors themselves as rightful and righteous sovereigns 
carefully judging the merits and faults of their subjects. Even as late as the beginning of the 
5
th
 century, only couple of years before the end of the Jin Dynasty, an official petitioned the 
court asking to revive lineage of Yang Hu Marquis of Juping: 
        
“In the first year of the Taiyuan Era (376 AD) of Emperor Xiaowudi [Yang] Faxing, 
son of great-great-grandson of [Yang] Hu‟s elder brother was enfeoffed as marquis of Juping 
with an apanage of five thousand households. [Later] he was executed as one of the members of 
Huan Xuan‟s faction and the fief was abolished. Director of section for sacrifices under the 
department of state affairs (shangshu cibulang 尚書祠部郎) Xun Bozi petitioned the throne in 
which he contested [this decision]: “Your subject has heard that when Jiu Yao lost an heir (line 
of his descendant came to an end), Zang Wen deeply sighed [feeling regret] and when Boshi‟s 
apanage city was taken from him, Guan Zhong was praised for his humanity. When the merit is 
high, then indeed it may not perish for one hundred generations, [but] excessive reward cannot 
[secure] respect for the court [and dynasty]. The late Grand Mentor (taifu 太傅) Marquis of 
Juping Yang Hu possessed bright virtue and was worthy and wise. He was truly one of the 
paragons of state. He rendered meritorious service [to the dynasty] in assisting [the transfer of 
the] heavenly mandate and completed his achievements with subjugation of Wu. And yet, later 
line of his descendants was discontinued and there was no one who would follow up with 
offering sacrifices [to him]. Due to the great achievement of establishing the dynasty the Han 
always immediately restored Xiao He‟s line once it got interrupted. In my ignorance I would 
say that we should deal with the fief of Juping on the same terms as [the Han dealt with] the fief 
of Zan [awarded to Xiao He]. The late Defender-in-chief (taiwei 太尉) [Chen] Zhun, Duke of 
Guangling, supported the cabal of the arch-villain [Sima] Lun [prince of Zhao]. When disaster 
struck [the family of Sima Yun, prince of] Huainan, he profited from this act of rebellion and 
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unlawfully [got the chance] to offer sacrifices to ancestors [as a lord] of large domain. It 
happened that the western court lost discernment and its decrees and punishments [were lacking 
good sense]. Thus the [possession of the fief] was not revoked even after the restoration. But 
now that the kingly way was reformed, is it permissible not to judge between good and bad? 
Therefore I say that the fief of Guangling should be abolished. The original noble title of the 
late Grand Guardian (taibao 太保) Wei Guan was prefecture duke of Ziyang. Then he had been 
atrociously slain and [his] reed-wrapped soil (the fief) was posthumously promoted, first to that 
of Lanling only to be changed later to Jiangxia. But there were many celebrated ministers at the 
imperial court who suffered premature death. Wei Guan‟s achievements and virtue were not 
exceptional, yet he was singled out for exceptional reward. I say that his commandery fief ought 
to be abolished and [his descendants] should revert to the apanage of Ziyang. [Only] then shell 
we maintain the order of giving and taking away and differentiate between good and bad.” In 
the end the memorandum was put aside and went without any response.”
420
 
                 
Yang Faxing 羊法興, the last holder of the marquisate of Juping, imprudently joined 
the ranks of ambitious usurper Huan Xuan 桓玄 who had deposed the emperor and in years 
403-404 AD ruled as an independent sovereign of Chu 楚. For this treason Yang Faxing 
suffered death and his marquisate was abolished. It was a harsh punishment as it involved not 
only the culprit but also other members of the family including deceased ancestors who were 
thus forever deprived of their sacrificial offerings. Whereas the individual title holders may 
have personally forfeited their noble dignity, the dignity per se usually did not cease to exist 
and only went into abeyance to be resurrected in the future. Therefore, the extinction of a 
dignity (guojue 國絕) was theoretically speaking only temporary for the dignity could have 
been revived through continuation of an interrupted noble lineage (jijue 繼絕) whenever there 
was an opportune time. However, this did not apply in case the dignity was outright abolished 
(guochu 國除) which is what happened to the marquisate of Juping. Once the peerage was 
abolished the potential right to succeed ceased to exist and the dignity could not be revived 
unless it was created anew. But that would naturally require new meritorious achievement in 
the service of the state justifying creation of a new dignity. 
Xun Bozi 荀伯子 did not try to exonerate Yang Faxing for his guilt was plain enough 
and punishment well deserved. The source for Xun‟s concern was finality and irreversibility 
of the abolition of the fief which would affect even the illustrious ancestors of the lineage for 
it would make future revival through an alternative heir impossible. He argues that the Han 
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precedent should be followed and the noble lineage of Yang Hu preserved. Apparently the 
original achievement of the lineage founder was far more important than possible crimes of 
his descendants and officially appointed successors. Because the noble dignity was seen as the 
means how to ensure continuous sacrifices to the progenitor of the lineage, the successive 
holders were in fact mere stewards temporarily charged with administering the noble dignity 
and catering to the ritual needs of the deceased founder. The importance of this task 
transcended the deeds of individual title holders, either good or bad, which were 
inconsequential in comparison to the great achievement of the meritorious minister.     
It is interesting that Xun Bozi‟s effort to revive the lineage of Juping is paired with 
suggestion of revision of other Western Jin gongchen dignities which survived the restoration. 
Xun considers the political rehabilitation of Chen Zhun 陳准 and Wei Guan as undeserved, 
being a product of period of heightened political struggle during which the court “lost 
discernment.” Xun Bozi appeals to the emperor as the highest authority judging the merits 
and demerits of each subject and asks for revision of the incorrect decisions of the past which 
would restore the justice and proper order of things. 
The symbolic and ritual importance of the noble dignities was undeniable and explains 
the unceasing effort on the part of the government to preserve the continuous line of 
succession through appointment of alternative heirs (shaofeng jijue). But we should not forget 
other, perhaps more practical factors which influenced rather liberal policy of the state 
towards titled nobility. Granting the privilege of shaofeng which considerably prolonged the 
life of noble lineages and ensured privileged social standing for families of their holders 
should be seen as a part of preferential treatment of the influential court families whose 
loyalty was crucial for establishing the dynasty. Without their support the Simas would not 
have been able to accomplish the dynastic transition and survival of the new dynasty was to 
certain degree dependent on them. Trying to secure their allegiance and further support Wudi 
had them generously rewarded for their pains. Rejection of the purely primogeniturial 
succession and its replacement with possibility of unlimited alternative succession was clearly 
a concession which was in the best interest of the court families. Whereas originally the fief 
would be abolished once the direct line of descent becomes extinct the right to adopt a 
successor from a cadet branch gave the family unique opportunity to retain noble dignity and 
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corresponding privileges which were crucial for maintaining their social preeminence, 
legalizing the land holding of the family and opening way to official career.
421
    
 
Special Grace Policy 
 
The practice of special grace (tui‟en 推恩) was another policy highly favorable to the 
families of titled nobility. It was originally connected with the process of inheritance of 
princely dignities and high peerages. The tui‟en practice originated during the reign of 
Emperor Wudi of the Han Dynasty as one of the measures taken by the central government in 
order to curb independence and excessive power of the princes of the blood and minimize the 
danger of regional uprising led by a member of the imperial clan. Whenever a prince died his 
fief was to be divided between all his sons with the eldest inheriting the princely rank and title 
and the rest being created marquises in their own right by the act of special grace. Thus while 
the independent power of the princes diminished as their economic base shrank with every 
new incumbent change, their social preeminence remained untouched. An elaborate system of 
devolving privileges for the heirs of deceased title holder emerged which was later applied to 
non-royal peerages as well. 
Certain shift in nature of the tui‟en practice occurred after the fall of the Han Dynasty. 
While the inheritance of princely dignities was still generally guided by the same principle 
with the princely fief being divided among sons of the dead prince, the rising importance of 
influential court families resulted in introduction of radical changes to the system of non-royal 
titled nobility. First of all, the special grace bestowals ceased to be limited to settling of 
inheritance after the death of title holders. Younger members of the families, either sons or 
younger brothers of the title holder, received the special grace and were granted their own 
titles already during the lifetime of their father or elder brother. As a noble title became a 
highly coveted guarantee of privileged social standing important court families tried to secure 
as many noble dignities as possible in order to strengthen their position in society and 
increase their chances of survival as a member of the elite.
422
       
The Jin Dynasty more or less adopted the Wei practice but introduced some important 
changes. The imperial princes continued to share the inherited fief with their younger brothers 
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with one of them usually being granted a peerage of his own by the act of special grace.
423
 In 
case of non-royal peerages the tradition of dividing the fief following the death of its holder 
was abolished altogether. The court might have decided to bestow additional titles on peer‟s 
younger sons or brothers during his lifetime. Whereas during the Wei Dynasty the dignities 
bestowed as a special grace were still derived from the original dignity with their apanage 
having been deducted from it, under the Western Jin the special grace dignities were true 
additional creations totally independent of the parent peerage either in terms of territory or 
apanage.
424
 Unlike the previous use of special grace privilege there were probably no regular 
bestowals under the Western Jin which would be connected to any special occasion, with the 
exception of an edict issued shortly after the establishment of the dynasty in 266/267 AD: 
 
“In the second year of the Taishi Era (266/267 AD) in the second month the emperor 
issued the following edict: “The enfeoffments of the five grades (peerages) originally recorded 
the old merits (i.e. merits before the establishing of the Jin dynasty). Let the enfeoffment of 
those who were originally prefecture marquises be handed down to their second-born sons who 
should become village lords (tinghou). [In case of] township marquises, [let their second-born 
sons become] lords of the royal domain (guanneihou). [In case of] village marquises, [let their 
second-born sons become] lords inside the passes (guanzhonghou). All these should enjoy one 
tenth of [revenue produced] by households allotted to the original apanage.”
425 
 
The old merits Wudi is referring to were of course the achievements of the new Jin 
titled nobility which they gained by loyal service and unswerving support of the Simas before 
the establishment of the dynasty. Many of them were originally rewarded with Wei noble 
titles but these were later abolished and supplanted by new peerages introduced in 264 AD 
which were granted in reward for the help with bringing about the dynastic transition. The old 
achievements, however, should not be forgotten for the new ones. Even though the original 
titles were part of the Wei system they were nevertheless bestowed by the Sima regents and 
therefore should be respected and revived. Wudi thus symbolically restored original Wei 
dignities of the current Jin peers and had them granted by the act of special grace to their 
younger sons or brothers as an eternal reminder of their invaluable services. However, Wudi‟s 
edict did not exactly recreate the original Wei dignities. He merely granted brand new Jin 
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titles which were nevertheless lower both in rank and apanage than their Wei counterparts. 
After all, granting a title which was lower in rank than the original dignity was a characteristic 
feature of the special grace since the very beginning.       
Transformation of a dignity which the family used to hold in the past into a new 
dignity of considerably lower rank bestowed upon one of its junior members was only one of 
the possible ways in which the special grace bestowals could be realized. Sometimes the 
noble title holders were not granted new dignities but were merely promoted in rank. Unlike 
new enfeoffment, promotion did not leave the family with a vacant dignity which could have 
been bestowed on its younger member. However, under certain circumstances promotion 
could secure conferment of an additional title provided for from the difference of the apanage 
quotas of the original dignity and the new dignity after promotion. If an individual was raised 
from a lordship to a peerage, the number of households forming his apanage had to be 
adjusted as well. In other words, his original apanage had to be reduced in number of 
households as the quotas prescribed for the peerages were much lower than the allowances for 
the lordship dignities. The remaining apanage households which accounted for the difference 
between peerage quotas and the apanage of the original lordship could have been bestowed by 
special grace on a junior member of the family as a new lordship so as to assure that the 
resources once given to the family would remain under its control: 
    
“[Wei Guan] succeeded to his father‟s title of township marquis of Wen … [When the 
Zhong Hui‟s uprising in Shu] was quelled the court wanted to enfeoff [Wei] Guan. But Wei 
Guan considered the conquest of Shu to be achieved by efforts of all the commanders and 
[argued that] both domineering generals [Deng Ai and Zhong Hui] invited their end and 
perished [without his endeavor]. Even though he might have had contributed by his wisdom and 
intelligence he did not gain merit by capturing enemy standard (i.e. vanquish the enemies) and 
therefore he firmly declined and did not accept the honor. [Despite his protests he] was 
appointed Commander-in-chief supervising all military affairs of Guanzhong, Commissioned 
with Extraordinary Powers (shichijie 使持節) and General Defending the West (zhenxi jiangjun 
鎮西將軍). Soon he was promoted to Commander-in-chief supervising all military affairs of 
Xuzhou and General Defending the East (zhendong jiangjun 鎮東將軍). His enfeoffment was 
enlarged to that of a Marquis of Ziyang. The remaining fief (i.e. apanage) was bestowed on his 
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It is not clear whether Wei Guan‟s new title was a prefecture lordship or a peerage. 
Nevertheless, his younger brother was granted a part of the apanage (here referred to as 




The transformation of the special grace from dignities bestowed from the original fief 
in a process of property division following the demise of a title holder into creation of new 
titles with additional apanages must have suited the material interests of the noble families as 
it certainly enabled them to retain or even extend their economic base. Yang Guanghui 
maintains that the Jin regime was catering to demands of the influential families and being 
partially dependent on their support and acknowledgment tried to oblige the titled nobility by 
granting additional titles and apanages to junior family members.
428
 However, it is also 
possible that such a policy was in a long run much more expedient than the traditional 
dividing of the parental apanage between heirs. The number of noble dignities would 
otherwise increase at much quicker pace, theoretically doubling in every new generation. It is 
true that number of apanage households would remain the same, yet the growth of number of 
noble dignities would mean that an ever increasing number of lineages would have valid 
claims to hereditary privileges. The factual resources at the disposal of the individual noble 
lineages would decrease but their influence would be undiminished or even rising. The more 
of noble dignities were held in the family, the better her position and prospects of its future 
survival. With every new title a family got more secure and more entrenched within the ranks 
of elite. What might have been no problem in case of imperial princes, whose social 
preeminence and influential position were after all considered to be a guarantee of stability of 
the imperial rule, was totally undesirable in case of non-royal aristocratic houses which could 
have easily become rivals of the imperial house and challenge its authority. Despite partially 
obliging the aristocratic houses the Jin managed to safely avert such danger by making 
“special” grace really special. Occasional act of special grace may have given the families 
additional source of income as it meant increase in apanage but the number of persons eligible 
for special hereditary privileges derived from the noble dignities remained more or less under 
control. The government used special grace as high honor and its willingness to grant such a 
concession naturally depended on potential merit achieved in the loyal service to the dynasty.  
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During Wudi‟s reign the special grace was therefore often bestowed in reward for 
remarkable service and military achievements mainly in the prolonged struggle with the 
southern state of Wu as is attested by the case of Chen Qian: 
   
“When Emperor Wudi received the abdication of the Wei Dynasty [Chen Qian] was 
promoted for his achievement of assisting in founding the dynasty to Chariot and Horse General 
(cheji jiangjun 車騎將軍) and created commandery duke of Gaoping. [Then] he was promoted 
to Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中), the Great General (dajiangjun 大將軍) and [later] was 
sent as Commander-in-chief to supervise all military affairs of Yangzhou with the rest of the 
offices remaining the same. He was given the yellow axe. He invested and seized the Wu walled 
city of Zhili and routed the garrison(s) in Tuzhong. [Chen] Kui, a son of Qian‟s elder brother 




The final defeat of the inveterate foe in 280 AD called for rewards which would be 
adequate to the importance of the moment for the Jin Empire which had just validated its 
claim to rule all under heaven. The imperial advisors who had devised the strategy of the Jin 
attack as well as generals responsible for command of the invasion forces during the 
campaign were generously rewarded by being created prefecture lords. As an additional honor 
their junior relatives were granted lower lordship dignities bestowed by an act of special grace:  
 
“At the beginning the emperor made secret plans with Yang Hu for attacking the state 
of Wu, but many of the ministers opined that it is not possible [to fight Wu]. Only [Zhang] Hua 
approved of this plan. Then Yang Hu fell gravely ill and the emperor sent [Zhang] Hua to visit 
[Yang] Hu and ask him about the plans of attacking the state of Wu. This is told in the 
biography of Yang Hu. When the great enterprise was just about to be launched [Zhang] Hua 
was made Minister of Revenue (duzhi shangshu 度支尚書 ) and was charged to assess 
possibilities of supply transportation via both the water and land routes and decide the general 
strategy [of the offensive]. The armies had already moved [into the field] and still have not 
achieved anything when Jia Chong and others [impeached] Zhang Hua calling for his execution 
so as to beg forgiveness of all under heaven [for this pointless campaign]. The emperor told 
them: “This is my own intention. [Zhang] Hua simply shares it, nothing else!” At that time the 
great ministers all thought that it is not possible to advance rashly but Hua alone persisted 
arguing that [Wu] would surely be conquered. And when the state of Wu was exterminated the 
following edict was issued: “Minister and lord of the royal domain Zhang Hua had in the past 
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devised the great strategy together with late Grand Mentor (taifu 太傅) Yang Hu and now he 
supervised the military affairs deploying the armies in various quarters, determining the tactics 
and planning the ultimate victory. Thus he has got [a great] achievement as the mastermind [of 
the whole campaign]. Let him be promoted in rank to prefecture lord of Guangwu and his 
apanage should be increased by ten thousand households. Let one of his sons be enfeoffed as a 
village lord with apanage of one thousand five hundred households. Let him be granted ten 




Zhang Hua followed in footsteps of Yang Hu who used to be the main advocate of the 
aggressive course urging Emperor Wudi to attempt an invasion of Wu. He appears to be one 
of the masterminds behind the campaign devising plans and being in charge of the logistics. 
But the same reward was given to other participants of the conquest who had actually taken 




“[Wang Jun] was enfeoffed as prefecture lord of Xiangyang with apanage of ten 
thousand households. His son [Wang] Yi was enfeoffed as village lord of Yangxiang with 
apanage of one thousand five hundred households. He was also granted ten thousand bolts of 





“After Sun Hao finally surrendered [Du Yu] regrouped his troops and returned 
victoriously back [to the capital]. For his merit he was promoted in noble rank to prefecture lord 
of Dangyang and his apanage was increased to final nine thousand and six hundred households. 
His son [Du] Dan was enfeoffed as a village lord with apanage of one thousand households. 




Although the bestowals of special grace after the conquest of Wu may resemble 
previous examples of this practice they are in fact different and constitute a part of a wider 
policy how to reward the meritorious commanders and strategists without antagonizing the 
gongchen, the highest standing peers of the realm who had helped to establish the dynasty. 
We have seen that lordship dignity bestowed as special grace upon a junior member of the 
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family tended to be of lower rank than the original peerage. Yet, both Zhang Hua and Wang 
Jun were merely lords of the royal domain before they were created prefecture lords and Du 
Yu was only slightly better off with a village lordship of Fengle 豐樂亭侯, originally a Wei 
title which he had inherited from his father. Thus the new noble dignities bestowed upon their 
sons and brothers by act of special grace were actually either of the same rank as the original 
dignity (Du Yu) or even higher (Zhang Hua and Wang Jun). I would argue that this rather 
unorthodox use of tui‟en attests to a deliberate effort on the part of the emperor to console his 
commanders and compensate them for the fact that despite their glorious victory they were 
denied higher peerage dignities for these, according to the rules of the enfeoffment system, 
remained reserved solely for the great achievements of the gongchen. Besides granting 
victorious commanders large apanages considerably exceeding fiefs of the peers the tui‟en 
bestowal of additional lordships upon their junior relatives higher in rank or larger in apanage 
than the original dignity remained the only way how the emperor could compensate them for 
the unattainability of peerages.  
 The meritorious ministers viewed the invasion plans with utmost concern perceiving 
the attack on Wu as a direct threat to their preeminent position. Their aversion to the planned 
campaign and their reluctance to participate in it is rather evident in following passage as is 
the emperor‟s effort to overcome their objections and mollify their fears, coaxing them into 
taking part in this “ill-advised and irresponsible adventure”: 
 
“When Wang Jun conquered Wuchang, [Jia] Chong sent a messenger with a petition: 
“It is still not possible to subjugate all of Wu. As it is summer now the [ground around] the Huai 
and the Jiang Rivers will be damp and sodden and [various] diseases are bound to arise [and 
spread within the army ranks]. It would be fitting to recall the army and then plan what to do 
next. Even if Zhang Hua [is executed by] cutting his waist, it won‟t be enough to beg for 
forgiveness of all under heaven.” Hua devised the strategy how to conquer Wu that is why Jia 
Chong said these words. Secretariat Supervisor (zhongshujian 中書監) Xun Xu submitted a 
memorandum in the same vein as Jia Chong‟s but the emperor did not heed them. When Du Yu 
had heard about Jia Chong‟s petition he rushed to submit [one of his own] protesting 
vehemently that the victory is a matter of days. His messenger [had managed to] reach [only] 
Huanyuan when Sun Hao surrendered. After the conquest of Wu the army was disbanded. The 
emperor sent Palace Attendant (shizhong 侍中) Cheng Xian to reward the army in the field with 
food and drink. [Jia] Chong was granted eight thousand bolts of silken fabric and his apanage 
was increased by eight thousand households. Grandsons of his brother, Jia Chang and Jia Gai 
were enfeoffed as village lord of Xincheng and village lord of Anyang respectively. The 
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apanages of his younger brother [Jia] Hun, village lord of Yangli, as well as lord of the royal 




In order to mollify the gongchen and reassure them of their unique standing within the 
social hierarchy of the empire both Jia Chong and Xun Xu were richly rewarded for the 
alleged achievements on the fall of Wu. Even though both men vehemently opposed the 
campaign repeatedly calling for the execution of the “warmongers” they were eventually 
rewarded in the same way as the generals and officers who had taken part in the actual 
fighting.
435
 Thus the special grace was used to maintain balance of power between the 
founding gongchen and new meritorious commanders. However, the gongchen retained their 
predominance as the special grace bestowed upon their families was obviously more generous 
entailing creation of at least two additional lordships in each case. 
Sometimes, special grace could have been bestowed on request of a meritorious 
minister or commander who himself refused to accept additional honors and enfeoffments and 
asked for them to be bestowed instead on his younger relatives. An interesting example would 
be Yang Hu who declined further promotion in rank and apanage and had it bestowed as a 
special grace on his cousin Cai Xi 蔡襲, grandson of famous Han courtier Cai Yong 蔡邕. 
Apparently under certain circumstances it was possible to ask for a special grace to be applied 
to one‟s maternal relatives as well, yet such a bestowal remained an exception: 
 
“[Yang] Hu (Marquis of Juping) should have been promoted both in noble rank and 
territory of his fief for his achievements in chastising the bandits of Wu, but he begged [for this 
additional enfeoffment] to be bestowed upon [his cousin,] Cai Xi, son of his maternal uncle. 





Curious case of special grace inheritance occurred in the family of Wang Ji 王濟, son 
and probably an heir presumptive to the Duke of Jingling 京陵公: 
 
“[Wang] Ji was married to an imperial princess [of Changshan]. The princess lost 
eyesight in both her eyes and she became extremely jealous. In the end she did not bear him a 
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son and [Wang Ji] had only two sons born of concubines. [Wang] Zhuo … succeeded to [his 
grandfather‟s] Wang Hun‟s noble dignity [as Duke of Jingling] and he was named Palace 
Steward (jishizhong 給事中). Younger [son Wang] Yu … succeeded to the dignity of the 




Wang Ji was married to the imperial princess of Changshan 常山公主 . As an 
emperor‟s daughter she was naturally his main wife but unfortunately she remained childless 
and Wang Ji‟s only sons were born by concubines. Wang Ji himself did not live long enough 
to succeed to his father‟s ducal peerage, but his eldest son Wang Zhuo 王卓 became an 
alternative heir (shaofeng) of the dukedom and in 297/298 AD became the second Duke of 
Jingling. The younger son Wang Yu 王聿 became an heir to the princess by an act of special 
grace and the apanage of Changshan was transformed into a new marquisate of Minyang 敏陽 
which was bestowed upon him. As the princess was only a step-mother of newly created 
marquis such an arrangement of inheritance of her property must have been exceptional mark 
of favor. 
After the death of Emperor Wudi gradual deterioration of the rigid enfeoffment system 
accompanied by overall inflation of bestowals of the noble dignities led also to further 
development of the special grace. With various political opponents desperately trying to 
secure their standing and political legitimacy through generous grants of highest possible 
peerages the traditional tui‟en practice offering only lower liehou lordships lost its appeal. It 
was simply not enough to encourage loyalty and entice political support of the leading court 
families. Therefore it was at least partially replaced by unprecedented bestowal of additional 
noble dignities (gengfeng 更封) by which a title holder was granted another noble title which 
was subsequently transferred on one of his younger sons. Even though the contemporary 
sources do not refer to this additional creation as an act of special grace, the two were in fact 
closely related, with gengfeng being under the given circumstances just a logical development 
of the special grace:    
 
 “At that time the imperial mounds were opened [and ransacked]. [Xun] Song sent his 
Recorder (zhubu 主簿) Shi Lan with an armed force to enter Luoyang and repair the imperial 
mounds. For this merit [Xun Song] was elevated to [the peerage dignity of] prefecture Duke of 
Wuyang. He was promoted to Commander-in-chief (dudu 都督) supervising all military affairs 
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of Jingzhou region north of the Yangzi River and he was to defend [the garrison city of] Wan as 
General Pacifying the South (pingnan jiangjun 平南將軍). His enfeoffment was changed to that 
of Duke of Quling … At the beginning of the Taining Era (323-325 AD) he was named 
Concurrent Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍) and later he was made 
Acting Grand Mentor to the Crown Prince (ling taizi taifu 領太子太傅). For his achievement in 





Xun Song belonged to one of the leading families of the Western Jin court. He 
managed to survive the fall of Luoyang and found shelter in the south where he continued to 
serve Sima Rui (Emperor Yuandi) and his descendants. As he had been created duke already 
at the end of the Western Jin, comital dignity of Pingle 平樂  must have been kind of 
additional honor granted in appreciation of his loyal stance during the rebellion of Wang Dun 
王敦. Being the highest of the peers, dukes could not be further promoted in rank (jinjue 進爵) 
and the government therefore tried to find other means how to reward them. Bestowal of 
special grace in form of additional enfeoffment (gengfeng) appears to be one of possible ways. 
Even though formally it was Xun Song himself who had been enfeoffed as Count of Pingle, 
the title must in fact have been received by one of his younger sons, because it was not 
possible to hold more than one noble title at the same time. Unfortunately, the sources do not 
provide enough detail to follow the line of succession of this particular comital dignity. We 
know that Xun Song‟s eldest son Xun Rui 荀蕤 inherited his ducal title and this lineage later 
continued through his own son. Only younger son known to us, Xun Xian 荀羡, married an 
imperial princess but we have no proof that it was him who had been created Count of Pingle. 
On the other hand, when he earned merit by defending Qingzhou 青州 against attacks of the 
Former Yan 前燕 ruler Murong Jun 慕容儁 around 355 AD, he refused to accept suggested 
enfeoffment. It is possible that he was refusing honor because he had already been a peer in 
his own right, inheriting the comital dignity formally bestowed upon his father. 
While the conclusions regarding the inheritance of additional enfeoffment by younger 
sons of a title holder may be rather tentative in case of Xun Song, the interpretation of 
gengfeng as kind of special grace is corroborated by the inheritance of titles heaped upon 
Wang Dao 王導 , the founding minister of the Eastern Jin, whose abilities and political 
acumen were instrumental in restoration of the dynastic power in Jiankang:          
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 “Wang Dao … was a grandson of Grand Master for Splendid Happiness (guanglu dafu 
光祿大夫) [Wang] Lan … At first he had succeeded to his grandfather‟s peerage as Viscount of 
Jiqiu … for his achievement in chastising Hua Yi he was enfeoffed as Marquis of Wugang … 
After [the rebellion of his cousin] Wang Dun was quelled he was promoted in rank to prefecture 
duke of Shixing with apanage of three thousand households… [Wang] Dao had six sons: Yue, 
Tian, Qia, Xie, Shao and Hui. [Wang] Yue … died before his father and was granted 
posthumous name and title Heir Zhen [of Shixing] … as he himself had no sons Wang Kun, son 
of his younger brother [Wang] Tian became his heir and succeeded to [Wang] Dao‟s peerage 
becoming Governor of the Metropolitan Area (Danyang yin 丹陽尹). When he died, he was 
posthumously promoted to Chamberlain for Ceremonials (taichang 太常) and his son [Wang] 
Gu succeeded to the title. He married imperial princess of Poyang and served as Capital 
Commandant (zhonglingjun 中領軍) and Imperial Secretary (shangshu 尚書). When he died his 
son [Wang] Hui succeeded to the title and at the end of the Yixi Era (405-418 AD) he was 
appointed Roaming and Attacking General (youji jiangjun 游擊將軍) … [Dao‟s younger son 
Tian] succeeded to the noble dignity of Viscount of Jiqiu … [Wang] Xie … succeeded to the 
noble dignity of Marquis of Wugang. He died young without leaving a son [of his own]. 
Therefore [Wang] Mi, a son of his younger brother [Wang] Shao became his heir [and 




Wang Dao had first inherited peerage dignity of his grandfather and in 278/279 AD 
became Viscount of Jiqiu 即丘子. Later he served princes of Donghai and Langye (i.e. future 
Yuandi) and sometimes after the fall of Luoyang was promoted to Marquis of Wugang 武岡
侯. The final promotion to Duke of Shixing 始興郡公 came after the end of Wang Dun‟s 
rebellion in 324 AD and was tantamount to formal acknowledgment of his exceptional 
standing as the most important founding minister of the restoration. The preeminent position 
of Wang Dao and his family in the court society of the Eastern Jin was further emphasized by 
the fact that his original noble dignities did not cease to exist with the promotion in rank but 
were allowed to be given to Wang Dao‟s younger sons by highly generous act of special grace. 
As Wang Dao‟s eldest son and ducal Heir Apparent Wang Yue 王悅 predeceased his father 
without leaving a legitimate heir, the dukedom of Shixing was inherited by a son of his 
younger brother Wang Tian 王恬 and his descendants in direct line till the end of the dynasty. 
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Wang Tian himself inherited his father‟s viscountcy, the original peerage which was in the 
family since 264 AD, and Wang Xie 王協 was awarded marquisate of Wugang which was 
later inherited by descendants of yet another brother, Wang Shao 王劭. Thus all three peerage 
dignities acquired by Wang Dao remained in the family. Whereas the special grace originally 
allowed the dignities gained earlier in one‟s career to be handed over to younger members of 
the family only in form of lower liehou lordships, Wang Dao‟s and presumably also Xun 
Song‟s peerages were inherited unaltered with the original rank and privileges. It must have 
been rather exceptional concession on part of the government reflecting the importance of 
both Xun Song and Wang Dao for newly emerging refugee court in Jiankang as a symbol of 
continuity of legitimate power and a founding minister of the restored regime respectively. 
To sum up various forms of inheritance of noble dignities as well as practice of special 
grace we may cite an example of ducal peerage of Julu 鉅鹿 originally bestowed on Pei Xiu, 
a man responsible for the introduction of five peerages and new ennoblement system, 
immediately after the founding of the Western Jin:       
                                            
“[Pei Xiu] had two sons, Jun and Wei. Jun inherited [father‟s] title and achieved the 
post of Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji changshi 散騎常侍). He died young and as his son 
born of concubine, Pei Jing was an impaired imbecile and was given an alternative enfeoffment 




“As Jia Chong was husband of [Pei] Wei‟s aunt, he petitioned the throne: “[Pei] Xiu 
had earned the great achievement of assisting the founding of the dynasty but he was 
unfortunate in that his eldest son born of the main wife died young and the orphan he had left 
behind was still immature and weak. Wei„s talents and moral integrity are outstanding, [which 
is in itself] sufficient [guarantee] of [future] prosperity and thriving of the line of noble 
descent.” The imperial edict ordered Wei to succeed to his father‟s peerage [instead of Xiu‟s 
underage grandson]. Pei Wei firmly declined but [the emperor] would not permit it. In the 
second year of the Taikang Era (281 AD) he was summoned as Palace Cadet of the Heir 
Apparent (taizi zhongshuzi 太子中庶子) and promoted to Cavalier Attendant-in-ordinary (sanji 
changshi 散騎常侍 ). When Huidi ascended the throne he was transferred to position of 
Chancellor of the National University (guozi jijiu 國子祭酒) and Concurrent General of the 
Right Army (jian youjun jiangjun 兼右軍將軍). At first, Wei‟s nephew [Pei] Jing was a 
commoner [but] Wei expounded the achievements of the [previous] generation and afterwards 
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[Jing] was granted noble title of village lord of Gaoyang ... After Yang Jun‟s execution he 
should have been [further] enfeoffed as Marquis of Wuchang. Wei asked for this dignity to be 
bestowed upon [his nephew] Pei Jing. [But] the emperor in the end enfeoffed Wei‟s second son 
[Pei] Gai. Pei Wei vehemently argued that Jing should have succeeded to [the ducal dignity of] 
Julu for he was originally an heir of the main line. [“]Due to the favor of the late emperor my 
renunciation [of the title] did not met with his approval. The dignity of Wuchang was graciously 
bestowed upon myself. Therefore I am asking for permission to have it granted to Jing.[”] 





Pei Xiu left his title to his eldest son Pei Jun 裴濬 who apparently succeeded as the 
second Duke of Julu. However, he died young and his only son Pei Jing 裴憬 was somehow 
unfit to succeed. His being a son of concubine was not the main problem of inheritance as the 
alternative succession (shaofeng) could have been employed. Much greater obstacle was the 
fact that the prospective heir was probably mentally impaired (Chronicle says buhui 不惠) 
and therefore further continuation of the noble lineage was endangered. This fear is clearly 
voiced in Jia Chong‟s argument calling for disinheriting Pei Jing and replacing him with his 
uncle Pei Wei whose virtue and moral integrity provides sufficient guarantee of future glory 
of the Pei Xiu‟s dignity. Apparently, Pei Wei‟s appointment was no longer regarded as 
regular primogeniturial succession otherwise Jia Chong would have not deemed it necessary 
to petition the throne for approval of the change of succession. Either Pei Wei was also son of 
a concubine or, more probably, succession from brother to brother was considered irregular. 
Had the elder brother died prematurely before he had actually a chance to succeed to the title, 
Pei Wei would have succeeded as rightful primogeniturial heir of Pei Xiu. But because Pei 
Jun had already succeeded to the dignity the change of succession lineage would leave him 
excluded from sacrificial offerings which could be provided only by one‟s descendants. Pei 
Wei could not become an adoptive heir to Pei Jun as it was impossible from the ritual point of 
view for a brother to become a son of a title holder. Once the succession was changed and 
settled upon Pei Wei, his elder brother and his descendants were circumvented and forever 
left out of the ancestral worship of the Julu Dukedom.   
Pei Wei was very reluctant to replace the primogeniturial line and when he finally 
accepted the succession he tried hard to secure Pei Jing a title of his own for he had always 
considered him to be the rightful heir of his father. Shortly after he had become third Duke of 
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Julu he petitioned the throne and asked for an alternative enfeoffment (biefeng) for Pei Jing 
who was duly created village lord of Gaoyang 高陽亭侯. Later when Pei Wei was to receive 
an additional enfeoffment (gengfeng) as Marquis of Wuchang 武昌侯 he again tried to prevail 
upon the throne to bestow this dignity on disinherited Pei Jing so as to make up for the lost 
dukedom. This time, however, his wish was not granted as the emperor chose to confer the 
title upon Pei Wei‟s younger son who happened to be married to an imperial princess. As the 
bestowals and inheritance of noble dignities always remained prerogatives of the sovereign 
the enfeoffment rules were subject to potential modifications and adjustments. The emperor 
or those acting in his name had the final word in the matter of succession and the decisions 





As was often the case with imperial institutions the ennoblement system of the 
Western Jin was based on much older traditions originating in the ancient past. All preceding 
imperial dynasties in some way practiced bestowal of noble dignities upon royal kinsmen and 
meritorious subjects, yet the Western Jin system remains unique for the Simas managed to 
combine various traditions of the previous regimes and transform them into a full-fledged 
system of titled nobility which was to be used by all subsequent dynasties of Mediaeval 
China. The princely dignities which began to be conferred on princes of the blood during the 
Han were thus combined with the peerage hierarchy of the ancient Zhou feudatories as well as 
noble distinctions which the Qin used to grant in reward for military achievements and 
intrepid conduct on the battlefield. Therefore the Western Jin system should be seen as an 
outcome of a long development process which did not end with the foundation of the dynasty. 
Due to the various reasons it underwent many changes even during the reign of the Jin having 
been constantly improved or modified according to current political needs.  
The first step towards establishing of the new system of titled nobility was actually 
made even before the founding of the Jin dynasty in 264 AD when regents of the Sima house 
introduced five ranks peerages following successful conquest of Shu Han. During prolonged 
process of gradual usurpation the Simas had carefully orchestrated portents and auguries of 
heaven and performed certain ritual acts emulating precedents of the past, yet the successful 
accomplishment of the dynastic transition required also an administrative reform or rather 
resurrection of a venerable institution of glorious past. By formally recreating such an 
institution the usurper implied moral as well as administrative deficiency of the dynasty he 
was going to replace and at the same time symbolically pledged redress of all governmental 
failings. In this context the revival of ancient enfeoffment system connected with reign of the 
Zhou kings of old was an important step in a sequence of ritual acts symbolically attesting to 
gradual transfer of the Mandate of Heaven which provided the house of Sima with semblance 
of legitimacy as rightful successors to the Wei. 
Leaving the symbolic importance of newly established peerage aside, practical 
considerations of rewarding loyal partisans and securing further political and military support 
before the actual abdication were by no means negligible either. Timely reward of the Sima 
followers strengthened their loyalty which might have otherwise wavered and revision of the 
current ennoblement system was a gesture of goodwill towards influential court families. 
While the rulers of the Wei Dynasty, jealously guarding privileged position of their family, 
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reserved higher noble titles for exclusive use of the imperial kinsmen, establishment of the 
peerage system in 264 AD satisfied the demand for more generous bestowal of the coveted 
dignities. The active support or at least tacit acknowledgment of the established court families 
was absolutely necessary for successful accomplishment of the usurpation process. By 
bestowing new noble titles the Simas were courting their favor and at the same time 
symbolically expressed their willingness to guarantee the established court families the same 
social standing and preeminence even under the new dynasty provided by the fact that they 
decide to support the right claimant. 
The actual founding of the Western Jin Dynasty brought no remarkable change in 
composition of the elite. As the membership of the new titled nobility was more or less 
decided already two years ago when Simas initiated establishment of the peerage ranks, the 
actual changes were now restricted to readjustment of relative standing of particular court 
families within noble hierarchy in regard to their commitment to the Jin cause. The most 
important meritorious ministers whose assistance was essential to founding of the new regime 
were granted ducal ranks, the highest peerage titles previously unattainable for non-royals, 
and many others were rewarded for their loyalty or readiness to accept the dynastic transition 
by promotion in rank, yet it seems probable that majority of hundreds of noble dignities 
created in 264 AD continued under the new regime unchanged. 
Creating new peers and nobles in the symbolic way ushered in the beginning of the 
new age and introduced new social order based on merit and service rendered to the Jin 
dynasty and its founders. At the same time it enabled Jin Emperor Wudi to enhance stability 
of his new regime. Loyal supporters and political allies were elevated to the highest ranks of 
the peerage becoming the elite of the new empire. As there was direct connection between 
noble ranks, office recruitment and all kinds of social and economical advantages, the 
families of the meritorious ministers should have become influential power behind the throne. 
The common interest should have ensured future loyalty of these families and reinforce the 
political position of the Simas and the dynasty as a whole. 
On the other hand, Wudi was well aware of the way how his family came to the throne 
and he was not willing to take the risk that one of the court families, erstwhile peers of the 
Simas, would aspire to the throne and try to reenact the gradual usurpation. Titled nobility 
should by no means endanger position of the ruling family. Therefore, Wudi was careful to 
impose certain restrictions on future ennoblement which should have prevented 
uncontrollable growth of titled nobility and its power. Theoretically speaking all noble titles 
were granted on basis of some achievement or loyal service rendered to one‟s sovereign or 
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dynasty and relative importance of this merit determined the reward, i.e. the rank and grade of 
a noble dignity bestowed upon meritorious subject. The hierarchy of noble titles should have 
corresponded to relative hierarchy of merit with the peerage dignities being the highest 
possible reward intended for the most loyal service. As there was no greater merit than 
assisting in the founding of the dynasty the peerages were henceforth reserved only for the 
meritorious ministers (gongchen) of the Jin who had actively helped to overthrow the Wei. 
Because the foundation of the dynasty could not be repeated it was well nigh impossible to 
gain the kind of merit necessary for bestowal of peerage. In consequence during the reign of 
Wudi peerage ranks became virtually unattainable for all non-royal court families and all 
future achievements and services for the dynasty, no matter how great or important they may 
have been, were to be rewarded only by grants of lesser lordship dignities. Not even the 
leaders of victorious campaign against the southern state of Wu in 280 AD were exempted 
from this rule. Even though their victory accomplished the long process of reunification and 
greatly enhanced legitimacy of the Jin they were not given more than prefecture lordships, the 
highest of the liehou dignities standing just below the peerage ranks. 
While restricting further bestowal of peerage dignities Wudi also made sure that the 
current peerage holders would not become threat to the ruling family. Imperial kinsmen were 
elevated high above members of other court families and created princes of the blood. As the 
princely dignities were reserved for sons and brothers of the reigning emperor the close 
relatives of the ruling line always held the highest noble dignities of the realm and the 
everlasting supremacy of the imperial house was ensured. Moreover, later reform of princely 
enfeoffment introduced in 277 AD created an elaborate system of royal peerage. After a death 
of a prince his younger sons were to be given part of the ancestral princely fief and created 
peers in their own right as a share of their inheritance. As the peerages became virtually 
unattainable once the dynasty was established, Wudi‟s decision practically turned the highest 
noble dignities into monopoly of the imperial family. The enfeoffment reform of 277 AD 
gave birth to numerous and practically ever-growing group of royal peerage which effectively 
counterbalanced the influence of the non-royal titled nobility and precluded its further rise as 
independent power challenging the royal authority. The danger of recurring usurpation was 
effectively averted for it did not only prevent the actual growth in numbers of the peerage as a 
whole but at the same time greatly minimized the influence of the peers created so far as they 
were in the long run bound to be eclipsed by royal peerage. 
Due to the highly complex and intertwined policies guiding princely enfeoffment and 
ennoblement of meritorious subjects the period of Western Jin saw birth of an elaborate 
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system of noble dignities comprising whole range of noble titles from imperial princes and 
royal and non-royal peerage to all kinds of lordships differing in rank, fief apanage and right 
to inherit. In fact the government had at its disposal more than twenty different noble titles of 
three or four categories. However, regardless of the noble rank the setting of the system 
ensured that the title holders would not become potential threat endangering the position of 
the central government in the provinces through establishing regional centers of power. The 
actual administration of the fief was not dissimilar to the official structure of any commandery 
or prefecture of the realm and was controlled by the government through centrally appointed 
officials. The peers may have been entitled to special household offices corresponding to their 
noble dignity but their establishment was in reality rather limited as it was conditioned by the 
actual departure of a title holder to the allotted territory. As majority of titled nobility served 
in government offices either at court or in the provinces they could not afford to reside 
permanently in their fief and the right to establish official retinue therefore remained just an 
empty privilege. 
The authority of the nobles over the territory granted as their “fief” and its inhabitants 
was only nominal. The fief holders neither owned land of their fiefs, nor commanded loyalty 
of the people living within their boundaries. They could not implement their own laws and 
regulations and had no jurisdiction over their own “subjects” whatsoever. The period of 
Western Jin thus did not see emergence of a semi-independent landed aristocracy, but mere 
titled nobility fully subordinated to the central government and entitled to annual stipend 
drawn from precisely defined number of state tax-paying households which were temporarily 
assigned to form an apanage of the fief. Whereas the apanages of the lesser lordship dignities 
were defined only in terms of number of apanage households, the fiefs of the peers were in 
addition defined also in terms of territory. The rules set by Emperor Wudi prescribed not only 
quotas of households but also the expanse of territory, acreage measured in miles, conferred 
on the recipient of the peerage title in correspondence to the rank of bestowed peerage. Yet 
again, despite referring explicitly to a well defined territory, the practice of territory allocation 
did not imply any territorial rights or jurisdiction over certain area and was considered only as 
an additional means for assessing the annual income drawn from the apanage. 
The process of selection of suitable fief territory primarily followed the elaborate 
system of rules prescribing apanage allotment, yet it was also influenced by important 
considerations of geographical and geopolitical nature. It seems that noble fiefs were 
dispersed unevenly over the whole territory of the empire with the exception of the imperial 
domain around the capital city of Luoyang. However, the majority of the large peerage fiefs 
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bestowed during the Western Jin were located in the populous and economically well 
developed regions in the basins of the Yellow and Huai Rivers with thriving agricultural 
production and presumably also operational road or waterway network providing decent 
transport facilities enabling smooth collection of taxes. It seems that at least during the reign 
of Emperor Wudi it was usual to select suitable territory as close to the ancestral home of the 
family as possible, provided by the fact that the chosen fief would meet all necessary 
requirements concerning available land and number of apanage households. The spatial 
proximity of the allocated fief and ancestral home of the family could have been desirable for 
purely practical reasons as it solved many a logistic problem connected with collection of 
taxes and generally made the management of the apanage households easier. On the other 
hand, at the beginning of the Jin Dynasty the court families often still maintained some kind 
of provincial base where the family held landed property and exercised considerable influence 
over the affairs of local community. The authority of central government on the local level 
often depended on the influence of these families and could be implemented only through 
their mediation. Therefore, awarding fief in or near one‟s home territory could have reflected 
the position of the family within the local society acknowledging on symbolical level its 
preeminent influence over the locality and its population and probably also conferring 
additional symbolic authority.  
Even though bestowal of a noble title did not bring any real political or military power 
the peerage dignities as well as lordship titles retained their appeal to members of court circles 
for every noble title provided its holder with economic advantages which were by no means 
negligible as the revenue gained from the fief exceeded by far the state-provided income of 
untitled officials of comparable court rank. Noble titles remained highly coveted social 
distinction which improved standing of one‟s family within the ranks of elite. Even the lowest 
of the lordship titles brought to its holder rather high court rank which entitled him not only to 
precedence over many untitled court officials but also to various hereditary privileges. The 
most important of them was right of priority entry into the higher ranks of bureaucracy for 
sons and grandsons of title holders. At the time when high social standing of a family 
depended on official ranks attained by its members such a privilege greatly improved chances 
of retaining their distinguished position among the elite. Thanks to the right of priority entry 
members of noble families were able to secure consequential court offices at fairly young age 
which gave them considerable advantage over members of untitled families whose official 
career was hardly as straightforward. Due to the better starting position it must have been 
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easier for every new generation of a noble family to reach the top echelon of the state 
bureaucracy and renew its claim to social preeminence. 
Being partially dependent on support and acknowledgment of the court families the 
Western Jin tried to oblige the titled nobility by ensuring almost unlimited heredity of the 
noble dignities. The succession within the noble lineage was basically primogeniturial in 
nature with the eldest son born of the main wife succeeding to his father‟s title and all the 
privileges and duties connected with it. Sons of the main wives held precedence over their 
brothers born of concubines as well as other members of the family. While the policy of the 
previous dynasties was rather strict, with noble dignities being regularly abolished once their 
main primogeniturial line became extinct, the Western Jin revived old Han practice of 
alternative succession (shaofeng) which enabled the families to retain the noble dignity and 
transfer it to a collateral branch. Shaofeng was kind of intra-family adoption which 
transcended the distinction between offspring born of the main wife and a concubine as well 
as seniority of the different branches of the family. Should the main primogeniturial line fail 
to prove viable the noble dignity could be inherited by the eldest surviving son born of 
concubine and his heirs male or by a younger member of wider family who was duly adopted 
as an heir to given peerage or lordship dignity. 
Another apparent concession to families of titled nobility was revival of practice of 
special grace (tui‟en) under which additional titles and apanages were granted to junior 
relatives of the title holders. The more of noble dignities were held in the family, the better its 
position and prospects of its future survival. With every new title a family got more secure 
and more entrenched within the ranks of elite. However, unlike the old practice of special 
grace which meant regular dividing of original fief or apanage among all sons of a deceased 
title holder the Jin turned special grace into a distinction bestowed only occasionally as a 
mark of highest favor. While the original practice would have led to uncontrollable increase 
of number of noble dignities as well as persons claiming preferential treatment, the Western 
Jin innovation managed to safely avert such danger. Occasional act of special grace may have 
given the families additional source of income but the number of persons eligible for special 
hereditary privileges derived from the noble dignities remained more or less under control for 
any act of special grace depended solely on the will of the sovereign and its bestowal was 
conditioned by performance of remarkable meritorious service. 
Bestowal of a noble title was always dependent on merit and could be obtained only as 
mark of distinction and imperial favor for various meritorious deeds and remarkable 
achievements in service of the sovereign and dynasty. It seems that apart from the most 
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valued merit of assisting in founding the dynasty the majority of meritorious achievements 
which led to ennoblement during the Western Jin Dynasty tended to be military in nature. 
Fighting the forces of rival state of Wu, defending the border against the raids of nomadic 
tribes and bringing down rebellions or annihilating internal enemies were the most frequent 
reasons for bestowal of a noble dignity. Yet the military achievements meriting ennoblement 
were not limited to actual fighting. Offering sound advice, devising useful strategy or simply 
supervising the preparations for the military campaign were also seen as important 
contributions to overall war effort and tended to be rewarded as such. On the other hand 
performance in a civil office usually could not secure ennoblement unless it went beyond the 
administrative routine and was charged with special symbolic impact. Great importance was 
attached to services rendered in connection with the state ritual and worshipping of the 
imperial ancestors. Welcoming of a new emperor, escorting funeral cortege of a deceased 
ruler, repairing of the dynastic ancestral temple or renovation of the imperial burial ground 
were all ceremonial and ritual acts of great symbolic importance for the legitimacy and 
survival of the imperial regime which in a way emulated the merit of the dynastic founders 
and called for corresponding reward. 
Symbolic value of title bestowal was important feature of the ennoblement system and 
the Western Jin rulers often used it as useful and effective tool for asserting their supreme 
authority and securing additional legitimacy of their rule. Wudi symbolically placed the Jin 
within the chain of legitimate imperial succession by bestowing noble dignities upon 
descendants of the royal houses of Zhou, Han and Wei as well as rival regimes of the Three 
Kingdoms. By creating deposed royals princes and peers Wudi exercised prerogatives of the 
Son of Heaven and asserted his indisputable authority as sole sovereign lord. At the same time 
the scions of the former ruling houses assumed their proper place within the social structure 
of the realm as subjects of the Jin emperor, thereby confirming the process of dynastic 
transition and unification of the empire as well as legitimacy of the new dynasty. 
The worsening political situation of the empire during the second half of the Western 
Jin led to inevitable decline of central authority and subsequent deterioration of many 
imperial institutions including the ennoblement system. The original restrictions imposed by 
Emperor Wudi were rescinded and the court resorted to regular creations of new peerages 
which would satisfy the ambitions of powerful men at court. Creation of new dignities closely 
followed the political development and shifts in balance of power between various princes of 
the blood and quarrelling court factions. Generous bestowal of noble titles could secure wider 
support for the rule of successive would-be regents and princely dictators during the Upheaval 
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of the Eight Princes and strengthen the bonds of loyalty within the ruling faction as well as its 
overall standing. Besides conferring titles upon one‟s supporters considerable political capital 
was to be gained also through posthumous rehabilitation and ennoblement of victims of 
persecution by one‟s political opponent. Recurrent restoring of noble dignities, titles and 
honors previously abolished became the norm during every subsequent power struggle as 
every new would-be regent was eager to appear as the legitimate surrogate of the sovereign 
authority restoring the order and bringing redress of injustice done by self-appointed usurpers.   
As the tension among various branches of the imperial family increased the rival 
princes were hiring tribal armies as mercenaries and the military might of nomadic groups 
gradually became indispensable. The court tried to secure their allegiance through bestowal of 
ducal peerages upon their rulers who were in a symbolic way integrated into the 
administrative and social structure of the realm. By accepting noble title they acknowledged 
the supreme authority of the emperor and became formal subjects of the dynasty. Such 
arrangement enabled the court to establish certain degree of control over border regions and 
their inhabitants as nominal overlords of these semi-independent tribal rulers. At the same 
time the dynasty secured additional legitimacy as the peaceful submission of the barbarians 
attested to superiority of the Jin Son of Heaven. With the fall of the Western Jin this symbolic 
meaning of the peerage bestowals upon tribal rulers became even more important. Through 
their ducal peerages the semi-independent nomadic leaders may have been, at least formally, a 
part of the titled nobility of the realm, nevertheless their actual position within Jin titled 
nobility was rather specific and their fiefs were in fact existing outside the established 
hierarchy of ordinary dignities bestowed on meritorious subjects of the dynasty. 
As we have seen, the ennoblement system of the Western Jin was quite flexible being 
used in order to achieve highly diverse aims from rewarding loyal service to asserting 
legitimacy as the sole inheritor of the imperial tradition or strengthening diplomatic alliance 
with semi-independent tribal rulers. Thus, the Western Jin titled nobility was a group of 
families of fairly varied origins. The pride of place belonged to meritorious ministers, staunch 
supporters of the Sima cause, but there were also imperial in-laws, former Wei courtiers as 
well as descendents of illustrious Han families, scions of deposed royal houses and royal 
pretenders of rival regime who had defected to the Jin. With loosening of the original 
restrictions on further ennoblement during the second half of the dynasty the titled nobility 
expanded considerably comprising also military commanders and men of local influence who 
had risen in service of various princes of the blood together with rulers of nomadic tribes 
inhabiting the border regions of the empire. 
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All members of titled nobility, regardless of their origin, to a various degree shared 
considerable social and economic privileges which under certain circumstances could have 
been turned into kind of political influence or power over the affairs of state. However, the Jin 
state managed to retain full control over its titled nobility with bestowals and inheritance of 
noble dignities always remaining exclusive prerogatives of the sovereign authority. The 
preeminent social standing of the members of titled nobility derived from their loyal service 
and allegiance to the dynasty and was always dependent on the will of the emperor. Even 
though the noble dignities were hereditary, their survival and even the right to pass them on to 
one‟s children could have never been taken for granted for the emperor or those acting in his 
name had the final word in the matter of succession. Privileges could be withdrawn at any 
moment and noble title could be abolished once its holder was attainted. Trespassing the law, 
being disloyal to the dynasty or simply being negligent in performing one‟s official duty 
meant risking the loss of noble title and jeopardizing the future of the family as a member of 
the elite. Even the most illustrious lineages could quite easily decline rapidly in just a couple 
of generations because without a title and corresponding hereditary privileges family‟s 
position at court became less secure, being more dependent on official career of its members. 
Thus the titled nobility of the Western Jin never became independent power group which 
would have challenged the authority of the throne and central government. 
  














Noble Dignities Bestowed During the Western Jin Dynasty  






Anchang 安昌公 – Pan of Xingyang 滎陽潘氏  
 
1. Pan Ni 潘尼 – Jin courtier; after usurpation of Prince of Zhao he had left the court and later 
joined the righteous army of Sima Jiong, Prince of Qi, becoming his Adjutant (canjun 參軍). 
After the defeat of Prince of Zhao Pan Ni was enfeoffed as Duke of Anchang 安昌公 
(probably early summer of 301 AD). He died shortly before or immediately after the fall of 
Luoyang in 311.  
 
Anle 安樂公 – Liu of Zhuojun 涿郡劉氏 
 
1. Liu Shan 劉禪 – son of Liu Bei 劉備, the last ruler of the Shu Han 蜀漢. He was enfeoffed 
as Duke of Anle right at the beginning of the Jin Dynasty.  
 
2. Liu Xun 劉恂 – son of Liu Shan, it is not clear whether he had ever succeeded to his 
father‟s peerage.  
 
Anxiang 安鄉公 –family of unknown origin 
 
1. Liu Zhen 劉真 – commander and partisan of Sima Jiong Prince of Qi. After Jiong seized 
power he had Liu Zhen created Duke of Anxiang as his meritorious minister (301 AD).  
 
Bohai 渤海公 – family of Xianbei origin 
  
1. Duan Pidi 段匹磾 – In 317 AD the regional commander of Youzhou and the Left Wise 
King (zuoxianwang 左賢王) of the Xianbei is mentioned as Duke of Bohai. The peerage was 
most likely only nominal title bestowed on local tribal leader in the border area. He was killed 
in 321 AD during the fights with Shi Le 石勒.   
 
Boling 博陵縣公 – Wang of Taiyuan 太原王氏, prefecture dukedom was later changed to 
commandery dukedom  
 
1. Wang Shen 王沈 – originally a Wei official. When Duke of Gaogui was conspiring against 
the Simas Wang Shen informed Sima Zhao who rewarded his loyalty by granting him 
marquisate of Anping 安平侯  with apanage of 2000 households. After establishment of the 
five ranks peerages in 264 AD he was created Marquis of Boling 博陵侯 (it was a second 
grade marquisate ciguo 次國). After the founding of the Jin Dynasty he was enfeoffed for his 
achievement of assisting in establishing the mandate as commandery duke of Boling. 
However, as he declined the honor he was at least promoted to Prefecture Duke of Boling 博
陵縣公 with apanage of 1800 households. He died in the same year. His posthumou name 
was Yuan 元公 . One year late the emperor recalled his achievements and had him 
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posthumously promoted and buried with honors due to a commandery duke. He was 
succeeded by his son Wang Jun. During the Xianning Era (275-279 AD) he was 
posthumously promoted to the rank of commandery duke.  
 
2. Wang Jun 王浚 – son of Wang Shen, his mother Lady Zhao 趙氏 hailed from a poor 
family and Wang Shen therefore considered her and her son bellow himself. However 
because Wang Shen did not have another son, fifteen-year old Wang Jun was proclaimed his 
heir by his relatives. At the beginning of the Taikang Era (circa 280 AD) he left the capital 
and repaired to his fief. After turbulent military career he became regional commander in 
Youzhou. His fief was enlarged by grant of another commandery, Yanguo 燕國. He died in 
314 AD defending his territory against Shi Le. As he did not have any son, the fief went into 
abeyance. 
 
3. Wang Daosu 王道素 – In Taiyuan 2 (377 AD) Emperor Xiaowudi 孝武帝 decreed that the 
broken lineage should be resurrected and an official heir adopted. Wang Shen‟s clan grandson 
(congsun 從孫) Wang Daosu became the 3rd Duke of Boling. 
 
4. Wang Chongzhi 王崇之 – son and heir to Wang Daosu, the 4th Duke of Boling. In Yixi 11 
(415 AD) he was transferred to become commandery duke of Dongguan 東莞郡公. The fief 
was abolished following the establishment of the Liu Song Dynasty in 420 AD.  
 
Chang’an 昌安公 – Shi of Leling 樂陵石氏  
 
1. Shi Jian 石鑒 – after the accession of Emperor Wudi Shi Jian was enfeoffed as Viscount of 
Tangyang 堂陽子 . After Wudi‟s death Shi Jian supervised construction of the imperial 
mound and when he had accomplished his task he was created Duke of Chang‟an 昌安縣公 
(probably at the instigation of Yang Jun). He died in Yuankang 4 (294 AD) and he was 
granted posthumous name of Yuan 元公. 
  
2.  Shi Lou 石陋 – son and heir to Shi Jian, 2nd Duke of Chang‟an. 
 
Chengyang 成陽  - Bian of Jiyin 濟陰卞氏 
 
1. Bian Cui 卞粹 – originally Viscount of Chengyang 成陽子, as a son-in-law of Zhang Hua 
he suffered demotion after Zhang‟s death but after execution of Lun of Zhao he was promoted 
to the ducal rank by victorious Jiong of Qi. Jiong‟s murderer Sima Yi Prince of Changsha did 
not trust Bian Cui and had him killed in 303 AD. His son could not immediately succeed to 
the title 
 
2. Bian Hu 卞壺 – son and heir to Bian Cui. He was rehabilitated only in the Yongjia Era 
(307-312 AD) when he succeeded to his father‟s peerage as 2
nd
 duke of Chengyang. However, 
this peerage apparently did not survive the fall of the Western Jin as Bian Hu was newly 
enfeoffed as Duke of Jianxing 建興公 by Emperor Yuandi 元帝 for quelling the rebellion of 
Wang Han. 
 




1. Wen Xian 溫羡 – When Jiong of Qi acted as regent he held Wen Xian in high esteem as a 
former official of his late father. Later he gained merit by participating in a punitive campaign 
against Ying of Chengdu and was subsequently enfeoffed as prefecture duke of Daling 大陵
縣公 with apanage of 1800 households. He died shortly after the accession of Emperor Huaidi 
and was given posthumous name Yuan 元公. 
 
Dongping 東平郡公 – Gou of Henei 河内苟氏  
 
1. Gou Xi 苟晞  – during the regency of Yue of Donghai he was for some military 
achievements created commandery marquis of Dongping with apanage of 10 000 households. 
Later he fell out with Yue of Donghai but retained his position and after prince‟s death 
secured control of the court and was promoted to the rank of a duke. The apanage was 
increased to 20 000 households. The fief probably ceased to exist with the fall of the northern 
regime.  
 
Dongpingling 東平陵 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Zhao Feng 趙酆 – duke of Dongpingling, details unknown. 
 
Fengqiu 封丘公 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Han Tai 韓泰 – follower of Sima Jiong Prince of Qi. When Jiong took over the reins of 
power he had Han Tai enfeoffed as Duke of Fengqiu as his meritorious minister. After Jiong‟s 
fall he was executed and his fief was abolished (301 AD).  
 
Gaoping 高平郡公 – Chen of Linhuai 臨淮陳氏 
 
1. Chen Qian 陳騫 – descendant of an ancient family, started his career as a Wei official and 
was granted Wei noble title of village marquis of Anguo 安國亭侯. Soon he started to serve 
the Simas and for his part in quelling rebellion of Zhuge Dan was promoted to Marquis of 
Guangling 廣陵侯. After introduction of five ranks peerages in 264 AD he was created 
Marquis of Shan 郯侯. Being a main gongchen he became Duke of Gaoping immediately 
after establishing the Jin Dynasty. He died in Taikang 2 (292 AD) and was granted 
posthumous name Wu 武公. 
 
2. Chen Yu 陳輿 – son and heir to Chen Qian, 2nd Duke of Gaoping. 
 
3. Chen Zhi 陳植 – son and heir to Chen Yu, 3rd Duke of Gaoping. 
 
4. Chen Cui 陳粹 – son and heir to Chen Zhi, 4th Duke of Gaoping. He died during the 
Yongjia Era and the noble line was broken.  
 
5. Chen Haozhi 陳浩之 – son of a great-grandson of Chen Qian. Emperor Xiaowudi named 
him an heir to the noble title and had him succeed as the 5
th
 and last Duke of Gaoping. The 
fief was abolished after the founding of the Liu Song Dynasty in 420 AD.  
 




1. Cao Jia 曹嘉 – son of Cao Biao, Wei prince of Chu 楚王曹彪, originally succeeded to the 
princely title but after the establishment of the Jin Dynasty he was created Duke of Anyi. 
  
Guang’an 廣安公 – family of unknown origin  
 
1. Zhen De 甄惪 – younger brother of Guo Jian Duke of Linwei 臨渭公郭建 (by a different 
father?), he married daughters of both Sima Shi and Sima Zhao. Thus he belonged to 
important waiqi families of the Simas.  
 
2. Zhen Xi 甄喜 – son and heir to Zhen Dea, 2nd Duke of Guang‟an.  
 
Guangling 廣陵郡公 –Chen of Yingchuan 潁川陳氏 
 
1. Chen Zhun 陳準 – friend and supporter of Sima Lun Prince of Zhao who had him created 
Duke of Guangling.  
 
Guangning 廣甯公 – family of Xianbei origin  
 
1. Duan Chen 段辰 – In 317 AD is mentioned as Duke of Guangning. The peerage was most 
likely only nominal title bestowed on local tribal leader in the border area.  
 
Guanyang 觀陽公 – Hua of Pingyang 平原華氏 
 
1. Hua Yi 華廙 – originally succeeded to the title of count of Guanyang. After the accession 
of Huidi he was promoted to the ducal rank, probably at the instigation of Yang Jun. His 
posthumou name was Yuan 元公. 
 
2. Hua Hun 華混 – son and heir to Hua Yi, 2nd Duke of Guanyang. 
 
3. Hua Tao 華陶 – son and heir to Hua Hun, 3rd Duke of Guanyang. He died during the 
upheaval caused by Shi Le and the fief ceased to exist.  
 
Jiangxia 江夏郡公 – Wei of Hedong 河東衛氏  
 
1. Wei Zao 衛璪 – grandson of Wei Guan 衛瓘, he succeeded to his ducal peerage of Lanling 
蘭陵. Later Yue of Donghai increased his apanage by adding some territory in Lanling and he 
changed the enfeoffment to that of Duke of Jiangxia 江夏郡公  with apanage of 8500 
households. He died in Yongjia 5 (311 AD), killed by soldiers of Liu Cong 劉聰. 
 
2. Wei Chong 衛崇 – great-grandson of Wei Guan, perhaps descended through Guan‟s 
grandson Wei Jie 衛玠. Yuandi proclaimed him to be Wei Guan‟s heir and he may have 
succeeded to the peerage as 2
nd
 Duke of Jiangxia.   
 
Jiaxing 嘉興開國公 –  Gu of Wujun 吳郡顧氏  
 
1. Gu Rong 顧榮 – After the fall of Jiong of Qi he was enfeoffed as Count of Jiaxing 嘉興伯 
for his achievement of chastising Jiong‟s henchman Ge Yu 葛旟. He died in 312 AD and 
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Yuandi who had just assumed title of King of Jin had him posthumously created Duke of 
Jiaxing. He was granted posthumou name of Yuan 元公. 
 
2. Gu Pi 顧毘 – son and heir to Gu Ronga, 2nd Duke of Jiaxing. 
 
Jingling 京陵公 – Wang of Taiyuan 太原王氏  
 
1. Wang Hun 王渾 – son and heir to Wang Chang 王昶. He succeeded to his father‟s peerage 
and became 2
nd
 Marquis of Jingling 京陵侯. At the beginning of the Taishi Era the apanage 
was increased by 1800 households. He acquired great achievements during the campaign 
against Wu. For his contribution to the final victory he was promoted to the ducal rank and his 
apanage was increased by 8000 households. At the same time his younger son Wang Cheng 
王澄 was granted title of a village lord (tinghou) and younger brother Wang Zhen 王湛 title 
of a lord of the royal domain (guanneihou). According to Pei Songzhi‟s commentary to 
Sanguozhi one of his sons was enfeoffed as Marquis of Jiangling 江陵侯 . He died in 
Yuankang 7 (297 AD) and was granted posthumous name of Yuan 元公. The text of the 
Jinshu is confused. It states that Wang Hun‟s eldest son Wang Shang 王尚 died prematurely 
and therefore his second son Wang Ji inherited the title, yet the biography of Wang Ji claims 
that he died before his father and one of his sons succeeded to the dukedom.  
 
2. Wang Ji 王濟 – son and heir presumptive to Wang Hun, married Princess of Changshan 常
山公主, daughter of Emperor Wudi. He died before his father and never held the ducal 
dignity.  
 
3. Wang Zhuo 王卓 – son of Wang Ji born of a concubine. As the princess of Changshan did 
not bear any children Zhuo became heir to his grandfather‟s peerage and succeeded as 2
nd
 
Duke of Jingling.   
 
Jiuquan 酒泉公 -  Jia of Wuwei 武威賈氏 
 
1. Jia Shu 賈疋 – During the reign of Emperor Huaidi he was enfeoffed as Duke of Jiuquan. 
He assisted in proclaiming future Emperor Mindi crown prince and later died during the 
turmoil in the North.  
 
Juancheng 鄄城縣公 – Cao of Pei 沛國曹氏 
  
1. Cao Zhi 曹志 – son of Cao Zhi, Wei Prince of Chen 陳王曹植. Originally he was 
enfoeffed as Prince of Jibei 濟北王. Wudi held in a great esteem his father and Cao Zhi 
himself and had him created Duke of Juancheng. Later, however, he merited emperor‟s 
displeasure by supporting Sima You Prince of Qi. He was granted posthumou name of Ding 
定公. 
  
Julu 鉅鹿郡公 – Pei of Hedong 河東裴氏 
 
1. Pei Xiu 裴秀 – staunch supporter of the Sima cause and main architect of the peerage 
system introduced in 264 AD. First he had inherited his father‟s Wei title of village marquis 
of Qingyang 清陽亭侯. After the defeat of Zhuge Dan he was promoted to township marquis 
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of Luyang 魯陽鄉侯 with the apanage increase of 1000 households. After the accession of 
Duke of Changdao he was promoted to prefecture marquis and apanage was increased by 700 
households. After introduction of the five peerages he was created Marquis of Jichuanu 濟川
侯, with territory of  60 li and 1400 households. The marquisate comprised prefecture of 
Gaoyuan 高苑  and wasteland of Jichuanxu 濟川墟 . After the establishment of the Jin 
Dynasty he was enfeoffed as commandery duke of Julu 鉅鹿郡公 with apanage of 3000 
households. He died in Taishi 7 (271 AD) and was granted posthumous name of Yuan 元公. 
 
2. Pei Jun 裴濬  – elder son of Pei Xiu, presumably his her presumptive, but he died 
prematurely. Probably never succeeded to the title.  
 
3. Pei Jing 裴憬 – son of Pei Jun born of concubine, should have succeeded to the peerage 
dignity, however his health was poor and the peerage was therefore given to Pei Wei, younger 
brother of Pei Jun. Pei Wei had Pei Jing enfeoffed as village lord of Gaoyang 高陽亭侯 (it 
was na alternative enfeoffment biefeng 別封).  
 
4. Pei Wei 裴頠 – son of Pei Xiu born of concubine, Jia Chong, husband of his aunt, had him 
succeeded to the dukedom instead of infirm Pei Jing. Pei Wei took an active part in the 
downfall of Yang Jun and for this merit he was additionaly enfeoffed  as Marquis of Wuchang 
武昌侯. Wei wanted to transfer this second  peerage on his nephew Pei Jing but the emperor 
bestowed this honour on his younger son Pei Gai 裴該 who had just married one of his 
daughters. Pei Wei was killed by Prince of Zhao in 301 AD.  Later he was rehabilitated and 
granted posthumou name Cheng 成公. 
  
5. Pei Song 裴嵩 – son and heir to Pei Wei, 3rd Duke of Julu. He died during the upheavals of 
the Yongjia Era and the ducal line ceased to exist. 
 
Juping 鉅平郡公– Yang of Taishan 泰山羊氏  
 
1. Yang Hu 羊祜 – brother-in-law of Sima Shi and one of the leading meritorious ministers 
of the dynasty. After introduction of five ranks peerage was created Viscount of Juping 鉅平
子 with apanage of 600 households. Following the founding of the dynasty he was enfeoffed 
as commandery duke of Juping 鉅平郡公 with apanage of 3000 households. He refused to 
accept such a high honor and was consequently created Marquis of Juping 鉅平侯.  
 
Kuaiji 會稽公 – Sun of Wujun 吳郡孫氏` 
 
1. Sun Xiu 孫秀 – descendent of a younger brother of Sun Quan 孫權, ruler of Wu. During 
the reign of Sun Hao 孫皓 (probably in Taishi 6 that is 270 AD) he defected to the Jin and 
was immediately created Duke of Kuaiji 會稽公. After the fall of Wu in 280 AD he was 
demoted in rank and died during the Yongning Era (301 AD). There is no indication of his 
son Sun Jian 孫儉 succeeding to the title. Probably the peerage was abolished after 280 AD.  
 
Lanling 蘭陵郡公 – Wei of Hedong 河東衛氏 
 
1. Wei Guan 衛瓘 – first he had inherited Wei title of township maquis of Wen 閿鄉侯. 
When the last of the Wei emperors ascended the throne his apanage was increased. Later he 
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was to be enfeoffed again for quelling the rebellion in freshly conquered Shu but he declined 
the honor. Soon he was created Marquis of Ziyang 菑陽侯. The original fief was granted to 
his younger brother Wei Shi 衛實 who became village marquis of Kaiyang 開陽亭侯. At the 
beginning of the Taishi Era (265-274 AD) he was promoted as a gongchen of the Jin to Duke 
of Ziyang 菑陽公. He was murdered by Prince Wei of Chu in 291 AD but the whole coup 
was orchestrated by Empress Jia. After the execution of prince of Chu he was rehabilitated as 
an innocent victim of an unruly prince and he was posthumously enfeoffed for his merit 
gained during the conquest of Shu as commandery duke of Lanling 蘭陵郡公 and his apanage 
was increased by 3000 households. He was granted posthumous name Cheng 成公. 
  
2. Wei Heng 衛恒 – son and presumptive heir to Wei Guan. He died together with his father 
in 291 AD and was only posthumously proclaimed Zhen, the Heir of Lanling 蘭陵貞世子. 
 
3. Wei Zao 衛璪 – son of Wei Heng, survived the massacre of his family in 291 AD and after 
his rehabilitation succeeded to the new ducal dignity as 2
nd
 Duke of Lanling. Later Yue of 
Donghai enlarged the territory of the fief and changed the enfeoffment to commandery duke 
of Jiangxia 江夏郡公 with apanage of 8500 households. He was killed in Yongjia 5 (311 AD) 
during the fights with Liu Cong. 
 
 4. Wei Chong 衛崇 – great-grandson of Wei Guan (probably through his grandson Wei Jie 
衛玠). Yuandi had him proclaimed the heir of Wei Guan. He duly succeeded to the peerage as 
2
nd
 Duke of Jiangxia.   
 
Langling 朗陵公 – He of Chenguo 陳國何氏 
 
1. He Ceng 何曾 – He inherited Wei dignity of village marquis of Yangwu 陽武亭侯 
(according to the Sanguozhi village marquis of Chengyang 成陽亭侯 ). Later he was 
promoted to township marquis of Yingchang 潁昌鄉侯. In 264 AD he was created peerage 
Marquis of Langling 朗陵侯. After the establishment of the Jin Dynasty he was raised to 
Duke of Langling with apanage of 1800 households. He died in Xianning 4 (278 AD) in the 
age of eighty years and was granted posthumous name Xiao 孝公. At the end of the Taikang 
Era (280-289 AD) his son He Shao petitioned the throne asking for the name to be changed to 
Yuan 元公 and his request was granted. 
 
2. He Shao 何劭 – son and heir to He Ceng, 2nd Duke of Langling. He died in 301 AD and 
was granted posthumous name Kang 康公. 
 
3. He Qi 何岐 – son and heir to He Shao, 3rd Duke of Langling. 
  
4.? He Rui 何蕤 – according to different sources he was the heir to He Shao and the 3rd Duke 
of Langling.  
 
Leling 樂陵郡公 – Shi of Bohai 勃海石氏  
 
1. Shi Bao 石苞 – one of the main supporters of the Simas. He helped to quell the rebellion of 
Zhuge Dan and was enfeoffed as Marquis of Dongguang 東光侯. After the accession of Jin 
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Wudi he was created Commandery Duke of Leling 樂陵郡公. He died in Taishi 9 (272 AD) 
and was granted posthumous name Wu 武公. 
 
2. Shi Tong 石統 – son and heir to Shi Bao, 2nd Duke of Leling. He was murdered by Prince 
Sima Lun of Zhao.  
 
3. Shi Shun 石順 – son and heir presumptive to Shi Tong.  
 
4. Shi Yan 石演 – clan grandson of Shi Tong. When Huidi resumed his imperial authority 
whole clan was rehabilitated and Shi Yan was made 3
rd
 Duke of Leling. 
 
Liaoxi 遼西公 – Duan 段氏, family of Xianbei origin 
   
1. Wuwuchen 務勿塵 – Xianbei ruler of the Duan group of Eastern Xianbei. He married 
daughter of Wang Jun Duke of Boling. At Wang Jun‟s instigation Wuwuchen was created 
Duke of Liaoxi (302 AD). Duan rulers used it thereafter as one of their regnal titles even after 
the fall of the Western Jin. Only after the fall of Later Zhao one of Wuwuchen‟s descendants 
claimed royal authority as a King of Zhao.  
 
2. Jilujuan 疾陸眷 – son and heir to Wuwuchen, 2nd Duke of Liaoxi.  
 
3. Mobo 末波 – probably next Duke of Liaoxi 
 
4. Duan Ya 段牙 – Duke of Liaoxi? 
 
5. Duan Liao 段遼 – Duke of Liaoxi? 
 
6. Duan Lan 段蘭 – Duke of Liaoxi? 
 
7. Duan Qin 段勤 – proclaimed himself King of Zhao 趙王 following the fall of Later Zhao 
in 351 AD. later he submitted himself to Murong Jun of Yan. 
 
Linhuai 臨淮公 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏  
 
1. Xun Yi 荀顗 – During the reign of Wei Shaodi he acquired dignity of lord of the royal 
domain. For his achievement in quelling Guanqiu Jian‟s rebellion he was created village 
marquis of Wansui 萬歲亭侯 with apanage of 400 households. During the Xianxi Era (264-
265 AD) was promoted to township marquis of Wansui. After the establishment of the 
peerages he was created Marquis of Linhuai 臨淮侯. Following the founding of the Jin he 
was promoted to Duke of Linhuai 臨淮公 with apanage of 1800 households. He died in 
Taishi 10 (274 AD) and he was granted posthumous name Kang 康公. He died sonless. 
 
2. Xun Hui 荀徽 – clan grandson of Xun Yi, 2nd Duke of Linhuai.  
 
3. Xun Xu 荀序 – great-great-grandson of Xun Yi‟s elder brother, after the restoration he was 
made successor to the Linhuai Dukedom, 3
rd
 Duke of Linhuai. After his death the lineage got 




4. Xun Heng 荀恒 – younger son of Xun Xu. Created 4th Duke of Linhuai later during the 
reign of Xiaowudi (375-396 AD). 
  
5. Xun Longfu 荀龍符 – son and heir to Xun Heng, 5th Duke of Linhuai. The fief was 
abolished after the establishment of the Liu Song Dynasty in 420 AD.  
 
Lingchuan/Lingzhou 靈川 縣公/靈州縣公 – Fu of Beidi 北地傅氏 
 
1. Fu Zhi 傅祗 – for his achievement in execution of Yang Jun he should have been enfeoffed 
as a commandery duke with apanage of 8000 households but he refused to accept it. He did 
accept only a lesser dignity of prefecture duke of Lingchuan / Lingzhou with apanage of 1800 
households. Remaining 2200 households were given to his son who was created village lord 
of Wuxiang 武鄉亭侯. 
 
2. Fu Xuan 傅宣 – son and heir to Fu Zhi, 2nd Duke of Lingchuan. 
 
3. Fu Chong 傅沖 – nephew and heir to Fu Xuan, probably 3rd Duke of Lingchuan. 
 
Linqiu 廩丘公 – Cao of Peiguo 沛國曹氏 
 
1. Cao Xi 曹翕 – son of Cao Hui, Wei Prince of Dongping 東平王曹徽. He inherited 
princely dignity and became 2
nd
 Prince of Dongping but following the accession of the Jin he 
was created Duke of Linqiu. 
 
Linwei 臨渭公 – Guo of Anping 安平郭氏 
 
1. Guo Jian 郭建 – cousin of Empress Guo, consort of Wei Emperor Mingdi, during the Jin 
he was created Duke of Linwei. 
 
2. Guo Jia 郭嘏 – son and heir to Guo Jian, 2nd Duke of Linwei. 
 
Linxiang 臨湘縣公 – Sun of Wujun 吳郡孫氏 
 
1. Sun Hui 孫惠 – scion of the ruling house of Wu. He followed Sima Jiong Prince of Qi in 
chastising Sima Lun of Zhao and was enfeoffed as prefecture lord of Jinxing 晉興侯. Later he 
entered service of Sima Yue of Donghai and for his achievement in welcoming Huidi back 
into his capital was created prefecture duke of Linxiang 臨湘縣公. 
 
Linying 臨潁縣公 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Zu 荀組 – During the Upheaval of the Eight Princes he was created Baron of 
Chengyang 成陽縣男. At the beginning of the Jianxing Era (313-316 AD) he was raised to 
the dignity of prefecture Duke of z Linying 臨潁縣公 as an uncle of Emperor Mindi. After 
the fall of Chang‟an he fled to the South where he died in Yongchang Era (322 AD) in the age 




2. Xun Yi 荀奕 – son and heir to Xun Zu, 2nd Duke of Linying. He died in Xianhe 7 (332 
AD) and was granted posthumous name Ding 定公. 
 
Lu 魯郡公 – Jia of Pingyang 平陽賈氏 
 
1. Jia Chong 賈充 – He inherited Wei title of village marquis of Yangli 陽里亭侯 with 
apanage of 750 households. Later he was promoted to township marquis of Xuanyang 宣陽鄉
侯 with apanage of 1000 households and later to township marquis of Anyang 安陽鄉侯 with 
apanage increased by 1200 households. After the introduction of the peerages Jia Chong was 
first created Marquis of Linyi 臨沂侯 and then, when Wudi succeeded to the royal throne of 
Jin domain Marquis of Linying 臨潁侯 . After the establishment of the dynasty he was 
promoted to commandery Duke of Lu. In Xianning 3 (277 AD) his fief was enlarged to 
encompass the territory of Gongqiu 公丘 in Peiguo. He died in 282 AD and was given 
posthumous name Wu 武公. 
 
2. Jia Limin 賈黎民 – son and heir presumptive to Jia Chong. He died in infancy and 
posthumously was created Duke Shang of Lu 魯殤公.  
 
3. Han Mi 韓謐 – grandson of Jia Chong, son of his youngest daughter. Jia Chong‟s widow 
proclaimed him adoptive son and heir to Jia Limin. Wudi confirmed his succession and Jia Mi 
became 3
rd
 Duke of Lu. He was executed together with Empress Jia during Sima Lu‟s coup in 
301 AD.  
 
4. Jia Tu 賈秃 – After the fall of Sima Lun of Zhao Jia Chong‟s lineage was rehabilitated. 
His clan grandson Jia Zhong 賈眾 should have succeeded to the dignity but he refused and Jia 
Tu, Chong‟s clan great-grandson was installed as 4
th
 Duke of Lu. He may have been son of 
Jia Zhong.  
 
5. Jia Zhan 賈湛 – great-grandson of Jia Chong. During the Yongxing Era (304-305 AD) he 
was installed as the 5
th
 Duke of Lu. However, he fell victim to the warfare and the fief got 
extinct.  
 
Mouping 牟平公 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Ge Yu 葛旟 – follower of Prince Jiong of Qi. After Jiong‟s successful coup he was created 
Duke of Mouping (301 AD). He did not survive his master‟s fall. 
 
Pingshou 平壽公 – Zheng of Xingyang 滎陽鄭氏 
 
1. Zheng Qiu 鄭球 – son of Zheng Mo, Marquis of Miling 密陵侯. He joined Prince Sima 
Ying of Chengdu in his fight against Lun of Zhao and was rewarded by being created Duke of 
Pingshou 平壽公. He died in Yongjia 2 (308 AD) and was granted posthumous name Yuan 
元公. 
 




1. Wei Yi 衛毅 – follower of Prince Jiong of Qi. After Jiong‟s successful coup he was created 
Duke of Pingyin (301 AD). He did not survive his master‟s fall. 
 
Qi 齊公 – Duan 段氏, family of Xianbei origin 
 
1. Duan Kan 段龕 – Xianbei leader who submitted to the authority of the Eastern Jin. In 351 
AD Mudi created him Duke of Qi. He died 357 AD during the fighting with Murong Ke of 
Yan. 
 
Quling 曲陵公 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏  
 
1. Xun Song 荀崧 – son and heir to Xun Yun, 2nd Marquis of Anling 安陵侯 and eldest 
daughter of Cao Cao. At the beginning of the Taishi Era (266-274 AD) he was made to 
succeed to his father„s title. After the fall of Luoyang he had the imperial mounds repaired 
and for this achievement was created prefecture Duke of Wuyang 舞陽縣公. Later his fief 
was changed to that of Quling 曲陵公. He served at the court of Emperor Yuandi in Jiankang 
and after quelling of Wang Dun‟s rebellion he was rewarded by an additional title of Count of 
Pingle. He died in Xianhe 3 (328 AD) in the age of sixty-seven. He was granted posthumous 
name Jing 敬公. 
  
2. Xun Rui 荀蕤 – son and heir to Xun Song, 2nd Duke of Quling.  
 
3. Xun Ji 荀籍 – son and heir to Xun Rui, 3rd Duke of Quling.  
 
Shandu 山都縣公 – Wang of Donghai 東海王氏 
 
1. Wang Kai 王愷 – imperial waiqi, relative of Wudi‟s mother. For his achievement in 
execution of Yang Jun he was created prefecture Duke of Shandu 山都縣公 with apanage of 
1800 households. After his death he was granted posthumous name Chou 醜公.  
 
Shangluo 上洛郡公 – Suo of Dunhuang 敦煌索氏 
 
1. Suo Chen 索綝 – originally enfeoffed as Count of Yiju 弋居伯 for his achievement of 
helping to install Emperor Mindi. For military achievement in fighting Zhao forces created 
commandery Duke of Shangluo 上洛郡公 with apanage of 10 000 households. He later 
defected to Zhao. 
 
Shanggu 上谷郡公 – Meng of Bohai 勃海孟氏 
 
1 Meng Guan 孟觀  – For his achievement in chastising Yang Jun he was created 
commandery Duke of Shanggu 上谷郡公. His son died prematurely and Meng Guan himself 
was executed after the fall of Lun of Zhao. The fief was abolished.  
 




1. Liu Kang 劉康 – grandson of the last Han Emperor Xiandi 漢獻帝 (189-220 AD), during 
the Jin he was created Duke of Shanyang to continue the offerings to the Han ancestors. He 
died in 270 AD. 
 
2. Liu Jin 劉瑾 – son and heir to Liu Kang, 2nd Duke of Shanyang. He died in 274 AD. 
 
3. Liu Qiu 劉秋 – probably son of Liu Jin, 3rd Duke of Shanyang. He was killed in 307 AD 
when the rebels plundered Pingyuan. 
 
Shaoling 邵陵公 – Cao of Peiguo 沛國曹氏 
 
1. Cao Fang 曹芳 – an ex-emperor of the Wei Dynasty. He was deposed in 254 AD and 
created Prince of Qi 齊王. After the abdication of the Wei he was demoted to Duke of 
Shaoling. He died in 274 AD.  
 
Shouguang 壽光公 – Zheng of Xingyang 滎陽鄭氏 
 
1. Zheng Chong 鄭沖 – important Wei minister, after 260 AD he was created Marquis 
of Shouguang 壽光侯 . After the founding of the dynasty he was promoted to Duke of 
Shouguang 壽光公. He died in Taishi 10 (274 AD) and was granted posthumous name Cheng 
成公. He died sonless. 
 
2. Zheng Hui 鄭徽 – nephew of Zheng Chong, 2nd Duke of Shouguang. 
 
3. Zheng Jian 鄭簡 – son and heir to Zheng Hui, 3rd Duke of Shouguang. 
  
Suiling 睢陵公 – Wang of Langye 琅邪王氏 
 
1. Wang Xiang 王祥 – important courtier of the Wei. In 254 AD he was enfeoffed as lord of 
the royal domain. For his part in quelling Guanqiu Jian‟s rebellion he was created village 
Marquis of Wansui 萬歲亭侯 and his apanage was increased by 400 households. After the 
establishment of the peerages he was created Marquis of Suiling 睢陵侯 with apanage of 
1600 households. After 266 AD promoted to Duke of Suiling. He died in Taishi 4 (268 AD) 
and was granted posthumous name Yuan 元公. 
  
2. Wang Fu 王馥  – third son of Wang Xiang, 2nd Duke of Suiling. He was granted 
posthumous name Xiao 孝公. 
 
3. Wang Gen 王根 – son and heir to Wang Fu, 3rd Duke of Suiling. 
  
Wei 衛公 – allegedly scion of the ruling house of Zhou 
 
1. Ji Shu 姬署 – created Duke of Wei, he died in Taishi 7 (271 AD).  
 




1. Zhou Qi 周玘 – member of ancient Wu family of local influence in Wujun. At the 
beginning of the 4
th
 century he had repeatedly quelled rebellions in the south maintaining 
authority of the Jin ruling house. For his achievements he was enfeoffed as prefecture lord of 
Wucheng 烏程縣侯. During the Jianxing Era (313-316 AD) Sima Rui created him Duke of 
Wucheng 烏程公. He was granted posthumous name Zhonglie 忠烈公.  
 
2. Zhou Xie 周勰 – son and heir to Zhou Qi, 2nd Duke of Wucheng.  
 
Wuyang 舞陽縣公 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Song 荀崧 – son and heir to Xun Yun, 2nd Marquis of Anling 安陵侯 and eldest 
daughter of Cao Cao. At the beginning of the Taishi Era (266-274 AD) he was made to 
succeed to his father„s title. After the fall of Luoyang he had the imperial mounds repaired 
and for this achievement was created prefecture Duke of Wuyang 舞陽縣公. Later his fief 
was changed to that of Quling 曲陵公. He served at the court of Emperor Yuandi in Jiankang 
and after quelling of Wang Dun‟s rebellion he was rewarded by an additional title of Count of 
Pingle. He died in Xianhe 3 (328 AD) in the age of sixty-seven. He was granted posthumous 
name Jing 敬公. 
 
Xiaohuang 小黃公 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Lu Ji 路季 – follower of Prince Jiong of Qi. After Jiong‟s successful coup he was created 
Duke of Xiaohuang (301 AD). He did not survive his master‟s fall. 
  
Xihua 西華縣公 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Fan 荀藩 – For his achievements in emperor‟s punitive action against Prince Jiong of 
Qi he was created prefecture Duke of Xihua 西華縣公. He died in Jianxing 1 (313 AD) in the 
age of sixty-nine and was granted posthumous name Cheng 成公. 
 
2. Xun Sui 荀邃 – elder son of Xun Fan, 2nd Duke of Xihua He fled to Jiankang and served 
Emperor Yuandi. After he died he was granted posthumous name Jing 靖公. 
  
3. Xun Wang 荀汪 – son and heir to Xun Sui, 3rd Duke of Xihua. 
 
Xincheng 新城郡公 – Liu of Peiguo 沛國劉氏 
 
1. Liu Hong 劉弘 – for his achievements he was created Duke of Xuancheng 宣城公. Prince 
Yue of Donghai had him posthumously enfeoffed as commandery Duke of Xincheng 新城郡
公 with ceremonial name Yuan 元公. 
 
2. Liu Fan 劉璠 – son and heir to Liu Hong, 2nd Duke of Xincheng. 
 




1. Yang Xuanzhi 羊玄之 – father to Empress Hui 惠皇后, second consort of Emperor Huidi. 
As the father of the empress he was created Marquis of Xingjin 興晉侯. Later he was 
promoted to the rank of duke. He died in 303 AD. 
 
Xiping 西平郡公 – Zhang of Anding 安定張氏 
 
1. Zhang Gui 張軌 – Regional Inspector of Liangzhou in Gansu. For successful defense of 
his regional command against incursions of the warlike Xianbei he was initially enfeoffed as 
township lord  of Anle 安樂鄉侯 with apanage of 1000 households. At the beginning of the 
Yongjia Era (307-312 AD) Zhang Gui defeated Liu Cong of Zhao in Hedong and relieved 
besieged Luoyang. Emperor Huaidi promoted him to commandery Duke of Xiping 西平郡公. 
Zhang Gui refused to accept. Later he sent supplies to the capital suffering from famine and 
for this merit was created Marquis of Bacheng 霸城侯. He continued to send reinforcements 
to Chang‟an and was to be enfeoffed as Duke of Xiping again, but he refused to accept the 
honor. The court promoted him only posthumously in 314 AD when he was also granted 
ritual name Wu 武公.  
 
2. Zhang Shi 張寔- son and heir to Zhang Gui. Initially he was enfeoffed as village lord of 
Jianwu 建武亭侯 for quelling local uprising of Cao Qu in Liangzhou. Later he was promoted 
to prefecture lord of Fulu 福祿縣侯. After the death of his father he was raised to the position 
of lord of Liangzhou. Emperor Mindi confirmed him in this position and conferred upon him 
title of 2
nd
 Duke of Xiping. He was murdered in 320 AD. His family conferred upon him 
ritual name Zhao 昭公, but Emperor Yuandi granted him instead the name Yuan 元. As his 
son Zhang Jun 張駿 was still a minor, Shi‟s younger brother Zhang Mao became semi-
independent ruler of Liangzhou. 
 
3. Zhang Jun 張駿 – son and heir to Zhang Shi. Initially he had inherited dignity of Marquis 
of Bacheng (in 316 AD) and later his uncle Zhang Mao installed him as the 3
rd
 Duke of 
Xiping. Jin court subsequently confirmed this title. He succeeded his uncle and ruled for 
twenty-two years as lord of Liangzhou and died when he was forty years of age. Liang 
posthumous name was Wen 文公  but Emperor Mudi conferred on him official name 
Zhongcheng 忠成公. 
 
4. Zhang Chonghua 張重華 – son and heir to Zhang Jun, 4th Duke of Xiping. He died in the 
age of twenty-seven after reign of eleven years. First, he was worshipped as Zhao 昭公 then 
Huan 桓公, and Emperor Mudi conferred on him official posthumous name Jinglie 敬烈公. 
 
5. Zhang Yaoling 張耀靈 – son and heir to Zhang Chonghua, 5th Duke of Xiping. His uncle 
Zhang Zuo Marquis of Changning 長寧侯張祚 conspired against him and had him deposed. 
Yaoling was degraded to Marquis of Liangning 涼寧侯 and murdered soon afterwards. He 
was granted posthumous name Ai 哀公.  
 
6. Zhang Xuanjing 張玄靚 – younger brother of Zhang Yaoling. After three years„ rule of 
Zhang Zuo who proclaimed himself Duke of Liang and later an emperor there was a rebellion 
which brought Zhang Xuanjing to the throne. He accepted traditional ducal title becoming the 
6th Duke of Xiping. In 361 AD Emperor Xiaowudi confirmed his titles and position. In 363 
AD Xuanjing was murdered by his uncle Zhang Tianxi. He was fourteen years old and ruled 
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for nine years. He was given posthumous name Chong 沖公, but Emperor Xiaowudi granted 
him another name, Jingdao 敬悼公. 
 
7. Zhang Tianxi 張天錫 – younger son of Zhang Jun. He proclaimed himself Regional 
Inspector of Liangzhou and 7
th
 Duke of Xiping. The southern court confirmed his titles in the 
Taihe Era (366-371 AD). In Taiyuan 1 (376 AD) he was forced to submit to Fu Jian King of 
Former Qin and the independent dominion of the Zhangs known as Former Liang came to an 
end. Zhang Tianxi was taken to Chang‟an where he was created Guiyi Marquis 歸義侯. After 
the collapse of the Former Qin in 384 AD he returned to the South where he was enfeoffed as 
commandery Duke of Xiping 西平郡公.  
 
Xuancheng 宣城 – Liu of Peiguo 沛國劉氏 
 
1. Liu Hong 劉弘 – for his achievements he was created Duke of Xuancheng 宣城公. Prince 
Yue of Donghai had him posthumously enfeoffed as commandery Duke of Xincheng 新城郡
公 with ceremonial name Yuan 元公. 
 
Yanling 延陵縣公 – Gao of Chenliu 陳留高氏 
 
1. Gao Guang 高光 – during the Upheaval of the Eight Princes he was created Duke of 
Yanling for his achievement in campaigning against Prince Sima Ying of Chengdu (probably 
in 307 AD). He died one year later. 
 
2. Gao Tao 高韜 – son and heir presumptive to Gao Guang. For misconduct during the 
mourning period and intriguing against the throne he was executed before he actually 
succeeded to his father‟s dukedom.  
 
Yidu 宜都公 – family of unknown, probably southern origin 
 
1. Bu Chan 步闡 – Wu military commander who had defected to the Jin in 272 AD. He was 
created Duke of Yidu. 
 
Yuanling 苑陵縣公 – Hua of Pingyuan 平原華氏 
 
1. Hua Heng 華恒 – husband of a daughter of Wudi. Originally he was lord of the royal 
domain but following the accession of Emperor Mindi he was created prefecture Duke of 
Yuanling. After the fall of the Jin he fled to the South. His enfeoffment was not respected by 
Emperor Yuandi and it was only after the rebellion of Wang Dun that Hua Heng was 
enfeoffed anew, this time as prefecture lord of Yuanling. 
 
Zhuangwu 壯武郡公 – Zhang of Fanyang 范陽張氏 
 
1. Zhang Hua 張華 – after the establishment of the dynasty he became lord of the royal 
domain. He was one of the advocates of the Wu campaign in 280 AD and after the conquest 
was rewarded by being created prefecture lord of Guangwu. His fief was increased by 10 000 
households. He became leading minister of the government of the Jia faction, was enfeoffed 
as commandery Duke of Zhuangwu 壯武郡公 and subsequently murdered by Sima Lun of 
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Zhao in 300 AD in the age of sixty-one. Both his sons were executed alongside their father. In 
303 AD Zhang Hua was posthumously rehabilitated and his ducal dignity was restored.  
 
2. Zhang Yu 張輿 – son of Zhang Wei 張韙, younger son of Zhang Hua. He succeeded to the 
ducal peerage as the 2
nd
 Duke of Zhuangwu. (in other sources he is named as the 2
nd
 
prefecture lord of Guangwu)   
 
Zhuxu 朱虛縣公 – Liu of Donglai 東萊劉氏 
 
1. Liu Tun 劉暾 – he assisted Prince Sima Yi of Changsha in conspiracy against Jiong of Qi. 
As a reward he was created prefecture Duke of Zhuxu 朱虛縣公 with apanage of 1800 
households. After the death of his benefactor he lost his peerage. His dukedom was restored 
following the return of Huidi back to Luoyang. He died as a prisoner of Shi Le.  
 
Ziyang  菑陽公 – Wei of Hedong 河東衛氏 
 
1. Wei Guan 衛瓘 – initially he inherited his father‟s Wei title of township Marquis of Wen 
閿鄉侯.Following the conquest of Shu he should have been enfeoffed but he refused further 
honors. Nevertheless he was created Marquis of Ziyang 菑陽侯. At the beginning of the 
Taishi Era (265-274 AD) he was promoted to Duke of Ziyang 菑陽公  as one of the 
meritorious ministers. He was murdered in 291 AD by Prince Wei of Chu at behest of 
Empress Jia. Soon he was rehabilitated and posthumously enfeoffed as Commandery Duke of 
Lanling 蘭陵郡公  and the fief was increased by 3000 households. He was granted 






Bacheng 霸城侯 – Zhang of Anding 安定張氏 
 
1. Zhang Gui 張軌 – Regional Inspector of Liangzhou in Gansu. For successful defense of 
his regional command against incursions of the warlike Xianbei he was initially enfeoffed as 
township lord of Anle 安樂鄉侯 with apanage of 1000 households. At the beginning of the 
Yongjia Era (307-312 AD) Zhang Gui defeated Liu Cong of Zhao in Hedong and relieved 
besieged Luoyang. Emperor Huaidi promoted him to commandery Duke of Xiping 西平郡公. 
Zhang Gui refused to accept. Later he sent supplies to the capital suffering from famine and 
for this merit was created Marquis of Bacheng 霸城侯. He continued to send reinforcements 
to Chang‟an and was to be enfeoffed as Duke of Xiping again, but he refused to accept the 
honor. The court promoted him only posthumously in 314 AD when he was also granted 
ritual name Wu 武公. 
 
Daliang 大梁侯 – Lu of Fanyang 范陽盧氏 
 
1. Lu Qin 盧欽 – originally inherited Wei title of village marquis of Dali 大利亭侯. Later he 
was promoted to Marquis of Daliang 大梁侯. He died Xianning 4 (278 AD) and was granted 




2. Lu Fu 盧浮 – son and heir to Lu Qin, 2nd Marquis of Daliang. 
 
Danyang 丹楊侯 – Sun of Wujun 吳郡孫氏 
 
1. Sun Kai 孫楷 – scion of ruling house of Wu. He used to be Marquis of Lincheng 臨成侯 
in his own right. In Xianning 2 (276 AD) he defected to the Jin being afraid of Sun Hao. 
Wudi had him created Marquis of Danyang 丹楊侯.  
 
Dingxiang 定襄侯 – Liu of Zhongshan 中山劉氏 
 
1. Liu Yu 劉輿 – loyal follower of Prince Yue of Donghai. He was enfeoffed posthumously 
for his “past merit” shortly before the fall of Luoyang in 312 AD. He was created Marquis of 
Dingxiang 定襄侯 and granted ritual name Zhen 貞.  
 
2. Liu Yan 劉演 – son and heir to Liu Yu, 2nd Marquis of Dingxiang. He died fighting Shi Le 
after 317 AD.  
 
Dongping 東平郡侯 – Gou of Henei 河内苟氏 
 
1. Gou Xi 苟晞 – during the regency of Prince Yue of Donghai he was created commandery 
Marquis of Dongping for his military merit. The apanage of his fief was 10 000 households. 
After the death of Prince of Donghai he took charge of government affairs and was promoted 
to a duke.  
 
Guanglu 廣陸侯 – Li of Liaodong 遼東李氏 
 
1. Li Yin 李胤 – loyal supporter of the Sima cause, initially lord of the royal domain and after 
establishment of the peerages he was created Count of Guanglu. After Wudi‟s accession he 
was promoted to Marquis of Guanglu. He died in 282 AD and was granted posthumous name  
Cheng 成侯. 
 
2. Li Zhi 李志 – grandson and heir to Yin. Yin‟s first-born Li Gu died young and his son 
inherited the fief and became 2
nd
 Marquis of Guanglu. 
  
Guangrao 廣饒侯 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Cao Yi 曹嶷 – in 317 AD he is mentioned as one of the co-signers of a petition urging 
Sima Rui to ascend the throne. Apparently, he was Marquis of Guangrao. He died after 321 
AD.  
 
Guangwu 廣武侯 – Liu of Zhongshan 中山劉氏 
 
1. Liu Kun 劉琨 – scion of Han royal house, relative of Sima Lun Prince of Zhao. For his 
merit in assisting the emperor in his return to Luoyang he was created Marquis of Guangwu 
廣武侯 with apanage of 2000 households. He was murdered in 318 AD by Xianbei ruler 




2.  Liu Qun 劉群 – son and heir to Liu Kun, Heir Apparent of Guangwu 廣武世子. He was 
taken captive by Shi Jilong and served in official position at the court of Later Zhao. He died 
after the fall of Ran Wei.  
 
Guangxing 廣興侯 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Zhu Zheng 朱整 – Marquis of Guangxing. He died in 289 AD. 
 
Guiming 歸命侯 – Sun of Wujun 吳郡孫氏 
 
1. Sun Hao 孫皓 – the last ruler of Wu. In 280 AD he was created Guiming Marquis (Return 
to Allegiance). He died in 284 AD. 
 
Guiyi 歸義侯 – family of non-Han origin 
 
1. XY – a son of King of Shanshan 鄯善 (Kroraina) in Eastern Turkestan. When he came to 
the Jin court in 283 AD with a tributary mission he was created Guiyi Marquis (Return to 
Righteousness).  
 
Jibei 濟北侯 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Xu 荀勖 – meritorious minister of the Jin, initially created Viscount of Anyang 安陽
子 with apanage of 1000 households. After the establishment of the dynasty he should have 
been promoted to commandery Duke of Jibei 濟北郡公 but Xun Xu refused to accept and 
followed the example of Yang Hu who was willing to accept only a lesser title of marquis. He 
died in 289 AD and was granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯.  
 
2. Xun Ji 荀輯 – son and heir to Xun Xu, 2nd Marquis of Jibei. He was granted posthumous 
name Jian 簡侯. 
 
3. Xun Jun 荀畯 – son and heir to Xun Ji, 3rd Marquis of Jibei. He was granted posthumous 
name Lie 烈侯.  
 
4. Xun Shi 荀識 – son of Xun Jun‟s younger brother, inherited the title and became the 4th 
Marquis of Jibei.  
 
Jingling 京陵侯 (also Jiangling 江陵侯) – Wang of Taiyuan 太原王氏 
 
1. Wang Chang 王昶  – Wei minister, during the Zhengshi Era (240-248 AD) he was 
enfeoffed as Village Marquis of Wuguan 武觀亭侯. In 250 AD he attacked Wu and Shu 
positions on the northern bank of the Yangzi and for his achievements was raised to the 
dignity of Marquis of Jingling 京陵侯. He became staunch supporter of the Simas. He died in 
Ganlu 4 (259 AD) and was granted posthumous name Mu 穆侯.  
 
1. Wang Hun 王渾 – son and heir to Wang Chang 王昶. He succeeded to his father‟s peerage 
and became 2
nd
 Marquis of Jingling 京陵侯. At the beginning of the Taishi Era the apanage 
was increased by 1800 households. He acquired great achievements during the campaign 
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against Wu. For his contribution to the final victory he was promoted to the ducal rank and his 
apanage was increased by 8000 households. At the same time his younger son Wang Cheng 
王澄 was granted title of a village lord (tinghou) and younger brother Wang Zhen 王湛 title 
of a lord of the royal domain (guanneihou). According to Pei Songzhi‟s commentary to 
Sanguozhi one of his sons was enfeoffed as Marquis of Jiangling 江陵侯 . He died in 
Yuankang 7 (297 AD) and was granted posthumous name of Yuan 元公. The text of the 
Jinshu is confused. It states that Wang Hun‟s eldest son Wang Shang 王尚 died prematurely 
and therefore his second son Wang Ji inherited the title, yet the biography of Wang Ji claims 
that he died before his father and one of his sons succeeded to the dukedom.  
 
Juping 鉅平侯 – Yang of Taishan 太山羊氏 
 
1. Yang Hu 羊祜 – brother-in-law of Sima Shi and important meritorious minister of the Jin. 
In 264 AD he was created Viscount of Juping 鉅平子 with apanage of 600 households. After 
the abdication of the Wei he should have been promoted to the rank of commandery duke 
with apanage of 3000 households but he refused the honor and accepted only a lesser dignity 
of Marquis of Juping 鉅平侯. Later, in 277 AD during the preparations of the Wu campaign 
Wudi established new commandery of Nancheng 南城郡 and bestowed it upon Yang Hu as 
commandery marquisate. He became Marquis of Nancheng 南城侯. He died in 278 AD and 
wanted to revert to the original dignity of Juping. Wudi granted his dying wish. He died 
without a son of his own. 
 
2. Yang Ji 羊暨 – son of Yang Hu‟s elder brother. He was nominated as successor but 
refused to accept as the lineage of his own father would have died out with him.  
 
3. Yang Yi 羊伊 – younger brother of Yang Ji. When Yang Ji refused to accept the dignity of 
Juping Wudi chose Yang Yi as a new heir presumptive. However, Yang Yi refused as well.  
 
4. Yang Pian 羊篇 – younger brother of both Yang Ji and Yang Yi. In 281AD he became 2nd 
Marquis of Juping. He died young and the dignity became temporarily extinct. 
 
5. Yang Faxing 羊法興 – son of great-great-grandson of Yang Hu‟s elder brother. In the 
Taiyuan Era (376-396 AD) he was chosen as alternative successor and inherited vacant 
dignity of Marquis of Juping with apanage of 5000 households. Later he was executed as 
accomplice of Huan Xuan and the fief was abolished.  
 
Lanling 蘭陵侯 –Wang of Donghai 東海王氏 
 
1. Wang Lang 王朗 – Wei official, initially village marquis of Anling 安陵亭侯 (Han title). 
After establishment of the Wei Dynasty he was promoted to township marquis of Leping 樂
平鄉侯. Later created Marquis of Lanling 蘭陵侯 with apanage of 1200 households. He died 
in Taihe 2 (228 AD) and was granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯.  
 
2. Wang Su 王肅 – son and heir to Wang Lang, 2nd Marquis of Lanling. His daughter was 
married to Sima Zhao and became mother of Emperor Wudi. For his meritorious service to 
the Sima regents his apanage was increased to 2200 households. He died in 256 AD and was 




3. Wang Yun 王惲 – son and heir to Wang Su, 3rd Marquis of Lanling. He died childless and 
the dignity became temporarily extinct. 
 
 4. Wang Xun 王恂 – younger son of Wang Su, in 263 AD he was created Marquis of 
Lanling. In 264 AD he was created Viscount of Zheng 氶子. He died in 278 AD. He might 
have been given the original marquisate of Lanling after the establishment of the dynasty. 
 
Liangzou 梁鄒侯 – Xie of Jinan 濟南解氏 
 
1. Xie Xiu 解脩 – he was created Marquis of Liangzou 梁鄒侯 following Wudi‟s accession 
as Emperor of the Jin. 
 
2. Xie Xi 解系 – son and heir to Xie Xiu, 2nd Marquis of Liangzou. He was murdered by Sima 
Lun Prince of Zhao and posthumously rehabilitated only in Yongning 2 (302 AD).  
 
Linhai 臨海侯 – Houshi of Donglai 東萊侯史氏  
 
1. Houshi Guang 侯史光 – During the Xianxi Era (264-265 AD) he was appointed lord 
within the passes. Later he was created Marquis of Linhai.  
 
2. Houshi Xuan 侯史玄 – son and heir to Houshi Guang, 2nd Marquis of Linhai. 
 
3. Houshi Shi 侯史施 – son and heir to Houshi Xuan, 3rd Marquis of Linhai. 
 
Linhai 臨海侯 – Pei of Hedong 河東裴氏 
 
1. Pei Kai 裴楷 – After Wudi‟s death he was created Marquis of  Linhai 臨海侯 with 
apanage of  2000 households. He was granted posthumous name Yuan 元侯. 
 
2. Pei Yu 裴輿 – son and heir to Pei Kai, 2nd Marquis of Linhai. He was granted posthumous 
name Jian 簡侯. 
 
Linjin 臨晉侯 – Yang of Hongnong 弘農楊氏 
  
1. Yang Jun 楊駿 – father of the second empress of Emperor Wudi and as such he was 
created Marquis of Linjin 臨晉侯 in 276 AD. He died during a coup orchestrated by Empress 
Jia in 291 AD. The fief was abolished. 
 
2. Yang Chao 楊超 – distant relative of Yang Jun. During the Yongning Era (301 AD) he 
was formally installed as Yang Jun‟s heir but he was created only village lord of Wuting (also 
pronounced as Maoting or Muting) 蓩亭侯. It was originally Wei noble dignity inherited in 
the family for couple of generations (father of Wudi‟s first empress was also village marquis 
of Wuting). 
 




1. Zheng Mao 鄭袤 – during the Wei he was enfeoffed as village marquis of Guangchang 廣
昌亭侯. After 260 AD he was promoted to township marquis of Ancheng 安城鄉侯 with 
apanage of 1000 households. With the introduction of the peerages in 264 AD created Count 
of Miling 密陵伯. Following the founding of the dynasty he was promoted to Marquis of 
Miling 密陵侯. He died in Taishi 9 (273 AD) at the age of eighty-five. He was granted 
posthumous name Yuan 元侯.  
 
2. Zheng Mo 鄭默 – son and heir to Zheng Mao, 2nd Marquis of Miling. He died in Taikang 1 
(280 AD) at the age of sixty-eight years and was granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯.  
 
3. Zheng Qiu 鄭球 – son and heir to Zheng Mo, 3rd Marquis of Miling. For his achievement 
in chastising Lun of Zhao he was created prefecture Duke of Pingshou 平壽縣公.  
 
Minyang 敏陽侯 – Wang of Taiyuan 太原王氏 
 
1. Wang Yu 王聿 – younger son of Wang Ji of the dukes of Jingling, born of concubine. 
While his elder brother succeeded to the ducal peerage of their grandfather Wang Hun, Wang 
Yu was given inheritance of his step-mother, Imperial Princess of Changshan 常山公主 (a 
daughter of Wudi) and created Marquis of Minyang 敏陽侯.  
 
Moling 秣陵侯 – Dai of Guangling 廣陵戴氏 
 
1. Dai Yuan 戴淵 – for his merit gained in quelling various rebellions he was created 
Marquis of Moling 秣陵侯. He served Yue of Donghai and later fled to Jiankang. He was 
murdered at the instigation of Wang Dun in 322 AD and given posthumous name Jian 簡侯.  
 
2. Dai Miao 戴邈  - younger brother of Dai Yuan. He had survived Wang Dun‟s rebellion but 
it is not clear if he had his own title or succeeded to the dignity of his brother. 
 
3. Dai Mi 戴謐 – son and heir to Dai Miao. He had succeeded to his father‟s dignity, but we 
don‟t know what dignity it was. It may have been marquisate of Moling but it is nowhere 
confirmed.  
 
Nancheng 南城侯 – Yang of Taishan 太山羊氏 
 
1. Yang Hu 羊祜 – brother-in-law of Sima Shi and important meritorious minister of the Jin. 
In 264 AD he was created Viscount of Juping 鉅平子 with apanage of 600 households. After 
the abdication of the Wei he should have been promoted to the rank of commandery duke 
with apanage of 3000 households but he refused the honor and accepted only a lesser dignity 
of Marquis of Juping 鉅平侯. Later, in 277 AD during the preparations of the Wu campaign 
Wudi established new commandery of Nancheng 南城郡 and bestowed it upon Yang Hu as 
commandery marquisate. He became Marquis of Nancheng 南城侯. He died in 278 AD and 
wanted to revert to the original dignity of Juping. Wudi granted his dying wish and gave him 
posthumous name Cheng 成侯. He died without a son of his own. 
  




1. Wang Cheng 王澄 – he served Prince Ying of Chengdu and later Yue of Donghai. For his 
achievement in assisting the emperor in his return to Luoyang he was created Marquis of 
Nanxiang 南鄉侯. He was murdered by Wang Dun when he tried to reach the southern court 
in Jiankang. Later he was given posthumous name Xian 憲侯. It seems that his peerage was 
not revived in the South and his son is not mentioned as 2
nd
 Marquis of Nanxiang.  
 
Ping’a 平阿縣侯 – Zhao of Huainan 淮南趙氏 
 
1. Zhao You 趙誘 – he served Wang Dun in the south and for his achievements in quelling 
couple of rebellions he was created prefecture lord of Ping‟a 平阿縣侯. He died in a battle 
and was granted posthumous name Jing 敬侯. His elder son died alongside his father and 
younger Zhao Yin 趙胤 served the Eastern Jin. It is unsure if he had ever succeeded to the 
lordship though. 
 
Pingchun 平春侯 – Hu of Huainan 淮南胡氏 
  
1. Hu Wei 胡威 – During Wudi‟s reign he was created Marquis of Pingchun. He died in 280 
AD and was granted posthumous name Lie 烈侯. 
 
2. Hu Yi 胡奕 – son and heir to Hu Wei, 2nd Marquis of Pingchun. 
 
Qi 祁侯 – Li of Shangdang 上黨李氏 
 
1. Li Xi 李憙 – supporter of the Simas. After establishment of the dynasty he was created 
Marquis of Qi 祁侯. He was granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯. 
 
2. Li Zan 李贊 – son and heir to Li Xi, 2nd Marquis of Qi. 
 
Qingquan 清泉侯 – Fu of Beidi 北地傅氏 
 
1. Fu Xuan 傅玄 – initially Viscount of Chungu 鶉觚子, posthumously created Marquis of 
Qingquan and granted ritual name Gang 剛侯. 
 
2. Fu Xian 傅咸 – son and heir to Fu Xuan. 2nd Marquis of Qingquan. He died in 294 AD and 
was granted posthumous name Zhen 貞侯. 
  
3. Fu Fu 傅敷 – son and heir to Fu Xian, 3rd Marquis of Qingquan. 
  
Rongcheng 容城侯 – Lu of Fanyang 范陽盧氏  
 
1. Lu Yu 盧毓 – during the Wei initially enfeoffed as village marquis of Gaole 高樂亭侯. 
Later he was promoted to township marquis of Daliang 大梁鄉侯. He died in 257 AD. 
Shortly before his death he was created Marquis of Rongcheng 容城侯 with apanage of 2300 
households and was later granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯.  
 
2. Lu Fan 盧藩 – grandson and heir to Lu Yu. He might have been 2nd Marquis of Rongcheng 




Wanling 宛陵侯 – Tao of Danyang 丹陽陶氏 
 
1 Tao Huang 陶璜 – Wu Regional Inspector of Jiaozhou. After 280 AD he was confirmed in 
his office by Emperor Wudi and he was also created Marquis of Wanling 宛陵侯. Tao 
Huang‟s descendants remained prominent local power in the south till the end of the Eastern 
Jin but inheritance of the marquisate is not confirmed by the sources. 
 
Wuchang 武昌侯 – Pei of Hedong 河東裴氏 
 
1. Pei Gai 裴該- younger son of Pei Wei 2nd  Duke of Julu. For his father‟s merit in execution 
of Zang Jun he was created Marquis of Wuchang 武昌侯. He was married to an imperial 
princess. 
 
Wudang 武當侯 – Teng of Nanyang 南陽滕氏 
 
1. Teng Xiu/You 滕脩 – Wu general and Marquis of Xi‟e 西鄂侯, Regional Inspector in 
Guangzhou. He submitted to the authority of the Jin in 280 AD and was subsequently created 
Marquis of Wudang 武當侯. He died in Taikang 9 (288 AD) and was granted posthumous 
name Sheng 聲侯. His son and heir did not like it and in the end secured different ritual name, 
Zhong 忠侯. 
 
2 Teng Bing 滕並 – son and heir to Teng Xiu, 2nd Marquis of Wudang.  
 
Wuling 武陵侯 – Wang of Langye 琅邪王氏 
 
1. Wang Yan 王衍 – one of the leading ministers of Huaidi‟s court. He defended Luoyang 
against attacks of Shi Le and Wang Mi and was duly enfeoffed as Marquis of Wuling 武陵侯. 
But he refused to accept this honor. Later he was captured by Shi Le and executed. 
 
Wuqiang 武強侯 – Lu of Fanyang 范陽盧氏 
 
1. Lu Zhi 盧志 – supporter of Prince Ying of Chengdu. He was created Marquis of Wuqiang 
武強侯. He died during the upheavals in the Yongjia Era. His son Lu Chan later served Shi 
Le as an official of the Later Zhao.  
 
Xiayang 夏陽侯 (also Yangxia 陽夏侯) – Hu of Anding 安定胡氏 
 
1. Hu Fen 胡奮 – initially created Viscount of Xiayang (or Yangxia) in 264 AD. Later he was 
promoted to Marquis of Xiayang (or Yangxia). He died in 288 AD and did not leave any sons. 
His daughter was a concubine of Wudi.  
 
Xicheng 西城侯 – He of Shujun 蜀郡何氏 
 
1. He Pan 何攀 – military commander hailing from Shu. For his achievement in bringing 





2. He Zhang 何璋 – son and heir to He Pan, 2nd Marquis of Xicheng. 
 
Xi’e 西鄂侯 – Luo of Xiangyang 襄陽羅氏 
 
1. Luo Xian 羅憲 – hailed form a Shu official family and served Shu and later the Jin. He 
died in 270 AD and Wudi had him posthumously created Marquis of Xi‟e and granted him 
ritual name Lie 烈侯. 
  
2. Luo Xi 羅襲 – son and heir to Luo Xian. 2nd Marquis of Xi‟e. 
 
 Xingjin  興晉侯 – Yang of Taishan 太山羊氏 
 
1. Yang Xuanzhi 羊玄之 – father to Empress Hui 惠皇后, second consort of Emperor Huidi. 
As the father of the empress he was created Marquis of Xingjin 興晉侯. Later he was 
promoted to the rank of duke. He died in 303 AD. 
 
Xunyang 循陽侯 – Liu of Pingyuan 平原劉氏 
 
1. Liu Shi 劉寔 – descendant of the Eastern Han princely lineage of Jibei 濟北. In 264 AD 
created Viscount of Xunyang and following the founding of the dynasty he was promoted to 
Count of Xunyang. After Wudi‟s death he was promoted yet again, to Marquis of Xunyang 循
陽侯. He died soon after the accession of Emperor Huaidi in 307 AD and was granted 
posthumous name Yuan 元侯. 
  
Yangxia 陽夏侯 – see Xiayang 
 
Yinping 陰平侯 – Lu of Fufeng 扶風魯氏 
  
1. Lu Zhi 魯芝 – loyal follower of the Simas, initially lord of the royal domain with apanage 
of 200 households. He took part in quelling Zhuge Dan‟s rebellion and was subsequently 
enfeoffed as village Marquis of Wujin 無進亭侯. In 260 AD he was promoted to township 
Marquis of Li/Lai/Taicheng 斄城鄉侯. With the introduction of the peerages he was created 
Count of Yinping 陰平伯 and two years later, in 266 AD he was promoted to Marquis of 
Yinping 陰平侯. He died in 273 AD and was granted posthumous name Zhen 貞侯. 
 
Yiyang 弋陽侯 – Ji of Qiaoguo 譙國嵇氏 
 
1. Ji Shao 嵇紹 – son of Ji Kang 嵇康. After the execution of Jia Mi he was promoted for not 
currying his favor and created Viscount of Yiyang 弋陽子. He served prince Yi of Changsha 
and after his death he was demoted and his peerage forfeited. Later he was rehabilitated and 
took part in Huidi‟s northern campaign and died during the battle of Dangyin. Prince Yue of 
Donghai had him posthumously promoted to Marquis of Yiyang 弋陽侯. Yuandi later granted 




2. Ji Han 嵇翰  – grandson of Ji Shao‟s brother. Shao‟s own son Ji Zhen 嵇眕 died 
prematurely and the dignity was inherited by Ji Han who became 2
nd
 Marquis of Yiyang. But 
later he returned to the lineage of his own father and Ji Shao was again left without posterity.  
 
3. Ji Kuang 嵇曠 – grandson of Ji Han. Emperor Xiaowudi had him installed as Ji Shao‟s 
heir and newly created Marquis of Yiyang. 
 
Yongping 永平侯 – Jia of Pingyang 平陽賈氏 
 
1. Jia Hun 賈混 – younger brother of Jia Chong Duke of Lu. Initially he was created village 
lord of Yangli 陽里亭侯 for his brother‟s achievement during the conquest of Wu. Later he 
secured higher peerage and became Marquis of Yongping. 
  
Yongshi 永世侯 – Wang of Langye 琅邪王氏 
 
1. Wang Jun 王俊 – son of Wang Zhao of the Dukes of Suiling. Wang Jun was created 
Marquis of Yongshi 永世侯 in his own right. 
  






Guanyang 觀陽伯 – Hua of Pingyuan 平原華氏 
 
1. Hua Biao 華表 – after establishment of the peerages he was created Count of Guanyang. 
His dignity survived dynastic transition and Hua Biao died in 275 AD and was given 
posthumous name Kang 康伯. 
 
2. Hua Yi 華廙 – son and heir to Hua Biao, 2nd Count of Guanyang. After the accession of 
Huidi he was promoted to Duke of Guanyang. 
  
Jiaxing 嘉興伯 – Gu of Wuguo 吳國顧氏 
 
1. Gu Rong 顧榮 – After the fall of Jiong Prince of Qi he was created Count of Jiaxing 嘉興
伯 for his achievement in dealing with Jiong‟s henchman Ge Yu 葛旟. When Sima Rui 
assumed authority as King of Jin he had him posthumously promoted to Duke of Jiaxing.  
 
Shangcai 上蔡伯 – He of Xiping 西平和氏 
 
1. He You 和逌 – during the establishment of the peerages he was created Count of Shangcai.  
 
2. He Jiao 和嶠 – son and heir to He You, 2nd Count of Shangcai. He died in 292 AD and was 




3. He Ji 和濟 – nephew of He Jiao, 3rd Count of Shangcai. His father He Yu 和郁 was village 
lord of Runan 汝南亭侯 in his own right. 
 
Xinta 新沓伯 – Shan of Henei 河内山氏 
 
1. Shan Tao 山濤 – trusted supporter of the Simas, charged to look after all the Wei princes 
of the blood summoned to Ye while Sima Zhao was campaigning in Shu. In 264 AD created 
Viscount of Xinta 新沓子 and following the accession of Emperor Wudi he was promoted to 
Count of Xinta. He died in 283 AD and was given posthumous name Kang 康伯. 
 
2. Shan Gai 山該 – son and heir to Shan Tao, 2nd Count of Xinta.  
 
Xunyang 循陽伯 – Liu of Pingyuan 平原劉氏 
 
1. Liu Shi 劉寔 – descendant of the Eastern Han princely lineage of Jibei 濟北. In 264 AD 
created Viscount of Xunyang and following the founding of the dynasty he was promoted to 
Count of Xunyang. After Wudi‟s death he was promoted yet again, to Marquis of Xunyang 循
陽侯. He died soon after the accession of Emperor Huaidi in 307 AD and was granted 
posthumous name Yuan 元侯. 
 
Yiju 弋居伯 – Suo of Dunhuang 敦煌索氏 
 
1. Suo Chen 索綝 – originally enfeoffed as Count of Yiju 弋居伯 for his achievement of 
helping to install Emperor Mindi. For military achievement in fighting Zhao forces created 
commandery Duke of Shangluo 上洛郡公 with apanage of 10 000 households. He later 
defected to Zhao. 
 
Yongning 永寧伯 – Zhou of Runan 汝南周氏 
 
1. Zhou Fu 周馥 – together with Zhou Qi 周玘 he crushed insurgents in the South and was 
duly created Count of Yongning 永寧伯. Later he died a rebel fighting the forces of the 






Changlu 昌陸子 – Gao of Chenliu 陳留高氏 
 
1. Gao Hun 高渾 – grandson and heir to Gao Rou 高柔, Wei Marquis of Anguo 安國侯. In 
264 AD he was created Viscount of Changlu but it is not clear whether his dignity survived 
dynastic transition and became a Jin title.  
 




1. Bian Cui 卞粹 – son-in-law of Zhang Hua, he was created Viscount of Chengyang for his 
achievement in the execution of Yang Jun in 291 AD. After the victory of uprising led by 
Prince Jiong of Qi he was promoted to Duke of Chengyang.  
 
Chungu 鶉觚子 – Fu of Beidi 北地傅氏 
 
1. Fu Xuan 傅玄 – initially he got Wei baronial dignity of Chungu, after the establishment of 
the dynasty he was promoted to Viscount of Chungu 鶉觚子, posthumously created Marquis 
of Qingquan and granted ritual name Gang 剛侯. 
 
Jiqiu 即丘子 – Wang of Langye 琅邪王氏 
 
1. Wang Lan 王覽 – brother of Wang Xiang Duke of Suiling. In 264 AD he was created 
Viscount of Jiqiu and it seems that the title survived the dynastic change. He died in Xianning 
4 (278 AD) at the age of seventy-three years and was granted posthumous name Zhen 貞子. 
 
2. Wang Cai 王裁 –son and heir presumptive of Wang Lan, he died young before he could 
have succeeded to the viscountcy. 
 
 3. Wang Dao 王導 – son of Wang Cai and heir to Wang Lan, 2nd Viscount of Jiqiu. After he 
followed Sima Rui to the South he was created Marquis of Wugang 武岡侯 for his merit in 
quelling several uprisings. Later he was created Duke of Shixing 始興郡公 but the court 
allowed for the original family dignity to be inherited by a younger son of Wang Dao. 
 
4. Wang Tian 王恬 – younger son of Wang Dao, 3rd Viscount of Jiqiu. He was granted 
posthumous name Xian 憲子. His own son later succeeded to Wang Dao‟s ducal dignity and 
Viscountcy of Jiqiu might have fallen into abeyance.  
 
Juyang 劇陽子 – Wei of Rencheng 任城魏氏 
 
1. Wei Shu 魏舒 – loyal supporter of the Simas, created Viscount of Juyang 劇陽子. He died 
in 290 AD at the age of eighty-two and was granted posthumous name Kang 康子. 
 
2. Wei Hun 魏混- son and heir to Wei Shu, he died young before his father.  
 
3. Wei Rong 魏融 – grandson of Wei Shu born of concubine, 2nd Viscount of Juyang. He 
died young as well.  
 
4. Wei Huang 魏晃 – grandson of Wei Shu‟s brother. He succeeded as the 3rd Viscount of 
Juyang. 
 
Shen 慎縣子 – Chen of Ruyin 汝陰陳氏 
 
1. Chen Wen 陳溫 – younger son of Chen Tai 陳泰. Initially he held Han dignity of village 
Marquis of Changwu 昌武亭侯 and Wei titles of township Marquis of Yingxiang 潁鄉侯 
with apanage of 800 households and Marquis of Yingyin 潁陰侯 with apanage of 2600 
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households. In 264 AD he was created Viscount of Shen. However, it is not confirmed that 
the dignity survived the fall of Wei. 
 
Tangyang 堂陽子 – Shi of Leling 樂陵石氏 
 
1. Shi Jian 石鑒 – After Wudi‟s accession to the imperial throne he was created Viscount of 
Tangyang 堂陽子. Later he was promoted by Yang Jun to prefecture lord of Chang‟an 昌安
縣侯 for supervising the construction of the imperial mausoleum of Wudi. 
 
Xiayang 夏陽子 (also Yangxia) – Hu of Anding 安定胡氏 
 
1. Hu Fen 胡奮 – initially created Viscount of Xiayang (or Yangxia) in 264 AD. Later he was 
promoted to Marquis of Xiayang (or Yangxia). He died in 288 AD and did not leave any sons. 
His daughter was a concubine of Wudi.  
 
Yiyang 弋陽子 – Ji of Qiaoguo 譙國嵇氏 
 
1. Ji Shao 嵇紹 – son of Ji Kang 嵇康. After the execution of Jia Mi he was promoted for not 
currying his favor and created Viscount of Yiyang 弋陽子. He served prince Yi of Changsha 
and after his death he was demoted and his peerage forfeited. Later he was rehabilitated and 
took part in Huidi‟s northern campaign and died during the battle of Dangyin. Prince Yue of 
Donghai had him posthumously promoted to Marquis of Yiyang 弋陽侯. Yuandi later granted 
him posthumous name Zhongmu 忠穆侯. 
 
Zheng 氶子 – Wang of Donghai 東海王氏 
 
1. Wang Xun 王恂 – younger son of Wang Su 王肅, in 263 AD he was created Marquis of 
Lanling 蘭陵侯. In 264 AD he was created Viscount of Zheng 氶子. He died in 278 AD. He 
might have been given the original marquisate of Lanling after the establishment of the 
dynasty. 
 
Zhu’a 祝阿子 – family of unknown origin 
 
1. Shao Xu 邵續 – in a petition from 317 AD he is mentioned as Viscount of Zhu‟a. He died 






Anzhong 安眾男 – Liu of Nanyang 南陽劉氏 
 
1. Liu Qiao 劉喬 – for his achievement in execution of Yang Jun he was enfeoffed as lord 
within the passes. For his part in execution of Jia Mi he was created Baron of Anzhong 安眾
男.  
 




1. Yu Min 庾珉 – during the reign of the Western Jin he was created Baron of Changcen. He 
was captured with Emperor Huaidi and dragged to Pingyang where he was executed by 
Former Zhao ruler for conspiring against him. At the end of the Taiyuan Era (376-396 AD) he 
was given posthumous name Zhen 貞男.  
 
Chengyang 成陽縣男 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Zu 荀組 – During the Upheaval of the Eight Princes he was created Baron of 
Chengyang 成陽縣男. At the beginning of the Jianxing Era (313-316 AD) he was raised to 
the dignity of prefecture Duke of z Linying 臨潁縣公 as an uncle of Emperor Mindi. After 
the fall of Chang‟an he fled to the South where he died in Yongchang Era (322 AD) in the age 
of sixty-five and was granted posthumous name Yuan 元公.  
 
Kangfu 亢父男- Jiang of Chenliu 陳留江氏 
 
1. Jiang Rui 江蕤 – created Baron of Kangfu. 
 
2. Jiang Zuo 江祚 – son and heir to Jiang Rui, 2nd Baron of Kangfu. 
 
3. Jiang Tong 江統 – son and heir to Jiang Zuo, 3rd Baron of Kangfu. He died in 310 AD.  
 
Pingling 平陵男 – Guo of Taiyuan 太原郭氏 
 
1. Guo Yi 郭奕 – At the beginning of the Western Jin he was created Baron of Pingling. He 
was granted posthumous name Jian 簡男. 
 
Yinping 陰平男 – Huwu of Taishan 泰山胡毋 
 
1. Huwu Fuzhi 胡毋輔之 – for his achievement in chastising Prince Jiong of Qi he was 








Anfeng 安豐縣侯 – Wang of Langye 琅邪王氏 
 
1. Wang Hun 王渾 – son of Wang Xiong, Wei village Marquis of Zhenling 貞陵亭侯. 
  
2. Wang Rong 王戎 – son of Wang Hun whom he succeeded as the 2nd Marquis of Zhenling. 
After the conquest of Wu he was created prefecture lord of Anfeng 安豐縣侯 and his fief was 
increased by 6000 households. He died in Yongxing 2 (305 AD) in the age of seventy-two 
years and was granted posthumous name Yuan 元侯. 
 




1. Shi Chong 石崇 – younger son of Shi Bao Duke of Leling. For his achievement in 
conquering Wu he was created prefecture lord of Anyang. He was executed by Sima Lun 
Prince of Zhao. 
 
Changguo 昌國縣侯 – Ren of Le‟an 樂安任氏 
 
1. Ren Kai 任愷- After the establishment of the Jin domain he was enfeoffed as prefecture 
lord of Changguo 昌國縣侯. He was granted posthumous name Yuan 元侯. 
 
2. Ren Han 任罕 – son and heir to Ren Kai, 2nd lord of Changguo. 
 
Chengwu 成武侯 (sometimes also Wucheng 武城侯) – Zhou of Runan 汝南周氏 
 
1. Zhou Jun 周浚 – initially enfeoffed as Marquis of Sheyang 射陽侯 (probably just Wei 
title). For his achievement in conquering Wu he was created prefecture lord of Chengwu 成武
侯 with apanage of 6000 households. When he supervised reconstruction of the temple of 
imperial ancestors his apanage was increased by 500 households.  
 
2. Zhou Yi 周顗 – son and heir to Zhou Jun, 2nd lord of Chengwu/Wucheng. He was killed in 
the South during Wang Dun‟s rebellion (322 AD). After Wang Dun‟s death he was 
rehabilitated and granted posthumous name Kang 康侯.  
 
3. Zhou Min 周 閔  – eldest son of Zhou Yi. He succeeded as the 3rd lord of 
Chengwu/Wucheng. He was granted posthumous name Lie 烈侯. He died without a son.  
 
4. Zhou Lin  周琳 – nephew and heir to Zhou Min, son of his brother Zhou Yi, 4th lord of 
Chengwu/Wucheng.  
 
Dangyang 當陽縣侯 – Du of Jingzhao 京兆杜氏 
 
1. Du Yu 杜預 – initially Du Yu became 3rd Village Marquis of Fengle 豐樂亭侯 (Wei 
dignity). Following the fall of Wu he was created prefecture lord of Dangyang with apanage 
of 9600 (Jinshu) or 8000 (Sanguozhi) households. His younger son Du Dan was in addition 
enfeoffed as village lord with apanage of 1000 households. He died in 284 AD and was 
granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯. 
 
2. Du Xi 杜錫 – son and heir to Du Yu, 2nd lord of Dangyang. 
 
3. Du Yi 杜乂 – son and heir to Du Xi, 3rd lord of Dangyang. He was father of Empress 
Cheng Gong, but died while she was still a child.  
 
Dongqian 東遷縣侯 – Zhou of Yixing 義興周氏 
  
1. Zhou Zha 周札 – younger brother of Zhou Qi Duke of Wucheng. For his achievement in 
chastising Qian Hui he was enfeoffed as village lord of Zhangpu 漳浦亭侯. Later he was 
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promoted to prefecture lord of Dongqian 東遷縣侯. The whole clan was exterminated by 
Wang Dun during his rebellion.  
 
Fenggao 奉高縣侯 – Ma of Dongping 東平馬氏 
 
1. Ma Long 馬隆 – one of leading military offices in Longyou. At the beginning of the Taixi 
Era (probably in 290 AD) he was created prefecture lord of Fenggao 奉高縣侯. 
 
2. Ma Xian 馬咸 – son and heir to Ma Long, 2nd lord of Fenggao. 
  
Fulu 福祿縣侯 – Zhang of Anding 安定張氏 
 
1. Zhang Shi 張寔- son and heir to Zhang Gui. Initially he was enfeoffed as village lord of 
Jianwu 建武亭侯 for quelling local uprising of Cao Qu in Liangzhou. Later he was promoted 
to prefecture lord of Fulu 福祿縣侯. After the death of his father he was raised to the position 
of lord of Liangzhou. Emperor Mindi confirmed him in this position and conferred upon him 
title of 2
nd
 Duke of Xiping. He was murdered in 320 AD. His family conferred upon him 
ritual name Zhao 昭公, but Emperor Yuandi granted him instead the name Yuan 元. As his 
son Zhang Jun 張駿 was still a minor, Shi‟s younger brother Zhang Mao became semi-
independent ruler of Liangzhou. 
 
Guangwu 廣武縣侯 – Zhang of Fanyang 范陽張氏 
 
1. Zhang Hua 張華 – after the establishment of the dynasty he became lord of the royal 
domain. He was one of the advocates of the Wu campaign in 280 AD and after the conquest 
was rewarded by being created prefecture lord of Guangwu. His fief was increased by 10 000 
households. He became leading minister of the government of the Jia faction, was enfeoffed 
as commandery Duke of Zhuangwu 壯武郡公 and subsequently murdered by Sima Lun of 
Zhao in 300 AD in the age of sixty-one. Both his sons were executed alongside their father. In 
303 AD Zhang Hua was posthumously rehabilitated and his ducal dignity was restored. It 
seems that even this prefecture lordship was revived but it is not clear if anybody succeeded 
to it.  
 
Guanjun 冠軍縣侯 – Guo of Taiyuan 太原郭氏 
 
1. Guo Zhang 郭彰 – cousin of Lady Guo Huai, mother of Empress Jia. As close relative of 
the Jia family he was created prefecture lord of Guanjun. He died before the fall of the Jia 
faction and was granted posthumous name Lie 烈侯. 
 
Jiangling 江陵侯 – Wang of Taiyuan 太原王氏 
 
1. XY – a younger son of Wang Hun 王渾 Duke of Jingling. According to Pei Songzhi‟s 
commentary to Sanguozhi one of Wang Hun‟s sons was enfeoffed for Wang Hun‟s merit as 
lord of Jiangling 江陵侯 following the conquest of Wu in 280 AD. 
 




1. Sun Hui 孫惠 – scion of the ruling house of Wu. He followed Sima Jiong Prince of Qi in 
chastising Sima Lun of Zhao and was enfeoffed as prefecture lord of Jinxing 晉興侯. Later he 
entered service of Sima Yue of Donghai and for his achievement in welcoming Huidi back 
into his capital was created prefecture duke of Linxiang 臨湘縣公. 
 
Lantian 藍田縣侯 – Wang of Taiyuan 太原王氏 
 
1. Wang Cheng 王承 – for his part in assisting Huidi in his return to Luoyang he was created 
prefecture lord of Lantian 藍田縣侯.  
 
2. Wang Shu 王述 – son and heir to Wang Cheng, 2nd lord of Lantian. He died in 368 AD 
and was granted posthumous name Mu 穆侯. Later his name was changed to Jian 簡侯.  
 
3. Wang Tanzhi 王坦之 – son and heir to Wang Shu, 3rd lord of Lantian. He died in 375 AD 
and was granted posthumous name Xian 獻侯. 
 
4. Wang Kai 王愷 – son and heir to Wang Tanzhi, 4th lord of Lantian. 
 
Liangzou 梁鄒縣侯 – Liu of Guangling 廣陵劉氏 
 
1. Liu Song 劉頌 – In 300 AD he was posthumously created prefecture lord of Liangzou 梁
鄒縣侯 for his achievement in execution of Jia Mi and he was given apanage of 1500 
households and posthumous name Zhen 貞侯. 
 
2. Liu Yong 劉雍 -  son of Liu He 劉和, elder brother of Liu Song. He was adopted as his 
uncle‟s heir but died prematurely.  
 
2. Liu Yan 劉鄢 – son of Liu Xun 劉詡, younger brother of Liu Yong. He was adopted as 
Liu Song‟s heir and became 2
nd
 lord of Liangzou.  
 
Pingyang 平陽縣侯 – Li of Pingyang 平陽李氏 
 
1. Li Ju 李矩 – originally village lord of Dongming 東明亭侯. After the fall of Luoyang he 
entered service of future Yuandi and was promoted to prefecture lord of Yangwu 陽武縣侯. 
The dignity was later changed to prefecture lord of Xiuwu/Youwu 脩武縣侯 and after the 
restoration he was created prefecture lord of Pingyang 平陽縣侯. 
 
Shangyong 上庸縣侯 – Tang of Luguo 魯國唐氏 
 
1. Tang Bin 唐彬 – one of the commanders during the campaign against Wu in 280 AD. 
Initially he was lord of the royal domain. For his achievement during the conquest he was 
created prefecture lord of Shangyong 上庸縣侯 with apanage of 6000 households. He died in 
294 AD and was granted posthumous name Xiang 襄侯. 
 
2. XY – son and heir to Tang Bin, 2
nd
 lord of Shangyong. 
 




Wucheng 烏程縣侯 – Zhou of Yixing 義興周氏 
 
1. Zhou Qi 周玘 – member of ancient Wu family of local influence in Wujun. At the 
beginning of the 4
th
 century he had repeatedly quelled rebellions in the south maintaining 
authority of the Jin ruling house. For his achievements he was enfeoffed as prefecture lord of 
Wucheng 烏程縣侯. During the Jianxing Era (313-316 AD) Sima Rui created him Duke of 
Wucheng 烏程公. He was granted posthumous name Zhonglie 忠烈公.  
 
Wuling 武陵縣侯 – Wang of Langye 琅邪王氏 
 
1. Wang Yi 王廙– son of Wang Zheng and a sister of Emperor Yuandi. For his achievement 
in welcoming Huidi back in Luoyang he was created prefecture lord of Wuling 武陵縣侯. He 
died in 322 AD and was granted posthumous name Kang 康侯.  
 
2. Wang Yizhi 王頤之 – son and heir to Wang Yi, 2nd lord of Wuling. 
 
Xiangyang 襄陽縣侯 – Wang of Hongnong 弘農王氏 
 
1. Wang Jun 王濬 – victorious military commander who had brought to submission the last 
ruler of Wu, Sun Hao in 280 AD. For this achievement he was created prefecture lord of 
Xiangyang 襄陽縣侯 with apanage of 10 000 households.  His younger son Wang Yi 王彜 
was appointed village lord of Yangxiang 楊鄉亭侯 with apanage of 1500 households. He 
died in 285 AD at the age of eighty years and was granted posthumous name Wu 武侯.  
 
2. Wang Ju 王矩 – son and heir to Wang Jun. 2nd lord of Xiangyang. The fief did not survive 
the fall of the Western Jin even though direct descendants of Wang Jun lived at the southern 
court.  
 
Xiu/Youwu 脩武縣侯 – Li of Pingyang 平陽李氏 
 
1. Li Ju 李矩 – originally village lord of Dongming 東明亭侯. After the fall of Luoyang he 
entered service of future Yuandi and was promoted to prefecture lord of Yangwu 陽武縣侯. 
The dignity was later changed to prefecture lord of Xiuwu/Youwu 脩武縣侯  and after the 
restoration he was created prefecture lord of Pingyang 平陽縣侯. 
 
Xue 薛縣侯 – Wu of Peiguo 沛國武氏 
 
1. Wu Gai 武陔 – initially he had Wei title of a village marquis. In 264 AD he was created 
prefecture lord of Xue 薛縣侯. He was granted posthumous name Ding 定侯.  
 
2. Wu Fu 武輔 – son and heir to Wu Gai, 2nd lord of Xue.  
 
Xunyang 尋陽縣侯 – Zhou of Runan 汝南周氏 
 
1. Zhou Fang 周訪  – he served Sima Rui and helped him to establish his position in 
Jiankang. For his military achievements in quelling several insurrections he was created 
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prefecture lord of Xunyang 尋陽縣侯. He died in Taixing 3 (320 AD) at the age of sixty-one 
years. He was granted posthumous name Zhuang 壯侯. 
 
2. Zhou Fu 周撫 – son and heir to Zhou Fang, 2nd lord of Xunyang. He took part in Huan 
Wen‟s conquest of Sichuan and for this achievement was created prefecture Duke of 
Jiancheng 建城縣公. He died in 365 AD and was granted posthumous name Xiang 襄公.  
 
Yangwu 陽武縣侯 – Li of Pingyang 平陽李氏 
 
1. Li Ju 李矩 – originally village lord of Dongming 東明亭侯. After the fall of Luoyang he 
entered service of future Yuandi and was promoted to prefecture lord of Yangwu 陽武縣侯. 
The dignity was later changed to prefecture lord of Xiuwu/Youwu 脩武縣侯  and after the 






Anchang 安昌鄉侯 – Suo of Dunhuang 敦煌索氏 
 
1. Suo Yu 索聿 – younger son of Suo Jiang, village lord of Anle. Later he was created 
township lord of Anchang in his own right. 
 
Anle 安樂鄉侯 – Zhang of Anding 安定張氏 
 
1. Zhang Gui 張軌 – Regional Inspector of Liangzhou in Gansu. For successful defense of 
his regional command against incursions of the warlike Xianbei he was initially enfeoffed as 
township lord of Anle 安樂鄉侯 with apanage of 1000 households. At the beginning of the 
Yongjia Era (307-312 AD) Zhang Gui defeated Liu Cong of Zhao in Hedong and relieved 
besieged Luoyang. Emperor Huaidi promoted him to commandery Duke of Xiping 西平郡公. 
Zhang Gui refused to accept. Later he sent supplies to the capital suffering from famine and 
for this merit was created Marquis of Bacheng 霸城侯. He continued to send reinforcements 
to Chang‟an and was to be enfeoffed as Duke of Xiping again, but he refused to accept the 
honor. The court promoted him only posthumously in 314 AD when he was also granted 
ritual name Wu 武公.  
 
Anling 安陵鄉侯 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Yun 荀頵 – initially he held Wei dignity of township marquis of Anling.  
 
2. Xun Song 荀崧 – son and heir to Xun Yun, 2nd Marquis of Anling 安陵侯 and eldest 
daughter of Cao Cao. At the beginning of the Taishi Era (266-274 AD) he was made to 
succeed to his father„s title. After the fall of Luoyang he had the imperial mounds repaired 
and for this achievement was created prefecture Duke of Wuyang 舞陽縣公. Later his fief 
was changed to that of Quling 曲陵公. He served at the court of Emperor Yuandi in Jiankang 
and after quelling of Wang Dun‟s rebellion he was rewarded by an additional title of Count of 
347 
 
Pingle. He died in Xianhe 3 (328 AD) in the age of sixty-seven. He was granted posthumous 
name Jing 敬公. 
 
Anyang 安陽鄉侯 – Xue of Danyang 丹陽薛氏 
 
1. Xue Jian 薛兼 – follower of Prince Yue of Donghai who had him enfeoffed as village lord 
of Anyang 安陽亭侯. For his further merit he was promoted to township lord of Anyang 安陽
鄉侯. It appears that his son Xue Yong 薛顒 predeceased his father and the dignity became 
extinct. 
  
Dongxiang 東鄉侯 – Tao of Lujiang 盧江陶氏 
 
1. Tao Kan 陶侃 – military commander of the Eastern Jin. During the transition period 
before restoration of the dynasty he gained merit in quelling a local rebellion and was created 
township lord of Dongxiang 東鄉侯 with apanage of 1000 households. Later he was Regional 
Inspector of Guangzhou and for his achievements there was created Marquis of Chaisang 柴
桑侯 with apanage of 4000 households (Eastern Jin title). 
 
Gao’an 高安鄉侯 – Xiahou of Peiguo 沛國夏侯氏 
 
1. Xiahou Dun 夏侯惇 – at the end of the Han he was enfeoffed as township marquis of 
Gao‟an 高安鄉侯. In Jian‟an 12 (207 AD) his apanage was increased to 2500 households. He 
died shortly after the establishment of the Wei Dynasty and was granted posthumous name 
Zhong 忠侯. 
 
2. Xiahou Chong 夏侯充 – son and heir to Xiahou Dun, 2nd Marquis of Gao„an. Wei Wendi 
wanted to give ennoblement to other sons of Xiahou Dun. Therefore he took 1000 households 
of the original apanage and divided it among seven sons and two grandsons of Dun who all 
became lords of the royal domain.  
 
3. Xiahou Yi 夏侯廙 – son and heir to Xiahou Chong, 3rd Marquis of Gao‟an. 
  
4. Xiahou Zuo 夏侯佐 – grandson of Xiahou Dun, Marquis of Gao‟an. He died in 266 AD 
and the lineage was interrupted.  
 
5. Xiahou Shao 夏侯劭 – relative Xiahou Zuo (according to Sanguozhi he was son of Xiahou 
Yi). Jin Wudi wanted to revive hereditary lineage of Xiahou Dun as one of the founding 
ministers of the Wei and had Xiahou Shao created township lord of Gao‟an. 
  
Lexiang 樂鄉侯 – Hua of Pingyuan 平原華氏  
 
1. Hua Jiao 華嶠 – initially lord of the royal domain. At the beginning of the Yuankang Era 
(291 AD) he was enfeoffed as village lord of Xuanchang 宣昌亭侯. For achievement in 
executing Yang Jun he was promoted to township lord of Lexiang. 
 




Pingle 平樂鄉侯 – Yan of Baxi 巴西閻氏 
 
1. Yan Pu 閻圃 – originally served Zhang Lu 張魯, master of Hanzhong and made him 
submit to the Wei. As a reward he was enfeoffed as township marquis of Pingle 平樂鄉侯. 
 
2. Yan Pu 閻璞 – son and heir to Yan Pu, 2nd marquis of Pingle. The title was abolished after 
the establishment of the Jin Dynasty. 
 
3. Yan Zuan 閻纘 (also written as 纂) – son of Yan Pu. For his merit he was enfeoffed as 
township lord of Pingle 平樂鄉侯 (before 300 AD). 
  
4. Yan Heng 閻亨 – son and heir to Yan Zuan, probably 2nd lord of Pingle. 
 
Pingxiang 平鄉侯 –  He of Shujun 蜀郡何氏 
 
1. He Feng 何逢 – younger brother of He Pan Marquis of Xicheng. For his brother‟s merit in 
execution of Yang Jun he was enfeoffed as township lord of Pingxiang. 
 
Pingyang 平陽鄉侯 – Jia of Pingyang 平陽賈氏 
 
1. Jia Mo 賈模– nephew of Jia Chong. For his achievement in executing Yang Jun he was 
created township lord of Pingyang with apanage of 1000 households. 
 
2. Jia You 賈遊 – son and heir to Jia Mo, 2nd lord of Pingyang. 
 
Wansui 萬歲鄉侯 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Yi 荀顗 – During the reign of Wei Shaodi he acquired dignity of lord of the royal 
domain. For his achievement in quelling Guanqiu Jian‟s rebellion he was created village 
marquis of Wansui 萬歲亭侯 with apanage of 400 households. During the Xianxi Era (264-
265 AD) was promoted to township marquis of Wansui. After the establishment of the 
peerages he was created Marquis of Linhuai 臨淮侯. Following the founding of the Jin he 
was promoted to Duke of Linhuai 臨淮公 with apanage of 1800 households. He died in 
Taishi 10 (274 AD) and he was granted posthumous name Kang 康公. He died sonless. 
 
Wuchang 武昌鄉侯 – Ji of Qiaoguo 譙國嵇氏 
   
1. Ji Han 嵇含 – he served Prince Jiong of Qi and inherited noble dignity of township lord of 










1. Suo Jing 索靖 – commander the royal forces, died in action. Posthumously created village 
lord of Anle 安樂亭侯 and granted posthumous name Zhuang 莊. 
 
Anling 安陵亭侯 – Bian of Jiyin 濟陰卞氏 
 
1. Bian Dun 卞敦 – for his part in quelling a local rebellion in the South he was created by 
future Yuandi village lord of Anling. Later for achievement in destroying Wang Dun he was 
created Marquis of Yiyang 益陽侯 (323 AD) with apanage of 1600 households. He was 
granted posthumous name Jing 敬侯. 
 
Anshou 安壽亭侯 – Wang of Donghai 東海王氏 
 
1. Wang Qian 王虔 – created village lord of Anshou 安壽亭侯. 
 
2. Wang Shiwen 王士文 – son and heir to Wang Qian, 2nd lord of Anshou. 
 
Anyang 安陽亭侯 – Han of Gaoyang 高陽韓氏 
 
1. Han Gai 韓蓋 - grandson of Jia Chong Duke of Lu. For Jia Chong‟s achievement in 
conquest of Wu he was created village lord of Anyang. 
 
Anyang 安陽亭侯 – Xue of Danyang 丹陽薛氏 
 
1. Xue Jian 薛兼 – follower of Prince Yue of Donghai who had him enfeoffed as village lord 
of Anyang 安陽亭侯. For his further merit he was promoted to township lord of Anyang 安陽
鄉侯. 
 
Dongming 東明亭侯 – Fu of Beidi 北地傅氏 
 
1. Fu Jun 傅雋 – son of an elder brother of Fu Zhi. After the fall of Yang Jun Fu Zhi was 
created a duke and his original dignity was given to Fu Jun with apanage of 300 households. 
 
 Dongming 東明亭侯 – Li of Pingyang 平陽李氏 
 
1. Li Ju 李矩 – for his achievement in fighting Di insurgent leader Qi Wannian he was 
created village lord of Dongming 東明亭侯.  
 
Fengle 豐樂亭侯 – Du of Jingzhao 京兆杜氏 
 
1. Du Ji 杜畿 – Wei minister and lord of the royal domain. After the establishment of the Wei 
Dynasty he was enfeoffed as village marquis of Fengle with apanage of 100 households. He 
was granted posthumous name Dai 戴侯. 
 
2. Du Shu 杜恕 – son and heir to Du Ji, 2nd Marquis of Fengle. He got into the conflict with 
the Simas and in 249 AD was demoted and his noble dignity was forfeited. He died in 253 




3. Du Yu 杜預 – initially the forfeited dignity was restored and Du Yu became 3rd Village 
Marquis of Fengle 豐樂亭侯  (Wei dignity). Following the fall of Wu he was created 
prefecture lord of Dangyang with apanage of 9600 (Jinshu) or 8000 (Sanguozhi) households. 
His younger son Du Dan was in addition enfeoffed as village lord with apanage of 1000 
households. He died in 284 AD and was granted posthumous name Cheng 成侯. 
 
Fengsheng 奉聖亭侯 – descendants of Confucius 
 
1. Kong Zhen 孔震 – descendant of Confucius, Wei Marquis of Zongsheng 宗聖侯. At the 
beginning of the Jin he was transferred to dignity of village lord of Fengsheng. 
 
2. Kong Jingzhi 孔靖之 – relative of Kong Zhen. Emperor Xiaowudi had him created village 
lord of Fengsheng in Taiyuan 11 (386 AD). 
 
Ganlu 甘露亭侯 – Yang of Taishan 太山羊氏 
 
1. Yang Xiu 羊琇 – cousin of Sima Shi‟s wife. He contributed to the conquest of Shu and 
was enfeoffed as lord of the royal domain. When Wudi became King of Jin he had him 
created village lord of Ganlu 甘露亭侯. He was granted posthumous name Wei 威侯. 
 
Gaoyang 高陽亭侯 – Pei of Hedong 河東裴氏 
 
1. Pei Jing 裴憬 – son of Pei Jun and grandson of Pei Xiu Duke of Julu. He should have 
succeeded to the ducal dignity but because he was mentally impaired he was given an 
alternative enfeoffment as village lord of Gaoyang 高陽亭侯 . 
 
Jianwu 建武亭侯 – Zhang of Anding 安定張氏 
 
1. Zhang Shi 張寔- son and heir to Zhang Gui. Initially he was enfeoffed as village lord of 
Jianwu 建武亭侯 for quelling local uprising of Cao Qu in Liangzhou. Later he was promoted 
to prefecture lord of Fulu 福祿縣侯. After the death of his father he was raised to the position 
o lord of Liangzhou. Emperor Mindi confirmed him in this position and conferred upon him 
title of 2
nd
 Duke of Xiping. He was murdered in 320 AD. His family conferred upon him 
ritual name Zhao 昭公, but Emperor Yuandi granted him instead the name Yuan 元. As his 
son Zhang Jun 張駿 was still a minor, Shi‟s younger brother Zhang Mao became semi-
independent ruler of Liangzhou. 
 
Qingming 清明亭侯 – Xiahou of Peiguo 沛國夏侯氏 
 
1. Xiahou Zhuang 夏侯莊 – father of the Princess Dowager of Langye, mother to Yuandi. 
He is mentioned as village lord of Qingming. 
 
Runan 汝南亭侯 – He of Runan 汝南和氏 
 
1. He Yu 和郁 – younger brother of He Jiao Count of Shangcai. For his brother‟s merit in 
conquest of Wu he was enfeoffed as village lord of Runan in 280 AD. His son He Ji later 




Wansui 萬歲亭侯 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏  
 
1. Xun Yi 荀顗 – During the reign of Wei Shaodi he acquired dignity of lord of the royal 
domain. For his achievement in quelling Guanqiu Jian‟s rebellion he was created village 
marquis of Wansui 萬歲亭侯 with apanage of 400 households. During the Xianxi Era (264-
265 AD) was promoted to township marquis of Wansui. After the establishment of the 
peerages he was created Marquis of Linhuai 臨淮侯. Following the founding of the Jin he 
was promoted to Duke of Linhuai 臨淮公 with apanage of 1800 households. He died in 
Taishi 10 (274 AD) and he was granted posthumous name Kang 康公. He died sonless. 
 
Wu 蓩亭侯 (somewhere also Fengwu 封蓩亭侯) – Yang of Hongnong 弘農楊氏 
  
1. Yang Wenzong 楊文宗 – he inherited a Wei title of village Marquis of Wu 蓩亭侯. His 
daughter became first consort of Emperor Wudi. But he died before the marriage and it is not 
clear whether this dignity actually survived the dynastic change. He was granted posthumous 
name Mu 穆侯. 
 
2. Yang Chao 楊超- distant relative of Yang Jun Marquis of Linjin. During the Yongning Era 
(301 AD) he was officially appointed Yang Jun‟s successor as village lord of Wu (also 
pronounced as Mao or Mu) 蓩亭侯.  
 
Wuxiang 武鄉亭侯 – Fu of Beidi 北地傅氏 
 
1. Fu Chang 傅暢 – younger son of Fu Zhi Duke of Lingchuan/Lingzhou. For achievement 
of his father in execution of Yang Jun he was created village lord of Wuxiang. 
  
2. Fu Yong 傅詠 – son of Fu Chang and probably his heir. He fled South but it is not sure if 
he had ever succeeded to the title.  
 
Xian 咸亭侯 – Xie of Chenjun 陳郡謝氏 
 
1. Xie Kun 謝鯤 – during the transitional period before the restoration of the Jin he helped to 
put down a local rebellion and for this achievement was created village lord of Xian. He was 
granted posthumous name Kang 康侯.  
 
2. Xie Shang 謝尚 – son and heir to Xie Kun, 2nd lord of Xian. He was granted posthumous 
name Jian 簡侯. He did not sire a son of his own. Son of his cousin Xie Yi succeeded to the 
title.  
 
3. Xie Kang 謝康 – adoptive heir to Xie Shang, 3rd lord of Xian. He died prematurely as well. 
 
 4. Xie Su 謝肅 – son of Kang‟s younger brother Xie Jing 謝靜, 4th lord of Xian. He died 
childless.  
 





Xincheng 新城亭侯 – Han of Gaoyang 羔羊韓氏 
 
1. Han Chang 韓暢 - grandson of Jia Chong Duke of Lu. For his grandfather‟s merit in 
conquest of Wu he was created in 280 AD village lord of Xincheng. 
  
Xuanchang 宣昌亭侯 – Hua of Pingyuan 平原華氏 
 
1. Hua Jiao 華嶠 – initially lord of the royal domain. At the beginning of the Yuankang Era 
(291 AD) he was enfeoffed as village lord of Xuanchang 宣昌亭侯. For achievement in 
executing Yang Jun he was promoted to township lord of Lexiang. 
 
Yangli 陽里亭侯 – Jia of Pingyang 平陽賈氏 
 
1. Jia Hun 賈混 – younger brother of Jia Chong Duke of Lu. Initially he was created village 
lord of Yangli 陽里亭侯 for his brother‟s achievement during the conquest of Wu. Later he 
secured higher peerage and became Marquis of Yongping. 
 
Yangxiang 楊鄉亭侯 – Wang of Hongnong 弘農王氏 
 
1. Wang Yi 王彜 – for achievement of his father Wang Jun in conquest of Wu he was created 
village lord of Yangxiang 楊鄉亭侯 with apanage of 1500 households. 
  
Yichang 宜昌亭侯 – Zhang of Nanyang 南陽張氏 
 
1. Zhang Fu 張輔 – during the Western Jin he was created village lord of Yichang 宜昌亭侯. 
  
Yingyang 潁陽亭侯 – Xun of Yingchuan 潁川荀氏 
 
1. Xun Xian 荀顯 – grandson of Xun Xu Marquis of Jibei. For his grandfather‟s achievement 
in conquest of Wu he was created village lord of Yingyang. 
 
Yuanxiang 原鄉亭侯 – Liu of Langye 琅邪劉氏 
 
1. Liu Chao 劉超 – scion of the Han royal family. His ancestors lived in Langye and were 
close to princely lineage of Langye and future Emperor Yuandi. Shortly before the restoration 
he was created village lord of Yuanxiang with apanage of 700 households. During Mingdi‟s 
reign he quelled a rebellion and was created Count of Lingling 零陵伯 (Eastern Jin dignity). 
 
Zhangpu 漳浦亭侯 – Zhou of Yixing 義興周氏 
  
1. Zhou Zha 周札 – younger brother of Zhou Qi Duke of Wucheng. For his achievement in 
chastising Qian Hui he was enfeoffed as village lord of Zhangpu 漳浦亭侯. Later he was 
promoted to prefecture lord of Dongqian 東遷縣侯. The whole clan was exterminated by 
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The practice of ennoblement became an important institution of the imperial 
government quite early, yet it were only the Western Jin who managed to combine various 
traditions of the previous regimes and transform them into a full-fledged system of titled 
nobility which was to be used by all subsequent dynasties of Mediaeval China. The 
development process did not end with the foundation of the dynasty and underwent many 
changes even during the reign of the Jin having been constantly improved or modified 
according to current political needs. The present study, based on close reading of the Jinshu 
standard history and selected chapters of Sanguozhi, focuses on the nature of the Jin 
ennoblement system and its changing use in the politics of the dynasty. The ennoblement 
system of the Western Jin was quite flexible being used in order to achieve highly diverse 
aims from rewarding loyal service to asserting legitimacy as the sole inheritor of the imperial 
tradition or strengthening diplomatic alliance with semi-independent tribal rulers. Thus, the 
Western Jin titled nobility was a group of families of fairly varied origins. The pride of place 
belonged to meritorious ministers, but there were also imperial in-laws, former Wei courtiers 
as well as descendents of illustrious Han families, scions of deposed royal houses and royal 
pretenders of rival regime who had defected to the Jin. With loosening of the original 
restrictions on further ennoblement during the second half of the dynasty the titled nobility 
expanded considerably comprising also military commanders and men of local influence who 
had risen in service of various princes of the blood together with rulers of nomadic tribes 
inhabiting the border regions of the empire. As the authority of the nobles over the territory 
granted as their “fief” and its inhabitants was only nominal, the introduction of the 
ennoblement system did not create a semi-independent landed aristocracy, but mere titled 
nobility fully subordinated to the central government and entitled to annual stipend drawn 
from precisely defined number of state tax-paying households. All noble title holders shared 
considerable social and economic privileges, yet the Jin state managed to retain full control 
over its titled nobility with bestowals and inheritance of noble dignities always remaining 
exclusive prerogatives of the sovereign authority. The preeminent social standing of the 
members of titled nobility derived from their loyal service and allegiance to the dynasty and 
was always dependent on the will of the emperor. Never did the titled nobility of the Western 
Jin become an independent power group which would have challenged the authority of the 





Udělování šlechtických titulů se již velmi záhy stalo důležitou institucí císařské vlády, 
ale byla to až dynastie Západní Jin (266-316), komu se podařilo skloubit různé tradice 
předcházejících dynastií a vytvořit plně hierarchizovaný systém titulární šlechty, který byl 
později převzat i všemi následujícími režimy čínského středověku. Vývoj však neskončil 
založením dynastie a titulární šlechta procházela proměnami i v průběhu vlády Západních Jin 
tak, jak to vyžadovala aktuální politická situace a zájmy trůnu. Tato studie vychází z pečlivé 
analýzy biografií, análů a pojednání obsažených ve standardní dynastické kronice Dějiny Jinů 
(Jinshu) a vybraných kapitol Záznamů Tří království (Sanguozhi) a soustřeďuje se na povahu 
systému udílení šlechtických hodností a jeho proměny v průběhu vlády dynastie. Jednalo se o 
velmi pružný systém, který jinská vláda využívala k dosažení velmi různorodých cílů, od 
odměňování věrných služeb přes ostentativní vyhlášení nároků na legitimitu z pozice 
nesporného dědice císařské tradice předcházejících vládců po upevnění diplomatických 
vztahů s polonezávislými kmenovými vládci. Titulární šlechta Západních Jin byla různorodou 
skupinou rodin často velmi odlišného původu. Přední místo mezi jinskou šlechtou zaujímali 
zasloužilí ministři (gongchen), ale také císařští příbuzní z rodin císařoven, bývalí hodnostáři 
weiského dvora či dokonce potomci význačných a starobylých rodů dynastie Han včetně 
příslušníků sesazených vládnoucích domů či pretendentů trůnu sousedních nepřátelských 
států, kteří přeběhli na stranu Jinů. S uvolněním omezení dalšího udělování titulů v druhé 
polovině vlády Západních Jin se řady titulární šlechty nebývale rozrostly a nově zahrnuly i 
vojenské velitele a členy lokálních prominentních rodin, kteří vystoupali vzhůru ve službách 
císařských knížat, i vládce nomádských kmenů usídlených v pohraničních oblastech říše. 
Jelikož autorita titulární šlechty nad jejich „lény“ a poddanými byla pouze nominální, 
zavedení udělování šlechtických hodností nestálo u zrodu polonezávislé dědičné pozemkové 
aristokracie, ale pouze titulární šlechty plně podřízené centrální vládě a oprávněné pobírat 
pravidelnou apanáž z přesně stanoveného počtu rodin státních daňových poplatníků. Všichni 
držitelé šlechtických titulů požívali významných společenských a ekonomických výhod, 
avšak stát si uchoval naprostou kontrolu nad titulární šlechtou a udílení titulů a jejich dědičné 
předávání navždy zůstalo nezadatelným a nezcizitelným právem panovníka. Přednostní 
společenské postavení členů titulární šlechty pramenilo z jejich loajální služby dynastii a vždy 
záviselo na vůli císaře. Titulární šlechta dynastie Jin se tak nikdy nestala nezávislou mocí, 
která by ohrožovala autoritu trůnu a centrální vlády.  
